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This thesis discusses the sources of royal power in the kingdoms of Argead Makedonia 
and early Ptolemaic Egypt. The overarching aim is to assess the degree of change and 
continuity between the structures and networks that framed Argead and Ptolemaic 
royal power.  
  
Viewing power not as an abstraction but as the outcome of the real and observable 
interrelations between individuals and groups, this thesis builds upon the historical 
sociology of Michael Mann in order to identify four main sources of royal power: 
dynastic, courtly, military and economic. In their capacity to enhance or limit royal 
power, the social networks that are formed between the king and representatives of 
these groups in each context, as well as the structures that produce and reproduce 
their behaviour, form the focal points of this research. As such, this thesis distances 
itself from that segment of socio-historical tradition, which grants ultimate primacy to 
human agency. 
 
The Introduction presents the main scholarly debates surrounding the nature of 
Ptolemaic and Argead kingship and highlights the fact that although both have 
received considerable attention separately, they have not yet been the focus of a 
systematic, comparative analysis. At the same time, this chapter brings in the 
theoretical and methodological framework employed in the thesis. Chapter One 
discusses the structural organisation of the dynasty, focusing on patterns of marriage 
and succession, and the manipulation of dynastic connections, real or constructed, as 
instruments of legitimation. It is argued that the colonial circumstances in early 
Ptolemaic Egypt led to an amplification of the importance of the dynasty as a source 
of power. Chapter Two examines the interrelations of the ruler with his extended 
circle of friends and associates, i.e. the courtiers. A discussion of the physical and 
social structure of the courts in Aigai, Pella and Alexandria in the early Ptolemaic 
period confirms that administration at the highest level continued to be organised 
around personal relations. Chapter Three identifies the enabling mechanisms, which 
sustained the military power of the Makedonian king. It is argued that royal military 
leadership and the integration of facets of military organisation (e.g. the institution of 
klerouchia) and values (through education) in society remained integral to the social 
 iv 
organisation of early Ptolemaic Egypt. Finally, Chapter Four examines the economic 
power of the ruler, as revealed by the organisation of property rights. The absence of 
the Makedones and the prominence of temples as economically significant groups in 
early Ptolemaic Egypt underline the structural discontinuities that arise from the 
necessary adaptation to different local conditions.  
 
This thesis concludes that the structures that framed Argead royal power were in their 
majority remembered and instantiated in the organisational practices of the early 
Ptolemaic rulers. Deviations from the Argead paradigm occurred when pragmatism 
led to the introduction of corrective practices, such as the co-regency principle aimed 
at eradicating the dynastic instability that had plagued the Argead monarchy, and 
when ecological and political considerations, such as the needs of their non-Hellenic, 
non-Makedonian audience, dictated a greater degree of accommodation to local 
conditions, especially in the field of economic organisation. Even there, however, one 
can discern the influence of the flexible, all-inclusive model of Argead administration 
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“… thought reveals that man is not contemporaneous with what makes him be –or with 
that upon the basis of which he is…” 
 






“[With] the recovery of temporality as integral to social theory […] history and 
sociology become methodologically indistinguishable.” 
 






“..remember, Fortune never stands still..” 
 


















“History knows inertia in a relative sense only: the decisive question is whether inertia or change 
predominates” 
 








he origins of this thesis lie in a simple question. When presented with the 
largely ignored fact among non-experts that Kleopatra, the last Queen of 
Egypt, was Makedonian rather than Egyptian the most inquisitive of those 
non-experts follow up this ‘revelation’ with a candid: ‘so, what else was Makedonian 
about Ptolemaic Kingship?’ Addressing the question of change and continuity, the 
subject of this thesis is to examine the migration of Argead Makedonian structures in 
the organisation of the early Ptolemaic monarchy. The focus will be placed on those 
structures and networks that underpinned and sustained royal power, i.e. the sources 
of royal power.   
 There are several elements in the outward trappings of Ptolemaic kingship that 
welcome a comparison with its Argead counterpart, but so far organisational change 
and continuity between the two kingdoms has received little scholarly attention, which 
rarely goes beyond statements supported by commonsensical observations. Common 
sense, as a body of interpersonal belief, exercises an irresistible appeal to thinking 
minds, both as the starting point of enquiry and as the yardstick by which to measure 
the correctness of theoretical postulates against the reality of everyday life.1 
Ultimately, however, common sense does little to anchor the empirical observations 
that constitute its backbone to explanations, and in the case of history reconstructions 
of past systems, that could withstand close academic scrutiny. At best, according to 
Bertrand Russell, common sense is “naively realistic.”2 At worst, it can be equated to 
                                                 
1 For the definition of common sense see Griffin (2003), p. 18. See also Russell (1945), p. 603. 




the metaphysics of a pre-modern mind.3 Moreover, in historical enquiry the 
employment of arguments grounded on ‘common sense’ carries with it the high risk of 
being based on anachronistic assumptions. In spite of that, it has too often been called 
up to serve as one of the historian’s most valuable tools.4 Against the unreliability of 
common sense, this thesis proposes to utilize a theoretical framework of enquiry based 
on social theory in order to identify the sources of royal power and a systematic 
analysis of the available sources in order to compare and contrast the structures and 
networks that sustained royal power in each case. The theory, methodology and the 
place of the present study within the wider literature on the subject are presented and 
explained in the following two sections. 
 In terms of chronology, the scope of this thesis will stretch from the earliest 
evidence on the organisation of the Argead monarchy towards the close of the 6th c. 
BCE, until its dissolution with the murder of Alexandros IV (315 BCE). For the 
Ptolemaic Kingdom the emphasis will lie on the reign of the first three Ptolemaioi 
(323-222 BCE), where the influence of their Makedonian background is expected to 
have been at its strongest. Passing references to later reigns will be made where 
deemed necessary.  
 
 
THE DUALITIES OF KINGSHIP (AND A PTOLEMAIC LITERATURE REVIEW) 
 
Argead prototypes are occasionally invoked as the precursors of some Ptolemaic royal 
practices. However, this continuity is assumed on the basis of outward similarity. As 
similarity can be attributed just as easily to chance as it can to consequence, the 
continuity of Argead structures into Ptolemaic Egypt is in need of a systematic 
structural analysis, which will qualify its nature and extent. The purpose of this section 
is to place the enquiry regarding the migration of Argead structures of royal power in 
Ptolemaic Egypt within the context of the relevant literature. The following discussion 
will present and evaluate the main dichotomies that have a bearing on an 
appreciation of the nature of Ptolemaic kingship. It will be argued that Makedonian 
tradition has been both downplayed in the face of Egyptian and Near-Eastern 
                                                 
3 For the first formulation of the idea commonly re-iterated in recent literature as the view that 
common sense was for Russell the metaphysics of the savage, or of the Stone Age, see Russell (1926), p. 
107. 
4 Heckel (1991) reviewing Borza’s In the Shadow of Olympus. 
 
3 
influences, as well as frequently subsumed under the umbrella of Hellenism. At the 
same time, continuity has so far been an article of faith rather than the subject of 
analytic investigation, while undue emphasis has been placed on the ruler as the sole 
agent of change. 
 
 
FUSION VS. SEGREGATION 
Kingship in Ptolemaic Egypt has been viewed by scholarship as the political 
institution par excellence.5 As such, interpretations of its nature have not remained 
immune to developments taking place in the debates regarding the nature of 
‘Hellenistic’ culture. The definition of the adjective, coined by Bossuet in the 
seventeenth century to refer to the ‘Hellenized’ form of Hebrew used by the Jews in 
the Septuagint, denoted a process of linguistic acculturation that was picked up by 
Droysen two centuries later and elevated into an all-round theory of cultural fusion 
between the institutions and practices of the Makedonian conquerors and the local 
Egyptian population.6 Influenced by Hegel’s philosophy, which viewed history as the 
product of a never-ending process of thesis ⇾ antithesis ⇾ synthesis, Droysen 
approached ‘Hellenistic’ society as the outcome of the syncretism of 
Makedonian/Hellenic elements with Oriental.7 His very influential thesis did not 
merely extend to the lower classes of immigrants and Egyptian peasants but, 
inevitably, contaminated ideas about the nature of the monarchy. This type of 
monarchy was viewed as a purely ‘Hellenistic’ phenomenon, which although not 
entirely alien to the Makedonian political culture, was, through its absolutism, an 
essentially oriental form of government.8 Both the Pharaonic and Achaimenid models 
of kingship have been recognised as providing prototypes for Hellenistic kingship.9 In 
                                                 
5 Hölbl (2001), Bagnall IN Bingen (2007), pp. 1-14. 
6 Bossuet [2006 (1681)], p. 38. 
7 Droysen (1877-1878). 
8 See Puchala (2003), pp. 143-163. Puchala bases his argument on the worship of certain Egyptian gods 
by the conqueror population and the increasing appeal of oriental mystical disciplines, such as astrology 
and magic. These, however, have nothing to do with the organisation of the monarchy and he does not 
qualify which particular kingship structures set it apart as oriental. He does claim, however, (without 
arguing further) that the underlying reason behind the Egyptianisation of the monarchy was the 
inherent contradiction between the Hellenic and Makedonian systems of government, which made it 
more susceptible to outside influences. 
9 Pharaonic: Koenen (1983, 1993), Redford (1986), Herz (1992, 1996), Delia (1993). Achaimenid: 
Burstein (1994) who sees continuity in the Persian administrative apparatus in place in Egypt, Nielsen 
(1994) for Achaimenid influences in palace architecture. Briant (2002), followed by Ma (2003), who 
 
4 
addition, it has been suggested that the accommodation and incorporation of oriental 
forms of royal organisation into Makedonian kingship found its way into the 
Successor kingdoms through Alexandros’ example, despite the fact that the 
‘orientalisation’ of his rule was initially frowned upon by his Makedones.10 As time 
wore on, argued the proponents of the fusion hypothesis, the orientalisation of the 
Ptolemaic monarchy became increasingly more pronounced.11 According to some, 
the process was already in motion at least since Ptolemaios Philadelphos. In order to 
strengthen his colonial rule over Egypt, he had to “revive in his person the despotic and divine 
power of the ancient Pharaohs.”12 Far from taking this orientalisation as an article of faith, 
some specialised studies have attempted to delineate the process of the gradual 
Egyptianisation of the Ptolemaic monarchy, which was allegedly complete by the 
reign of Ptolemaios V.13 Their evidence drew on the forms of royal epiklesis used in 
bilingual priestly decrees recovered from Egypt, written in the Hellenic language and 
both Demotic and Hieroglyphic Egyptian.14 They also relied on accounts describing 
the coronation of Ptolemaic kings in Memphis.15 More recently, arguments for the 
Egyptianisation of the Ptolemaic monarchy have found support in certain objects 
recovered from the underwater excavations at the port of Alexandria. These have 
revealed a considerable number of what has become known as Pharaonica; namely 
Pharaonic Egyptian or Egyptian-styled fragments of sphinxes, sarcophagi, statues or 
parts of monuments (obelisks, columns, shrines). Preliminary research has shown that 
                                                 
argue that the strategies employed by the Hellenistic kings in order to achieve unity and establish their 
dominance derived from Achaimenid templates. 
10 For contemporary responses to Alexandros’ adoption of oriental practices see Plout. Alex. 47.9, Plout. 
Eum. 6.3. For Alexandros’ governance as the model of Hellenistic kingship, see Price (2001), p. 366, 
Bingen (2007). See also Samuel (1993) and Hölbl (2001): Like Alexandros’ kingship, Ptolemaic kingship 
was a “supranational kingship, whose legitimacy rested on military victory,” pp. 90-91. Bingen (2007) proposed a 
happy medium when he assigned to Alexandros’ model of kingship the role of mediator between 
Makedonian kingship and its Hellenistic equivalent, p. 18. 
11 Hadas (1959), p. 24: The “[m]onarchy was orientalized, and the kings became as autocratic as the Pharaohs or 
Babylonian kings had been,” Bell (1966), Puchala (2003), p. 156. 
12 Jouguet (1923), p. 113. 
13 For the growing Egyptianisation of Ptolemaic monarchy based on a study of royal titulary in royal 
priestly decrees, see Thissen (1966), Onasch (1976). They argue that Ptolemaic monarchy was 
Egyptianised by Ptolemaios V. Austin (2006) argues that this Egyptianisation knew an impetus from the 
reign of Ptolemaios IV onwards, p. 491. For Mahaffy (1905) the Ptolemaic monarchy had become 
completely Egyptian certainly by Ptolemaios IX, p. 77. 
14 The Kanopos Decree (reign of Ptolemaios III – CGC 22187, OGIS 56), the Memphis Decree (also 
known as the Pithom Stele or the Stele of Raphia, reign of Ptolemaios IV – CGC 22183), the Memphis 
Decree (famously known as the Rosetta Stone, reign of Ptolemaios V - CGC 22188, OGIS 90), OGIS 739 
(reign of Ptolemaios IX). 
15 Koenen (1977) followed by Green (1990), p. 405 argue that from Alexandros III onwards the 
Ptolemaioi were crowned as Pharaohs in Memphis. Contra Burstein (1991), who finds no explicit 
evidence in support of this. 
 
5 
some of them date to the earlier Pharaonic period and were transferred to Alexandria 
from their original contexts, while others were produced during the Ptolemaic period 
in conformity to the Pharaonic tradition.16 Given the recentness of some of the finds, 
it would be premature to draw firm conclusions regarding their function in the 
Ptolemaic capital. However, their presence and style is crucial in deciphering the 
cultural identity of Alexandria as promoted by the kings. Yoyotte has used the 
evidence to suggest the conscious Egyptianisation of the Ptolemaic capital already in 
the early stages of Ptolemaic rule.17 
 Droysen’s theory of syncretism between foreign and local structures and the 
ensuing orientalisation of kingship was dealt its most decisive blow by Préaux’s 
synthetic, revisionist work, Le Monde Héllénistique.18 The primary drawback of 
Droysen’s theory was its reliance on literary material, especially Ploutarchos. As the 
amount and ease of access of archaeological, epigraphic, numismatic and 
papyrological evidence multiplied a different, less idealised, but more direct picture 
emerged. The mutual and equal interpenetration of cultures proposed by the theory 
of fusion could no longer be supported by the evidence. Rather, conceptualisations of 
social interaction at all levels of society in the Hellenistic kingdoms began favouring a 
stricter segregation between the local and conqueror social systems.19 While the 
proponents of fusion argued that “the ancient culture…of the Kingdoms of the Near East 
became inextricably fused with the polity and civilization of the Greek world,” the ‘segregationists’ 
challenged them by maintaining that fusion was limited and extended only to 
marginal groups at the fringes of society.20 There was no longer a question of 
coalescence, as Lewis put it, but of coexistence of structures and it was seldom, if at all, 
that one could claim to have “their feet in both worlds.”21 At the centre of Ptolemaic 
kingship, according to the segregationists, the Alexandrian élite remained “fiercely 
chauvinistic in its Greekness,” while the Ptolemaioi conceived themselves as Hellenic kings 
alone.22 Moreover, in the face of new evidence, the arguments for the growing 
Egyptianisation of the Ptolemaic monarchy described above were gradually brought 
                                                 
16 This evidence is still largely understudied. Current researchers include Gallo and his team from the 
University of Torino, see the text of his presentation at the conference Les Pharaonica d’Alexandrie (2001). 
On the underwater excavations at Alexandria see Empereur (1998), Goddio & Clauss (2006).  
17 Yoyotte IN Goddio (1998). Contra Gallo (2001). 
18 Droysen was followed by Rostovtzeff (1941), p. 1040, Tarn & Griffith (1952), p. 3. Préaux (1978). 
19 In addition to Préaux (1978), see Lewis (1986). 
20 Smith (1974) cited in Lewis (1986), p. 159, n. 4. Will (1979) called these spheres the “fringes of co-
penetration.” 
21 Lewis (1986), p. 4, Samuel (1989), p. 9. 
22 Zanker cited in Hunter (2003), pp. 47-48, Préaux (1978). 
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into question. One is forced to consider the authority behind the bilingual priestly 
decrees, which was none other than the priests of the native religious order. For them, 
the Ptolemaioi were the ruling dynasty to which they had to confer the same honours 
as to any other Pharaoh of the past.23 Therefore, it is more likely that it was them who 
bestowed Pharaonic-styled epikleseis to the Ptolemaioi and not the Ptolemaioi who 
demanded them.24 The sheer volume of the evidence that has accumulated from 
Egypt also brings to the foreground the relative scarcity of material that can be used as 
evidence for the ‘Egyptianisation’ of the monarchy. Compared to royal decrees issued 
directly by the Ptolemaic king the priestly decrees are few and far between. To make 
matters worse, one becomes aware that even among the decrees written in the 
Egyptian language there are discrepancies in the use of epikleseis. In some, the 
Ptolemaic kings are addressed by Pharaonic titulary, while in others they are simply 
referred to by name followed by the sign denoting “of the foreign people”.25 Further, there 
are only two kings whose coronation as Pharaohs in Memphis is unequivocally 
evidenced.26 Finally, as far as the presence of Pharaonica in Alexandria is concerned, 
Yoyotte’s interpretation can be challenged by the following observation: the number 
of demotic inscriptions from Alexandria (less than a dozen have been catalogued) is 
but a small fraction of the overall number of recovered inscriptions, which are 
otherwise written in the Hellenic language.27 The fact that the Ptolemaioi were using 
Pharaonic-styled statuary to adorn the Alexandrine Sarapeion and portray 
themselves, does not detract from the essential Hellenic character of the Ptolemaic 
capital, which was, after all, built by a Makedonian architect (Deinokrates) and which, 
according to Strabon, contained all the standard features of a Hellenic polis (i.e. an 
Agora, law-courts, a gymnasion, a theatre and stoai).28  
                                                 
23 Especially when one considers the religious imperative of the priestly class not to break the Pharaonic 
order of succession, see Burstein (1991). 
24 See Johnson (1995). 
25 Lewis (1986), pp. 159-160, n. 6. 
26 Ptolemaios V was crowned with the Pschent crown (Rosetta Stone - CGC 22188, OGIS 90, ll. 46-47). 
Ptolemaios VIII was crowned according to Egyptian ritual (Diod. 33.13.1). For doubts on the 
coronation of Alexandros, see Burstein (1991).  
27 Gallo (2001) argues that the Pharaonica do not provide adequate evidence to support the thesis of an 
Egyptianised Alexandria in the early Ptolemaic period. At most they attest to the tolerance of Ptolemaic 
rulers towards the religious sensibilities of the native Egyptian clergy in conjunction with the promotion 
of the Hellenic-Egyptian syncretistic cult of Sarapis. Similarly, the portrayal of individual Ptolemaic 
rulers as Pharaohs can be explained as part of the same policy of appeasement towards the Egyptian 
priestly class, see also Huss (1994), Stanwick (2002). As far as the presence of authentic Pharaonic 
statuary in Alexandria is concerned, Gallo (2001) attributes the transfer of the works to the Roman 
period. 
28 Strab. 17.10. 
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HELLENIC VS. MAKEDONIAN 
Firmly rooted in primary sources, the segregationist approach offers a much 
more realistic appreciation of Ptolemaic kingship than the theory of syncretism. At the 
same time, however, it tends to overemphasize the influence of Hellenism at the 
highest level.29 The evidence that associates Ptolemaic kingship with the Egyptian and 
Persian royal traditions cannot be ignored. In recent years it has become 
commonplace to speak of the ‘duality of Ptolemaic Kingship’.30 This concept 
essentially brings together earlier notions of fusion between ideologies of kingship and 
the thorough examination of all the available evidence. The main assumption behind 
this approach can be summarised in the words of Ma: “…the Hellenistic kings exist merely 
as a bundle of local commitments, a series of roles assigned by the subjects, an endless and ubiquitous 
process of exchange and negotiation to achieve acceptance by different constituencies.”31 For a long 
time the only referent groups recognized in Ptolemaic Egypt were the Hellenes that 
had migrated to Egypt, and the local population.32 However, Ptolemaic kingship in 
fact catered for three different audiences: the Egyptians, the Hellenes and the Makedones. 
For the Egyptians the Ptolemaic kings were the successors of the Pharaohs. In turn, 
the Ptolemaioi took measures to present themselves as such. For the Hellenic 
immigrants, who inhabited the cities they founded or sponsored, the majority of 
which originated from polis environments and, hence, was inclined to be suspicious of 
monarchic régimes, the Ptolemaioi became philosopher-kings and benefactors, in 
accordance with the prescripts of the late classical philosophical writings on 
kingship.33 Finally, to their peers and fellow Makedones, with whom they shared the 
same aristocratic and ethnic background accordingly, the Ptolemaic kings were, and 
would present themselves as, Makedonian monarchs.34 It should be stressed that the 
organisation of the monarchy cannot be viewed merely, as might be inferred from 
Ma, as a one-way process by which the ruler tailored his performance in response to 
the expectations of his various audiences. His actions were also informed by his own 
background, education and experience. As such, the Makedonian contribution to the 
                                                 
29 Bosworth (1977) argues for the exclusive influence of Hellenic prototypes in the self-representation of 
Alexandros and Ptolemaios I as kings. 
30 Koenen (1993) with bibliography n. 2, Ma (2003), Burstein (2007), pp. 36-37.  
31 Ma (2003), p. 183. 
32 Chauveau (1997), p. 33 on making the distinction simply between Hellenes and Egyptians. 
33 See Braund (2000). 
34 Samuel (1989), p. 28, Ma (2003). 
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development of Ptolemaic royal structures deserves more than the cursory attention 
that has hitherto been accorded to it.  
 The distillation of particularly Makedonian elements from under the generic 
umbrella of Hellenism in Ptolemaic Egypt is not something that scholars have always 
paid attention to. At times, given the degree of emigration from a host of different 
poleis from the southern extremity of the Balkan Peninsula to Ptolemaic Egypt it must 
have appeared convenient to conflate Hellenic with Makedonian in order to evade 
complex issues of differentiation. A characteristic example is the lecture of Barns in 
1966 where in his speech on the relations of Egyptians and Hellenes from the period 
of the New Kingdom until well into the establishment of Christianity, the Ptolemaioi 
are consistently referred to as Hellenic kings belonging to a Hellenic royal house and 
administering a Hellenic ruling élite. The undue conflation in scholarship of 
Makedonian and Hellenic royal structures under the heading Graeco-Makedonian or, 
even just Hellenic has led to the consistent lack of emphasis on the influence of 
Makedonian structures in the organisation of kingship.35 It is telling of the prevalence 
of this attitude that a recent introduction to the nature of the monarchy in Ptolemaic 
Egypt contains a section on its Egyptian and Hellenic background but nothing on the 
Makedonian.36 To be sure, such a conflation between Hellenes and Makedones is not 
altogether wrong. A generic dubbing of the immigrant population into Egypt as 
Hellenic is understandable insofar as we are aware of large numbers of former 
inhabitants of various city–states flooding into Egypt, each bringing with them, in 
precise outlines, their civic culture. In addition, the Makedonian rulers themselves, 
since at least the times of Archelaos in the fifth century BCE, were consciously open to 
cultural influences and welcomed interaction from the city-state world. They actively 
participated in southern Hellenic culture in every sense.37 However, notwithstanding 
the similarities that the Makedonian and Hellenic cultural traditions shared, especially 
in the field of military and economic organisation, their political cultures were 
strikingly dissimilar. Given the characteristic differences between the Hellenic and 
Makedonian political and social systems (in terms of administration, decision-making, 
and social stratification, to name but a few) and the fact that the Ptolemaic ruling élite 
was and remained distinctly and self-consciously Makedonian, especially during the 
                                                 
35 Samuel (1983), Lewis (1986). 
36 Thompson (2003), pp. 113-114. 
37 Shipley (2000), p. 60. 
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formative years of its rule over Egypt, the undertaking of a systematic analysis of the 
structures that underpinned its organisation is, in the opinion of the author, 
imperative for the understanding of Ptolemaic kingship.  
 
 
CHANGE VS. CONTINUITY 
 Writing on time and its relation to history Braudel professed that “It is not so 
much the passage of time itself which is a figment of our imagination as the fragments into which we 
divide it”.38 In 2000, N.G.L. Hammond, the veteran of Makedonian studies, 
acknowledged the fact that, up to the present day, the reign of Alexandros the Great 
has often been treated as a watershed, with scholars limiting their study to either side 
of that artificial divide.39 The artificiality of periodisation in history is nowhere more 
evident than in the creation of the much-disputed designation ‘Hellenistic.’ The term 
was first applied by Droysen, who in the 1830s approached with a keen interest the 
“cramped […], degraded […]” and “no longer interesting to the reader or operative on the destinies 
of the future world” post-Alexandrian period.40  
 The most straightforward reason that has contributed to the segmentation of 
scholarly interest concerning the Hellenic world from the late fourth century BCE 
until the consolidation of the Roman Empire towards the close of the first century 
BCE appears to be the new set of circumstances that emerged after the extraordinary 
career of Alexandros III of Makedonia. To some, Alexandros “stands as the end of the 
ancient world and as the beginning of the new age, the omega and the alpha.”41 Overwhelming 
metaphors aside, this segmentation has practical merit indeed if one focuses on the 
writing of narrative history or what Braudel called histoire événementielle. Alexandros 
manifestly did change the face of the political map of the known world. With the 
break-up of his short-lived empire the scholar has to reckon with the formation of 
distinctly new political units in need of independent and/or parallel histories.  As for 
the ‘Old World’, i.e. the city-state world of the Hellenic mainland and coast of Asia 
Minor, this in its turn had suffered the transformations inherent in any shift of the 
                                                 
38 Braudel (1973), p. 424. 
39 Hammond (2000), p. 141. 
40 As this would be described by Grote (1846-1856) a few decades later, I, p. x. In the span of a decade 
Droysen wrote a History of Alexandros (1833), his Diadochoi (Successors-1836) and their Epigonoi (the 
Successor dynasties until 220 BCE-1843). These works were republished as a single study under the 
title Geschichte des Hellenismus (1877), which proved more influential than its constituent parts alone. 
41 Rice (1997), p. 190. 
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balance of power. However, as demonstrated by the growing realisations that the 
narrative should no longer be regarded as an end in itself and that the world might 
not “present itself as a suitable candidate for story-telling” after all, the history of institutions 
cannot profit from such segmentation.42 
 In those instances where continuity between Argead Makedonian and 
Hellenistic structures is proposed as a social reality, it is more often than not the case 
that it is readily taken for granted, rather than analysed.43 Statements such as: the 
Ptolemaioi “preserved their Macedonian roots” or “human relations had their roots in Macedonian 
tradition,” appear not so infrequently in the literature.44 Few scholars, however, have 
carried the analysis further. What is more, such comparisons and lines of continuity 
are usually drawn only as far back as the reign of Philippos II. References to the 
Makedonian rulers and structures before him are few and far between.45 Briant and 
Hammond are among the few scholars to have attempted an examination of the 
continuity of distinct Makedonian institutions into the Hellenistic Kingdoms.46 Briant 
focused on Seleukid Asia, while Hammond’s scope was wide enough to encompass the 
entire Hellenistic world. Some of the latter’s observations, however, bear a direct 
relevance to Ptolemaic Egypt. The major contribution of both these scholars is that 
they transcended the chronological and geographical confines of the Hellenistic era, 
so zealously guarded by others. Samuel, for instance, considers it unproductive to 
examine Hellenistic kingship as the product of evolution from the kingship of 
Philippos and Alexandros. This is because he viewed Ptolemaic, and by extent 
Hellenistic, kingship as an isolated phenomenon, the product of very unique socio-
political circumstances.47 However, in agreement with Hammond and Briant, this 
thesis shares the premise that the study of structures and institutions and their 
                                                 
42 Morley (1999) argues that the function of narrative is primarily to pave the way for the interpretation 
of the events in question, p. 101. Quote from White (1987), p. 24.  
43 Walbank (1984), Roy (1998), Hölbl (2001), p. 92. 
44 Hölbl (2001), p. 92, La’da (2003), Bingen (2007), p. 17. See, however, Ogden (1999) for a rare 
discussion of the Argead structures of polygamy and their relevance to the organisation of the 
Hellenistic dynasties. See also the studies of Weber G. (1997) and Herman (1997) on the Hellenistic 
courts. Both hint at the structural similarities between the Hellenistic and Argead court practices. 
45 Consider the influential work of Préaux (1978), where she states in passim that in matters of military 
and political practice, the Makedonian monarchy, such as the Successors had seen it practiced under 
Philippos, was the model for the Hellenistic kingdoms, p. 182. 
46 Briant (1982, 1994, 2002, 2006), Hammond (1989, 1993, 2000). 
47 Samuel (1989), pp. 22-23. 
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evolution cannot be affected by putative chronological markers, such as the death of 
Alexandros the Great in 323 BCE.48  
 Hammond’s approach, although largely descriptive, is a commendable starting 
point for the discussion on the migration of the structures that framed monarchical 
power in Argead Makedonia into early Ptolemaic Egypt. He identified Makedonian 
influences in the divine ancestry of the kings, ancestor worship and worship of 
individual kings, the promotion of the Makedonian ancestry of the rulers, the role of 
an Assembly in the election and deposition of kings, the Assembly of the Makedones 
and their role as a law court, the oaths of loyalty and obedience to the king, and the 
issuing of equipment to the army by the king.49 However, his research conclusions, as 
well as the direction of his enquiries as a whole, were resisted by other Makedonian 
experts. The main argument of the opposition, spearheaded by Borza, was that the 
lacunose state of the Makedonian evidence rendered the reconstruction of the 
institutions of the Makedonian state very problematic. This in itself precluded any 
attempt to compare them fruitfully with other political units, consequently negating, 
according to this line of thought, the possibility of migration of Makedonian 
institutions in any of the Successor Kingdoms.50 Since the last voices of dissent were 
raised though, significant works on Makedonian history and epigraphy have been 
published, which make it unproductive and anachronistic to write off the study of 
Makedonian influence on the Hellenistic Kingdoms on the grounds of ignorance.51  
 In addition, further templates for the study of monarchical power and the 
origins of its structures in Ptolemaic Egypt are provided by recent scholarship on the 
Seleukid Kingdom. Since Bickerman, the institutional history of the Seleukidai has 
profited from the work of Billows and Briant, who have both studied the influence of 
Makedonian structures in Seleukid Asia, and Capdetrey, who examined the 
organisation of Seleukid royal power.52 The work of these three scholars is relevant in 
the context of this thesis for making the following contributions. Billows’ study of 
Makedonian imperialism in the Seleukid East set out to prove what has rather been 
                                                 
48 See also Bugh’s (2006) introduction to the Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World: “The 
many and diverse aspects [of Hellenistic history, the dubbing of which as such is a choice of convenience and 
custom] cannot all be inserted into a timeline, any more than thinking that the Greeks woke up on June 11, 323 B.C., 
with the e-news of Alexander’s death and pulled out their “New Era” calendars.”  
49 Hammond (2000). 
50 Borza IN Hammond (1993), Samuel IN Hammond (1993), Borza (1999). 
51 The most important body of work is published in the Meletemata series by the Research Centre for 
Greek and Roman Antiquity. See especially Hatzopoulos (1991, 1994, 1996), Guimier-Sorbet et al. 
(2006). 
52 Briant (1994, 2006), Billows (1995), Briant & Joannès (2006), Capdetrey (2007). 
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frequently assumed so far; that the Hellenistic monarchies shared some common 
features deriving from their Makedonian background.53 Briant addressed some of the 
methodological challenges inherent in an analysis of structural change and continuity, 
focusing on the necessity to distinguish between local inherited traditions and 
transferred Makedonian institutions. He emphasized that any evaluation of Hellenistic 
structures in the transitional period following Alexandros’ conquest should take into 
account evidence pertaining to the fourth century Persian administration it had 
supplanted. Finally, Capdetrey’s thorough study of Seleukid royal power and its 
organisation, especially in the early formative period under Seleukos I and Antiochos 
I, is useful in that it can provide a model for the study of monarchical power in 
Ptolemaic Egypt. Excluding the field of economic history, where notable 
advancements have been made, Ptolemaic institutional history remains overall, 
viewed largely through a descriptive lens.54  
 
 
AGENCY VS. STRUCTURE 
A final observation deriving from the literature review is that scholarship has 
unduly overemphasised the individual personalities of rulers as agents of change. This 
has led to a disregard of the fundamental structures and the networks of 
interdependence that were to an extent responsible for shaping their behaviour. The 
view of the Ptolemaic king as an autocrat, who operated on a carte blanche, was first 
introduced by Droysen and was followed by Claire Préaux and Mikhail Rostovtzeff, 
whose magisterial monographs laid down the foundations for the study of Ptolemaic 
political, economic and social history.55 To date, it is commonplace to describe the 
Ptolemaic monarchy in terms of absolutism.56 Although there is no evidence to 
suggest that the power of the king in Ptolemaic Egypt was formally constrained by any 
other institution within the state, such as an Assembly, this view has sidetracked 
historians into granting ultimate primacy to the personality of the Ptolemaic ruler for 
the organisation of the kingdom. In his influential overview of Hellenistic Monarchies 
and Monarchic Ideas, Walbank argued that “[i]t is the king’s personal qualities which form the 
                                                 
53 Billows (1995), pp. xiv-xv.  
54 The last decade has seen the publication of two important all-encompassing histories of the Ptolemaic 
Kingdom, Hölbl (2001), Huss (2001). Both, however, are traditionally descriptive in their approach. 
55 Droysen (1877-1878), Préaux (1978, 1979), Rostovtzeff (1941). Cf. Corradi (1929). 
56 Green (1990), “There can be no doubt that Ptolemy was firmly in charge; an absolute monarch,” Ellis (1994), pp. 
60-61. Chauveau (1997), Garnsey (2000), Bosworth (2006) to name but a few. 
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justification of his rule; and the absolutism of his rule itself provides the field within which those 
qualities find their fulfilment.”57 Equally, Samuel concluded his long exposé on the 
components of the Ptolemaic royal ideology with the assessment that the king was 
“ruling by qualities of character rather than position.”58 However, the emphasis on the 
personal qualities of the ruler as the determinant of social and political action and, 
hence social and political change, ignores the structures and networks within which 
the ruler’s actions were bound and demonstrates that the study of ancient history itself 
is still bound to the prescripts of Carlyle’s heroic determinism, whereby history is the 
consequence of individual actions and as such can be infinitely malleable by ‘great 
men.’59  
 Structures, as principles of organisation, which sustain “recognizably 
consistent forms of time-space distanciation,” are more constraining to individual 
action than the scholarly consensus on the nature of Ptolemaic monarchy allows.60 
The primacy of structure vs. action or of society vs. the individual agent in social 
behaviour, and by extent social change, has been the battlefield of sociological theory 
for almost two centuries now.61 Some structural theories (although structuralism 
overall is far from being a unified school) emphasise the existence in society of a web 
of social facts that have a constraining effect on the actions of the individual, to the 
point of depriving them of their autonomy.62 Actors are the product of structure, 
rather than its authors. The latter is the founding premise of action theories, which 
stress the capacity of the agent for voluntary, undetermined action.63 This thesis 
adopts the definition of ‘structure’ developed by Giddens in his formulation of 
Structuration theory. According to Giddens the term refers to the “binding […] 
properties [rules and resources] which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to 
exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them systemic form.”64 In effect, 
structure is no longer treated as something entirely ‘external’ to the actions of the 
                                                 
57 Walbank (1984), p. 80. 
58 Samuel (1993), p. 192. 
59 Carlyle (1963), see also Sztompka (1993), pp. 259-273. This is as much a phenomenon in Ptolemaic 
as it is in Argead scholarship, see following section. 
60 Giddens (1984), p. 181, see further Glossary s.v. time-space distanciation. Braudel (1973) defined 
structures loosely as “recurring frameworks of reality” extending through historical time and space, p. 
411.  
61 See further Sztompka (1993). 
62 Glazer (1996). In Durkheim’s definition social facts are “every way of acting which is general throughout a 
given society,” (1938, pp. 13, 28).  
63 Scott & Marshall (2005), s.v. action theory, action frame of reference. 
64 Giddens (1984), p. 17. 
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agent, but can be seen as both the medium (production) and the outcome 
(reproduction) of the agent’s social practices.65 In this process structures are only 
existent when remembered and/or instantiated through action by individuals across 
generations.  
 In the case of Ptolemaic Egypt, the relevant structures that produced and 
reproduced the actions of the ruler can be found in the political and social traditions 
of royal organisation that preceded the Ptolemaic assumption of rule in Egypt. On the 
one hand, the early Ptolemaic sovereigns originated from a vital political culture of 
their own; one that was not so distant in time and the memory of which, as well as the 
subsequent degree of its replication through action, cannot be ignored.66 On the 
other, the experience of Alexandros’ reign and the traditions of royal organisation 
already in place in Pharaonic and Persian Egypt were also influential. On a 
theoretical level, they both consisted of sequences of events, which had the capacity to 
prompt institutional change.67 More specifically, the first-hand experience of the 
Successors in observing how a vast territory with a multi-ethnic subject base was 
managed by Alexandros, but also how his Argead predecessors, also avid 
expansionists, administered newly-added territories to the Makedonian state, as well 
as their gradual familiarisation with the structures and processes through which Egypt 
was traditionally ordered in the Persian and Pharaonic periods were equally 
significant parameters in shaping their own organisation of royal power.  
 
In conclusion, recourse to the relevant academic literature for insights on the question 
of the possible migration of Makedonian structures in Ptolemaic Egypt, and in 
particular of those structures connected to the organisation of the monarchy and the 
power of the king, reveals that, in all its unmasked simplicity, the degree of 
Makedonian influence is a little studied facet of Ptolemaic institutional history. 
Indeed, the survey of the literature has demonstrated that to the present day, the 
histories of Argead Makedonia and Ptolemaic Egypt have been kept largely 
segregated, discouraging discussions on structural change and continuity between 
                                                 
65 This Giddens recognises as the ‘duality of structure.’ 
66 Cf. Giddens (1984), p. 377: “Structure only exists as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, 
and as instantiated in action.” 
67 Giddens calls these events ‘episodes.’ Episodic characterisation is a phrase coined by Giddens (1984) 
for marking significant sequences of change in definite contexts. The Asian Expedition and the 
assumption of the Egyptian satrapy by Ptolemaios I, which brought the Makedones in close contact 
with local organisational cultures, can be considered as such. 
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them. In addition, the shifting interpretations of Hellenistic culture, viewed through 
the lens of fusion theorists and segregationists have overemphasized Near Eastern and 
Hellenic influences in the nature of Ptolemaic kingship. The purpose of this thesis is 
not to negate or diminish the influence of other traditions. Rather, it is to examine the 
structure of Ptolemaic kingship beyond the influence of the character of individual 
kings and from a geo-historical angle that has hitherto been overlooked (Argead 
Makedonia). This will be achieved by building on the work of Hammond, Briant and 
others who have studied the continuity of Makedonian institutions in the Hellenistic 
and Seleukid contexts. In response to critics (Samuel, Borza) who are sceptical of the 
relevance of Makedonian royal structures of power to their Hellenistic equivalents one 
can quote Briant’s justification for tackling the issue of continuity of Achaimenid 
institutions in the Seleukid context: “Observations banales et de bon sens? Certes!  Mais, on 
dois bien constater, pour le déplorer, qu’elles ne sont guère mises en pratique par les historiens.”68 
 
 
THE STRUCTURES OF ROYAL POWER (AND AN ARGEAD LITERATURE 
REVIEW) 
 
The purpose of this section is to present a critical overview of the main power 
structures that have been associated with Argead Makedonian kingship in scholarship 
thus far. It will become evident that the nature of the evidence has prompted a variety 
of competing interpretations. The following will involve an examination of the two 
main schools of thought that have developed regarding the structural organisation of 
power in the Makedonian monarchy, followed by a critique of their method and 
content. Responding to that critique a third way of approaching the subject will be 




EARLIER VIEWS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE MAKEDONIAN MONARCHY 
 The breakdown of Makedonian kingship into its constituent structures was 
first attempted by Granier in the 1930s.69 Before him, Makedonian political 
organisation had scarcely been the subject of attention. An exception is Edward Farr, 
                                                 
68 Briant (1982), p. 304. 
69 Granier (1931). 
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who in 1850 discussed the position of the Makedonian ruler in his History of the 
Macedonians. The work is a controversial history of the successive Makedonian rulers 
with no bibliography, methodologically uncritical use of ancient literary sources and 
rife with the author’s unmasked Christian ethics bias.70 The book is interesting, 
nevertheless, in that Farr attempted for the first time to delineate the structures of 
power that made up the monarchy in Argead Makedonia.71 The structures he 
identified have been italicised for the reader’s convenience.  
 First of all, royal conduct was circumscribed by a body of law, based on natural 
equity, which was in existence since the establishment of the kingdom.72 This body of 
law allowed the rulers to act as guardians of the kingdom but prevented them from 
transgressing the boundaries of their authority. Succession to that authority was 
hereditary, even if occasionally less than straightforward.73 Most deliberative powers 
rested with the king, although in the area of justice, and in particular in the judgement 
of capital cases, it was the Makedonian army and/or people that were called on to pass the 
sentence.74 In regard to the exercise of government, the king was assisted by his friends, 
both in manning the necessary posts and in holding consultations.75 Further, Farr 
recognised that the organisation of the Makedonian royal household was important in 
understanding the ways in which power was organised. However, in this case Farr was 
more concerned with the household troops, singling out the Bodyguards as the most 
important among them, rather than with the members of the king’s family.76 In this 
respect, he disregarded the role of royal women and their offspring altogether. Finally, 
Farr distinguished between the king’s priestly, military and economic power.77 He 
discussed the occasional officiating of kings in Makedonian religious rites, their 
position as the supreme military commanders in war and their role in exploiting 
Makedonia’s natural resources in precious metals as their most important source of 
revenue. 
 Farr’s conceptualisation of the Makedonian monarch as a fatherly autocrat 
“united in one common bond of affection” with his subjects, constrained by the legal 
                                                 
70 Farr (1850). For instances of his bias see his dismissal of the “vain and ridiculous rites that made up the sum 
of the religion of the Macedonians” (p. 28) or, his appreciation of the warlike nature of the Makedonian 
people as a consequence of their “evil” paganism, p. 32. 
71 Farr (1850), ch. III, “The History of the Polity of the Macedonians,” pp. 25-34. 
72 Farr (1850), p. 25. 
73 Farr (1850), p. 25. 
74 Farr (1850), p. 26. 
75 Farr (1850), p. 27. 
76 Farr (1850), p. 28. 
77 Farr (1850), pp. 29, 33-34. 
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boundaries of his office, does not take scholarship very far.78 More than the imperfect 
evidence Farr relies on, his interpretation hinges upon the methodological fallacy of 
translating a purely political (and ancient) organisation in contemporary Christian 
spiritual terms. Despite all that, Farr’s general categories have remained largely the 
centre of focus in subsequent debate. 
 Following the admonitions of Fustel de Coulanges against the fallacy of 
anachronism, scholarly work of the late nineteenth century onwards became 
increasingly focused on the analysis of the ‘primary’ sources. This was the direction 
that studies in Makedonian kingship and society took as well, with Hammond’s 
systematic textual criticism and first hand knowledge of the geography of Makedonia 
taking historical investigation to new levels of realistic reconstruction.79 As the 
following exposition of the debate regarding the nature of Makedonian kingship will 
show, however, emphasis on the sources in the case of Makedonia can only guarantee 
glimpses of its organisation. 
 
 
ABSOLUTISM VS. CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 The publication of Granier’s Die Makedonische Heerversammlung brought the 
constitution of the Makedonian monarchy to the forefront of Makedonian 
scholarship. Since then, many of the structures initially regarded as interacting with 
the power of the monarchy have been put under serious scrutiny. Granier’s main 
thesis, known as the ‘constitutionalist’ approach, identified two sources of power: the 
king and his army, as represented by an assembly of men-in-arms. Almost two decades 
later, Aymard added to those a body of traditional norms that was accepted and, at least 
in theory, had to be respected by the king and the Makedones alike.80 The view of the 
Makedonian monarchy as constituted by the king, an Army Assembly and a 
Makedonian system of laws prevailed until the 1970s, when it was slightly modified by 
Briant.81 He suggested that the Assembly of the Makedones could be a popular one 
(meeting without arms) or a military (with arms) depending on whether the Kingdom 
                                                 
78 Farr (1850), p. 27. 
79 His magnum opus (in collaboration with Griffith and Walbank) A History of Macedonia in three volumes 
remains the point of reference for students of Makedonia. For a list of his major works see bibliography. 
80 Aymard (1948, 1950, 1950b). 
81 Briant (1973). 
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was at peace or war respectively.82 This constitutional theoretical model posits that 
Makedonian kingship had evolved from the heroic military kingship of the archaic 
period.83 Accordingly, it argues that the Assembly was the formalised version of the 
once unceremonious, but steadfast relationship of reciprocal trust and obligations that 
warriors shared with their leader. In this interrelation, the king was regarded as a 
primus inter pares. As the scattered regional groups of lower Makedonia came together 
into a more coherent political unit, the Assembly of Makedones, in both times of 
peace and war, came to enjoy sovereign power alongside the king.84 This power, 
following Aymard, was guaranteed by a political νόμος.85 The functions of all three 
structures, therefore, were rigidly prescribed and king and assembly alike formally 
limited the extent of each other’s power.86  
 Constitutionalism has been challenged on various levels, ranging from minor 
amendments to its in toto rejection by the so-called ‘absolutist’ school, spearheaded by 
Errington, from the 1970s onwards.87 The grounds for attacking Granier’s theoretical 
model were to be found in the emphasis its critics lay on the stricter reliance on the 
sources and the facts related therein. For them, there was simply not enough evidence 
from the period preceding the reigns of Philippos II and Alexandros III to confirm the 
existence of a formal body of norms, laws or customs that constrained royal power 
and that allocated constitutional sovereignty to other groups within the kingdom. 
Similarly, it was argued that those last two reigns were so unique in their 
circumstances that it would be methodologically flawed to take contemporary 
evidence as reflecting earlier practice.88 And, indeed, any attempt to identify Argead 
structures reading back from Hellenistic evidence was considered little more than a 
leap of faith.89 According to the absolutists, there was but one recognised source of 
                                                 
82 Briant’s view of a popular assembly was rejected by Hammond (1972-1988) who insisted that the 
evidence suggests that the Assembly met only under arms, regardless of whether the Kingdom was at 
peace or war. From that, he draws the conclusion that the so-called ‘Makedones’ were only those men 
bearing arms in the King’s service, II, pp. 160-162. 
83 Granier had in mind the Homeric model and that of the chieftain groups of Germania, as described 
by Tacitus. 
84 For the evolution and establishment of the Makedonian Kingdom, see the account by Hammond 
(1983). 
85 Aymard (1950b), p. 127. 
86 Proponents of variations of constitutionalism include Aymard (1950), Briant (1973), Hammond 
(1989) and most recently Hatzopoulos (1996). For further work by these authors see bibliography. 
87 The first to reject Granier’s thesis was de Fransisci (1948). See also Errington (1974, 1978, 1983, 
1990). See also Lock (1977) and Anson (1985, 1991, 2008). See also Borza (1992), pp. 231-252. For an 
intermediate position see Mooren (1983).  
88 Borza (1992), pp. 232-234.  
89 Borza (1992), p. 233. 
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power and that was the king. Unfettered by any constitutional restrictions, be they 
laws, customs or organised groups exercising legitimate authority, it was the strength 
of the ruler’s personality combined with other exogenous factors, such as his economic 
wealth and the current politico-military situation both within the Kingdom and 
abroad, which determined the extent of his power. As succinctly put by one 
proponent of this position, the “king could do exactly what he could get away with.”90 
 The profoundly contradictory interpretations proposed regarding the nature of 
the Makedonian monarchy are exemplary of the problem of a fragmentary source 
record. Such is the nature of the evidence that some of its pieces lend themselves to 
conflicting interpretations. For instance, the same excerpts of Arrianos and Curtius 
have been used both to support and refute the existence of binding traditions and a 
Makedonian Assembly.91 It seems that what scholars are in reality battling out is not 
the structural organisation of Makedonian kingship per se, but rather the methods used 
to discern its components. We have already seen how the absolutist side has accused 
the constitutionalists of making unsubstantiated assumptions for pre-Philippic 
Makedonia based on later Alexandrian and Hellenistic material. It is remarkable to 
note that adherents of the constitutionalist school have pressed the exact same critique 
of the methodology of the absolutists.92 However, the chief bone of contention 
between the two schools is the use of theory. The author believes that, at this point, 
the division between constitutionalists and absolutists, a division based on the content 
of the debate, becomes secondary. Following Mooren, this thesis will revert to the 
distinction between maximalists and minimalists, a division catering to the 
methodological approach each favours.93 Maximalists, on the one hand, are generally 
keen to test theoretical models, such as the notion of Staatsrecht, on ancient political 
units and proceed deductively according to the evidence. Minimalists, on the other, 
follow a largely atheoretical approach. Refusing to go beyond the contemporary 
sources, which they subject to thorough textual criticism, the minimalists’ professed 
aim is a more realistic and unbiased appreciation of the past. According to one critic 
of the maximalist approach, they [the constitutionalists] “have attempted to force the practice 
                                                 
90 Borza (1992), p. 238. 
91 Most notably: Curt. 6.8.25 (Errington, 1978 contra Briant, 1973), Arr. 4.11.6 (Errington, 1978 & 
Lock, 1977 contra Aymard, 1950b).  
92 Commenting on Errington (1978) Hammond argues that “he makes the mistake, shared by almost all writers 
on this subject, of working backwards from the Hellenistic period and preferring Latin writers such as Curtius to 
contemporary Greek inscriptions and writers,” (1980), p. 463, n. 29. 
93 Mooren (1983), pp. 212-213, n. 28, based on terminology borrowed from discussions on Alexandros 
III (Schachermeyr 1973, p. 637 and Badian 1976, p. 293, n. 2.) 
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of Macedonian politics to fit preconceived modern theories which are out of place in the context of the 
unsophisticated Macedonian state.”94 However, it cannot be argued that the meticulous 
attention that minimalists pay to the sources renders the absolutist approach any 
stronger. On the contrary, on some occasions the source criticism applied is so harsh 
that authors end up rejecting (arbitrarily according to critics) a good deal of the 
already scarce available evidence as inconsequential.95 A case in point is Lock’s 
dismissal of Curtius’ “vetustus Macedonum modus” as an uncorroborated choice of 
wording by an author who cannot be trusted “to have observed nice distinctions of 
constitutional usage.”96 
 In 1983 Mooren addressed the discrepancy between the two approaches by 
suggesting for the first time that when it comes to the nature of the Makedonian 
monarchy “it seems not unlikely that the answer is to be sought somewhere between the ‘maximalist’ 
and the ‘minimalist’ views.”97 Although he admitted he could not provide a solid 
compromise, he attempted to re-evaluate the key evidence regarding the exercise of 
royal power in Makedonia. In his analysis he argued that the Makedones were “an 
integral component” of the monarchy and that a Makedonian nomos (in the form of a body 
of unwritten customs or traditions) existed beyond reasonable doubt.98 In sum, the 
Argead king’s power was not unconstrained, hence not absolute, even though there 
were no formal constitutional obligations in place for either the ruler or the people to 
abide by. 
 In agreement with Mooren’s proposition, which remains unchallenged more 
than twenty years after its formulation, this thesis holds that neither of the two 
principal models is satisfactory, both in terms of content and method. On the one 
hand, the attempt of the maximalists to force the evidence into a preconceived 
                                                 
94 Lock (1977), p. 97. 
95 See Goukowsky (1978), who even though sympathetic to the unitary nature of Makedonian kingship, 
refused to consider Lock’s argument against the judicial role of the army and people, because “cet auteur 
rejette arbitrairement les textes qui le gênent…” I, p. 232, n.29.  
96 Curt. 6.8.25, Lock (1977), p. 97. However, scholarship on Curtius has currently moved away from 
the aphoristic characterizations of Tarn and others, who viewed him as more of a novelist than a 
historian. The tendency is now to grant him more credibility, especially when it comes to his 
descriptions of foreign customs. See Baynham (1998), pp. 5-14. Cf. Fears (2001). 
97 Mooren (1983), p. 213, followed by Adams (1986), pp. 44-45. 
98 Mooren (1983), pp. 213-232. This argument echoes Aymand’s earlier work on the existence of a 
body of traditional nomoi. This shows that the constitutionalist/absolutist dichotomy is too rigid to 
accommodate all the nuances of scholarly interpretations. Rather, the main argument, as L.G. Mitchell 
suggests, is really between constitutionalism versus non-constitutionalism. As such, the debate should 
concentrate not on the existence or not of a formal body of law, which in any case is beyond the 
capacity of the extant evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt, but rather on the degree of 
autonomy of action that the ruler enjoyed within the context of the Argead monarchy. 
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theoretical mould presents us with an interesting, yet largely unsubstantiated scenario, 
whereby the main structure regulating the extent of the king’s power is constitutional 
law. However, nothing as institutionalised as this arrangement can be supported 
either by the literary or the epigraphic record. On the other hand, the minimalist 
conceptualisation of the workings of the Makedonian kingship favoured by the 
absolutists results in a self-confessed abstractive model, whereby the king is presented 
as an absolute autocrat, whose even most serious digressions (e.g. the murder of 
Kleitos by Alexandros) can be explained away as part of the rules of the game.99 
Despite the obvious merits of a heavily evidence-oriented approach, the type of 
monarchy described in this model can only be taken to correspond to a formulaic 
representation of the actual organisation of the monarchy in Makedonia. Certainly, 
the king stood at the apex of the social and political hierarchy, but it was not only his 
personality or the exogenous circumstances prevailing in the international arena at 
any given reign that defined the extent of his power. The dichotomy between a 
monarchy where the source of all power is either the law or the figure of the king is 
merely overestimating the importance of each at the expense of the other, while at the 
same time failing to identify those social, political and economic structures that shaped 
the expectations of the Makedones (nobility and citizenry alike) vis-à-vis the power of 
the ruler. In other words, it fails to define the structural framework within which the 
ruler operated. 
 To that effect, both approaches offer limited and static explanations of the 
nature and sources of power in the Makedonian monarchy, as well as of the 
relationship between the king and the Makedones. This thesis will argue that the 
interrelations between the king and his household, his well-attested circle of 
companions and friends, the army, and the rest of his subjects are far more dynamic 
and relevant in this context than hitherto presumed. A better understanding of these 
social networks will reveal the foundations upon which the power of the ruler rested, 
as well as the variety of the constraints that had an impact on its extent. It will be 
illustrated that these go beyond any constitutional arrangements, personality traits or 
fortuitous circumstances in the political arena. Such circumstantial evidence is 
significant, but only to a degree.  
                                                 
99 “..we are forced by the lack of evidence to describe in an impressionistic manner how things worked among the 
Macedonians,” Borza (1992), p. 236. For the absolute authority of the Makedonian king over everything, 




THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In regard to structure and methods, this thesis will not veer away from the traditional 
historical approach of an inductive enquiry, based on an examination of literary, 
numismatic, epigraphic and archaeological evidence.100 Further inferences will be 
drawn, where evidence allows, from comparisons with the other northern political 
units in Hellas, namely Epeiros, Thrake and Thessalia.101 However, the examination 
of the structures and organisation of Makedonian royal power will require an 
additional set of more robust theoretical and analytical tools, presented in this section.  
 
 
DEFINITION OF POWER 
 Before all else, it is imperative to define royal power. Power, as the cornerstone 
of any stratification system, modern or historical, is a central concept in the 
humanities as much as it is in the social sciences. In ancient history, it has become the 
focal point of an increasing number of studies and since the 1990s the literature has 
grown considerably. More specifically, scholarship has explored the relationship of 
monarchic power to politics and economics, religion, royal females, royal 
representation, propaganda and culture.102 Yet, for all its centrality it is more often 
than not the case in modern historical writing about the ancient world that the notion 
of power goes undefined and unscrutinized.103 There is a general tendency to assume 
that royal power can be predominantly manifested through the use or threat of 
                                                 
100 In the case of Ptolemaic Egypt, papyrological material will be used as well. As far as literary sources 
are concerned, it should be noted here that on account of the nature of the research question, the 
scarcity of the evidence, especially on the Makedonian side, and the space restrictions this thesis is 
heavily informed by the source criticism conducted by specialists, and unless noted otherwise, follows 
the current consensus.  
101 The work of Cabanes (1980), (1993), Archibald (2000), Carlier (2000) and Davies (2000) are 
instrumental. On the merits of the comparative approach see Samuel (1988). In reaction to the 
prevailing formalistic assumptions about a Makedonian monarchy of delineated power, he has 
conducted an influential study, whereby the Argead monarchy is compared to the tribal kingship of the 
Lombards, Visigoths and Merovingians in Late Antiquity. 
102 Politics: Nicolet (1990), economy: Manning (2003), religion: Marquaille (2003), Brisch (2008), royal 
females: Mirón (2000), Savalli-Lestrade (2003), Melville (2005), royal representation & propaganda: 
Stewart (1993), Hekster & Fowler (2005), culture: Erskine (1995). 
103 Consider Erskine’s (1995) account of the interrelation between the pursuit of cultural objectives by 
the Ptolemaioi and the advancement of their power. Nowhere in the text is the reader made aware of 
what the author has in mind when he uses the term ‘power’. Should one think that culture reinforces 
the ‘power’ to act upon will and whim? Or should one infer that it contributed to the Ptolemaic control 
over resources? Or both? Or something entirely different? Consider also Hekster & Fowler (2005), 
where the lack of a working definition for ‘power’ undermines their argument, see Noreña, 2006.       
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physical force, that it involves control, it breathes authority and legitimacy to the 
subjects and allows the basic leeway for a ruler to do as they please. It can be all or 
some of these elements at once. Taking for granted that the aforementioned 
commonsensical observations are valid, definitions are altogether omitted. Power, 
however, and by extent monarchic power, is not a static quantity and is infinitely 
more nuanced than sometimes assumed.104 The advancements of social theory that 
bear on the qualification of the notion cannot be ignored. This thesis adopts the 
general definition used by Mann in The Sources of Social Power, whereby power is “the 
ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of one’s environment.”105 Distanced from the 
Nietzschean overtones of der Wille zur Macht, power is not treated as an end in itself.106 
Rather, the Ur-goals of power holders conform to the principal drives of human 
nature: the maximization of enjoyment through the rational choice of the appropriate 
means to achieve them. According to Mann, these characteristics of human nature 
provide the original sources of power and power in itself is sought out only insofar as it 
can facilitate the acquisition of these goals.107 The choice of Mann’s definition is based 
on the plurality and analytical quality of his overall approach towards the study of the 
concept of power (through the IEMP model), which will be examined in the following 
section.  
 Although he accepts Weber’s classic definition that ‘power’ can best be 
understood as the chance of a man or men to realise their will against the resistance of 
others (which was articulated as a reaction to the Marxist equation of ownership and 
control of the means of production with political rule), Mann de-emphasizes the 
notion of conflict inherent in both these definitions.108 Instead, he focuses attention on 
co-operation, which he scrutinises on a meta-level. Put simply, Mann’s analysis of 
social power ventures to map the complex grid of intersecting human wills and needs 
each pursuing their goals in an attempt to identify the major sources of power, i.e. 
                                                 
104 As argues Parsons, discussed in Giddens (1984), pp. 256-262. 
105 Adapted from Parsons (1968) I, p. 236: Power is a “generalised mean” for attaining whatever goals 
one want to achieve. Mann (1986), p. 6. 
106 The term was coined by Nietzsche in Also Sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen (1883-1885). 
107 Mann (1986), pp. 4-6. Various thinkers have identified different motivations for the pursuit of 
power: for Schopenhauer it was the “will to live,” for Freud the need for sexual gratification, for the 
Utilitarians it was the pursuit of happiness, for the Marxists the drive for material subsistence. Each of 
these “wills” is typically given primacy over other motivations.   
108 “In general, we understand by ‘power’ the chance of a man or a number of men to realise their own will in a social 
action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action.” Weber (1978), p. 926. The concept 
of power in Marx is never addressed explicitly. It is found conflated with his notion of the state, which, 
for him, is the embodiment of power. As such, power is only existent in class societies and is intimately 
linked to the conflicting interests of the different classes. 
 
24 
single out the most important relations, which are most effective in “influencing the shape 
and nature of social structures in general.”109 Ultimately, human motivation for power is 
irrelevant. What matters are the ‘mechanics’ through which co-operation in any given 
context is negotiated by the participating actors in order to achieve the de facto 
plurality of human goals.110   
 Significantly, following much Marxist and Weberian thinking, power is viewed 
as a constant sum game. In other words, power is always possessed by some at the 
expense of others. Although the organisational superiority enjoyed by those who 
occupy superordinate positions within any given system places them at an advantage 
as opposed to the rest, this does not preclude the possibility that those at the lower and 
lowest echelons of the institutional apparatus can form collectives and through co-
operation enhance their joint power prospects at the expense of that of their superiors. 
Viewed this way power is no longer necessarily the prerogative of élite groups.  
 Finally, power is regarded as being a dispositional concept, referring to the 
“recurrent tendencies of human beings to behave in certain ways.”111 In other words, 
dispositional power alludes to the possibility of an action occurring rather than its 
actual occurrence. In the context of the possession of royal power, the ruler must still 
be considered powerful even when he is not physically observed exercising his power.  
  
 
THE IEMP MODEL 
 To date, while the power of the Makedonian monarch, and by extension the 
phenomenon of the endurance of the Argead dynasty on the throne, have been 
treated in numerous studies, none have methodically distinguished between the 
sources of that power, especially in its relation to the organisation of the groups that 
surrounded the monarch and made up the Makedonian state (i.e. court, army, the 
Makedones).112  
                                                 
109 Mann (1986), pp. 5-6. 
110 See Bryant (2006), p. 74. 
111 As opposed to an episodic one, whereby power is only recognised when exercised, see the discussion 
by Wrong (1979), quote in p. 6. 
112 Hammond (1972-1988) argued that the power of the Makedonian monarch was the result of the 
“reverence” held by the common people for the royal family, II: 152. On the other hand, Borza sounds 
resigned when he concedes that the reason behind the success of the Argead dynasty lies beyond our 
understanding (1992), p. 237. Both place emphasis on the absence of competing groups for power, 
without, however, taking the matter further. 
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 There is no need to reel off the debate regarding the place of social theory in 
historical writing and research.113 Its importance cannot be seriously contested. 
Further, as any sceptic of the idea of evolutionism in human history and society is 
aware, social change cannot be explained by any single mechanism, such as upward 
progress.114 It has already been made clear in the section on Agency vs. Structure 
above where this thesis stands on the debate regarding the drivers of social change. If 
history, therefore, is seen as the structuration of events in time and space through the 
continual interplay of agency and structure, then the historian cannot disengage 
themselves from the dual task of collecting the factual evidence of everyday life and 
giving them meaning through the understanding of the institutional and cultural 
forms that stretch frequently across vast expanses of time and space.115 
 The convergence of history and sociology is not only theoretical, but also 
methodological. As social science needs to incorporate the thorough examination of 
texts or material evidence, so does history cannot afford to ignore the study of abstract 
concepts inherent in social theory. Notwithstanding the absence of universal laws to 
govern social conduct, this thesis sides with those who argue that human behaviour 
was not less complex in the pre-modern world as it is in the modern.116 Insofar as 
economic opportunity presented itself, prompting political co-operation and the 
ensuing social stratification within a confined geographical space, the same 
complexity, in terms of power and its organisation and distribution, applies to ancient 
monarchical environments. Following from the definition offered above, the 
commonplace notion that power is something that élites have at the expense of the 
masses is deceptive.117  
 An obvious methodological template for the study of power structures in 
Argead Makedonia and early Ptolemaic Egypt was provided by a specialised strand of 
                                                 
113 See Burke’s (2005) seminal presentation of the connections between history and sociology and social 
theory. The 2005 edition of History and Social Theory is an expanded and updated version of his 1980 
Sociology and History (London: Allen and Unwin). There is a very good discussion in Giddens (1984), pp. 
355-372. See also Braudel (1973, 2002). For an overview of the debate regarding the role of theory in 
ancient history, see Morley (2004). 
114 As Giddens (1984) concedes: “…there are no keys that will unlock the mysteries of human social development, 
reducing them to a unitary formula, or that will account for the major transitions between societal types in such a way 
either,” p. 243. 
115 This is Giddens’ definition of history (1984), pp. 362-363. 
116 Claude Lévi-Strauss argued that the “savage mind” was structured along the same human 
characteristics as the “civilised.” Mann (1986), pp. 50, 124-127. See also his discussions of Pharaonic 
Egypt (pp. 108-115), Minoan Krete (pp. 115- 117). For the primitivist/modernist debate in ancient 
economic history, see Appendix A. 
117 See the definition of power offered by Lasswell (1936): “Those who get the most are the élite; the rest are 
mass,” p. 13. 
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scholarly research, which is called appropriately the Power Structure Research. The 
main objectives of this school are to highlight the unequal distribution of resources, 
control of which, they claimed, led to power, and the importance of social networks, 
formal and informal, in the concentration and preservation of power.118 Adherents of 
this approach built on the work of radical social theorists Floyd Hunter and C. Wright 
Mills, in order to identify who is/are the main power holder(s) in a given system and 
explain in what ways they perpetuate the power they yield through the manipulation 
of the political institutions that structure economic life.119  
 Although promising, Power Structure Research presents the ancient historian 
with two significant problems. The first is of a conceptual nature, while the second is 
methodological. Both can be elucidated by a reading of the school’s foremost 
representative, G. William Domhoff and his work Who Rules America?120 In the first 
instance, Domhoff’s approach in the controversy regarding power distribution in the 
United States is elitist, i.e. it concentrates on the role of power élites in decision-
making. By networks, Power Structure researchers refer exclusively to lobbying and 
social interaction at the high-end of decision-making. In addition to failing to provide 
a clear-cut method of establishing which individuals or groups constitute the ruling 
élite in a given society (which renders its existence more hypothetical and less 
axiomatic than proponents of this model would have it), critics have signalled the one-
dimensionality of what is essentially a heavily top-down approach.121 In other words, 
the élite model ignores the various ways in which individuals and groups, which are 
perceived to be excluded from the ruling élite can partake in the distribution of power, 
either through their role in enabling (and disenabling) power concentration, or 
through their compliance, which may be the result of cultural conditioning. The role 
of such groups is essential in evaluating the extent of any ruling élite’s power. The 
approach of this thesis is more in tune with Elias’ figurational sociology, which 
stressed the importance of networks (figurations as he called them) in shaping and 
binding human behaviour, even at the highest level of decision-making. Elias, who 
studied the power structures of the monarchic state (as observed through the 
figurations that developed in the royal courts) in its most absolutist manifestation in 
                                                 
118 For an overview and the relevant criticism, see Peoples (2009). 
119 Hunter authored the Community Power Structure (1953) and Mills the seminal The Power Elite (1956).  
120 The book has undergone six editions since its first publication in 1967. The latest was published in 
2010. 
121 For a critique of Mills, see Dahl (1958). 
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early modern Europe under Louis XIV, demonstrated that ultimately there can be no 
such thing as an absolute monarch.122  
 In regard to the second problem, the main methodological tool of this school 
was developed in response to criticism about the general ‘untestability’ of the élite 
model.123 Proponents have adopted network analysis as the preferred method of 
identifying the major “nodes” of decision-making activity and gathering all the data 
on all the ties and relevant exchange that takes place across these nodes. These are 
then mapped onto matrices in order to reveal the connections between the various 
networks. In the case of ancient history such a detailed method is problematic due to 
the limitations of the evidence.124  
 Both the lack of multi-dimensionality and the incompatible methodological 
framework provided by Power Structure Research renders this line of enquiry ill-
suited for the purposes of this thesis. Elias’ study of the social figurations in court 
societies and Giddens’ dual explanation of social change as effected by knowledgeable 
agents bound by structures beyond their choosing are extremely helpful in providing 
the conceptual springboard for the study of historic royal power structures and their 
migration through time and space. However, in terms of identifying and analysing 
these structures and networks that develop between the various power holders in 
Argead Makedonia and early Ptolemaic Egypt this thesis will make use of Michael 
Mann’s IEMP model. In the author’s view, Mann’s historical sociology, and 
specifically his IEMP model, provides a theoretically and methodologically sound, and 
empirically rich method to disentangle the mass of power structures and networks 
present in a monarchical environment.  
 Mann’s work represents the most recent synthesis of much general thinking in 
historical sociology, beginning with Marx, Durkheim, Weber and culminating in 
Giddens, with whose structuration theory there is significant conceptual compatibility. 
Like Giddens, Mann identifies four types of power institutions. Where Giddens 
recognises symbolic orders/modes of discourse, economic institutions, law/modes of 
sanction/repression, and political institutions as separate forms of power, Mann 
speaks of ideological, economic, military and political sources of social power 
                                                 
122 Elias (2000, 2006). 
123 See Dahl’s “Some Bad Tests” (1958), pp. 464-466. He argued that ultimately the hypothesis of a 
particular ruling élite can only be tested when there is observable conflict of interest between various 
groups of decision-makers and a particular group regularly prevails, (1958), p. 466. 
124 Peoples (2009). 
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respectively.125 What made him better suited for this study is the methodological 
clarity with which he presents his model of power organisation and which will be 
discussed further below.126 What is more, his predominantly empirical approach in 
examining the complexities of power distribution, which includes ancient empires 
(territorial and empires of domination), provides a viable template for the study of the 
kingdoms under scrutiny in this thesis.127 Unlike Elias, Mann does not set out to reveal 
universal laws.128 Far from being simply descriptive, his pluralistic approach, which 
centres on the identification of the most powerful organisational means that are 
created by the masses of individuals pursuing their goals, is essentially concerned with 
the process of social change.129 As such, his work has been praised for balancing the 
right amount of theory with the right amount of empirical evidence and for 
contributing significantly to the understanding of historical change.130    
 In his study, which is fundamentally a history of power relations in human 
societies and the changes in its uses, Mann holds that “[s]ocieties are constituted of multiple 
overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power.”131 As already mentioned, he 
identifies four such networks (Ideological, Economic, Military and Political), which he 
called the four sources of social power. According to his theoretical model, the 
primacy of these four categories is derived not from their role as ends in themselves 
(i.e. humans are not specifically desirous of ideological, economic, military or political 
goals) but from the fact that each possesses the fundamental organisational means 
necessary to attain any variety of human goals, irrespective of what these are.132 In 
this line of reasoning, the acquisition and preservation of power can be considered the 
outcome of the effective manipulation of its sources; in our case, by the Argead kings 
of Makedonia and early Ptolemaic Egypt, as the heads of state. However, power was 
                                                 
125 Giddens (1981), Mann (1986), p. 11, n. 1. Marxists and neo-Weberians recognize three types of 
power: class (i.e. economic power), status (i.e. political power) and party (i.e. ideological power). Mann 
believes that the potential for coercion (i.e. military power) is a separate type of power and should not 
be integrated with political. 
126 For a graphic representation of the causal IEMP model of organised power see figure 2. 
127 Mann (1986), esp.  chs. 5 and 8.  
128 In all of his voluminous work Elias was guided by the conviction that it is possible to “clarify the 
characteristics that all possible human societies have in common,” Elias (2000), p. 454. 
129 Mann (1986), pp. 5, 30. 
130 See Bryant (2006), Jacoby (2004). 
131 Mann (1986), pp. 1-2. Mann holds that he provides a theory, as well as a history, of power relations. 
However, critics have argued that his theoretical formulations do not make up for a recognizable social 
theory. What he has provided instead is a method (referring to the IEMP model of representing ideal-
typical constellations of ideological, economic, military and political power relations). See further Hall 
& Schroeder (2006). 
132 Mann (1986), p. 2. 
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not limited to them, at the expense of everybody else. Within the ideological, 
economic, military and political networks that formed around them various other 
groups or individuals within the state (members of the dynasty, members of the court 
and members of the citizenry) participated, which had the possibility to manipulate 
rules and resources in order to achieve their own goals. This fact alone made them 
power holders in their own right. 
 One of the central analytical problems with this model is the degree of overlap 
between these different sources. As one reviewer noted, they could all be considered to 
a certain extent ‘political.’133 Such criticism, however, monumentally fails to grasp the 
analytical purpose served by Mann’s separation of the sources of power. By dispensing 
with the conventional abstract language used by historians and sociologists alike to 
describe power and power relations in human societies, the contribution of Mann’s 
approach deserves merit precisely because he concentrates discussion on more 
concrete levels of analysis. Power is not treated as an abstraction but is studied 
through the real connections that are formed between people and which are 
empirically observable. For instance religion, which is Mann’s most typical 
manifestation of ideological power, is not studied as the sum of its abstract beliefs at 
any given point in history, but rather as the sum of the everyday structures formed by 
the people who participate in the workings of religion (e.g. priests, monks, devotees 
etc.).134 More specifically, the model seeks to examine power networks in a given 
historical setting through the study of sociospatial and organisational parameters, 
namely the capacity to organise and control people, resources and territory.135 The 
distinction between the four sources of power draws attention to the different 
relationships that matter in the capacity of a ruler for organisation. It brings to the 
foreground the ways and extent in which power-holders monopolised ideological 
norms and interacted with social networks in order to extract surplus, secure territory 
and resources, and maintain political control and cohesion over the subjects and 
territories under their control. In the case of the Argead Makedonian monarchy/state, 
such an approach can provide a fresh perspective in a research area where more than 
                                                 
133 Moore (1988), p. 170. Mann’s model has been critiqued by both historians and social theorists. The 
former have objected to his Eurocentrism, (the idea that civilisation moves steadily westward), see Blaut 
(2000, pp. 113-127). The latter have mainly criticised his anti-evolutionism, see Lenski (1987), Tilly 
(1987), Gellner (1988). The interests of this thesis lie with Mann’s approach towards the study of social 
networks, rather than with his grand vision of historical development. 
134 See Collins (2006), pp. 20-23, Mann (2006), pp. 343-350. 
135 Mann (1986), pp. 2-3. 
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three generations of scholars’ interpretations have been confounded by the 
intractability of the source problem. 
 A second consideration that arises concerns the level of methodological 
integration of the IEMP model in this thesis. Balancing the primary role played by the 
evidence in this study with the organisational clarity this model will lend, a tweaked 
version of it will be adopted here. Based on the available evidence and the already 
established need for an analysis of the structures and social networks of kingship, an 
examination of the power structures of the Argead Makedonian monarchy will need 
to incorporate Mann’s four distinct layers of power under the following headings: 
dynastic, courtly, military and economic.136 To begin with, the dynastic layer 
incorporates at the same time elements of an ideological and political nature. On the 
one hand, the dynasty of the king, or rather the king’s dynastic connections, served as 
the main legitimating (hence ideological) vehicle that galvanised the support of his 
court (his high-end political associates) and his subjects. On the other hand, his 
household (i.e. the rest of the members of the dynastic house) were involved in the 
decision-making process on a political level, either enabling or constraining the extent 
of his power. The court, involving the main decision-making individuals and groups 
on a state-level, corresponds to the political component of Mann’s model. The 
networks and structures developed around the military and economic sources of 
power are self-explanatory, denoting the ever-important capacity of a ruler to mobilise 
a military force in order to ensure compliance and the capacity to organise efficiently 
the economic resources of the state. It has to be noted that these layers are not 
ordered according to importance. On the contrary, it is the author’s contention that 
there is no issue of primacy between them. Each, or a combination of several, was 
more prevalent than the rest at different periods and reigns. Their presentation in this 
thesis is based simply on the level of immediacy of the ruler to the power networks 
that are inherent in each layer, as well as their reach. On the one end, the political 
organisation of the dynasty involved a finite combination of networks unfolding in the 
immediate environment of the ruler, while at the other end, the networks that 
sustained the economic power of the king fanned out across the entire kingdom.  
 
 
                                                 
136 For a schematic representation, see figure 1. 
 
31 
THE SOURCES OF ROYAL POWER 
 
What follows is an introduction to the power structures that will form the backbone of 
discussion in the main body of this thesis. The most prominent elements of each are 




 Depending on whether one views the ‘dynasty’ as an abstract idea or as a 
concrete mesh of intersecting individuals that belong to a particular clan and are tied 
through bonds of kinship, dynastic power can be both ideological and political. In 
each case, the organisational structure and reach of dynastic power differ. In view of 
Mann’s model, it could be studied under two separate headings: the abstract notion of 
the dynasty as an ideological movement on the one hand, and on the other the 
political role of the members of the Argead or Ptolemaic clan could merge with the 
study of the political structures of the monarchy. However, given the centrality of the 
‘dynasty’ (as a concept and as an agglomeration of people) in the Makedonian state, 
whether Argead or Ptolemaic, dynastic power and its dual nature (both ideological 
and political) will form the first layer of power to be examined in this thesis. 
 In Mann’s terminology, dynastic power exhibits elements of both an extensive 
and an intensive organisation. The extensive organisation of dynastic power involves 
the manipulation of dynastic frames of reference as instruments of legitimation with the purpose 
of strengthening and intensifying the cohesion and confidence of the ruler’s subject 
base.137 Its use of diffused power techniques, such as coinage and myth, which transcend 
sociospatial boundaries render it akin to ideological power.138 
 The intensive organisation of dynastic power concerns the structures that 
framed the dynastic organisation of the monarchy and the social networks that were 
formed between the king and the rest of the Argead royal house, i.e. consorts and 
progeny. Since in this context power derives from the centralised regulation of social 
relations, following Mann’s model, dynastic power can be equated to political 
power.139   
                                                 
137 Mann (1986) calls this immanent morale, p. 24. 
138 Mann (1986), pp. 22-23. 
139 Mann (1986), pp. 26-27. 
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 Beginning with the assumption of royal office one needs to address first and 
foremost the issue of succession and its mechanisms. It appears that in Argead 
Makedonia succession was not a clearly demarcated process. With no law of 
primogeniture being uniformly applied, any royal offspring or close relative had the 
potential to contend for the throne through the necessary backing of other influential 
individuals or groups, both domestic and foreign. The practice of royal polygamy, which 
produced multiple offspring from different wives/queens, further complicated the 
situation, allowing royal females to participate in the struggle for dynastic supremacy. As 
Ogden has successfully shown, wives of the same king and their sons often formed 
rival groups, which contended against one another and against the king himself for the 
crown.140  
    
 
COURT STRUCTURES 
 The second layer involves the organisation of the court and the power 
networks that developed between the king and his extended circle of friends, 
assistants, allies; i.e. those individuals that frequented his court and with whom he 
socialised on a personal and political level. As the centre of political decision-making 
in a monarchical environment, the organisation of a ruler’s court was a source of 
political power. As Mann argues, political power is necessarily located at the centre 
and is exercised outwards.141 In this light, the effective organisation of power relations 
at the court level bears an impact on the political power of the ruler on both an 
intensive and an extensive level: first, in his capacity to mobilize the commitment and 
loyalty of his assistants, and second, to delegate his decisions over the peoples and 
territories under his control.142  
 The court is both a physical and a social structure. The layout of the physical 
court, as revealed through the archaeological remains of the royal palaces, and 
especially the arrangement of space in and around what are thought to be the 
official/public quarters, can provide information on the type of social activities that 
                                                 
140 Ogden (1999). 
141 Mann (1986), p. 27. 
142 According to Mann’s model, the organisation of power relations at the court level is a form of 
political organisation, regulating political relations at the centre and exercised outward. See Mann 
(1986), pp. 26-27 and above n. 46. 
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took place there.143 Literary and archaeological evidence suggests that banqueting was 
the cornerstone of the social interaction between the king and his courtiers. By extent, 
the makeup of the social court can broadly be deduced from the attendance to these 
banquets. The literary sources often speak of members of the extended Argead family, 
a restricted circle of close companions (σωματοφύλακες), a broader one of friends 
(ἑταῖροι or φίλοι) and, on occasion, other officials, with military or administrative 
responsibilities. The hierarchic organisation of those individuals depended on their 
personal standing with the ruler and as such was rather fluid. As revealed by the titles 
of the courtiers there was overall very little of the professional specialisation in 
function in the Argead court, which tends to result in rigid hierarchical structures.  
 The function of the social court entailed acting as an advisory body to the ruler, 
which occasionally met in Assembly or synedrion, and a quarry of military, administrative 
and diplomatic personnel necessary for the workings of the monarchy. Conclusive 
evidence for the binding authority of the decisions reached by the participants in the 
Assembly or synedrion, as we have seen in the first part of this introduction, is lacking. 
However, it seems improbable that the king could afford to disregard the opinions 
voiced by the court as a whole, by court factions, or even by individuals, at least on a 
regular basis. This is an outcome of the network of power interdependencies that evolved 
between the Makedonian ruler and his courtiers.144 The evidence suggests that the 
infrastructural apparatus in Argead Makedonia was weak and logistics would not 
allow political decisions to be implemented on a far-reaching scale. In other words, 
the political power of the Argead ruler was not organised around a functioning 
bureaucracy. Rather, the real infrastructure of the political power of the king was the 
courtiers, charged with communicating political decisions to the farthest corners of the 
kingdom and beyond on diplomatic missions. In return for good services rendered the 
king would reward the courtiers with gifts (δωρεαί) of money, land or booty. Such a 
working relationship was geared towards the satisfaction of self-interest on both sides 
and can account further for the loyalty of the courtiers towards the king, (another 
significant reason being the aforementioned loyalty to the ideological power 
commanded by the ‘dynasty’).  
 
 
                                                 
143 Cf. the multiple banquet halls of the palace at Pella, Chrysostomou (1997), p. 125. 




The third layer involves the structures that supported the military power of the 
ruler and the networks that stemmed from it. Owing to the success of Philippos’ re-
organisation of the Makedonian army and Alexandros’ Asian campaign, the military 
has long been celebrated as the most important source of Makedonian power. And 
deservedly so, since the Makedonian phalanx marched through the most inhospitable 
terrains of the known world and conquered the notorious Persian Empire 
undefeated.145 Similar to the organisation of dynastic and court power, the 
organisation of military power can be both intensive and extensive.146 The former 
refers to the ability of the ruler to “command a high level of mobilization or 
commitment” from those who partake in the hierarchy of military power (i.e. military 
officials, army, citizens of the state), while the latter concerns the organisation of 
defence and offence over broader geographical and social spaces (i.e. territories and 
populations that lie outside the strict administrative control of the state, but within the 
military reach of a campaigning army).147  
The extensive organisation of military power relies heavily on logistical issues 
of human and material resources, technology and the nature and speed of 
communications.148 Notwithstanding their importance in increasing the effectiveness 
of a military force, these elements can be considered more as the tools through which 
military power was implemented, rather than the structures upon which it depended. 
Additionally, it has been observed that extensive military organisation cannot yield 
but minimal control in territories that have not been politically or economically 
integrated to the state.149 The loyalty (often to the death) of agents within the sphere of 
sustained royal military power, cemented by the ideological acceptance of a king’s 
right to rule, dissipates to a cursory compliance as one moves farther away from the 
centre of power, where the effects of military power are of a more transient nature (i.e. 
                                                 
145 See Engels’ (1978) logistical analysis of Alexandros’ campaigning army. He argues that thanks to 
Philippos’ reforms Alexandros had at his disposal “the fastest, lightest, and most mobile force in existence, capable 
of making lightning strikes before anyone had time to fear the event,” p. 119. 
146 According to Mann (1986). 
147 Mann (1986), p. 7, pp. 25-26. 
148 Mann (1986), pp. 9-10. Military logistics is defined as “the science of planning and carrying out the movement 
and maintenance of forces,” NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, s.v. logistics. (AAP-6-2009, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap-6-2009.pdf, last accessed 14 February 2010). 
149 Mann (1986), p. 26. This was also observed by Lattimore (1962), who studied the frontier relations 
between China and Mongol tribes. He distinguished between an inner and an outer radius of military 
reach. In the outer, which included conquered but not consolidated territories, the populations could 




they desist when the conquering army moves onwards). In line with Genghis Khan’s 
alleged dictum that it is easy to conquer the world on horseback, but an empire 
cannot be ruled unless the conqueror dismounts, the study of military power in the 
framework of this thesis will focus on those structures that supported the intensive 
organisation of military power.150 
The military power of the king was based on the virtual monopoly of physical force, 
which, in line with the tenets of military kingship, was concentrated in his hands. An 
understanding of the ideological cohesion inspired by the legitimacy of the dynasty and 
state to enjoy the monopoly of violence, which extended to the common soldier, is 
relevant for an appreciation of the extent and organisation of military power. Vital to 
this cohesion was the fact that the king himself was the head of the army. He was in 
charge of organising the military units and devising the strategic plans for the 
campaigns. Most importantly, though, he was expected to lead the charge in battle 
and to co-ordinate the army in the field. This direct involvement was to an extent 
dependent on the personal charisma of the ruler. At the same time, however, it 
created a set of power relations with the common soldiers, which, coupled with his 
military success record, fuelled the loyalty of the army towards what was considered a 
traditionally sanctioned royal authority.151  
The intensive military organisation of the kingdom was reinforced by the 
nature of the Makedonian society itself with its emphasis on militarism.152 Military 
training was prominent in the education of the young. Literary anecdotes and 
archaeological evidence point to the importance of hunting as an activity suitable for 
adolescents and young adults alike in order to familiarise them with military 
discipline. On some occasions, successful hunting of large game indicated the rite of 
passage from adolescence to manhood. Both the latter structures impressed upon the 
younger generations the virtues of military life, the mode of which seems to have been 
widespread in Makedonian society.153 Further support for the permeation of military 
organisation in society, even in times of peace, is the existence of a system of material 
                                                 
150 Quoted in Meagher (2007), p. 408. 
151 le Bohec-Bouhet (1999), p. 79. 
152 In the context of this thesis militarism is used absolved of its modern derogatory connotations. 
Rather, given the preponderance of military ideology in the governance of the Makedonian state it is 
taken to encompass those military attitudes or ideals, which supported the belief or policy that a state 
should maintain a strong military capability and be prepared to use it aggressively in order to defend or 
promote its interests, OED s.v. militarism. 
153 The most prominent grave offerings in male burials are instruments for drinking, hunting and 
warfare, suggesting that these were the most significant pastimes of the average Makedonian, (Hellenic 
Ministry of Culture Press Office, 10 September 2008).  
 
36 
rewards for good services that was in place for both soldiers and high officials. It had 
the form of gifts of land. The much-debated consultative role of an army assembly 
during times of crisis testifies to the power relations that developed between the king and the 




 The fourth layer involves the economic power of the king and the structures 
that sustained it. The evidence for the economic organisation of Argead Makedonia 
has long been considered too scanty to support any in-depth discussion. However, a 
careful collection of the available material, including the most recent advances in the 
field of Makedonian epigraphy, reveals that the Argead economy was far more 
sophisticated than previously recognised. In order to understand and analyse the 
structures of an economy this thesis makes use of Douglass North’s Neo-Institutional 
Economics framework, which places emphasis on the examination of economic 
institutions, i.e. the rules of the game, in order to explain continuity and change.154 
The discussion will concentrate on the property rights régime and the variety of economic 
actors that were engaged in it, (i.e. the ruler, private entrepreneurs, the Makedones and 
temples). By disentangling who had access to the natural and monetary resources of the 
state (i.e. land, timber, minerals, booty, taxation) and to what degree, one can gauge 
the evolution of power figurations through time and space and assess the level of 
interdependence between the central authority and the peripheral networks of 
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Fig. 1: Schematic representation of the four sources of royal power. In this schema, 
which is a variation based on Mann’s IEMP model (1986), the sources of royal 
power are shown to radiate outwards from the concentrated core of the dynasty, 
the royal court and the army, ultimately to cover the territorial totality of the 
kingdom under the diffused workings of the economy. The schema is organised in 
concentric circles in order to reflect the basic concept of spatial immediacy with 
the ruler and accentuate the centrality of the monarchic authority as the fons et origo 
of these powers. No form of hierarchical arrangement is implied. At the same time, 
it should be borne in mind that the structures and networks that make up the 
organisation of each of these layers of power are overlapping and intersecting and 





“An eagle descending from the clouds, accompanied by lightning, 
is a favourable omen for victory in war 
for the Argead kings..” 
 




CHAPTER ONE: DYNASTIC POWER 
 
 
t has long been recognised that the monarchy was the central institution in 
Makedonia and the dynasty was at the centre of that monarchy.156 Of all the 
royal houses that emerged after the death of Alexandros III, the Ptolemaic 
dynasty proved the most enduring. In terms of longevity, it was the most successful. 
Although for three centuries the unchallenged, uninterrupted rule of one Ptolemaios 
after another stands as a testament to the institutionalisation of the Ptolemaic line as 
the legitimate source of power, the enduring presence of Ptolemaic Egypt as a political 
unit in the power map of the Hellenistic World was the result of factors that went 
beyond its dynastic cohesion.157 As a matter of fact, it was the lack of cohesion, inter 
alia, that destabilised the broader system of the Hellenistic world and allowed the 
Romans to intervene as early as the close of the third century BCE.158 The strife for 
power and succession, which is endemic in any monarchic state and which most 
frequently manifests itself among competing groups belonging to different branches of 
the dynastic family tree, was exacerbated by the self-serving practices of the Romans, 
who played potential candidates for succession off against their rivals.159 The kingdom 
was eventually weakened to such an extent that it was finally incorporated into the 
provinces of the Roman Empire.160 
                                                 
155 Based on a translation by Stephens IN Acosta-Hughes et al. (2006). 
156 “The monarchy is the foundation of all else in any Hellenistic kingdom,” Bagnall IN: Bingen (2007), p. 4. 
157 Paradoxically, the enormous wealth of Egypt kept it from being annexed sooner that it was. See Cic. 
De Rege Alexandrino, esp. FF 1-6. For a recent commentary on the fragments see Crawford (1994), pp. 
44-57.  
158 For the decline in Ptolemaic international status and the shift in the balance of power that followed 
the premature death of Ptolemaios IV, see Eckstein (2006), pp. 104-116. 
159 E.g. the Roman Senate supported in 163 BCE the partition of Ptolemaic rule between Ptolemaios 
VI Philometor and his younger brother Ptolemaios VIII Physkon, Polyb. 31.10. 
160 Ptolemaic Egypt was annexed by Octavianus in 30 BCE. Thirty years earlier (63 BCE) the Seleukid 
kingdom had succumbed to the forces of Pompeius and Lucullus. For a detailed history of the dynastic 




 In spite of the instability that similarly characterised succession in the régime of 
Argead Makedonia, hereditary dynastic monarchy still constituted the most 
recognizable paradigm of government for the generals who partitioned the Empire 
after the death of Alexandros.161 Every single one from this new generation of state-
builders ventured to establish their own dynastic monarchy with varying degrees of 
success.162 The purpose of this chapter is to examine the dual capacity of the ‘dynasty’ 
to act both as a source of ideological and of political power for the Argead and early 
Ptolemaic rulers.163 Accordingly, the first part will be devoted to the function of the 
‘dynasty’ as an ideology. More specifically, the relevant section will concentrate on the 
ways in which the ‘dynasty’ could, by its very nature, or through conscious 
manipulation, invoke notions of legitimate authority to the subject populations. It will 
be argued that the ‘dynasty’ acted as the single most important ideological element, 
overrunning religion, which unified the Makedonian states, Argead and Ptolemaic. 
The second part, which will examine the role of the dynasty as a source of political 
power, will address the structures that framed the dynastic organisation of the 
monarchy and the social networks that were formed between the king and the rest of 
the Argead royal house, i.e. consorts, progeny and extended family members. The two 
most defining structures of Argead intensive dynastic organisation were the patterns of 
succession and the practice of royal polygamy. In light of the heightened importance 
of royal females in the Ptolemaic dynasty the final section of this chapter will focus on 
a comparison between the political role exercised by female members of the Argead 
royal household and their Ptolemaic counterparts. Overall, it will be argued that the 
‘dynasty,’ both as an idea and as a configuration of individuals, was a significant 
contributing factor to the imperial success of the Makedonian kingdoms, both Argead 
and Ptolemaic, not because it had become an institutionalized aspect of Makedonian 
rule, but because the extensive and intensive power networks it generated continued 
to serve the goals of the decision-makers. 
  
                                                 
161 One should note the proposal of Ptolemaios I at the conference of Babylon, namely that the empire 
could, instead of a king, be governed by a council of generals that would decide by majority voting 
(Curt. 10.6.13-15, Just. 13.2.12). As Mooren (1983) argues this incident could suggest that kingship 
might not have been “that essential to the Macedonian state,” pp. 233-240. In practice, however, such 
alternatives were only considered in times of real crisis. This recommendation, essentially to bypass the 
traditional constitution of Makedonia, vanished into thin air when Ptolemaios was assigned his own 
satrapy. He exhibited no interest in governing Egypt according to majority vote. For royal succession in 
Argead Makedonia, see Hatzopoulos (1986), contra Greenwalt (1989). 
162 Consider the short-lived kingdom of Lysimachos in Thrake, Lund (1992).  
163 Refer to the introduction, pp. 31-32.  
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THE DYNASTY AS IDEOLOGY: THE USE OF DYNASTIC FRAMES OF REFERENCE 
 
According to Mann, ideological power stems from three interrelated sociological 
arguments.164 First of all, individuals cannot interpret and act upon the social world 
solely relying on their senses. Categories of meaning are required to decode sensory 
perceptions. Secondly, compliance and smooth co-operation between individuals and 
groups are sustained through normative behaviour, i.e. behaviour based on shared 
understandings of how people should act in relation to one another. Finally, there is 
the existence of ritual practices, which give outward expression to traditional, non-
rational beliefs. Rites and rituals involve actions whose significance and meaning is 
usually much wider and deeper than the deed itself. According to Bourdieu, they take 
place “only because […] they find their raison d’être in the conditions of existence and the 
dispositions of agents who cannot afford the luxury of logical speculation, mystical effusions or 
metaphysical Angst.”165 It follows that those who monopolise a claim to meaning, norms 
and ritual practices yield ideological power. As ideological movements tend to 
increase the mutual trust, collective morale, cohesion and co-operation prospects of a 
group, the collective power of its leaders is enhanced. In terms of organisation, 
ideological power generally depends on what Mann calls “diffused” power techniques, 
such as coinage, whose distribution transcends by far the logistical reach of any other 
authoritative institution of the state.166 
 Through the ages, religion has proven the most obvious ideological source of 
power. However, this does not mean that its role was prevalent in all societies. Unlike 
Pharaonic Egypt, Classical Hellas, including the Argead Kingdom of Makedonia, was 
made up of more secular political units, meaning that religion was not the major 
permeating source of power over the people. It is a fact that the pantheon of gods was 
shared across the Makedonian kingdom and so were to a great extent the rituals 
associated with religious practice.167 The evidence we possess, however, implies that 
religious and political authority did not depend on one another in the same manner 
that they overlapped in Dynastic Egypt. The Makedonian king was the head of the 
religious order, but religion itself was not what “caged” (in Mann’s words) the 
population into compliance. The closest thing to a transcendent unifying ideology that 
                                                 
164 For an overview, see Mann (1986), pp. 22-23. 
165 Bourdieu (1990), p. 96. 
166 Mann (1986), p. 23. 
167 See Christensen and Murray (2010). 
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the Makedones shared was the ideology of the monarchy. Its organisation, through 
the use of diffused power techniques, such as coinage and the construction of dynastic 
genealogies, was geared towards providing legitimation for the established political 
authority in the Makedonian state and its representatives, the Argead dynasty. It is of 
interest to observe in the following discussion that the importance of the Argead 
dynasty (the Ur-dynasty of the Makedonian state) as a legitimating factor continued to 
be used as an ideological source of power in the early Ptolemaic Kingdom. 
 
Legitimacy can generally be described as a formula by which individuals accept a 
power and view their obedience as a just commitment.168 Rather than being an 
abstract quality that a state either possesses or not, legitimacy, or rather the process of 
legitimation, is an observable activity in which empowered groups make claims 
regarding their right to rule.169 The strategies employed in early Ptolemaic Egypt for 
legitimating rule and securing the support of subjects and peers were varied, but 
modern scholars tend to view some as more influential than others. On the one hand, 
Gruen believes that legitimacy lay with the personal achievements of the individual 
kings.170 Austin, on the other hand, argues that the consolidation of kingship and its 
legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects depended on military success and the associated 
economic rewards. It was the parading of booty and the promise of more that 
attracted soldiers to the sides of the Hellenistic monarchs.171 Bosworth voices another 
view: legitimacy and support were essentially maintained by the constant practice of 
euergesiai. Failure to reward the loyalty of subjects would ultimately have a detrimental 
effect on the ruler’s popularity.172 Notwithstanding the importance of immediate 
benefits in a ruler-ruled relationship and the favourable or unfavourable reputation 
individual rulers could accrue as a result of their personal charisma, military success or 
benefactions, legitimation is also the outcome of more deeply-seated processes that 
relate to what the audience (domestic and inter-state) perceive as constituting the right 
of a king to rule. Adherence to traditional norms as a legitimating claim is in line with 
Weber’s theory of the bases of legitimate authority, whereby the person occupying a 
traditionally sanctioned position commands the obedience of subjects who believe in 
                                                 
168 International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences 2001, s.v. Legitimacy, Sociology of. See also 
Mann (1986), p. 7 and Weber M. (1978), pp. 212-301. 
169 Weber M. (1978), Barker (2001), pp. 1-29. 
170 Gruen (1958). 
171 Austin (1986) esp. 457-461, Carney (1995), p. 375. 
172 Bosworth (2002), pp. 246-278. 
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the validity of age-old rules.173 In the Hellenistic context, students of the literature and 
art of the period have recognised a conscious effort from the part of the rulers to 
manipulate those media in order to project a self-constructed persona that would help 
cement the acceptance of their subjects.174 This rhetoric aimed not only at 
legitimating the current king but extended the honours to his family, successors and 
ancestors.175 The representation of a strong dynasty, rooted in both Egyptian and 
Hellenic-Makedonian tradition, was a recurring theme in royal propaganda. As 
suggested by their titulature and the Pharaonic visual vocabulary in their portraits, the 
Ptolemaioi aspired to be accepted by their Egyptian subjects as the legitimate 
successors of the Pharaohs.176 For their Hellenic-Makedonian subjects and the rival 
Hellenistic kingdoms, links with the Hellenic and Argead past appear to have 
mattered in claims for legitimation. The following sections aim to explore the use and 
importance of Argead references in early Ptolemaic ideological claims for dynastic 
legitimation, especially in relation to the construction of dynastic genealogies. This 
involves the making of dynastic claims through the exploitation of widely recognisable 
symbols in myth and coinage and the relentless advancement of dynastic links to 
illustrious representatives of the Argead dynasty, or rather simply to Philippos II and, 
most importantly, Alexandros III himself. 
 
 
CONSTRUCTING ARGEAD GENEALOGIES 
 Kingship in Makedonia was inextricably linked to the Argead dynasty.177 Even 
if the transition between reigns was rarely smooth the fact that every last one of the 
Makedonian kings was an Argead confirms that Argead dynastic connections were an 
indispensable source of ideological power for aspiring rulers. It appears that the belief 
in the supremacy of the Argead royal house over and above the rest of the Upper 
Makedonian royal houses can be traced back to the earliest history of the Makedonian 
                                                 
173 Weber distinguished between three ideal types of legitimate authority: legal -which, as the outcome 
of a legally established impersonal order, cannot find its parallel in the Classical and Hellenistic world- 
traditional and charismatic, Weber M. (1978), pp. 212-301. 
174 Stewart (1993), Stephens (2003), Kosmetatou (2004), pp. 226-227 with references on earlier work. 
175 Consider the Memphis Decree (OGIS 96 ll. 35-38 of the Greek, Budge 1989) where the legitimacy 
accrued by the various benefactions is extended to the king’s children/successors, but also backwards to 
his ancestors. 
176 For Pharaonic prototypes in Ptolemaic royal iconography and titulary see Stanwick (2002), Hölbl 
(2000), pp. 79-81. 
177 See further below in this chapter the section on the organisation of dynastic succession. 
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state.178 The widely disseminated story, also reiterated by Herodotos, that the royal 
house of the lowland Makedones originated from the king of Argos Temenos, who 
was a direct descendant of Herakles, thus vesting them with divine ancestry, might 
hold some evidence in explaining that supremacy.179 
 Interestingly, the role of the Argead dynasty as a legitimating ideology for rule 
was retained in the period that witnessed the meteoric rise of the shining new 
Successor dynasties. Even if, as Diodoros mentions, a collective sigh of relief escaped 
the Successors when Kassandros eliminated the last of the Argeadai, the now extinct 
Makedonian dynasty still mattered as a legitimating vehicle.180 This section will 
examine the creation of dynastic links with the Argead dynasty as a whole by looking 
at the genealogical traditions put forward in the early Ptolemaic period. 
 Accepting the premises that ideological power can stem from the control of 
ideological resources and that the rulers in a monarchic environment have the 
capacity to monopolize the choice of myths and symbols that they associate with 
themselves, then it can be deduced that the royal genealogies that circulated in early 
Ptolemaic Egypt, especially within court literary circles, served the precise aim of 
advertising the legitimating agenda of the rulers to their subjects.181 
 Walbank has argued that the Ptolemaioi did not press their Argead connections 
very far.182 In fact, however, the genealogical strands preserved in a number of 
accounts paint a different picture. In all of them, Ptolemaios I is presented as having 
direct blood relations with the Argead kings. In what seems to be the most widely 
iterated version, Ptolemaios I inherited this connection through his mother, Arsinoe. 
Satyros, evidently a contemporary of Ptolemaios IV, traced the patrilinear descent of 
Arsinoe directly through the various Makedonian kings, all the way back to Herakles, 
the mythical founder of the Argeadai, and Dionysos.183 The Adulis inscription, dating 
to the reign of Ptolemaios III, suggests that this link was first promulgated long before 
                                                 
178 It is most probably a remnant from the period of the original migrations of the Makedones from the 
mountains to the fertile lowlands of the Pierian plain. Those Makedones who settled there and 
subsequently formed and extended the Kingdom of Makedonia became known as the Argeadai. See 
Edson’s discussion (1970), pp. 20-21, followed by Borza (1992), pp. 79-80. 
179 Hdt. 8.137-139. 
180 Diod. 19.105.3-4. 
181 For Ptolemaic court poetry as promoting the cultural agenda of its patrons see Stephens (2003). 
182 Walbank (1993), p. 1725. 
183 Satyros FGrHist 631 F 2, preserved in Theoph. 2.7, P.Oxy. 2465. For the Argive ancestry of the 
Makedonian kings see Thouk. 2.99. Satyros’ genealogy ends with the reign of Ptolemaios IV 
Philopator. Certainly, he wrote no later than the reign of Ptolemaios VI Philometor when his Lives 




 Connections with the Argeadai were not only drawn in order to establish a 
common mythical ancestry. Another story, which was invented most probably in the 
court circles of Ptolemaios I, attempted to anchor Ptolemaic lineage directly on the 
mortal line of Argead kings by presenting him as the illegitimate son of Philippos II.185 
According to Pausanias and Curtius, our sources for the story, Ptolemaios’ mother 
was a concubine of Philippos II. Having become pregnant by him, she was married 
off to the obscure Lagos who bore the responsibility of raising the bastard son of the 
Makedonian king.186 The historicity of this claim has been discredited, but veracity is 
not what matters in this context. Instead, it is the illusion that the two houses, Argead 
and Ptolemaic, were tightly linked through blood that was promoted by the 
Ptolemaioi. Against this background, one can interpret the close association of 
Alexandros and Ptolemaios I’s statues in dynastic celebrations and central public 
buildings as promoting this fictional half- brother relationship. Examples of this 
association can be found in the, no-doubt massively attended, procession of the 
Ptolemaia, as well as in the dynastic sculptural group situated at the now lost 
Tychaion, which housed the inscribed plaques of the laws of Alexandria.187 
 Without naming Philippos as the father, Claudius Aelianus preserves another 
relevant snippet of gossip, whereby Arsinoe gave birth to an illegitimate Ptolemaios 
while she was married to Lagos. In this version, the latter did not bear his 
responsibility with dignity. Instead, he exposed the infant on a bronze shield to die. 
The child survived through the intervention of a male eagle, which sheltered it from 
the elements and fed it with his own blood.188 The currency of the eagle myth could 
find a possible parallel in the choice of the Ptolemaic eagle as a symbol for the 
Ptolemaic dynasty. It is interesting to note how both stories about the illegitimate birth 
(with Philippos as the only named candidate) and the descent from Herakles (as the 
son of Zeus) can be seen as coming together in the Ptolemaic Eagle. As the staple 
image in most Ptolemaic coins down to the end of the Ptolemaic era, it is arguably the 
most recognizable symbol of the Ptolemaic dynasty. 
                                                 
184 OGIS 54, (246-241 BCE). 
185 See Tarn (1913), p. 57. Contra Collins (1997) who argues that the story originated in Macedonia by 
Ptolemaios Keraunos. 
186 Curt. 9.8.22, Paus. 1.6.2.  
187 Kallix. FGrHist F 2 ll. 305-307, Rice (1983), Nikolaos Rhetor in Ps.-Libanios Progymnasmata 25.1-9. 
The building was a commission either of Ptolemaios I or II, Kosmetatou (2004), pp. 243-244 with 
bibliography. 
188 Cl. Ael. Fr. 285.7-9, “καὶ τὸ αἷμα αὐτῷ παρέχειν τροφὴν ὡς γάλα.” 
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 As hinted at above, Ptolemaios I’s choice of coin iconography was not wholly 
innovative. He made use of traditional themes that already existed on Argead coinage, 
and which communicated the earthly power and divine connections of the kings.189 
The staple of Ptolemaic coin iconography, the eagle, first appeared on the coinage of 
Archelaos I.190 Closer to the ‘Ptolemaic eagle’ type with its closed wings, standing on 
Zeus’ thunderbolt, was the ‘eagle’ coinage of Amyntas III, Perdikkas III and later on, 
Alexandros III.191 Although the eagle does not figure on coins of Philippos II, Zeus’ 
iconic symbol, the thunderbolt, occurs frequently.192 The laureate head of the king of 
the gods was another very common image on Ptolemaic coins, while the portrait of 
the Ptolemaic king was frequently depicted wearing Zeus’ aegis.193 Zeus was 
introduced on Makedonian coinage on Philippos’ silver tetradrachms around the 
middle of the fourth century BCE.194 As the father of Makedon, the eponymous 
ancestor of the Makedones, the cult of Zeus carried special significance for the 
Makedones.195 The genealogical rhetoric of the Ptolemaioi, as revealed by Theokritos’ 
enkomion to Ptolemaios II, implies that behind the popularity of Zeus and his 
attributes on Ptolemaic coinage lay a Ptolemaic claim of descent from the same god 
who had fathered Alexandros: “From Zeus let us begin and, Muses, cease with Zeus.”196 
Although, in all probability, the rationale behind the choice of any of the symbols 
examined will remain elusive, it is worth considering that the reason behind the 
Ptolemaic adoption of the Zeus-type had a more concrete political dimension. His 
image was originally adopted at a time when an expanding Makedonia was looking 
for a patron of pan-hellenic appeal to accommodate the sensitivities of the Hellenic 
states falling rapidly under its sphere of influence. It is possible that, like Alexandros 
before him, who continued to mint Philippos’ Zeus-types upon his accession, 
Ptolemaios I recognized that he had also become the leader of disparate groups of 
                                                 
189 Mylonas (1946). 
190 Syll. Cop. 505 (open wings, no thunderbolt). 
191 Syll. ANS, 94-96, 113, Le Rider (1996), pp. 91-94. 
192  Price (1991), p. 106, Le Rider (1977), pp. 423, 425-6. 
193 Price (1974), pp. 18-36. The bronze diobol with the laureate head of Zeus remained the standard 
bronze unit until the middle of the reign of Ptolemaios II, Lorber (2007), p. 137, Mørkholm (1991), pp. 
63, 106. 
194 Price (1974), pp. 21-22, Le Rider (1977), pp. 7, 73, 363-364. 
195 Sanctuary of Zeus at Dion, Diod. 17.16, Hes. F 7 (IN Merkelbach and West Fragmenta Hesiodea). The 
Hesiodic fragment is quoted in Konstantinos Porfyrogennitos De them. 2: “ἣ δ’ ὑποκυσαμένη Διὶ γείνατο 
τερπικεραύνωι υἷε δύω, Μάγνητα Μακηδόνα θ’ ἱππιοχάρμην, οἳ περὶ Πιερίην καὶ Ὄλυμπον δώματ’ 
ἔναιον.” See also Steph. Byz. Ethnica s.v. Makedonia and Voutyras (2006). 
196 Theok. Eid. 17.1ff. 
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non-Makedones.197 The image of Zeus on the coinage provided a more than 
respectable mythical ancestry for the new dynasty, and more importantly, a familiar 




THE ALEXANDRIAN CONNECTION 
 It is the communis opinio of ancient and modern scholarship that the dynastic 
legitimacy of the Diadochoi stemmed from the manipulation of their association to 
Alexandros III. Such claims were made on the basis of their personal closeness to the 
King during his lifetime or by their imitation of his behaviour and regalia 
posthumously.198 The strength of Alexandros’ legitimating power in non-Makedonian 
territory, like Egypt, rested primarily on two grounds: Alexandros provided the new 
foreign ruling élite with a link to its Hellenic-Makedonian past, but most importantly 
he furnished ties with the land itself. As the territory was won by Alexandros’ spear, 
Ptolemaios I had to devise ways according to which he could claim to be his legitimate 
Successor. Additionally, as the Hellenic-Makedonian immigrants of Alexandria, most 
of which had either served under him as soldiers, or were familiar with his career, 
constituted the primary audience for Ptolemaios’ legitimating claims, he could not 
afford to disregard their expectations regarding his right to rule.199 
 Alexandros penetrated the everyday lives of the ordinary citizens of Alexandria 
from early on. To begin with, a founder cult in honour of Alexandros as Kτίστης (the 
Founder) was inaugurated in Alexandria possibly even during Alexandros’ lifetime 
and persisted until well into the Christian era.200 Distinct from the state cult instituted 
                                                 
197 Cf. Price (1991), p. 31. 
198 See Plout. Dem. 41.4-5, Pyrr. 8.1, Bosworth (2002), pp. 275, 278, Chaniotis (2005), p. 58, Bingen 
(2007), pp. 15- 30. 
199 For the Hellenes and Makedones as the source of dynastic stability for the Ptolemaioi, see Bagnall 
IN Bingen (2007), p. 279. 
200 The only unambiguous reference to a cult and priesthood of Alexandros the Ktistes comes from a 
papyrus of 120-121 CE (SB 3.6611), see Fraser (1972), I, p. 212. However, the so-called Alexandros 
Romance of pseudo-Kallisthenes, which was never intended as an accurate historical account, but the 
importance of which for Alexandrian traditions and insights on Ptolemaic propaganda is 
acknowledged, informs us that the institution of a priesthood of Alexandros was provisioned in his will, 
Ps.-Kallisth. Rec. α 3.33.19-20. For the cult of Alexandros at Alexandria, see Taylor (1927). For the 
value of Pseudo-Kallisthenes as Ptolemaic propaganda, cf. Bosworth (2000). An equestrian statue of 
Alexandros the Founder (Kτίστης) in Alexandria is described in some detail by Nikolaos Rhetor of 
Myra in Ps.-Libanios Progymnasmata 12.27. As for the worship of Alexandros as a hero since the 
foundation of Alexandria see Ps.-Kallisth. Rec. α 1.32.5-13. This extract includes the story of the killing 
of the great serpent by Alexandros and how the people of Alexandria offered sacrifices to the slayer as 
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by Ptolemaios I around the turn of the fourth century BCE, the founder cult in 
Alexandria seems to have echoed the traditions of founder worship that were a typical 
feature of Hellenic colonial foundations.201 The founder cult was very closely 
integrated with the formation of the civic identity of new settlements. It provided a 
common ‘past’ for the new city of which Alexandros, as the founder, was to hold 
centre place.202 If one accepts Pseudo-Kallisthenes, Alexandros as Ktistes was 
worshipped in especially dedicated sanctuaries but also in a household 
environment.203 The cult legend of the foundation of Alexandria is important in this 
context as it provides the setting through which Alexandros’ presence penetrated the 
domestic cultic life of the Alexandrians. According to the legend, after the slaying of 
the great serpent that appeared during the foundation of the city, Alexandros built a 
shrine to commemorate his feat. Out of the shrine doors, however, there emerged 
myriads of other serpents which each found their way into the newly built houses of 
the Alexandrians. The soothsayers present decreed that these should be worshipped as 
good spirits, (ἀγαθοί δαίμονες).204 Through this association with the Agathos Daimon 
(Good Fortune/Spirit) the figure of Alexandros became intertwined with the good 
fortune/spirit of the city and as such assumed duties of protection. According to the 
description of Ammianus Marcellinus, the temple to the Agathos Daimon of 
Alexandria was still standing at the crossroads of the two main avenues of the city in 
the fourth century CE. This same account testifies that even at this late date the 
Alexandrians were very protective towards it.205 In addition, the large number of 
statuettes representing Alexandros wearing the aegis (the so-called Alexandros 
Aigiochos type) recovered from Alexandria, Ptolemais and elsewhere in the Egyptian 
chora and which date from throughout the Hellenic-Roman period, seem to support 
the possibility that a domestic cult of Alexandros as the founder of Alexandria was 
                                                 
hero: “..θυσία τελεῖται αὐτῷ τῷ ἤρωι.” Also in ps.-Κallisth. Rec. α 2.21.19-20 Alexandros designates 
one Moschylos whom he had left in charge of affairs in Egypt, to found a temple to his name. 
Interestingly, an Aischylos is mentioned in Arr. Anab. 3.5.3 and Curtius 4.8.4, but only as an overseer 
with no reference to a temple commission. Taylor posits other examples of founders of cities that were 
worshipped as such during their lifetime, Taylor (1927), p. 167 n.3. 
201 Diod. 18.28.4-5, Paus. 1.7.1, Kosmetatou (2004), p. 241 with references. For the date of the 
institution of the dynastic cult, see Könen (1993), p. 50, Stewart (1993), p. 247. 
202 See Antonaccio (1999). 
203 Ps-Kallisth. Rec. α 1.32.11-12 and 2.21.12-21. Sanctuaries of Alexandros in Alexandria are 
mentioned in connection to the celebrations of his birthday, which were known as Alexandrina. 
204 Ps-Kallisth. Rec. α 1.32.5-13. 
205 Amm. Marc. 21.11.6-7. 
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prominent.206 Although this view has been challenged by Stewart, who favours a 
dynastic cult context for these statuettes as opposed to a domestic one, their small size 
and the snake-fringed aegis that covers the torso of Alexandros, as well as other 
serpentine details, cannot preclude a more generalised domestic worship of the 
conqueror associated with good fortune.207 
 Ptolemaios I was quick to realize the dynamics of Alexandros’ potential for 
legitimating his rule and equally keen to exploit the attraction he held for the 
Hellenic-Makedonian public. Alexandros’ posthumous presence in Egypt was not 
limited to the abstract memory of his achievements and to his worship in domestic or 
state cults, all-pervasive as they might have been.208 The early Ptolemaioi made sure 
that visual prompts of their association as rulers with the conqueror of Egypt were in 
constant supply. A study of the extant portraits of Alexandros from the early 
Ptolemaic period reveals that his image was institutionalised to an unprecedented 
degree in comparison to the rest of the Successor Kingdoms.209 It also figured 
prominently on early Ptolemaic coinage, whose primary function “is to record the 
messages which the [ruler] and his advisers desired to commend to the populations [under their 
control]”.210 Although the minting of particular coin types can be attributed to 
commemorative and honorific purposes alongside propagandistic ones, a conscious 
thought process is invariably involved in the choice of symbols to be portrayed on the 
coinage of a political unit.211 Ptolemaios I was the first of the Successors to mint coins 
bearing the portrait of Alexandros and the first to tweak the iconography of the 
standard Alexandros-type tetradrachms into a uniquely Ptolemaic variety.212 
                                                 
206 According to von Schwarzenberg (1976): “every self-respecting Alexandrian household had a shrine dedicated 
both to the founder of the city and to its good genius,” p. 235. 
207 Contra Stewart (1993), p. 247. Reproductions of some versions of the Aigiochos type and a list of 
extant figurines with bibliography can be found in Stewart (1993), pp. 241-242. 
208 For the state cult of Alexandros see Fraser (1972), I, p. 215. The Egyptian priestly class had its own 
reasons for promoting the legitimation of the new dynasty ever since the conquest by incorporating its 
kings into the traditional Egyptian king worship. According to Burstein (1991): “A break in the line of god 
kings that stretched back to the beginning of Egyptian history literally threatened Egypt’s continued existence by making 
impossible the proper performance of the rituals on which its very existence depended and was, therefore, intolerable,” p. 
141. 
209 Stewart (1993), pp. 229-262.  
210 Mørkholm (1983), p. 63. 
211 Howgego (1995), pp. 71-72. 
212 Alexandros wearing an elephant headdress appeared first in Ptolemaic Egypt around 319 BCE, and 
it was not until much later that the theme was picked up by other Successors; cf. Mørkholm (1991), pp. 
27, 63. See also Hölbl (2001), p. 111 and n. 213, Stewart (1993), pp. 233-234 with bibliography. If the 
gold double daric form the Mir Zakah treasure representing Alexandros with the elephant headdress is 
authentic, then a currently puzzling Ptolemaic iconographic innovation would prove a unique imitation 
of an Alexandros lifetime issue. See Bopearachchi and Flandrin (2005) and Holt (unpublished 
 
48 
Although remarkably similar to the idealised head of the youthful Herakles with the 
lion skin on Alexandros’ lifetime issues, the young man depicted on the new Ptolemaic 
Alexandroi wore an elephant headdress; a distinct historical allusion to Alexandros’ 
conquest of India. The “Alexandroi” remained in circulation until the need to pay for 
mercenary armies in recognizable, hence legitimate, currency subsided and 
Ptolemaios I felt secure enough in his newly proclaimed royal position to mint coins 
bearing his own portrait.213 Once more, he was the first to supplant the image and 
legend of Alexandros with his own. However, certain of the symbols Ptolemaios I 
chose to emphasise as significant, (e.g. the Ptolemaic Eagle) are encountered in earlier 
Argead issues, indicating a continuity in dynastic semiology that has already been 
elucidated above. 
 As far as visual prompts go, however, the most dramatic in providing a concrete 
ideological reminder of the rightful claim of the Ptolemaic dynasty to the throne was 
Alexandros’ own body. Diverted from its funeral cortège, which was probably 
escorting it back to Aigai, it was finally put on prominent display in Alexandria where 
it stayed until at least the reign of Caracalla in the early third century CE.214 Although 
not an absolute prerequisite for succession, and the evidence certainly does not 
warrant it being called a custom, it appears that in Makedonia, as well as in Pharaonic 
Egypt, the legitimate successor would frequently provide for the burial of his 
predecessor.215 In a magisterial act of propaganda Ptolemaios I thus singled himself 
out from the rest of the Successors of Alexandros as the guardian of the king’s body; 
an idea he further elaborated upon by instituting a cult with an eponymous priesthood 
in Alexandros’ honour.216 By the time of Ptolemaios Philadelphos’ accession to the 
throne in 283 BCE Alexandros’ carefully constructed role, as the predecessor of the 
Ptolemaic dynasty, must have permeated public and domestic life in Alexandria, 
which constituted the centre of the Hellenic-Makedonian experience in Egypt.  
 Ptolemaios I’s pioneering and persistent manipulation of Alexandros’ image and 
cultic presence, as well as the early circulation of genealogical myths promoting firm 
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213 de Callataÿ (2007), p. 121, n. 19. The new type was introduced shortly after Ptolemaios I became 
king, Mørkholm (1991), p. 66. 
214 Paus. 1.6.3. For Alexandros’ wish to be buried at Siwah, see Curt. 10.5.4, Just. 12.15.7. Caracalla’s 
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connections with Philippos II and the rest of the Argead clan reveal as much about the 
need for legitimation in the new state of Egypt under the Ptolemaioi, as for the 
ideological force that the old Makedonian dynasty traditionally commanded over the 
people. First appearing in the eight century BCE, the tribe of the Argeadai, 
descending from Argeas, the son of Makedon, the son of Zeus, became the dominant 
tribe in the Emathian plain, the heartland of the Makedonian state.217 The members 
of the clan took over the performance of sacred rites and ritual practices believed to 
ensure the prosperity of the Makedones.218 Gradually, these became the responsibility 
of the Argead king and members of the dynastic family who performed them in the 
name of the Makedones.219 The Argead dynasty’s ideological monopoly of meaning 
and ritual practices was successful in rallying the Makedones for more than four 
hundred years. This fact alone explains why the Ptolemaioi sought so fervently to 
establish ideological links of continuity with their Argead past. At the same time, 
however, the introduction of an elaborate dynastic cult, venerating the Ptolemaic 
dynasty (albeit rooted in Alexandros III), suggests that the Ptolemaioi staked an 
ideological claim to meaning in Ptolemaic Egypt in their own right.220 In doing so, 
they were elaborating on the successful example of their Argead predecessors, taking 
the ideological potential of the dynasty as a unifying force one step further and into 
the realm of religion.221 
 
 
THE DYNASTY AS POLITICAL POWER: THE PRINCIPLES OF DYNASTIC 
ORGANISATION 
 
It has been stated in the introduction to this chapter that the ‘dynasty’ is as much an 
abstract notion, which commands ideological power, as an agglomeration of people, 
whose organisation of social relations demands centralised regulation. The king, who 
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successfully manages the boundaries between himself and his social networks, is seen 
as exercising political power. In order for a monarchy to function smoothly, the 
organisation of dynastic power in its political aspect entails the institutionalisation and 
routinisation of one key structure: the pattern of succession. In turn, succession can be 
influenced by other structures, which in the case of Argead Makedonia can be 
summarised in the practice of royal polygamy. Finally, given the prominence of 
dynastic marriages in the legitimation process of the ruler’s position the last section of 
this chapter will address the role of royal females. Overall, it will be argued that the 
early Ptolemaioi looked back into their Argead past, not only for bolstering their own 
ideological significance vis-à-vis their antagonists in the manner that has been 
discussed above, but also for drawing paradigms for their dynastic organisation. 
Recognising the paramount importance of dynastic stability as an instrument of 
imperial rule, a rare state of affairs in Argead Makedonia, the Ptolemaioi attempted to 
improve the system of dynastic succession. 
  
 
PATTERNS OF SUCCESSION 
 Although Argead history is rife with dynastic instability, in almost four 
centuries of recorded Makedonian history, up until the reign of Alexandros IV, the 
king belonged to the Argead royal house. It was very seldom that outsiders would 
contend for the throne and even then, their dissociation from the Argead dynasty 
cannot be unequivocally proven.222 In the troubled early fourth century BCE, the 
pretender Pausanias was, according to the scholiast in Aischines, a member of the 
royal family (οὗτος ἦν τοῦ βασιλικοῦ γένους).223 Equally, it is possible that his rival, 
Ptolemaios of Aloros, the favourite of the recently widowed queen Eurydike, was the 
great-great-grandson of Alexandros I.224 It is also relevant to note that, as a rule of 
                                                 
222 The most straightforward case of an outside pretender is apparently that of Argaios, who in 393 
BCE appears to have expelled Amyntas III from his kingdom with the help of Illyrians. Diodoros 
(14.92.4) mentions that he ruled for two years after that, but acceptance of this comment has become 
increasingly challenged, see Borza (1992), pp. 182, 297 with references. However, although we possess 
no information as to his origins or family, he does bear an Argead royal name. According to Herodotos 
(8.139.1) an Argaios ruled Makedonia around the middle of the seventh century BCE. As Argead royal 
names have a high percentage of repetition, this might imply that the pretender Argaios was in some 
way related to the royal house. Of course, without any additional evidence this remains only a 
conjecture. 
223 Schol. in Aisch. 2.26-27, also Diod. 16.2.6. 
224 Just. 7.4.7-8, 7.5.3-8. Diodoros (15.71.1) describes him simply as “son of Amyntas” and Alexandros II 
as his brother. This has been the cause of a lot of debate. See Hammond (1972-1988, II, pp. 181-183), 
who suggested that he was the son of Amyntas II. Macurdy (1932, pp. 18, 32) thought that he was a 
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thumb, pretenders to the Makedonian throne with dubious dynastic connections were 
backed by foreign powers.225   
 This information, therefore, elucidates the fact that membership to the Argead 
royal house was a prerequisite for ruling the Makedones. The actual pattern and 
process of succession, however, is far less clear. The most direct evidence in regard to 
Makedonian royal succession is the emergency deliberations that followed the sudden 
death of Alexandros III. It is extremely interesting to note that in this case there was 
no obvious and unchallenged successor in line. 
  Mitchell has argued that understanding the nature of the Makedonian state 
depends heavily on the understanding of the mechanics of succession.226 Once more, 
the constitutionalist/absolutist debate on the nature of the Makedonian monarchy has 
a bearing on scholarly interpretations. Constitutionalists, such as Hammond and 
Hatzopoulos, argue that succession was determined in accordance to the law and had 
to be validated by an Assembly of Makedones (either under arms or popular).227 
However, as Borza rightly argues, acclamation of the army is not the same as election 
by it.228 There is evidence for men in arms or civilians present during accession 
proceedings both in the Argead and the Successor period. Philippos II, according to 
Justinus, was forced by the people (a populo) to take up the government.229 Arridaios 
was acclaimed (ἀνάρρησιν) as king by the army in Babylon and was given the name 
Philippos.230 During the era of the Diadochoi, Demetrios Poliorketes was proclaimed 
king (ἐκεῖνον ἀνηγόρευσαν βασιλέα Μακεδόνων) by the Makedones.231 Similarly, a 
decade earlier, in the year of the Kings, Ptolemaios I stood in front of his army, who 
pronounced him king (rex ab exercitu cognominatur).232 Rather than denoting a choice 
with binding effects, the acclamation of the army might simply represent approval, or 
what Borza calls “a publicly demonstrative expression of support.”233 The social relations 
                                                 
bastard son of Amyntas III (followed by Mortensen 1992, p. 157), while Borza makes the suggestion 
that he could have been the grandson of Archelaos by his son Amyntas, (1992, p. 191). 
225 Argaios was supported by the Illyrians in 393 BCE (Diod. 14.92) and the Athenians in 359 BCE 
(Diod. 16.2.6, 16.3.3). In the early 370s BCE, Pausanias and Ptolemaios of Aloros were supported 
against each other by the Thrakes (Diod. 16.2.6, 16.3.4) and the Athenians (Aisch. 2.29) respectively. 
226 Mitchell (2007), p. 64. 
227 Hammond (1972-1988), II, pp. 152-158, Hammond (1989), pp. 58-64, Hatzopoulos (1996), I, pp. 
276-279. 
228 Borza (1992), pp. 244-246. 
229 Just. 7.5.10. 
230 Arr. Τά Μετά Ἀλέξανδρον 1.1. 
231 Plout. Dem. 37.1-2, in 294 BCE. 
232 Just. 15.2.11, App. Syr. 54, 305 BCE. 
233 Borza (1992), p. 245. 
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between the army (especially the national army of the Makedones) and the king both 
in Argead Makedonia and early Ptolemaic Egypt were in any case structured around 
personal bonds of familiarity, strengthened by the custom of παρρησία (i.e. the ability 
to address the king directly and freely), and reciprocal obligations of consent, praise 
and rewards.234 No king could afford to lose the support of their army, and no 
(national) army would comply to a king’s orders unless he held their respect and 
without the promise of some material rewards.235 Far from being of legal significance, 
the practice of acclamation could have a ceremonial character much in the same way 
that the army swore an oath of allegiance to new rulers.236 
 Further, Hatzopoulos puts forward an exhaustive case supporting the existence 
of a rule of primogeniture, whereby the first son born to the king after his accession 
would be the one to succeed him.237 His arguments have been rejected by minimalists 
of the order of Carney and Borza who are convinced that, even if some sort of 
primogeniture did apply, it never genuinely operated.238 On the other hand, 
Errington who also rejects the constitutionalist approach, has argued that it was the 
“first of the Makedones” (i.e. the Makedonian aristocracy) that jointly decided on 
matters of succession. He also assumes that there indeed existed an heir apparent and 
that he was the eldest son of the king, regardless of whether he was born in the purple 
or not.239 Others, such as Greenwalt, are of the opinion that the king simply 
appointed his own successor.240 All these views can be supported by the sources, but 
for none is the evidence so consistent so as to speak of a pattern. The futility of 
discerning patterns of succession cannot be made more clear than when one considers 
all the different options put forward for the resolution of the succession crisis in the 
confusing few days after Alexandros III’s death. Almost all of the aforementioned 
modern views on principles of succession were voiced in the Conference of Babylon, 
and although everybody who had assembled there to discuss the alternatives 
welcomed the possibility of the successor belonging to the Argead dynasty, it seems 
that pretty much any resolution was open for discussion. While Perdikkas suggested 
that the child of Roxanne, the official wife of Alexandros III, should inherit the rule, 
                                                 
234 For the evidence on the freedom of speech, see Adams (1986) and Lock (1977). 
235 See further Austin (1986). 
236 For Argead Makedonia, see Diod. 16.3.2, 17.2.2, Just. 13.2.14, 13.3.1, Curt. 10.7.9. For Ptolemaic 
Egypt, Polyb. 15.25.11. 
237 Hatzopoulos (1986). 
238 Carney (1983), (2000), pp. 23-27, Borza (1990), pp. 177, 243-244.  
239 Errington (1978), esp. p. 99. 
240 Greenwalt (1989), pp. 19-43. 
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Nearchos vied for Alexandros’ first-born son, Herakles, son of Barsine. Meanwhile, 
Aristonous was arguing that the king had already appointed his heir when he gave his 
signet ring to Perdikkas, but was met with Meleagros’ opposition. To top it all, 
Ptolemaios made the unprecedented suggestion that the extended Makedonian 
Empire could be governed by a council of generals, who would decide by majority-
voting. Finally, the voice of an unidentified soldier proposed the winning motion; that 
the rule over the Makedones should go to the only surviving male adult blood relative 
of Alexandros, his half-brother Philippos Arridaios.241  
 Summing up, the sheer confusion that typically followed the sudden death of 
the ruler attests to the fact that there were no fixed principles of succession, other than 
a strong partiality towards members of the Argead dynasty. These had, of course, to 
be male, not necessarily of age, and most often they happened to be the sons of the 
ruling king or indeed his brothers or uncles, which means that they were still the sons, 
or grandsons (in cases the great-grandsons) of a king. As the perceived right to rule 
moved laterally, between brothers, as well as vertically, between fathers and sons, this 
meant that, if anything, there was not one particular legitimate vertical line of 
succession, although one seems to have been kept between the reigns of Alexandros I 
through to Orestes, the underage successor of Archelaos. Pretenders and usurpers of 
the Makedonian throne could justify their claims by relying on their Argead dynastic 
connections, but as Mitchell contends, it was their personal ability to spot the 
opportunities and manage the social relationships that would grant them the necessary 
support, which made them stand out or fail in the dynastic arena.242 This was equally 
true in the crucial period during the struggle for dynastic supremacy, as it was during 
the actual reign. The only long and successful kingships were the ones of rulers that 
were able to regulate effectively the social relations between themselves and their 
supporters, such as Perdikkas II and Philippos II. These kings enjoyed political power 
and a significantly more stable rule for forty one and twenty four years respectively.  
 One can compare to that effect the occasions where an infant or underage 
king came to the Makedonian throne. In most cases, the appointed regent would 
murder, or usurp power from the rightful, yet politically disempowered king. The 
stable father-son line of succession mentioned earlier was interrupted because the 
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regent and uncle of the child Orestes, Airopos, murdered him.243 Similarly, Philippos 
II usurped power from the infant Amyntas IV, if ever he acted as his regent.244 Even if 
Philippos II was pronounced king immediately following the death of Perdikkas III, it 
remains a fact that the son of the previous king was bypassed by his brother and that 
certainly strengthens the view for the lack of a legitimate line of succession. In the only 
occasion, where the infant king grew to adulthood and did away with his own regent, 
(in the case of Perdikkas III and Ptolemaios of Aloros) the latter had failed to assume 
the kingship for himself although he had actually murdered Perdikkas III’s 
predecessor, his brother, Alexandros II.245 In the meantime, Perdikkas III position was 
strengthened by the support of the Athenian general Iphikrates, called into action by 
the former’s mother Eurydike.246  
 The accession of Philippos II will be brought in at this point as indicative of 
the inconsistencies of succession in Argead Makedonia. His father, Amyntas III, was 
the great-grandson of Alexandros I, and the grandson of one of the latter’s five sons, 
Arridaios, who as it so happened was never king. Philippos II himself was the youngest 
son of Amyntas III’s four children with Eurydike. Amyntas fathered three more sons 
with a wife named Gygaia. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to confirm which 
marriage took place first.247 When Philippos II’s two older brothers, who both became 
rulers, Alexandros II and Perdikkas III, had been murdered and killed respectively, 
Philippos II was appointed either regent and tutor to Perdikkas III’s infant son, 
Amyntas IV, or directly, king. In both scenarios, the child was bypassed and he was 
king within a few months of Perdikkas III’s death. Although Amyntas IV was allowed 
to live during Philippos’ reign, his status as a rightful contender to the Makedonian 
rule forced Alexandros III to remove him from the political scene immediately upon 
his accession.248  
 The circumstances surrounding the succession of Philippos II bring to the 
foreground another very important parameter that should have a bearing on patterns 
of succession, namely the practice of polygamy. In the presence of multiple sets of 
                                                 
243 Arist. Pol. 1311b, Diod. 14.37.5-6, 14.84.6. 
244 For an overview of that debate see Ellis (1971). The debate centres on the conflicting accounts of 
Justinus (7.5.9-10) and Diodoros (16.1.3), as well as the scholiast of Aischines (3.51). The latter two 
place Philippos II directly on the throne in 359 BCE, while Justinus mentions a long period of regency. 
245 Just. 7.4.5, Diod. 15.77, 16.2. 
246 See Kallet (1983). 
247 For a later marriage of Gygaia, see Carney (2000), pp. 46-48. Contra Greenwalt (2010), who claims 
the marriages were concurrent and Gygaia was probably the first wife, p. 286. 
248 Arr. Anab. 1.5.4. 
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wives and offspring it begs the question, which son out of which set of children would 
be promoted for succession, at the expense of the rest. At first glance, at least in the 
case of Philippos II, it appears that the children of Eurydike could have been preferred 
because they might have been older than those of Gygaia. Or, they could have been 
promoted on the grounds of the king’s personal predilection either for his first-born or 
for Eurydike herself. All these interpretations, however, are conjectural. The fact 
remains that judging by the extant evidence all Argead kings had to secure their 
position upon accession by eliminating opposition from other members of the dynasty 
and by cultivating stable social relations with their base of supporters. It is 
symptomatic of this instability that even Alexandros III, whose posthumous ‘greatness’ 
was of course not apparent to his contemporaries, at least not before the Asian 
campaign, had to worry that his election as heir would not be straightforward. His 
anxiety over being sidelined for succession by his elder half-brother Arridaios is well 
documented in the events surrounding the Pixodaros affair.249  
 Tarn was the first to notice rightly that in the Makedonian dynasties 
legitimacy of succession was at best a vague matter.250 The principles of seniority and 
primogeniture did not uniformly apply, neither between sons of the same mother, nor 
across different mother-son groups. The polygamous practices of the Argead and early 
Ptolemaic kings exacerbated the situation in expanding the dynastic pool of 
candidates. It seems quite probable to the author that there existed favourites, which 
were groomed as future kings from an early age (like Alexandros III), but the reality 
was that once the king was dead, other potential successors could stake a claim to 
kingship and challenge the dauphin. In the end, all interested parties would have had 
to fight it out between themselves. The victor was usually the one with the strongest 
support base and the one with the more charismatic personality, pace Weber. In short, 
if ever there were principles that guided succession in Argead Makedonia, they were 
either ill-defined to being with, or poorly enforced. 
 
The history of Ptolemaic Egypt is equally rife with dynastic struggle and instability. 
However, this is more a staple of the later period than it is characteristic of the early 
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reign of the Ptolemaioi over Egypt.251 This stability is partly due to an innovation 
wrought by Ptolemaios I, which alongside the choice of the name Ptolemaios for every 
heir apparent, constituted the most lasting contribution of the new ruler of Egypt in 
cementing the dynastic power of the Ptolemaioi. In effect, Ptolemaios I constructed a 
legitimate line of succession. Although he did not scourge the source of the problem, 
(i.e. polygamy, which will be discussed below) he did find a solution to remedy some of 
its ills. By effectively nominating his successor well in advance and instituting the 
practice of co-regency, he normalised the transition of power and preserved the 
political strength of the ruler, which would otherwise have been dispensed in fending 
off potential dynastic rivals.252 Ptolemaios II was named co-regent on the 39th regnal 
year of his father and they ruled jointly for two years until the death of Ptolemaios 
I.253 Literary sources suggest that he in fact was the effective ruler during the period of 
co-regency. Porphyrios of Tyros mentions that “while he [Ptolemaios I] was still alive, he 
gave his rule to his son Ptolemaios who was called Philadelphos and a further two years he lived under 
the son who now ruled.”254 The success of the new system in directing compliance 
towards the new ruler is aptly described by Justinus: “…the people […] showed themselves 
no less indulgent in accepting the son for their king than the father...”255 This smooth transition 
becomes all the more admirable when one considers that Ptolemaios II was the 
youngest of all of Ptolemaios I’s sons. Some few hundred years later, Justinus 
marvelled at this contravention “of the ius gentium,” most probably alluding to the 
principle of primogeniture most common in later periods.256 Ptolemaios II’s two elder 
half-brothers, Meleagros and Ptolemaios Keraunos, who were bypassed in succession, 
fled Egypt, apparently without contending for the throne, and ended up in 
Makedonia where they both served brief spells as kings.257 Two more brothers by 
                                                 
251 The first pronounced episode of dynastic rivalry is the struggle between the brothers Ptolemaios VI 
and VIII and their sister Kleopatra II in the early decades of the second century BCE. See Whitehorne, 
chs. 8, 9, 10. 
252 Kantorowicz (1957). Justinus described the co-regency as a resignation from the throne.  
253 The earliest attested date for the sole reign of Ptolemaios II is 282 BCE, Year 4, SEG 28.1224. The 
latest date for the reign of Ptolemaios I is 282 BCE, Year 41, P. Eleph. 3, P. Eleph. 4. Contemporary 
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254 Porphyrios of Tyros FGrHist 260 F 2.2-3. 
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257 App. Syr. 10.62, Corn. Nepos 21.3 mention that Ptolemaios Keraunos left Egypt in fear, or was 
expelled right after the accession of Ptolemaios II. For his spell in Makedonia, see Diod. 21.4 and 




Eurydike are attested by Polybios to have conspired against the new king. This was a 
serious digression for which they were duly killed.258 
 On a very practical level, this innovation contributed to the stabilisation of the 
political power of the Ptolemaic dynasty in the early period. Even though the habit of 
eliminating possible contenders was not eradicated, in terms of outward appearances 
the dynasty was a manifestation of stability. The successor was nominated and 
groomed for his duties, long before he assumed them. Although not practiced 
religiously by all the Ptolemaic kings, a good number of them chose to associate their 
successor with themselves on the throne, before it became vacant. Ptolemaios II co-
ruled with Ptolemaios the Son for almost a decade, dating all the official documents 
between 267 and 259 BCE with the protocol Βασιλεύοντος Πτολεμαίου τοῦ 
Πτολεμαίου καἰ τοῦ υἱοῦ Πτολεμαίου.259 When the latter became involved in a 
conspiracy in Miletos it was evident that the co-regency was no longer bound by 
mutual interest. As social relations between the king and his dynastic successor broke 
down the partnership was terminated.260 As the only surviving male of Ptolemaios II’s 
line, the throne passed to Ptolemaios III. Even though he did not associate his 
successor to the throne through a co-regency, he nevertheless was the first in a long 
line of Makedonian rulers to have married only once. Judging by the silence of the 
sources, Ptolemaios III was succeeded, rather uneventfully, by his eldest son, 
Ptolemaios IV.261 It is indicative of the dynastic stability of the early Ptolemaic period 
that the rulers enjoyed long, uninterrupted reigns of forty one, thirty eight and twenty 
five years respectively, while most significantly, all three of them died of natural 
causes. Together, the first three Ptolemaioi make up for more than one third of the 
Ptolemaic era. 
  The co-regency system, coupled with the dying down of the polygamous 
practices of the Ptolemaic rulers, furnished some necessary checks and balances in the 
dynastic organisation of the chaotic and ill-defined Argead patterns of succession. The 
dynasty, as an abstract concept, was as important to the Ptolemaioi as it was to the 
Argeadai. In fact, given that the Ptolemaic state was constructed ex nihilo in the eyes of 
the Makedones and the Hellenes who migrated to Egypt, its ideological organisation 
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was a more urgent matter, precisely because the compliance demanded by the new 
authority was not as intuitive as the allegiance that the Argead clan commanded over 
the Makedones. Against this background, the Ptolemaic rulers had to make an extra 
effort to push their ideological agenda through the manipulation of the diffused power 
techniques discussed in the previous section. As an agglomeration of people, the 
dynastic organisation of the Argead clan was a chaotic affair where personal relations 
mattered more than orderly notions of hierarchy. Any and all members of the Argead 
dynasty, it seems, could contend for the throne. Precisely because his dynasty did not 
command the intuitive compliance of its subjects, Ptolemaios I came up with a 
brilliant plan to institutionalise his rule. His experience of dynastic strife back home 
dictated that a change, which would involve the conditioning of all parties concerned 
towards the legitimate authority of the new ruler, needed to be made. The system of 
co-regency was aimed and succeeded at minimising dynastic friction and quenching 
the aspirations of contenders before they had a chance to mature. In that, the 
Ptolemaic system of dynastic organisation was an improvement to its Argead 
predecessor. 
 When Ptolemaios IV succeeded his father, he did so without undergoing the 
experience of the co-regency. This was perhaps one of the reasons that led to the so-
called purge of 221 BCE. The eldest of possibly four brothers, Ptolemaios IV felt that 
his position was not secure enough at the moment of his accession and sure enough he 
reverted to practices that to all appearances matched the tactics employed by the 
Argeadai in order to gain dynastic supremacy. One only needs to refer to Platon’s 
account of Archelaos’ ascent to the Makedonian throne through the murder of his 
uncle Alketas, his cousin Alketas’ son Alexandros, and his seven-year old half-brother, 
who he pushed down a well and then lied to his mother that he fell while chasing a 
goose.262 Ptolemaios IV had his younger brother, Magas, scolded in his own bath for 
being popular with the army, while his other brothers, Alexandros and one whose 
name has been reconstructed as ‘Lysimachos,’ disappear from the records shortly after 
the time of Ptolemaios IV’s accession in 222 BCE.263 The new king, through his 
minister Sosibios, also removed his own mother, Berenike II and his uncle Lysimachos 
from the scene.264 However, when the time came for him to hand down his political 
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power, he opted to co-rule with his only son, Ptolemaios V, from the time of his 




 The other most defining structure of the intensive organization of dynastic 
power in the Makedonian monarchy was the formal association of its rulers with more 
than one woman. Ploutarchos informs us that making “many marriages” was “not 
prohibited, but customary for the kings of Makedonia from Philippos and Alexandros.”267 In fact, 
the ‘custom’, as Ploutarchos calls it, extends backwards well beyond the reign of 
Philippos II. Indeed, in the Argead dynasty every king who managed to stay on the 
throne long enough to incite interest in our sources is associated with more than one 
wife, or in less well-documented occasions, is credited with offspring from multiple 
unions.268 Perdikkas II is the first Argead ruler for whom the actual names of two of 
his wives (there may or may not have been more) as well as their respective offspring 
have survived. He was associated with one Simiche and a Kleopatra.269 Similarly, a 
passage from Aristoteles’ Politics reveals that Archelaos, Perdikkas II’s heir by Simiche, 
made a conscious effort to prevent dynastic quarrelling between the children 
produced from his different unions.270 Unfortunately, information relating to the 
period following his reign is lacunose. The name of only one of his wives has survived 
(Kleopatra), while for his successors evidence for their marital activity is even more 
                                                 
265 P. Gurob 25 mentions for the first time Ptolemaios V, as Ptolemaios the son, in 209 BCE. For the 
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remarkably limited.271 The dynastic strife that ensued after Archelaos’ death led to the 
exhaustion of Perdikkas II’s line.272 After a quick succession of short-lived reigns, 
Amyntas III rose to the throne and for him the sources have been meticulous enough 
to record two of his marriages, to Eurydike and Gygaia. There is general 
disagreement as to which marriage preceded the other, but it is a fact that for some 
reason, it was Eurydike and her progeny that took precedence over Gygaia and her 
children in the dynastic race for succession.273 
 The same principle of multiple marriages applies to the majority of 
Makedonian kings of the early Hellenistic period, the Ptolemaioi of Egypt included.274 
In making the comment that opened this section Ploutarchos was seeking to explain 
the numerous marriages of Demetrios Poliorketes, the Antigonid King notorious for 
his fondness of women.275 Marrying at least six, he was by far the most frequently wed 
Hellenistic King, closely rivalling his Argead predecessor Philippos II and his seven 
recorded marriages.276 In their lavish number of marriages, however, both of them 
form the exception rather than the norm as far as Makedonian matrimonial practices 
were concerned. However, although the rest of the Argead and Hellenistic 
Makedonian Kings are on the whole known to have made fewer marriages, it is still 
more often than not the case that they were indeed associated with more than one 
wives. Lysimachos of Thrake and Ptolemaios I of Egypt hold second place with four 
recorded marriages each.277 Alexandros III himself is attested to have concluded 
                                                 
271 The ruling dates for Orestes are 399-398 BCE. He was succeeded by his regent and murderer 
Airopos II, who ruled between 398-395 BCE. He was replaced by Amyntas II (395-394 BCE), followed 
by Pausanias (394-393 BCE), who was assassinated by Amyntas III on the year of his accession. 
272 Cl. Ael. VH 8.9. 
273 See above. Carney (2000), pp. 46-49 and Greenwalt (2010), p. 286 believe that Gygaea preceded 
Eurydike, pp. 46-49. Ogden (1999) argues that the extant evidence does not allow for a clear 
understanding of which wife was married first, p. 11. 
274 See Ogden’s (1999) extremely helpful and neat groupings of Makedonian rulers and their 
associations. For the Argead dynasty, see pp. 3-51. For the Ptolemaic dynasty, see pp. 67-81.  
275 Ploutarchos preserves an anecdote, shocking for Athenian religious sensitivities, that Demetrios, 
while in Athens, filled up the rear quarters of the Parthenon with courtesans, (these quarters were given 
to him as lodgings by the Athenians themselves). Plout. Dem. 23-24. 
276 The marriages of Demetrios Poliorketes: Phila, an unnamed woman from Illyria, Ptolemais, 
Deidameia, Eurydike (Plout. Dem. 53) and Lanassa (Plout. Pyrr. 10). Ogden (1999) lists two more 
possible matches, which raise the total to eight, p.177. However, it is less than clear from the evidence 
that Demetrios was actually married to them. For Lamia, see Plout. Dem. 24, 27, Ath. Deipn. 13.577c. 
For Demo, see Plout. Dem. 24, 27, Ath. Deipn. 13.578a-b. Despite Ogden’s convictions both were in all 
probability mere courtesans. For Philippos II, seeAth. Deipn. 13.557b-e.  
277 Lysimachos was married to Nikaia, (Strab. 12.4.7), Amastris, (Memnon FGrHist 434 F4.9, Diod. 
20.109), an unnamed Odrysian woman, (Paus. 1.10.4-5) and Arsinoe II, (Plout. Dem. 31, Memnon 
FGrHist 434 F4.9).  
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three.278 An interesting deviation from Ploutarchos’ comment is that some of the 
Hellenistic rulers, like Kassandros, Antigonos I Monophthalmos and Ptolemaios III 
Euergetes, are known to have married only once.279 Put in numbers, on average, the 
marriages for each monarch amounted to more than two.280 Our sources, therefore, 
confirm the tendency of the Makedonian rulers, both in the Argead and the Ptolemaic 
period, to make “many marriages” in a very concrete way. 
 It is only in recent years that it has become the orthodoxy among ancient 
historians to interpret the matrimonial arrangements of the Makedonian kings by 
making use of the concept of Makedonian royal polygamy.281 This concept denotes 
the concurrent recognized marriages of monarchs to multiple wives. As an approach, it 
has been thoroughly and convincingly argued and it is the author’s contention that it 
has lain to rest any serious consideration of alternative interpretations.282 Nevertheless, 
until this position gained ground in the last couple of decades, royal polygamy had 
been very influentially resisted by a host of prominent scholars.283 The theory they 
                                                 
278 He married Roxanne, daughter of a Bactrian nobleman, in 327 BCE (Plout. Alex. 47, Mor. 332e, 
338d, Diod. 18.3.3, Curt. 8.4, Arr. Anab. 4.19, 4.20, Just. 12.15, 13.2) and Stateira, eldest daughter of 
Darios III and Parysatis, the youngest daughter of Artaxerxes Ochos, the predecessor of Darios III, at 
the mass weddings at Susa in 324 BCE (for Stateira see Arr. Anab. 4.4, Diod. 17.107.6, Plout. Alex. 70, 
Just. 12.10, for Parysatis see Arr, Anab. 7.4, Aristob. FGrHist 139, F 52). His association to Barsine is the 
object of much debate as there is no extant reference to a marriage between the two. Cf. Brosius who 
believes that Alexandros married Barsine. Nevertheless, the evidence she provides –i.e. Plout. Alex. 21- 
does not support her claim. However, the employment of the name Herakles for their son, with all its 
connotations for Alexandros himself as the emulator of the hero and for the Argead dynasty itself, 
tracing its ancestry back to him, could suggest a more formal association than a mere one of ruler and 
concubine. Chronologically as well the relationship seems to have been more than occasional having 
lasted for a period of at least four years. According to Diodoros, Herakles was born around 327 BCE 
(Diod. 20.20.1), or even as late as 324 BCE, as Justinus suggests (Just. 15.2), while Barsine became the 
captive of Alexandros around 332/1 BCE, (Plout. Alex. 21, Eum. 1). Nevertheless, when compared to 
the detail with which Alexandros’ aforementioned associations are specifically designated as marriages 
one has to accept the sources’ inclination to regard it as an affair. 
279 Kassandros to Thessalonike (Just. 14.6.13, Diod. 19.52.1-2), Antigonos I Monophthalmos to 
Stratonike (Plout. Dem. 2) and Ptolemaios III Euergetes to Berenike II of Kyrene (Just. 26.3.2-8). 
280 Out of 42 monarchs in the Argead, (beginning with Alexandros I), Ptolemaic, Seleukid and 
Antigonid Kingdoms (including the line of Kassandros and the single generation dynasty of 
Lysimachos) we know of roughly 90 concluded marriages. This would amount to approximately 2,2 
wives for each of them. There is of course the caveat that there are many for which we simply do not 
have a clue. This calculation is based on Ogden’s 1999 research. 
281 Greenwalt (1989), Ogden (1999) and Carney (2000) are among the most fervent proponents for 
Makedonian royal polygamy. Macurdy (1932) is one of the earliest scholars to have also conceded that 
polygamy was “an old Macedonian custom”, p. 106. Greenwalt (1989) is ambivalent about the polygamous 
arrangement of the Hellenistic kigs. Nevertheless, he concedes polygamy to Lysimachos, Demetrios I 
and Ptolemaios I, p. 43. On the contrary, Ogden (1999) claims that “Polygamy is in fact clearly demonstrable 
in many of the […] Hellenistic families”, p. xv. See also his views on what he calls the monogamy fallacy, 
pp. xiv-xvii. 
282 Especially by Ogden (1999). 
283 I.e. Beloch (1912-1927), esp. III, 2, pp. 68-71, 79, Berve (1926), see under the names of particular 
wives, Seibert (1967), p. 4, Hamilton (1969), p. 24, Green (1974), p. 515, n. 55, (1990), pp. 20, 24. 
Berve and Macurdy (1932), p. 25 conceded polygamy only to Philippos II. 
 
62 
proposed consisted of the practice of royal serial monogamy. This entails the 
repudiation each time of the former wife in favour of the new, or the conflation of 
wives with concubines. The most influential proponent of the theory of serial 
monogamy was Beloch, whose strong conviction on the matter led him to the 
reorganization of Satyros’ list of Philippos II’s marriages. His endeavour to 
accommodate only one wife (Gemahlin) at any given time in the court of Philippos II, 
while the rest were set apart as courtesans (Nebenfrauen), has by now become notorious 
for the inverse relationship between its widespread influence and its arbitrary 
methodology.284 Christian biases coupled with an embedded perception of monogamy 
as the norm for human sexual relations are thought to serve as indications why 
scholarship was originally averted from considering polygamy as an explanation for 
the formal association of more than one wife with a given king.285  
 Adherence to a concept of serial monogamy, however, creates more problems 
than it solves. To start with, it cannot be supported by the extant evidence.  The list of 
Philippos II’s wives preserved through Satyros does not leave room to doubt the 
concurrency of the king’s marriages. Apart from the fact that some of the nuptials 
appear to have taken place roughly at the same time, leaving little time for any process 
of repudiation, (Nikesipolis and Philinna, both from Thessalia, were married to 
Philippos in 358/7 BCE as part of his effort to win over the Thessalians), the 
vocabulary used by Satyros clearly indicates that additional wives were brought into 
the household besides (ἐπεισήγαγεν) the already existing ones.286 In the instances where 
repudiation of earlier wives for the sake of new ones has been proposed the arguments 
rest on shaky grounds. Justinus is responsible for a tradition that calls for the 
repudiation of Olympias by Philippos II in favour of Kleopatra.287 Yet, it was her son 
who was groomed for and finally inherited the throne.288 In Ptolemaic Egypt, it has 
been argued that the first wife of Ptolemaios II, Arsinoe I, was possibly repudiated. 
The story is that following the arrival of Arsinoe II in Egypt Arsinoe I was allegedly 
                                                 
284 See for instance how the marriage to Phila is placed before that of Audata the Illyrian and the latter 
only becomes a Gemahlin after Phila’s death, Beloch (1912-1927), vol. III, 2, pp. 68-70. Contra Tronson 
(1984), pp. 116-117, with bibliography on scholars who, partially or holistically, accepted Beloch’s 
arguments, n. 7 and 10. See also Ogden (1999), p. xvi. 
285 See Heckel (2001). On monogamy and ancient empires see the very interesting study of Scheidel 
(2001b).  
286 Satyros apud. Ath. Deipn. 557b-e. 
287 Just. 9.7.1-2. Carney (2006), considers the possibility of a repudiation highly unlikely, p. 44. 
288 Corradi (1929), p. 304. Against this view, see further Plout. Mor. 70b & 179c. 
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found guilty of a conspiracy and sent in exile to Koptos, in Southern Egypt.289 
Nevertheless, her exile does not constitute proof that Ptolemaios II repudiated her, as 
some scholars have suggested, all the more so if one takes into account that she alone 
bore him heirs.290 In support of this, comes an inscription from Koptos, considered to 
be referring to Arsinoe I, which names her “the chief royal wife of the king.”291 In addition 
to that, polygamy, although not the norm, was nevertheless not unknown in the rest of 
the Classical world. The tyrants of Sicily were practicing polygamists. Dionysios I of 
Syrakousai is reported to have married Aristomache of Syrakousai and Doris of 
Lokroi on the same day in 397 BCE.292 For the early Hellenistic period, Ploutarchos is 
quite clear on more than one occasion that a multiplicity of wives was kept 
concurrently. He stated that Demetrios Poliorketes, did just as Lysimachos and 
Ptolemaios, and held all his wives in honour (διὰ τιμῆς).293 He also hinted at the basis 
upon which the Makedonian polygamous households were organised: favouritism. 
When Pyrros of Epeiros was at the court of Ptolemaios I as a voluntary hostage, he 
made sure to pay special attentions to Berenike, “seeing that she had the greatest influence 
and was foremost in virtue and intellect of all the wives of Ptolemaios,” (μέγιστον δυναμένην καὶ 
πρωτεύουσαν ἀρετῇ καὶ φρονήσει τῶν Πτολεμαίου γυναικῶν).294 Significantly, since 
the sources show no explicit objection to it, the practice of polygamy in both the 
Argead and Ptolemaic dynasties was, to say the least, an accepted reality.295  
 Further, serial monogamy implies a hierarchical dynastic organisation with 
strong implications for legitimacy. If only one wife was the formal consort of the king 
at any given time then it follows that her status would be elevated above all other 
liaisons and that her children would be the only legitimate successors to the kingship. 
How is one then expected to interpret the dynastic situation as Ploutarchos describes 
it? “…almost all the […] [Hellenistic] lines [with the exception of the Antigonid] afford 
many examples of men who killed their sons, and of many who killed their mothers and wives; and as 
                                                 
289 Schol. Theok. 17.129. 
290 Beloch (1924-1927), IV, Macurdy (1932), p. 110. Hatzopoulos (1986) & Hammond (1989), p. 153 
have both related that begetting heirs was one of the primary functions of royal women.  
291 Petrie W.M.F. Koptos, 1896, Plate XX. Cited in Macurdy (1932), pp. 110-111 & Ogden (1999), p. 
74. It is interesting to note here that her children were adopted posthumously by Arsinoe II who died 
barren, (Schol. Theok. 17.128). This could imply that later in her life at Koptos Arsinoe I lost her status 
of chief wife. 
292 Plout. Dion 3.1-4. 
293 Plout. Comparatio Demetrii et Antonii 4.1-2. 
294 Plout. Pyrr. 4.5-7. 
295 Greenwalt (1989), p. 22. For him, polygamy “should be accepted as an Argead institution”, p. 29. See also 
Carney (2000), pp. 23-27. 
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for men killing their brothers, just as geometricians assume their postulates, so this crime came to be a 
common and recognised postulate in the plans of princes to secure their own safety.”296 A similar 
situation prevailed in Argead Makedonia. Several examples of intense brutality 
targeted at competing members of the Argead clan have already been cited above in 
reference to the ‘anything goes’ atmosphere of Argead dynastic succession. This 
blatantly suggests that there was no formalised dynastic hierarchy in place, which gave 
precedence to particular sons of particular wives. Given the inability of humans to 
restrain the cultivation of preferences and subdue their personal predilections for the 
sake of fairness, the existence of favourite wives and sons, already discussed above, 
constitutes a valid hypothesis for the formation of hierarchies in a royal polygamous 
household. If a form of stricter dynastic organisation ever existed, in however 
rudimentary a form, it seems that it was largely disrespected, especially when the 
central authority was not strong enough, i.e. when the designated successor was under 
age, or the Kingdom in general disarray from external threats or internal struggle.297 
All Argead contenders, apparently, considered themselves justified in thinking that 
they held and could claim equal rights to the throne.  
 Finally, the practice of royal polygamy raises questions over notions of 
illegitimacy, which were as blurred as notions of legitimacy. The extreme lengths to 
which Archelaos went in order to eradicate his opposition (he cut the throats of his 
paternal uncle, along with his cousin and drowned his young half-brother supposedly 
with his own hands) have been attributed to his contested ancestry. Allegedly, he was 
the bastard (νόθος) son of Perdikkas II and a slave-girl, Simiche.298 Equally, Arridaios 
was accused, by his own half-brother Alexandros III, of being the illegitimate son of 
Philippos II and a dancing girl from Larissa.299 Tronson, however, has successfully 
demonstrated that there is no reason to doubt the legitimacy of her marriage to 
Philippos II.300 It has been argued, rightly, that allegations of illegitimacy in Argead 
Makedonia were a malicious propagandist tactic used to undermine the dynastic 
claims of otherwise rightful heirs to the Makedonian throne.301 Such a view can be 
supported by the fact that in most cases, the sources are quite clear in delineating 
                                                 
296 Plout. Dem. 3.4.  
297 See for instance events in the transition period between the death of Archelaos and the accession of 
Amyntas III. 
298 Pl. Gorg. 471a-c, Cl. Ael. VH 12.43, Schol. Aristeides 45.55, 46.120. See Ogden (1999), pp. 7-8. 
299 Plout. Alex. 10, 77.5, Ath. Deipn. 13.578a, Just. 9.8.2, 13.2.11. 
300 See Tronson (1984), pp. 121-122. For literature on the debate see Tronson (1984), p. 121, n. 36 and 
Prestianni-Giallombardo (1976-1977), p. 85, n. 8.  
301 See Ogden (1999). 
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between proper concubines and wives. An example is Ptolemaios II with his two 
marriages and his eight recorded mistresses.302 Interestingly, illegitimacy claims had, 
more often than not, little to do with the perceived validity of the marriage itself. 
Rather, accusations of bastardy were connected principally with purity of blood. To 
be 100% Makedonian was probably the ideal pedigree for the successor to the Argead 
throne. The Epirote ancestry of Olympias was used by Attalos, the uncle of Philippos 
II’s new and all-Makedonian bride, to discredit Alexandros III as a non-legitimate 
heir (γνήσιον…διάδοχον τῆς βασιλείας).303 In a similar manner, the emphasis that 
sources place on Eurydike’s Illyrian descent might suggest that similar accusations of 
ethnic impurity dogged Philippos II.304 Perhaps that was the same reason why 
Ptolemaios I never promoted his children from Thais, his Athenian wife and former 
courtesan, for the throne, despite the fact that they were his first-borns.305 
 
In conjunction with the ill-defined rules of succession discussed in the previous section 
the implications of royal polygamy for the extent of the political/dynastic power of the 
ruler are severely limiting. A polygamous environment fosters competition. Fluidity in 
the hierarchy of partnerships exacerbates the situation massively, as women and their 
offspring need to vie constantly for the king’s preference. Surely competition 
manifested itself in everyday life, but ultimately the primary area of contestation was 
succession. In relation to one polygamous king, Ploutarchos’ sharp comment that 
“…the domestic strife that resulted from Philippos’ various marriages and love-affairs caused the 
quarrels which took place in the women’s apartments to infect the whole kingdom…,” sounds 
intensely realistic.306 In such an eruptive environment the king’s regulation of the 
social relations that formed between himself, his consorts and his progeny were crucial 
for the preservation of dynastic and political stability. Despite the precarious balance 
of dynastic power, the politically disruptive practice of polygamy was carried over 
unaltered as a prototype for dynastic organisation from Argead Makedonia to the 
Ptolemaic monarchy. What is deemed to be the most defining reason for the 
                                                 
302 Ptolemaios II had taken as wives Arsinoe I (Paus. 1.7.3, Schol. Theok. 17.128) and Arsinoe II (Paus. 
1.7.1). For his mistresses, see Ath. Deipn. 13.576e-f. See also the case of Thais. During the campaigns of 
Alexandros III, she is clearly demarcated as a courtesan, Diod. 17.72. She then goes on to become the 
wife of Ptolemaios I, Ath. Deipn. 13.576e. For concerns raised over the legitimacy of their children, see 
references in Ogden (1999), p. 69. 
303 Plout. Alex. 9.7-8. 
304 See Ogden (1999), pp. 12-13. 
305 Ath. Deipn. 13.576e. 
306 Plout. Alex. 9. 
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preservation of royal polygamy, namely its use as a diplomatic foreign policy tool, will 
be explored in the following section. It will be argued that the objectives behind the 
instantiation of polygamy in the Hellenistic period remained the same from the 
passing of the Argead to the Ptolemaic dynasties. It is only in the reign of Ptolemaios 
II that royal sibling marriage introduces a significant change in the marital practices 
of the Makedonian kings. 
 
   
MARRIAGE AS POLITICAL ALLIANCE 
 Marriage in Classical Makedonia was used as a way of concluding political 
alliances. Satyros the Peripatetic is explicit in his account of Philippos II’s list of 
marriages that these took place in view of strengthening the Kingdom.307 Philippos II, 
with his seven known marriages may represent an anomaly as regards the number of 
women a Makedonian monarch would normally marry, but his situation must be seen 
as reflecting a kingdom under expansion. Instances of diplomatic marriages are 
known to us since the close of the sixth century BCE when Alexandros I married his 
sister Gygaia to the Persian commander Bubares.308 Herodotos related that this 
marriage was part of Alexandros’ Persian appeasement plan for the murder of their 
embassy in his father’s court.309 Following from that, the available evidence is almost 
constant in sketching the marriages of Makedonian monarchs as a way of maintaining 
the balance of power, or of expanding spheres of influence. Archelaos married his 
elder daughter to the King of Elimeia in order to neutralize him and gain a freer hand 
in his battle against the Lynkestians and the Illyrians.310 The marriage of Amyntas III 
to Eurydike, the daughter of an Illyrian chieftain, Sirras, which took place at a time 
when the Makedonian/Illyrian borders were unstable, also conforms to this 
pattern.311 The marriages of the Ptolemaic kings seem to have addressed the exact 
same political questions of balance of power, expansion, as well as a much more 
pronounced need for legitimacy.  
Ideological legitimation in the era of the Successors necessitated a connection 
with Alexandros III himself or with the Argead dynasty. This could be achieved 
                                                 
307 Ath. Deipn. 13.557b-e. 
308 Hdt. 5.21. 
309 Hdt. 5.21. 
310 Aristot. Pol. 5.1311b 
311 See Borza (1992), p. 191. 
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through propaganda, as we have seen above, but also through marriage. Ptolemaios I 
made use of both techniques. On the one hand, he promoted his dynasty’s 
genealogical links with the Argead past and with Alexandros in particular, but also 
attempted in effect to continue Alexandros’ bloodline by marrying his only full-sister 
Kleopatra.312 He was not the only one to recognise the political merits of such a 
union. Diodoros mentions that almost all of the Successors, and various other high 
officials, at one time or another entertained the idea of marrying themselves to 
Kleopatra.313 These plans were quelled by the murder of Kleopatra at the court of 
Antigonos Monophthalmos, but other available brides served equally advantageous 
political goals. At a time of military alignments, Ptolemaios I chose to marry the 
daughter of Antipatros, Eurydike, in order to cement the decision at Triparadeisos to 
join forces against Perdikkas.314 Echoing Philippos II’s policy who “αἰεὶ κατὰ πόλεμον 
ἐγάμει” Ptolemaic foreign policy was often sealed with a diplomatic marriage. This 
did not necessarily involve the ruler as the groom. Female members of the royal 
dynasty were frequently given off to prominent individuals of other political units.315 
Ptolemaios I is known to have married no less than four of his daughters to rulers of 
Successor kingdoms ranging from Epeiros, to Makedonia, to Thrake.316 Continuing 
the tradition of royal diplomatic marriages, his son, Ptolemaios II, married the 
daughter of Lysimachos of Thrake, Arsinoe I, around the time when he assumed the 
position of co-regent with his father.317 His later marriage to Arsinoe II will be 
discussed below. After almost three centuries of polygamous practice, Ptolemaios III 
Euergetes I is the first recorded king, in both the Argead and the Ptolemaic dynasties, 
to have taken only one wife. Yet, the sources stress the extreme diplomatic importance 
                                                 
312 He stole Alexandros’ body and brought it to Egypt, Diod. 18.28.3 and propagated his descent from 
Philippos II by circulating rumours that he was his illegitimate son, Curt. 9.8.22, Paus. 1.6.2. Further 
evidence of his propaganda to establish a valid Argive descent comes from a fragment of Satyros, which 
traces the patrilinear descent of Ptolemaios’ mother, Arsinoe, all the way back to Herakles, FGrHist 631 
F 1. See above. For the attempted marriage to Kleopatra, see Diod. 20.37.3-6. 
313 Diod. 20.37.4. For an overview of the ancient sources and a biography, see Carney (2000), pp. 123-
128. 
314 Paus. 1.6.8. 
315 E.g. the marriage of Stratonike, Perdikkas II’s sister and Seuthes, the nephew of the Odrysian King, 
Sitalkes. Thouc. 2.101.5.  
316 Ptolemais to Demetrios Poliorketes: Plout. Dem. 32, Lysandra to Alexandros V of Makedonia (son of 
Kassandros): Porphyrios, FGrHist 260 F 3 §5, Antigone to Pyrros of Epeiros, Plout. Pyrr. 4.4, Arsinoe to 
Lysimachos of Thrake, Paus. 1.10.3. 
317 Schol. Theok. 17.128. 
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of his marriage with Berenike II of Kyrene, as it involved the re-attachment of the 
peninsula of Kyrenaike to the Ptolemaic Kingdom.318  
Dynastic intermarriage between members of ruling families was the norm for 
consolidating diplomatic exchange in the Classical period, not just in Makedonia, but 
in most political units under the rule of one person, be they kings or tyrants. In 
Argead Makedonia it was practiced with increased intensity during periods of political 
and military expansion as a way of securing the compliance of key players. Political 
and military alliances were also sealed through treaties, but these usually involved 
partners from different political systems, e.g. city-states.319 The Hellenistic world 
inherited this familial approach to the conduct of diplomacy. As the key players were 
now in their majority monarchies, dynastic intermarriage, in spite of its usually short-
lived benefits, carried the day as a diplomatic tool. It was mostly in the face of the 
Roman Res Publica and the city-states of Asia Minor and Old Hellas that the 




Special reference should be made here to the marriage of Ptolemaios II 
Philadelphos to his full sister Arsinoe II. It has been argued that full sibling marriage 
constituted the answer of Ptolemaios II to the problems of dynastic instability that 
dogged the organisation of the royal houses both in the Argead and the Hellenistic 
periods.320 This marriage had significant repercussions both in regard to the political 
power of royal females (especially in the later Ptolemaic period, where they played 
increasingly more formal parts in the exercise of Ptolemaic government), as well as to 
the subsequent pattern of Ptolemaic dynastic organisation.321 Interpretations as to the 
reasons behind the marriage vary considerably. Overestimating the political power of 
Arsinoe II based on the appearance of her name on the Khremonides Decree, 
                                                 
318 Just. 26.3.  
319 See for instance the negotiations for the Peace of Philokrates (see Cawkwell, 1978), or the Treaty of 
the Common Peace signed in Korinthos between Philippos II and the rest of the Hellenes, (IG II² 236). 
320 Ogden (1999), p. 67-116. 
321 The strongest evidence for the growing political role of the queen in later Ptolemaic times is the 
change in the wording of the address of Ptolemaic instructions. From around 136 BCE onwards the 
singular “βασιλέως προστάξαντος” (e.g. P. Hib. II 198, lines 141-7, C. Ord. Ptol. 27, 29) is replaced by 
the plural “βασιλέων προσταξάντων.” The earliest reference for the latter is BGU VI.1249. For detailed 
overviews of the political role of the various Ptolemaic queens following Arsinoe II, see Hazzard (2000), 
pp. 101-159, Ogden (1999), pp. 80-116, Whitehorn (1994), pp. 80-202. 
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scholars have attributed the decision to her.322 The extent of Arsinoe’s actual 
influence though remains highly debated. As a result of perceiving female political 
visibility as a direct consequence of ‘empty-chair’ situations, Arsinoe II’s political 
prominence has been frequently attributed to the weakness of Ptolemaios II’s 
personality.323 Scholars, relying largely on anecdotal evidence, have called him a 
womanizer and an indolent in constant pursuit of tryphe.324 As the recent critique of 
Burstein has demonstrated though, these assertions on his character do not lend 
support to his alleged incapability of efficiently conducting the affairs of state.325 As a 
matter of fact, the latest scholarship exhibits signs of a de profundis re-appraisal of 
Ptolemaios II’s political, diplomatic and military skills, based on a thorough 
examination of the available evidence.326 This re-appraisal discredits earlier 
appreciations, with all the implications that this entails for the actual political role of 
Arsinoe II. 
Others saw in this marriage Ptolemaios II’s attempt to “construct an effective 
legitimacy structure for the dynasty.”327 On the whole, this marriage must have represented 
a radical break with the traditions both of the Makedonian Kingdom and of the rest 
of the Hellenic world. Full sibling marriages were outlawed in the Classical world, 
while there is only one instance in the history of the Argead Makedonian dynasty 
where a brother-sister marriage is mentioned.328 Archelaos married his son Amyntas 
to his younger daughter in order to prevent a dynastic feud between two of his sons.329 
                                                 
322 E.g. Macurdy (1932), p. 124. The Khremonides Decree, IG II2 687. 
323 Macurdy (1932), pp. 118, 120, Longega (1968), pp. 72-74. 
324 For the references on the ancient sources, see Burstein (1982), p. 205, n. 44. 
325 Burstein (1982), p. 205-212 with references. This critique, targeted against the consensus on the 
degree of Arsinoe’s political power, is an excellent example of a corrective approach to modern 
scholarship and has effectively flagged the danger of drawing conclusions out of meagre and/or 
controversial sources. See also Carney (1987b), p. 425. 
326 On the surviving traditions regarding Ptolemaios II see esp. Hazzard (2000), pp. 36-42, 78 with 
references. On his military prowess and his image as the ‘cultured conqueror,’ see Samuel (1993), pp. 
183-185. 
327 Ogden (1999), p. 75. 
328 For full sibling marriage in the Hellenic world, see Pomeroy (1984), p. 16 with references. Familial 
intermarriage, especially between siblings, was not practiced in the Roman world either, see Smith 
(2006), pp. 30-32. As regards sibling marriage in Argead Makedonia, scholars have argued for another 
case, that of Ptolemaios of Aloros with Eurynoe. Diodoros put him down as the son of Amyntas III and 
the brother of Alexandros II on two separate occasions. However, he is nowhere recorded to have been 
married to Eurynoe, Amyntas III’s only known daughter. Regardless, scholars have made the 
assumption that Diodoros actually means ‘brother-in-law’ when he writes ‘brother’ and the only way 
for this to work out is if Ptolemaios of Aloros was married to Euryne. This is actually stretching the 
evidence. For the assumption, see Ogden (1999), pp. 14-15, Buraselis (2008), p. 292, relying on Ogden. 
See also Carney (2000), pp. 39-40. The references are in Diod. 15.71.1, 15.77, Marsyas of Pella apud 
Ath. Deipn. 14.629d.  
329 Aristot. Pol. 5.1311b. 
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In all probability, this marriage was between half-brother and sister and could have 
served a direct dynastic goal through diplomatic means, i.e. the confirmation of 
Amyntas’ preferred status as a successor. Given the rarity of full sibling unions, then 
surely, if that were the case, Aristoteles would not have failed to comment on it. 
Instead, his description is quite sober and he refrains from passing any judgment. 
Others, such as the court poet Sotades, were not at all subtle in their criticism of the 
marriage between Ptolemaios II and Arsinoe.330 News of it must have been received 
as a shock by Hellenes everywhere, and it is a matter of debate how far Philadelphos 
would have afforded to off-put his Makedonian and Hellenic subjects.331 It is the 
contention of the author that he need not have gone to such lengths in order to 
initiate a clearer pattern of succession, especially when his own line of succession was 
neatly organized.332 He only had children from Arsinoe I. If he wanted to avoid what 
Ogden calls “amphimetric strife” he need not remarry in the first place. In addition, 
Seibert argues with some conviction that if indeed he had a programmatic plan to 
institute sister marriage in the Ptolemaic Kingdom then he could as well have thought 
of a consequent evolution for the practice. i.e. to have married his own children 
together; Berenike Phernophoros with Ptolemaios III.333 She was married off in a 
diplomatic rapprochement with the Seleukid kingdom but that does not change the 
fact that if Ptolemaios II was that intent on establishing dynastic continuity through 
purity of blood he could have spared her from Antiochos II Theos and given her to 
his son.334  
Instead, there might be a kernel of truth in the ancient sources that attributed 
vehemently the practice to influence from Egypt.335 Or, rather, more rightly, what the 
Ptolemaioi perceived as being customary in Pharaonic Egypt. Carney asserts that, 
whether intended or not, this was the beginning of the Egyptianisation of the 
                                                 
330 Sotades of Maroneia, quoted in Plout. Mor. 11a and Ath. Deipn. 14.620f: “εἰς οὐχ ὁσίην τρυμαλιὴν τὸ 
κέντρον ὤθει.” 
331 The argument that full sibling marriage was out of the ordinary and frowned upon can be further 
supported by the reprimanding comments of Eurypides Andromache 173-180 and Platon Laws 8.838a-c. 
332 Ogden (1999). For his argument and a definition of amphimetric strife see pp. ix-xxxiv.  
333 Seibert (1967), p. 84. 
334 Macurdy (1932) makes the interesting proposition that she was originally betrothed to Ptolemaios 
the Son, but this is just an unverifiable conjecture, p. 87. 
335 Memnon, FHG 3 F 14 on Ptolemaios Keraunos’ decision to marry his half-sister Arsinoe: “Αὐτίκα 
γοῦν τὴν οἰκείαν μᾶλλον ἐκφαίνων σκαιότητα, Ἀρσινόην μὲν, ὡς πάτριον τοῦτο τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις, τὴν 
ἀδελφὴν γαμεῖ…” Paus. 1.7,1, on Ptolemaios II’s decision to do the same: “οὗτος ὁ Πτολεμαῖος 
Ἀρσινόης ἀδελφῆς ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐρασθεὶς ἔγημεν αὐτήν, Μακεδόσιν οὐδαμῶς ποιῶν νομιζόμενα, 
Αἰγυπτίοις μέντοι ὧν ἦρχε”. See also Diod. 1.27.1: “Νομοθετῆσαι δέ φασι τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους παρὰ τὸ 
κοινὸν ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων γαμεῖν ἀδελφὰς διὰ τὸ γεγονὸς ἐν τούτοις τῆς Ἴσιδος ἐπίτευγμα.” 
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Ptolemaic monarchy.336 While it is now generally accepted that full sibling marriages 
were actually rare in the ruling families of Dynastic Egypt, their frequency and 
importance might have been overinflated by the regular conflation of the literal and 
extended meanings of kinship terms in the available sources at the time and in 
contemporary everyday life, but also by the pervasive presence of Egyptian religious 
cosmology, where divine brother-sister marriage was a recurrent trait.337 Leaving 
infatuation on the side, it might be fair to assume then that the full sibling marriage of 
Ptolemaios and Arsinoe can be seen as the ‘marriage’ of certain Makedonian and 
Egyptian elements. In other words, one could argue that the nascent Makedonian 
ruler cult found fertile ground alongside the Egyptian tradition of divine kingship, in 
which royal marriage between full siblings was thought to be a regular phenomenon, 
and contributed to the development of a new variation for the representation of the 
Makedonian monarchy.338 In that variation, the Ptolemaic rulers could manipulate 
their dynastic relations in order to create a semblance of divine rule, similar to that of 
Pharaonic Egypt.339 Such a monarchy could cater for their Egyptian audience, and 
especially the priestly class, addressing their concerns regarding the uninterrupted 
continuation of Pharaonic rule.340 At the same time, the insistence on marrying from 
Makedonian stock, whether diplomatically or consanguineously, is equally telling of 
the unsuitability of the alternatives, as of the preference to sustain a dynastic line with 
strong claims to “purity of blood.” It has already been discussed above how belonging 
to the Argead clan amounted to a solid prerequisite for leadership aspirations. In 
Ptolemaic Egypt, the dynasty simply did not have the time to branch out to the extent 
that the Argead had over the centuries. As a result, the pool of suitable candidates was 
necessarily severely limited and intermarriage, even between brothers and sisters, 
ensued when there was no pressing need to confirm foreign policy aims through 
diplomatic marriages. The Successor marriages to non-Makedonians (i.e. Persian 
noble women) with the exception of Seleukos I Nikator and Apamea, the daughter of 
the Sogdian nobleman, Spitamenes, and in principle Alexandros III and Roxanne, all 
                                                 
336 For her views see Carney (1987b). 
337 Middleton (1962), Shaw (1992). Dickey (2004). See the discussion by Buraselis (2008). 
338 See Hammond (2000), p. 142, 150-152 & Carney (2000), pp. 209-225. See Carney (1987b), p. 423, 
n. 8 for references. 
339 Official royal propaganda stressed the holy matrimony of Zeus and Hera as a template in an 
obvious attempt to bring the coupling closer to the sensibilities of the Hellenic and Makedonian 
audience, Theok. Eid. 17.131-134. 
340 See Burstein (1991). 
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proved inconsequential to the continuation of the dynastic line.341 In Egypt, due to the 
Persian occupation, there was no significant nobility, other than the priestly class, that 
could furnish brides that were of dynastic and political importance for the 
consolidation of the new Ptolemaic state. What is more, unlike Alexandros and 
Seleukos, the Ptolemaioi seem to have aspired to a Mediterranean oriented state, 
rather than an amalgamated Egyptian/Makedonian one in the manner of Alexandros 
III’s Hellenic/Persian model. Thus, sibling marriage, with its resolve to view 
membership in the Ptolemaic clan as a necessary prerequisite for succession, could be 
viewed as the continuation of Argead dynastic policy by other means.342 
 
 
DYNASTIC ORGANISATION AND ROYAL FEMALES  
 Apart from demonstrating the precariousness of the balance of power of the 
period, following the death of Alexandros III, the almost frantic rate the Successors 
were intermarrying between themselves serves also to direct attention towards the 
importance of royal women as valued representatives of the dynasty. Even if 
pragmatically the stability achieved was more often than not short-lived their offer to 
marriage was meant to guarantee that end. In fact, the complex matrix of royal 
polygamous liaisons and the resulting multiplicity of offspring/contenders to the 
throne render royal women an important part of the intensive political power 
networks of the Makedonian ruler. Their involvement in succession disputes reveals 
that they could be influential in promoting the interests of their own sons and 
daughters, and as such they could be seen in partaking in the political life of the state. 
In times of crisis, their quasi-political, dynastic role was acted upon and one observes 
women offering themselves up for marriage out of their own volition and on their own 
account, or resorting to armed conflict to preserve their dynastic interests. Kleopatra, 
the full sister of Alexandros III, offered herself to Leonnatos and Perdikkas, while 
Kynnane, the half-Illyrian daughter of Philippos II is attested to have taken up arms 
in order to secure the marriage of her daughter, Adea Eurydike, to Philippos III 
                                                 
341 For Apamea, see Arr. Anab. 7.4.6. Ptolemaios I had married Artakama, the daughter of Artabazos, 
in the mass marriages at Susa, but she disappears from the record, Arr. Anab. 7.4.4-8, Plout. Alex. 70. 
Tarn’s (1929) assertion that Ptolemaios I married an Egyptian princess upon arrival in Egypt does not 
take the argument beyond conjecture. 
342 Paraphrasing von Clausewitz (1873). 
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Arridaios.343 The endeavours of those women demonstrate that it was impossible for a 
woman of royal status to claim political power for their own sake. Equally, however, 
the willingness with which the Successors were keen to associate themselves with a 
woman of royal status exemplifies that the strength of those women lay in their 
equation with the dynastic line. 
Royal women and their position within the monarchy were thus an important 
structure that framed the dynastic power of the Makedonian monarch, especially 
when one considers the increasing political visibility that they acquired towards the 
end of the dynasty. By Kleopatra VII’s reign, association with the Queen was what 
gave legitimacy to the successor. Kaisarion was Kleopatra’s son and there is no hint in 
the sources that his being sired by a non-member of the Ptolemaic clan mattered in 
the slightest against his succession.344 Similarly, when Ptolemaios XII Auletes was 
expelled, the Alexandrians proclaimed his daughter, Berenike IV, queen and engaged 
in a hunt for a suitable consort. Their quest is described as almost farcical, since 
Berenike is said to have strangled the first suitor with her own hands, on account of his 
uncouth manners.345 To the Alexandrians, Berenike IV was sufficiently equipped, as 
far as her dynastic status went, to hold power on her own. Overall, while during the 
reign of the Argeadai, it was normally the patronymic of the potential successor that 
added to his status, this was no longer of the same importance in the late Ptolemaic 
period.346  
 It has been argued that the increased political power of the Ptolemaic queens 
was a direct result of the sibling marriage between Ptolemaios II Philadelphos and 
Arsinoe II.347 However, it will be shown here that the active role of royal women in 
the dynastic and political affairs of the kingdom can be traced back to the Argead 
Kingdom and the social structures that allowed royal women the liberty to interfere in 
the political arena, should the circumstances demand it. 
 The sources reveal the presence of a host of influential women in Argead 
Makedonia. The reader’s attention is arrested by the extraordinary career of 
Olympias, but she was not the only one. There existed less famous but, in all 
appearances, similarly active and prominent royal women. The family of Philippos II 
                                                 
343 Diod. 19.52. For Kleopatra and Leonnatos, see Plout. Eum. 3.9. For Kleopatra and Perdikkas, see 
Diod. 18.23. 
344 For this argument see Ogden (1999), pp. 100-105. 
345 Strab. 17.1.11 
346 For patronymics, see IG I3 89. 
347 See Hazzard (2000), esp. ch. 5. 
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has to exhibit a number of conspicuous female members, making their way into 
historical writings through their involvement in dynastic intrigues, such as his mother 
Eurydike, or through their assertive participation in dynastic conflicts, often armed, 
such as his daughter Kynnane and his grand-daughter, another Eurydike.348  
 A reading of secondary sources reveals that scholars have picked up on the 
interest of ancient authors in stories of dynastic conflict and cruelty figuring royal 
women, leading them to identify, on the one hand, a pattern for devious political 
involvement in empty-chair situations, and on the other, a template for the expression 
of female political power in both societies in the face of Olympias. For Macurdy, 
author of the 75-year-old, and still only, comprehensive study of Hellenistic royal 
women, Olympias “was the first of the Macedonian queens to show that thirst for political power 
combined with unscrupulous and unbounded ambition which marks many of the later women of this 
extraordinary northern breed.”349 Next to Olympias in documented political involvement is 
her younger contemporary, Adea Eurydike. Wife to the only surviving adult male of 
the Argead line, Philippos Arridaios, she was Olympias’ main rival in her struggle to 
ensure the viability and succession of her grandson, Alexandros IV. The sources tell us 
that her life’s course was dominated by the pursuit of power politics and dynastic 
survival, ultimately leading to her forced suicide.350 Droysen attributes Eurydike’s 
involvement in public affairs partly to the influence of her secretary Asklepiodoros, but 
mostly to her own ambitious character, which drove her to side step her “imbecile” 
husband and assume the role of decision-maker.351 Bearing the same resonance in its 
vocabulary as the above, the only monograph on Arsinoe II Philadelphos is built 
around the notion that her disposition was that combination of intelligence, ambition 
and lack of scruples that would allow her ultimately to overshadow her brother-
husband and King, Ptolemaios II, and become the true ruler of Egypt.352 According 
to another she was “a typical Hellenistic tigress queen in the formidable tradition of Olympias and 
Cleopatra.”353  
                                                 
348 For a concise biography of Eurydike, see Carney (2000), pp. 40-46. For the biographies of Kynnane 
and Adea Eurydike, see Carney (2000), pp. 69-70, 129-131 & 132-137. 
349 Macurdy (1932), p. 44. 
350 There are two main accounts on Adea Eurydike’s political involvement after her marriage to 
Philippos Arridaios: Diod. 18.39.1-4, Arr. FGrHist 156, F 9.30-33.  On her suicide see Diod. 19.11.5-7, 
Cl. Ael. VH 13.36. 
351 Droysen (1993), pp. 140, 231. See also Will (1979-1982), p. 51. 
352 Longega (1968), esp. 127-134. Other historians to share this view are Tarn (1913) pp. 262-263, 
Bevan (1927), pp. 60-61, Beloch (1912-7), IV: pp. 1, 242, 582.  
353 Huzar (1966), p. 337. 
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 In terms of the political involvement of royal females in the dynastic struggles 
that arose, it is a well-documented fact, looking back into history of the Argead 
dynasty, that they tended to become more assertive when there was no strong male 
authority on the throne. For instance, Eurydike I was a widow when she made 
diplomatic overtures to the Athenian general Iphikrates, Olympias’ son and ruler of 
Makedonia was away campaigning in Asia and Adea Eurydike was married to a man 
not “capax imperii.”354 However, insofar as the origins of the behaviour of royal women 
is concerned, these historians observe a strong element of continuity between the 
assertive actions of Olympias, whom history placed at the command of her own army, 
within a yard of grasping some degree of real political power in an era of contenders, 
and Arsinoe II, whom the Egyptian sources name “nsw-bitj” (Queen of Upper and 
Lower Egypt), a royal title, at least, suggestive of attained political visibility.355  
 In terms of the role of Olympias as setting the trend for the political assertion 
of royal women in the Makedonian monarchy, it is an uncontested fact that these 
emerge from their relative obscurity for the first time during Olympias’ time. As 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the earliest reference we possess of a 
Makedonian princess dates from the time of Amyntas I or Alexandros I’s reign in the 
late sixth century. It merely refers to the daughter of the king by name (Gygaia) and to 
her being given off to a diplomatic marriage.356 Before Olympias, only Philippos II’s 
mother Eurydike is being treated more extensively by the sources herself in relation to 
dynastic ruses.357 In spite of that fact though, we must be wary of assigning similarities 
in the visibility of royal women across time and space to the example of one woman. 
Instead, one should enquire to what extent was Olympias acting driven by her own 
tempestuous disposition and in defiance of the confines for the ‘permissible’ behaviour 
of royal women set by the society she had grown up in (i.e. Epeiros) and the one she 
had married into (i.e. Makedonia).  
 The following section is devoted to the re-examination of the commonly held 
view of Olympias as the ‘trend-setter’ for the behaviour of successive Hellenistic royal 
                                                 
354 Aisch. 2.29. Carney, (1987a), p. 42. 
355 For Olympias: Just. 14.5, Diod. 19.11.1-3.. See Polyperchon’s offer of the role of “βασιλική 
προστασία,” Diod. 18.49.4. For an overview of the debate on the meaning and significance of 
‘prostasia’ as a rank, see Carney (1987a), p. 58, n. 61 and Hammond (1985), p. 156. For Olympias and 
her daughter Kleopatra as exercising prostasia, see Hammond (1985), p. 158. For Arsinoe II: 
Quaegebeur (1978), pp. 258, 262. He supports the idea that this title consists proof that Arsinoe II ruled 
on an equal basis with her brother-husband. Contra Carney (1987b), p. 425-426, n. 14.  
356 Hdt. 5.21. For dating problems see Borza, 1992, p. 103, n. 15. 
357 See the tradition preserved by Just. 7.4-5.  
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women. In this respect, one needs to approach Olympias both on a micro and a 
macro level. On the micro level, one needs to take into account the particular 
circumstances that surrounded the period of her increased political visibility (i.e. 
starting from the reign of Philippos II and culminating after the death of Alexandros 
III). The higher degree of Olympias’ political exposure during that time did not 
depend solely on her idiosyncrasy, as writers, both ancient and modern, tend to 
emphasize, but also, on the unique position she occupied in the Makedonian court as 
wife to the man who took the city-state world by storm and who was murdered 
unexpectedly at the height of his power, mother to the conqueror of the Persian 
Empire, who introduced a queen quite late in his reign in a court far removed from 
Makedonia and grand-mother to two of the three eligible contenders for the Argead 
throne at a time of extreme dynastic instability.358 This was enough material to 
account for the extensive interest that ancient writers took in her.359 In this triple 
capacity, however, her position was rendered inimitable. Therefore, her assertiveness 
in the extraordinary circumstances that surrounded her life cannot be held 
accountable for similar behaviours in completely different contexts.360 On the macro 
level, one needs to evaluate Olympias’ political visibility against the backdrop of the 
traditions both of her homeland, Epeiros and the kingdom in which she spent more 
than half her life, Makedonia. 
 Research on the Epeirotic monarchy and society based on epigraphic 
material, has demonstrated that women enjoyed a greater degree of freedom and of 
responsibility than in the poleis.361 Inscriptions of manumission from the theatre of 
                                                 
358 Herakles, son of Barsine and Alexandros IV, son of Roxanne. 
359 It must be noted that the overt hostility of the overwhelming majority of the extant sources against 
Olympias could be due to a subsequent alleged propaganda by Kassandros. Kassandros was her major 
rival in the dynastic conflict for the Argead throne, backing the claim of Philippos Arridaios and his 
wife, Adea Eurydike. After his victory over Olympias he did much to appear as a loyal royalist (see 
Will, 1979-1982, pp. 51-52). Further, it is equally important to note that there is no significant extant 
source telling the story from a Makedonian perspective. Marsyas of Pella, a childhood companion of 
Alexandros III, wrote a History of Makedonia in ten books, the few fragments of which have been 
collected in Jacoby’s FGrHist 135, 136. See also Souda s.v. Μαρσύας. The other work of ‘insider’ history, 
that of Ptolemaios I, exists in fragmentary condition as well, (FGrHist 138). Interestingly, Ptolemaios I 
has no entry in the Souda. Our dependence, therefore, is on sources that were written by ‘outsiders’ 
looking into the Makedonian society, mostly centuries after the facts. Our major sources on Argead and 
Ptolemaic history, (Diodoros Sikeliotes, Ploutarchos of Chaironeia, Arrianos of Nikomedeia, Quintus 
Curtius Rufus, a first century CE Roman and Justinus, a third century CE Roman), though most based 
on contemporary sources, wrote at least two centuries after the events took place. Of those, Diodoros is 
the closest in time, writing in the mid-first century BCE. By implication, it rests with the historian to try 
and decipher the specific biases that a certain author might have over what he is describing. 
360 Unless of course her career served consciously as a role model for future royal women, for which of 
course we have absolutely no evidence. 
361 See Cabanes (1993), pp. 308-309. 
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Bouthrotos reveal that they had the right to free their own slaves; therefore the right 
to own property. In cases, where there would be no adult male immediate relation (i.e. 
father, brother, or husband), they could function as the head of the family.362 There is 
no attestation for the imposition of a male guardian, or kyrios, in such cases, like it was 
prescribed in the city-states.363 Even though the bulk of our evidence comes from the 
Hellenistic period we possess some earlier inscriptions, which seem to confirm this 
type of practice in Epeiros. More specifically, in a citizenship decree from the 
sanctuary of Zeus at Dodona dating from the 370s BCE, a woman, Phinto of Arronos, 
is placed at the head of the family and is granted the citizenship in their name and the 
name of her descendants.364 For Cabanes, the above is evidence of a stronger familial 
community in Epeiros, with all the implications that this might have on the figure of 
the wife/mother.365  It is a fact that Epeiros is an epigraphically much richer region 
than Makedonia.366 Nevertheless, epigraphic material from Makedonia per se 
concerning women is beginning to come to the surface and experts assess that their 
reading is pointing towards similar conclusions.367   
The liberty of the female to act in the interests of minors is particularly 
important in the Makedonian context, especially when seen in the light of mother/son 
configurations, pursuing a common goal, i.e. achieving succession. As such, it presents 
an interesting context for Olympias’ relationship with her children, both Alexandros 
and Kleopatra, as well as for her determination to defend the interests of her 
grandson, Alexandros IV. It can also be used to explain Polyperchon’s offer of the role 
of ‘βασιλική προστασία’ to Olympias.368 The exact nature of the office of προστασία is 
elusive to us. Nevertheless, research has demonstrated that it translated to more than 
mere “royal dignity.”369 Hammond juxtaposed to it the use of the word ‘προστάτης’ 
found in Epeirotic inscriptions to allude that it had a concrete meaning and equally 
                                                 
362 Cabanes (1980), p. 333.  
363 See Harrison (1971), where he states that “An Athenian woman […] remained under tutelage all her life”, p. 
84. 
364 Davies (2000), p. 246, D2 (translated): “When Neoptolemos, the (son) of Alketas was king, to the family of 
Phinto of Arronos, was given citizenship, to herself and descendants…” 
365 Cabanes (1980), p. 333. 
366 See Cabanes (1980), p. 336, Archibald (2000), p. 215. 
367 Hatzopoulos (1988), Cabanes (1993), pp. 308-309. The latter speaks of a community of civilization 
between Makedonia, Epeiros and Southern Illyria. Cf. Aristoteles’ own juxtaposition of them, Pol. 
5.1310b-1311a. 
368 Diod. 18.49.4. 
369 As translated by Geer (1947) in the Loeb edition of Diodoros Bk 18, p. 149. 
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concrete responsibilities.370 That the ‘προστασία’ in Epeiros, or indeed the 
representation of the community in state business, was not exclusively prescribed to be 
exercised by men is illustrated by the fact that the name of Kleopatra of Epeiros, 
Olympias’ daughter and widow of king Alexandros of Epeiros, appears in a list of 
theorodokoi from Argos.371 She is also the recipient of an embassy from Athens and of 
shipments of grain from Kyrene.372 Olympias is recorded to have acted on similar 
diplomatic and political matters both in Epeiros as well as in Makedonia. She received 
shipments of grain like Kleopatra, as well as booty from Gaza.373 She is also 
responsible for a mini diplomatic episode with Athens caused by her dedication of a 
bowl to the goddess Hygieia.374 The circumstances surrounding the offence taken on 
account of that bowl are unclear but Hypereides informs us that Olympias had the 
capacity and did send envoys to Athens carrying her charges against the polis. It is 
important to note that there is recorded precedence in Makedonia for the 
independent political and diplomatic initiative of a royal wife/mother. In one of his 
speeches Aischines has Eurydike, the mother of Philippos II and widow of the 
Makedonian King Amyntas III, demanding the diplomatic alliance of the Athenian 
general, Iphikrates. Her plea, very similar in outlook to Olympias’ labours after 
Alexandros’s death, was extended in an effort to preserve the succession rights of her 
children in the face of pretenders.375   
In connection to economic activity and the dispensing of property, 
Makedonian royal women were in a more advantageous position than Athenian 
women. Where an Athenian woman could not dispose of an amount larger than the 
equivalent of a bushel of barley, Makedonian women are attested to have been 
dedicating statues to sanctuaries as early as the beginning of the fourth century.376 
More specifically, a statue base was discovered in Vergina in the early 1980s bearing 
the inscription ΕΥΡΙΔΙΚΑ|ΣΙΡΡΑ|ΕΥΚΛΕΙΑΙ (Eurydike, daugher of Sirras, to 
Eukleia). Sirras was the father of Philippos II’s mother Eurydike and she appears to 
                                                 
370 As used for instance in D2, supra n. 97. See also Davies (2000), p. 246, D1, p. 250, D12-14. Note that 
the king is clearly delineated from the “προστάτας.” See Hammond (1985). Cf. Thouk. 2.65, 6.89 use 
of “προστασία” to denote political leadership and compare it with Xen. Mem. 3.6.10 use of 
“προστατεία” in the context of military leadership. 
371 Davies (2000), p. 248, D5. 
372 Aisch. 3.242. SEG IX.2, ll. 6-10. 
373 SEG IX.2. Plout. Alex. 25. 
374 Hyp. Ὑπὲρ Εὐξενίππου ἐισαγγελίας ἀπολογία πρὸς Πολύευκτον 4.19-26.  
375 Aisch. 2.26-29. The succession of her two remaining children, Perdikkas III and Philippos II, was 
threatened by a dynastic rival, Pausanias, whom Iphikrates ultimately defeated.  
376 Isaios Πρὸς Ξεναίνετον περὶ τοῦ Ἀριστάρχου κλήρου 10.10. 
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have dedicated the statue to Eukleia, the goddess of good reputation.377 Even though 
we have no evidence of Makedonian royal women, (at least not before the Hellenistic 
period), managing or disposing of land, as was common in the Persian Empire, 
religious dedications are an indicator of control over some amount of property.378 
Therefore, Olympias was not an innovator when she decided to make a considerable 
monetary dedication to Delphi.379 A similar arrangement applied in Epeiros, where 
Kleopatra also made gifts of grain to Korinthos.380  
Bearing the above in mind, Olympias cannot be seen as an isolated 
phenomenon. She did not break any conventions insofar as she might have stretched 
them. Her actions can be seen as springing largely from within the bounds of what 
was socially permissible for a woman of her status in Epeiros and Makedonia, 
intensified perhaps by the unique circumstances of that turbulent period.381 The 
similar actions of Eurydike, mother of Philippos II, Kynnane, Adea Eurydike, 
Kleopatra and others, suggest that the social structures of the Argead Kingdom, 
which prescribed a greater degree of domestic and economic independence for 
women than elsewhere in Hellas, were reflected in the dynastic organization of the 
monarchy. It was these structures that allowed royal women to assert a certain level of 
freedom of action in the political sphere, depending on the urgency of the 
circumstances. In this light, the increasingly pronounced role of royal women in 






This chapter has discussed the organisation of dynastic power in Argead Makedonia 
and Ptolemaic Egypt for traces of change and continuity. The ‘dynasty’ has been 
examined both as the abstract notion of a hereditary line of rulers, as well as the 
                                                 
377 Strab. 326c. Andronikos (2004), pp. 49-51. 
378 For Persian royal women holding vast property, see Pl. Alkib. I.121c-123d and Brosius (1996), pp. 
123-182. See Carney (2000), p. 34. 
379 Syll.3 252. 
380 Lyk. Κατὰ Λεωκράτους 26. 
381 It is interesting to note that despite the fact that Macurdy’s views on Olympias have now been re- 
evaluated by the extensive and thorough publications of Carney (see bibliography) in favour of a multi- 
factored approach, the image of Olympias as the forerunner for the elevated status of Hellenistic royal 
women by virtue of her character alone still persists, cf. Mirón-Perez, 2000, p. 37. 
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actual agglomeration of individuals belonging to a royal house at a given time. In this 
dual capacity, the ‘dynasty’ was approached both a source of ideological and political 
power for the rulers in Argead Makedonia and early Ptolemaic Egypt.  
 In terms of ideological power, it has been argued that the concept of the 
dynasty functioned in lieu of a unifying political ideology in early Ptolemaic Egypt as 
much as it did in Argead Makedonia. Membership to the Argead clan appears to have 
been the sole legitimating prerequisite of the various contenders for the Argead 
throne. Following that tradition, until the Ptolemaic dynasty was firmly consolidated 
in itself and as long as Ptolemaic Egypt was still regarded as the spear-won territory of 
Alexandros III, the early Ptolemaioi sought to establish an incontrovertible ideological 
continuity with their Argead predecessors. Complementary to the situational 
legitimation borne out of personal charisma, military victories or benefactions, as well 
as the methodical exploitation of Alexandros’ image and name, aimed at smoothing 
out in popular imagination the creases of an irregular transition of power between the 
conqueror and the nascent Ptolemaic dynasty, the early Ptolemaioi systematically 
made the effort to present themselves to the Alexandrian population as the scions of 
the Argead dynasty.  
 Interestingly, the essential claims of the legitimating rhetoric of the early 
Ptolemaioi are encapsulated in just a few lines of a recently discovered epigram by the 
Makedonian poet Poseidippos of Pella, active in the courts of the first two Ptolemaioi: 
the eagle and lightning of Zeus, both considered good omens for military victories, 
appeared to the Ptolemaioi in the same way as they had to Alexandros before 
conquering the Persian Empire. What is most striking to notice here is that instead of 
calling them Ptolemaioi, the poet addresses them as “Argead kings.”382 
 
In terms of political power, the most defining structures of dynastic organisation in 
both Argead Makedonia and early Ptolemaic Egypt have been identified as the 
patterns of succession and royal polygamy practiced as a diplomatic and foreign policy 
tool. It has been argued that conflicts over succession were a direct result of the 
polygamous practices of the Argead kings, bringing too many wives into the 
household, producing too many offspring that were bound to compete with one 
another. The confusion was further promoted by the lack of a clear hierarchy between 
those women and their progeny. There is no evidence to suggest that any one of the 
                                                 
382 Poseidippos, Oionoskopika Pap. Mil. Vogl. VIII 309 AB 31 (V 20-22) 
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royal wives took formal precedence over the rest in the period in question. Claims that 
Argead royal wives bore the title “Queen” have been rightly discredited for lack of 
evidence.383 In the Ptolemaic Kingdom the term came into use along with its male 
counterpart ‘Basileus’ after 306 BCE but it still failed to incorporate any notion of a 
prescribed public and/or political role.384 An inscription referring to Ptolemaios I’s 
unmarried daughter Philotera as ‘Basilissa’ subscribes to the view that the term 
denoted rather a formal dynastic relationship with the ‘Basileus’ than a public office in 
the modern sense.385 The practice of royal polygamy, and in particular the extensive 
use of diplomatic marriage as a way to cement alliances and extend spheres of 
influence, continued almost unaltered under the Successors in general and under the 
first two Ptolemaioi in particular. The latter, nevertheless, attempted to eradicate the 
side effects of an ill-defined system of succession by instituting the practice of co-
regency. 
 Finally, this chapter has examined the role of royal women in the dynastic 
organisation of both kingdoms. It has been shown that the increased political visibility 
of Ptolemaic queens can be partially attributed to the social structures that bound the 
behaviour of women in Argead Makedonia and which allowed them greater freedom 
of action and independence in the domestic and economic spheres. However, the 
nature of the Makedonian marital practices was such that there was no room for 
prescribed political duties for the various wives. The political initiative they are known 
to have exercised was always associated with times of great crisis. Normally, their 
primary responsibility was the bearing and upbringing of children. Instances of public 
gestures of royal women in the form of dedications were mostly made in a religious 
context and could have been the equivalent of offerings made by ordinary women, but 
on a grander scale.386 Even in the biggest anomaly of the Makedonian marital norms 
that was Ptolemaios II’s marriage to his full sister Arsinoe II, she was never regarded 
as an equal to the King, at least not in her lifetime. Dynastic honours are not to be 
confused with actual power holding. The appearance of her name on a public policy 
document has been perhaps rightly attributed to “un formule de courtoisie”, especially if 
one takes into consideration that is was carved four years after her death.387  
                                                 
383 Macurdy (1932), pp. 8 & 25. Contra, Carney (2000), p. 25-26, 225-228.  
384 For a discussion see Carney (2000), pp. 225-228. 
385 OGIS 35. 
386 See Carney (2000), pp. 34-35, Pomeroy (1984), pp. 14-15. 
387 The Khremonides Decree, IG II2 687. Will (1979-1982), p. 199. 
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 It has also become clear that the real strength of women, which could be used 
as a lever for political pressure when the circumstances demanded it, as it ultimately 
had been, was their membership to the dynasty. Actual political power may have 
escaped the Argead and early Ptolemaic women but dynastic power was something 
that came with birth or marriage. This is attested most strongly by the role of women 
in the cementation of political and military alliances. Argeadai and Ptolemaioi alike, 
not to mention the rest of the Successors, engaged in a frenzied hunt for suitable 
brides that, apart from the dowry, would bring along to their husband legitimacy and 
recognition; elements very important in a society where dynastic struggles raged 
generation after generation, and equally important in a newly instituted kingdom 
surrounded by pretenders. The degree of dynastic power that women held was 
confined mostly on the ideological plane and is graphically illustrated in the loyalty it 
inspired upon the ordinary Makedones. Kynnane may have challenged Antipatros in 
battle but his army refused to strike back on Philippos II’s daughter.388 The regiment 
sent by Kassandros to terminate Olympias left her unscathed. Diodoros mentions that 
they could not lay a hand on the mother of Alexandros.389  
 If the theory on the marriage of Ptolemaios II to his sister proposed above 
holds truth, even there one can discern the gravitas of Arsinoe’s lineage weighing 
against any other probable bride. Even if nothing else can be proven on the marriage 
of Ptolemaios with Arsinoe one can at least be confident that in a foreign environment 
like Egypt, where the most probable course of action would be native intermarriage 
(Alexandros III paved the way for that) Ptolemaios II chose to lay the foundations of 
an introvert dynasty whose roots ran deeper into the Argead past than any other.   
 
With the establishment of a firm line of dynastic succession through the principle of 
co-regency, coupled with the widespread propaganda that the new dynasty had solid 
ties with the ancestral Argead one, the researcher is presented with a state whose 
leaders are painfully aware that it is deficient in legitimacy. As such, the colonial 
circumstances in early Ptolemaic Egypt led to an amplification of the importance of 
the dynasty as a source both of ideological and political power. All along, however, 
they were making use of the same structures of dynastic organisation as their 
predecessors; only tweaking them for efficiency. 
                                                 
388 Diod. 19.52. 
389 Diod. 19.51. 
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“The power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority, who stands 
alone before the totality of the organised minority.” 
 









t has been suggested that the rise of a court society around a monarch is linked 
to his growing monopolisation of two of the most decisive sources of power: 
revenues and the army.390 In other words, a court society is the most probable 
outcome of the strengthening of one man’s rule. Far from being a spontaneous 
creation or the brilliant conception of an individual, the emergence of court society 
has its roots elsewhere. Historically, it has accompanied the expansion from “a 
master’s rule over his household” to his “domination over other masters.”391 As a 
social phenomenon it is the product of a gradual process of evolving social power-
relationships. These relationships are based on a series of (inter)dependencies that 
develop between the ruler and his circle of attendants.392 The need to secure and 
                                                 
390 Elias (2006), pp. 4, 151. For a fuller discussion of the control of revenues and the army as 
instruments of power see Elias (2000), pp. 268-277. 
391 What Max Weber calls ‘patriarchal’ form of rule (1978). Weber (1978) calls the recognised authority 
of one ruler over others, usually pettier, ‘patrimonial’, esp. ch. 12. For a reaction against the court as 
originating from the extended household of the ruler see Herman (1997), p. 202. Herman is right in 
drawing a distinction between the formation of the Seleukid and Ptolemaic courts and the Antigonid. 
Nevertheless, he fails to elaborate on the distinction between the colonial/conquest character of the 
former as opposed to the established traditions of rule that characterised the latter. If he did, his 
argument would take on a whole new dimension as we would be faced with the emergence of court 
formation in conditions outside traditional rule. 
392 The work of Max Weber and Norbert Elias is decisive for the understanding of the nature and 
development of the relationship between a ruler and his following. In his theory of pure types of 
legitimate authority (legal –which, as the outcome of a legally established impersonal order, cannot find 
its parallel in the Classical and Hellenistic world, traditional and charismatic), Weber (1978, pp. 215-
245) describes the forces of tradition and charisma accordingly as the basis upon which rests the 
legitimacy of the latter two types of authority. In the process, he provides an explication for the 
obedience exercised by those accepting these types of authority. In the case of traditional authority 
obedience is owed to the personal loyalty one feels towards the person who occupies a traditionally 
sanctioned position. In the case of charismatic authority obedience is based on the person’s individual 
trust in the charisma of the leader and of his goal. Elias expands Weber’s theory when he examines the 
transition of the charismatic leader to an established ruler, [what Weber called the ‘routinisation’ of 
charismatic authority, (1978), pp. 246-254]. In this process, he argues, the common goal under which 
the charismatic leader was united with his followers dissolves. The nature of the charismatic leader’s 
authority is no longer one of action but one of conservation. With the loyalty of his followers having 
dissolved along with the common goal, the established ruler has to find alternate ways of maintaining 




safeguard one’s position of authority through a loyal power-base, and the innate drive 
of humans for distinction and the satisfaction of their needs and desires are but a few 
of the incentives for forming and maintaining ties of interdependence.393  
 The courts of kings are, therefore, to be understood as a barometer for the 
effectiveness of their rule. A controlled and acquiescent or a corroborative court, 
depending on one’s point of view, can serve to enhance the prestige of the ruler and 
reduce the risk of his replacement. A dissenting or disgruntled court on the other hand 
can ultimately cost the monarch his authority. The relationship between the two can 
be seen to operate under an effective system of checks and balances. A court is, 
therefore, a requisite component for the preservation of one’s rule. As such, it is a 
source of political power.  
 It is on these grounds that the structure and networks of court societies will 
form the focus of this chapter. In keeping with the original question, the aim is to 
examine the features of royal courts in the royal cities of Makedonia under the 
Argeadai and in Alexandria under the early Ptolemaioi for traces of change and 
continuity. The comparison will concentrate on an examination of both the physical 
and social structures of the court. The physical structures involve the architectural 
layout of the royal palaces and other areas where the King would have interacted 
regularly with his courtiers. The purpose is to distil what information the organisation 
of physical space can offer to the understanding of the hierarchy and functions of 
court society in Makedonia and Egypt. The social space denotes the human element, 
namely the people that made up the court in its political sense. These individuals 
could be referred to as the administrative class of the Kingdoms. The emphasis will lie 
on their interaction with the ruler from the moment of their selection for membership 
at court all the way to the interruption of the relationship. Of special interest in 
examining these interdependencies are the criteria for selection, as well as the basis 
                                                 
as, court is one such effective way, (2006, pp. 127-157). It is the contention of the author that it can be 
profitable to envisage the Argead rulers as exercising traditional authority, interrupted by the hybrid 
traditional-charismatic authority exercised by Alexandros III, followed by the rather situational type of 
authority exercised by the first generation rulers of the Hellenistic monarchies.  
393 The theory of interdependence in the context of royal courts was first expounded by Norbert Elias 
in the 1930s. What is most intriguing and useful for our purposes in Elias’s work is his coupling of social 
theory with historiography, which places the study of the unique and unrepeatable events of the past 
within the remits of recurring patterns of social behaviour. For further analysis see his Introduction: 
Sociology and Historiography in Elias, 2006. Subsequently, his theoretical framework has been used in 
diverse studies of royal courts ranging from the Hellenistic period (Herman, 1997) to the Portuguese 
court in the Late Middle Ages, (R. Costa Gomez, 2003, The Making of a Court: Kings and Nobles in Late 
Medieval Portugal, Cambridge University Press). An important recent study incorporating Elias’ social 
theory is Spawforth (2007) on the court of Alexandros III. 
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upon which ties were maintained and enhanced. Lastly, the organisation of the court 
society will be examined. This will entail an enquiry into the function and 
responsibilities of the courtiers and their hierarchy within the court society.  
 
 
THE COURT AS A SOURCE OF POLITICAL POWER  
 
It has already been outlined in the introduction that the royal court constitutes a 
source of political power for the ruler. As the centre of governance and decision-
making the court becomes the administrative and political hub of the monarchy. As 
the focal point of diplomatic activity, with foreign ambassadors being received and 
entertained on a regular basis, it also projected the face of the monarchy to the outside 
world. In order to begin exploring further this intricate web of the social relations 
formed around the king in his court and the manner in which they were managed 
(through the formation of hierarchies, flattery, ceremony and etiquette) it is necessary 
to distinguish between the different meanings of the terms ‘court’, ‘court society’ and 
‘court structures.’  
 
 
DEFINING THE COURT 
 The OED defines a sovereign’s ‘court’ as a princely residence, a household, a 
retinue and a formal assembly, all at the same time.394 A ‘court’ can denote, therefore, 
both a place (i.e. the establishment or surroundings where the sovereign holds his 
residence and state attended by his retinue) and a group of people (i.e. the body of the 
sovereign’s attendants collectively, or if construed as the ruling power of a state, 
including the sovereign himself), as well as a function (i.e. the formal assembly held by 
the sovereign and his attendants in the former’s residence for purposes of 
administration, or the holding of audiences and receptions).395 In order to function to 
the advantage of the ruler a court requires a structured internal organisation of people 
and functions best described by the terms hierarchy, ceremony and etiquette.396 
                                                 
394 OED2 (1989) s.v. court n.1 II, III. 
395 This is also the definition for ‘court society’ that we will be using in this chapter. 
396 According to Elias (2006) the crystallisation of hierarchies and patterns of ceremony (or etiquette as 
he calls it) in a court is the characteristic of a firmly established monarchic power, see esp. pp. 78-79, 
136-142. For a detailed discussion on the function of etiquette in the court of Louis XIV as an 
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Finally, there is one other element that has been regularly attached to the description 
of court societies; the purposeful display of luxury.397 
 
 
THE ANCIENT COURT 
 Following from this definition, the ancient Hellenes do not seem to have 
assigned all the multiple meanings of residence, court society and formal assembly to 
their terms for ‘court’: αὐλή or τό βασίλειον/τά βασίλεια. The most common usage of 
these terms referred to the residence of the ruler. The members of the court society 
were referred to by their proximity to something else, usually the palace complex, or 
the ruler himself. This way Polybios, our major source on court life during the period 
of the reign of Ptolemaios V, designated a person as belonging to the entourage of the 
king by appending “περὶ τὰς αὐλάς,”398 “περὶ τὴν αὐλήν”399 or, “ἐν ταῖς 
βασιλείαις”400 to names or articles. Similarly, inscriptions commonly referred to court 
people by their association to a particular king. Hence, the Spartan Demaratos is 
recorded to have been ‘spending time’ by King Lysimachos, (“διατρίβων παρὰ τῷ 
βασιλεῖ Λυσιμάχῳ”).401 Additionally however, we possess the occasional use of the 
adjective αὐλικός in the sense of ‘courtier,’ or ‘of the court’. Deinokrates of Messenia, 
an ambassador of the Messenians to Rome, is introduced by Polybios as an ‘αὐλικός,’ 
not only by practice but by nature as well.402 Lastly, as far as the function of the 
formal assembly is concerned, this was not related linguistically to the words αὐλή or 
βασίλεια. Rather, it was described by the term συνέδριον. Alexandros III convened a 
συνέδριον of his Friends during the siege of Tyre in 332 BCE to discuss the peace 
proposals of Dareios.403 Similarly, Perdikkas, as the one entrusted with the care of 
Alexandros’ royal affairs (ἐπιμελητὴς τῆς βασιλείας), held such a council upon the 
                                                 
instrument of power, see Elias (2006), chs. 5-6. Similarly, Asch & Birke (1991) emphasize the 
appearance of norms and rules of conduct as the catalyst, which transforms a simple formation of a 
king’s followers into a court society, p. 9.  
397 Veblen (1994, orig. pub. 1899) ch. 4, coined the term conspicuous consumption to describe the 
luxury in which court societies indulged. He elaborated on the display of luxury as a social necessity 
aiming at achieving higher status within the court society. Max Weber (1922) also explained the luxury 
of court people as a non-superfluous means of social self-assertion, p. 750. 
398 Polyb. 5.26.13 referring to the courtiers of Philippos V of Makedonia. 
399 Polyb. 5.41.3 referring to the courtiers of Seleukos II Keraunos. 
400 Polyb. 5.26.12. 
401 IG XI, 4: 542, Durrbach 15 (Delos, 300-281 BCE). 
402 “..Δεινοκράτης ὁ Μεσσήνιος ἦν οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν τριβήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν αὐλικὸς καὶ  
στρατιωτικὸς ἄνθρωπος,” Polyb. 23.5.4. 
403 Diod. 17.54.1. 
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death of Alexandros to divide the task of ruling the king’s empire between the 
generals.404  
 It has been argued that a contemporary Classical and Hellenistic 
conceptualisation of what constituted a royal court did not exist.405  The words αὐλή 
and βασίλειον in ancient Greek were not interchangeable to denote space, people and 
function at the same time, as in Medieval and Renaissance courts. Rather, they were 
reserved to refer to the architectural complex that was the residence of the ruler. In 
this interpretation there is no implied blurring of the physical and human element, or 
put in another way, of the spatial and social aspects of the King’s primary zone of 
interaction, his house. Nevertheless, the evidence that we possess does not lend 
support to such a limited understanding of the ancient court. On the one hand, the 
term βασίλειον/-α, which has been used more consistently to describe the palace of 
the ruler, also bore the meaning of the ‘capital city’, demarcating the wider area 
where the palace was built and from where power was delegated to the four corners of 
the kingdom.406 On the other hand, the term αὐλή has been used in such a way by 
ancient authors as to convey a meaning more abstract than the concrete stone walls of 
an edifice.407 	  
                                                 
404 “..συνεδρεύσας μετὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων..”, Diod. 18.3.1. Equally Ptolemaios I, Curt. 10.6.15. 
405 Weber G. (1997), p. 31. 
406 See for instance Polyb. 3.15.3: the New Town as the capital city of the Carthaginians in Iberia. 
Diod. 19.18.1: “Σοῦσα τὸ βασίλειον”. Strab. 1.2.25: Meroe as the capital of the Aithiopians. 
407 The major sources of information on this period and subject are literary. The most valuable in terms 
of dates is the account of Diodoros as he provides the only consecutive account for the years 362-301 
BCE, covering both the history of Argead Makedonia and the Successor period. Also pertinent are the 
Alexandros historians, most notably Arrianos, Ploutarchos and Quintus Curtius Rufus. It is unfortunate 
that a history of court and social affairs under Alexandros’ reign composed by Chares of Mytilene, the 
former’s usher, has been lost. Certain fragments have survived though in the Deipnosophistai of 
Athenaios, which constitutes an acceptable source of related anecdotal references. Polybios, our most 
important source on court life during the period 220-146 BCE, can be used as a point of reference to 
elucidate aspects of court society that we have little information on. He is important in that his Histories 
transcend the boundaries of annalistic history that was more typical of Diodoros and provide us with a 
more flexible narrative that revolves around the causes and effects of things. Unfortunately, there is a 
literary gap where Diodoros’ account becomes fragmentary and Polybios’ begins. For that period there 
is a limited supply of information on the organisation of courts and court societies to be gathered from 
papyri and inscriptions. Fortunately, thanks to its particular climatic and geological conditions, the 
Kingdom of Ptolemaic Egypt is the most represented of the Hellenistic Kingdoms in these non-literary 
sources. Despite this chance occurrence, the early years of the Ptolemaic dynasty are still not very well 
documented, (though infinitely more so than three decades ago when only two certainly dated Hellenic 
papyri, thirty demotic documents and some six scraps were known for the reign of Ptolemaios I, 
Turner, 1984, p. 118). To this day, the first ten years of Ptolemaios II’s reign are still relatively blank 
whereas a veritable ocean of documents has been discovered for the years 270 until about 215 BCE. As 
for inscriptions, the interaction of the early Ptolemaioi with the city-states of the Hellenic world is 
relatively well documented. However, we have to bear in mind that for all their wealth of detail and the 
feel of immediacy with the period that they convey, papyrological and epigraphic evidence tend to be 
rather dry, factual accounts of specific events, frequently, but not always, failing to demonstrate the 
links between their content and the wider context. Finally, of special importance is the information 
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 Nowhere is this more amply illustrated than in the existence of migratory 
courts, belonging to the Makedonian Kings of the Classical and Hellenistic times. 
Philippos II used to travel, even when the purpose was going into battle, accompanied 
by his retinue of jesters, musicians and assorted courtiers who would normally be 
present at banquets back home. Theopompos recounts how Philippos took such 
persons with him everywhere.408 The migratory court of the grandest scale remains by 
far the court of Alexandros the Great during the Asian campaign. Apart from the 
military force, a host of attendants, including sophists, engineers, poets and men of 
science, is reported to have been attached to his train. Although the evidence does not 
allow for the reconstruction of an accurate number, enough names and occupations of 
these individuals have been preserved so as to allow us a glimpse of court life on the 
move.409  Ploutarchos preserves a typical day of the ruler when military matters were 
not requiring quick marches and short resting stops.410 In the morning, after 
sacrificing to the gods, he would sit for breakfast. Then, he would spend the day 
hunting or writing or organising his military affairs. He usually took his dinner quite 
late in the evening and he had a host of cooks and bakers travelling with him to 
provide for it. The care, which Alexandros III awarded to the organisation and 
execution of these evening banquets, draws attention to their function as social events, 
as opposed to a necessity dictated by subsistence.411 The king did not eat alone behind 
closed curtains as was the practice with the Persians.412 Rather, the Makedonian 
banquet was an open affair in which the King played a central role.413 Attendants 
could range from a handful of the king’s most trusted companions to a hundred 
guests.414 The participants were not deprived of certain luxuries they could enjoy at 
                                                 
provided by archaeological excavations. This is particularly pertinent in the study of the organisation of 
the actual court complexes. The most relevant sites are those of the palaces at Vergina and at Pella in 
Makedonia. 
408 “..περιήγετο γὰρ πανταχοῦ τοὺς τοιούτους ὁ Φίλιππος.” Theopomp. apud Athen. Deipn. 10.435b-c, 
(FGrHist 115 F 236). 
409 For an in-depth account of the military and civilian following during Alexandros’ expedition see the 
still important work of Engels (1978), esp. pp. 11-14. A small degree of caution has to be exercised with 
his referencing, esp. on p. 11, n.1, (i.e. the physician Philippos appears in Plout. Alex. 19.2 instead of 
19.4ff, while the seer Kleomantes in Plout. Alex. 50.3 instead of 50.6ff). Kleomantes can be a corruption 
for Kleomenes, see Heckel (1992), s.v. Cleomenes (2). 
410 Plout. Alex. 23. 
411 “..θαυμαστὴ δ’ ἦν ἡ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ περίβλεψις ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης..”, Plout. Alex. 23.6.  
412 Herakleides apud Athen. Deipn. 4.145a-146a. 
413 See Vössing (2004). 
414 The size of the average sympotic chamber based on archaeological evidence from Vergina, 
Olynthos and Perachora could hold 9 to 23 couches, Tomlinson (1970). Ephippos (FGrHist 126 F 2) 
apud Ath. Deipn. 4.146c speaks of 60-70 guests. Additionally, there is the famous “Tent of a Hundred 
Couches” that was used during expeditions. Diod. 17.16.4 first mentions it in association with the 
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home. They took their meal reclining in couches and engaged in long conversations 
over wine, as was Alexandros’ preference. Moreover, he personally oversaw that none 
of his guests would be unequally treated in the distribution of food. Expenditure for 
these dinners rose in proportion with the wealth acquired at each stage of the 
expedition, reaching the height of ten thousand drachmai per dinner.415 That became 
the standard amount spent for the entertainment provided during Alexandros’s 
dinners. Like his father, he had an affinity for the performing arts and ordered the 
transport of groups of performers from Greece to wherever he was at the time. Artists 
of all types are attested to have entertained him and his courtiers in Phoenike,416 
Memphis417 and Ekbatana,418 to name but a few. What is most important for our 
purposes here, though, is that Alexandros’s entourage is repeatedly referred to as 
those surrounding the ‘court’ (e.g. …πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τὴν αὐλὴν εἶχε ῥαβδούχους 
Ἀσιαγενεῖς…,419 …οἵ τε φίλοι τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ πάντες οἱ περὶ τὴν αὐλὴν 
Μακεδόνες…,420 …χιλίους αὐτῶν εἰς τοὺς περὶ τὴν αὐλὴν ἔταξεν ὑπασπιστὰς…421) at 
a time when Pella, the official court of the Kingdom, was hundreds of miles away. As 
a form of entertainment the banquet strengthened the social and ideological cohesion 
of a campaigning army, between the officers themselves as omotrapezoi (sharing the 
same food) and vis-à-vis their king as the provider of the food and merriment. 
 The practice of the court forming around the king and not being associated 
strictly with the capital city continued into the Hellenistic period. The most graphic 
example is the Kingdom of the Seleukids whose use of multiple capital cities (such as 
Seleukeia-upon-Tigris, Antiocheia, Laodikeia and Apameia) demanded a flexible 
court structure with the ability to “wander” between the various points of rule.422 
What seems therefore, to have allowed the courts of the Makedonian kings to become 
                                                 
banquet held by Alexandros during the Dion festival in 334 BCE. It crops up again as the scene for the 
symposion held to celebrate the recovery of Alexandros from wounds in India (Curt. 9.7.15) and as the 
place where the mass marriages at Susa took place, Chares (FGrHist 125 F 4) apud Ath. Deipn. 12.538b-
d. 
415 Plout. Alex. 23. The extravagance of these meals can be brought to focus if one takes into 
consideration the fact that a skilled worker or hoplite in the late fourth century BCE received one 
drachma as a day’s wage (Thouk. 3.17.4) and that, according to Aristophanes (Wasps, ll. 300-302, ll. 
605-610), half a drachma (a heliast’s pay) could sustain a family of three for a day, even if at a 
subsistence level. 
416 Plout. De Fort. Alex. 334e. 
417 Arr. Anab. 3.1.4. 
418 Ath. Deipn. 12.538f-539a. 
419 Diod. 17.77.4. 
420 Diod. 17.101.3. 
421 Diod. 17.110. 1. 
422 See Herman (1997). 
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migratory was their elevation from the concrete to the abstract. The confines of 
physical space were secondary to the human element whose particular organisation 
and scope of action made up the basis upon which the King’s rule rested. 
 
 
MODERN APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF THE ANCIENT COURT  
 There are few studies devoted to the Makedonian or to the Ptolemaic court, 
although literature on the Hellenistic courts taken as a whole increases.423 References 
to the aforementioned particular courts and their structure, nevertheless, remain 
scarce and incidental. Of the most useful studies are the relatively recent articles by 
Herman (1997) and Weber (1997). Although both of them are interested in the 
phenomenon of the Hellenistic court as a whole, they are equally breaking away from 
the traditional approach of the court as an abstract concept which mainly 
encompassed intellectual life, élite social interaction and some vague mention about 
circles of decision making.424 Both Herman and Weber are concerned with the 
political value of the royal court in light of the lack of any formal administrative 
apparatus. Herman, in particular, has made use of Norbert Elias’ socio-historical 
approach to the workings of court society in the context of seventeenth century 
France. Since the French and English translations of Elias’ Habilitiation thesis in 1974 
and 1983 respectively his work on the organisation of royal courts has become 
influential and the standard yardstick for any discussion of royal courts.425 Elias’ aim 
was to develop a theoretical model against which such court societies, as that of Louis 
XIV, the (so-perceived) paragon of absolutism whom he uses as a case study, could be 
compared. The objective of his research was to establish how certain ‘figurations’ of 
interdependent people (in his case the king and his courtiers) made it possible for 
themselves to maintain their position of power for long periods of time over vast 
numbers of subjects and territory. His method, particularly pertinent to this study, was 
the elaboration, through the employment of empirical evidence, on those specific 
                                                 
423 See also Mooren (1998). See Savalli-Lestrade (1998) on the friends of kings in Seleukid Asia and 
(2003) on the place of queens within the court society.  
424 This focus was particularly prevalent a quarter of a century ago, where the study of the Hellenistic 
court was first addressed more extensively. Indispensable representatives of this approach, particularly 
for their freshness and wealth of detail, are Claire Préaux’s (1978), “Le Monde Héllénistique”, pp. 181-
229, Walbank’s 1984 entry to the CAH on “Monarchies and Monarchic Ideas,” pp. 62-100, esp. 68-77, 
Fraser’s discussion of the relationship between the city of Alexandria and its sovereign, (1972), ch. 3, 
esp. 101-105 and Mooren’s essay on “The Nature of Hellenistic Monarchy,” (1983), pp.  205-240. 
425 See Spawforth (2007). 
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social structures which made, on the one hand, individuals with power centralised in 
their hands (at the apex of monopoly rule environments, as he calls them) to optimise 
and maintain that power, and on the other, of the people in their close proximity to 
perpetuate the rule of the aforementioned through the pursuing of their self-
interest.426 His aim was also to study how traditions pertaining to ceremony and 
etiquette can be instruments of rule and power distribution.427  
 At this point, it has to be acknowledged that academic research revolving 
around the study of princely courts has focused mainly on the kingdoms of early 
Medieval Europe and later.428 This can be explained primarily because of the 
abundance of detail available for those periods. In most cases scholars can access 
primary sources as immediate as the hand-written memoirs of courtiers or the kings 
themselves, something which is impossible for the Classical and Hellenistic periods, or 
for the ancient monarchies at large.429 Consequently, the groundwork for the study of 
court societies has been laid through the examination of societies far removed from 
the chronological scope of this chapter. This should not act as an inhibitor though. As 
Samuel has illustrated in 1988 by drawing a widely accepted and frequently used 
parallel between the nature of Makedonian kingship and that of the Merovingian 
dynasty, comparisons can add valuable fresh insight to the study of things much 
debated yet still controversial.430  
 Going back to the specialised studies on the Hellenistic courts discussed in the 
beginning of this section, neither Weber nor Herman have addressed the makeup and 
function of courts in Argead Makedonia and early Ptolemaic Egypt. This is all the 
more significant since a comprehensive treatment of this subject area is 
complementary to the debate on the nature of monarchy. Paraphrasing Elias, a 
                                                 
426 Elias (2006), p. 3. 
427 Elias (2006), p. 29. On this topic, see also Cannadine & Price (1987). 
428 The OED itself traces its definition of ‘court’ as far back as the period of the early Frankish 
kingdoms, c. 450-750 CE. 
429 For example, in his analysis of the structures of the French court society Elias, inter alia, was guided 
largely by the Mémoires of Duc de Saint-Simon, a courtier in the reign of Louis XIV and a resident for 
many years at Versailles. His memoirs were a monumental work of forty volumes, (Duc de Saint-
Simon, 1856-1858). Equally important is his access to the diaries of Louis XIV himself, (Grouvelle & 
Grimoard, 1806). 
430 The structure of the Makedonian monarchy is one such issue, as we shall see later on. Scholars have 
objected to the validity of certain of Samuel’s arguments but overall he has met with widespread 




history of the court is also a history of the monarchy.431  The people closer to the 
person of the king, both physically and intimately, have had traditionally the function 
of delegating his will to areas where his physical presence would be impossible. They 
provided the link(s) with the ever-widening web of his subjects. The power and 
responsibilities assigned to those people are by implication reflective of the king’s own 
power, both of its degree as well as of its nature. As Habicht has argued in a short 
article on the ruling class of the Hellenistic monarchies, the circle of the ruler’s friends 
was frequently perceived as a political power in its own right.432 This means that their 
involvement in the political life of the kingdom was crucial for the smooth functioning 
of the monarchy. In this respect, the court and its representatives could detract from 
the ruler’s overall political power, if the relationships between the two were not 
negotiated efficiently.433 
 Scholarship to the present tends to downplay, and at times, disregard any 
potential influence of Makedonian structures on the courts of the Ptolemaioi and the 
Seleukidai alike. One often gets the impression that the appeal of ‘extra-Makedonian’ 
models of kingship, administration and aesthetics on those overseas-based polities was 
stronger than the traditions proper of the northern Hellenic Kingdom. It has been 
argued that palace architecture had “oriental predecessors”434 and the court was of “an 
elaboration which [recalled] the monarchies of Persia and Pharaonic Egypt.”435 The presence of 
philosophers in the company of Hellenistic Kings was following the “Greek models”, 
while the Hellenistic royal conduct had its “[ideological] roots in the Greek world”.436 A 
‘hellenocentric’ approach, which focuses on the emulation of southern Greek 
organisational models, predominates in accounts of the administration of the cities in 
the Hellenistic Kingdoms.437  Yet, these are only half-truths. The following will 
attempt to establish the degree of influence of Makedonian court structures in the 
organisation of the early Ptolemaic court.  
 
  
                                                 
431 Elias’ more insightful comment was that “The sociology of the court is at the same time a sociology of the 
monarchy”, (2006), p. 42. 
432 Habicht (2006), pp. 26-40. 
433 Polyb. 5.50.4-9, 29.27.1-8. 
434 Nielsen (1994), p. 11 and Préaux (1978), pp. 208-209. 
435 Walbank (1984), p. 68. 
436 Préaux (1978), p. 213. By ‘Greek models’ and ‘world’ Préaux refers exclusively to the city-state 
environment. 
437 Notably Fraser (1972), pp. 93-101. 
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ΑΥΛΗ, Η ΤΟΥ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΟΙΚΙΑ:438 THE COURT AS A PHYSICAL SPACE 
 
The term αὐλή, or else, βασίλειον/βασίλεια is used by the extant sources to describe 
the palace complex of the ruler.439 This section will address the physical expression of 
the term αὐλή. The principal aim is to distil, through the architectural arrangement of 
the Makedonian and Ptolemaic palaces, information concerning the interrelation of 
the ruler with his entourage.   
 The architectural structure and layout of the royal court was, according to 
Elias, determined by the residential needs coupled with the administrative and 
representative functions of the king.440 It is a logical assumption to deduce from the 
spatial arrangements of the court structure the sort of social arrangements that 
unfolded there.441 Every type of social interaction, especially between units of people 
perceived as ‘belonging’ together, finds its visible expression in terms of space 
arranged in such a way so as to accommodate that interaction.442 Speaking about 
palace complexes such spatial arrangements will take the form of rooms and 
courtyards, as well as gardens, hunting grounds and athletic installations. The purpose 
of the following overview of the state of the archaeology in the capital cities of the 
Argeadai and the Ptolemaioi is to familiarise the reader with the peculiarities of the 
primary material at hand. In the process, conclusions will be drawn regarding the 
social connotations of the organisation of physical space. 
 
 
THE ROYAL PALACES 
 In an interesting feat of contrast the royal palaces of Makedonia (in Aigai and 
in Pella) are revealed to us mainly through their architectural remains whilst, to the 
contrary, Alexandria comes alive principally through literary texts.443 This has to be 
                                                 
438 Souda s.v. Αὐλή 
439 See for instance Diodoros’ use of βασίλεια to describe palaces in Egypt (e.g. 1.50.6, 1.51.1, 2.22.4, 
17.50.3) and Asia (e.g. 1.46.4, 2.6.2, 2.13.6). For use in a Hellenic context see Ps.-Skylax 66.5, “Πέλλα 
πόλις καὶ βασίλειον ἐν αὐτῇ.”  
440 Elias (2006), pp. 43-44.  
441 There’s more to be noted on that in Grahame (2000). 
442 Grahame (2000), p. 43. 
443 The palace-fortress at Demetrias lies beyond the chronological scope of this paper as it dates 
unambiguously to the Hellenistic period. Its construction postdates the creation of the homonymous 
city by Demetrios Poliorketes around 294 BCE (Ailios Herodianos, De Pros. Cathol. 3,1: 58, ll. 29-30, 
Plout. Dem. 53.7).  Large building complexes excavated in Perachora at Korinthos (which also date to 
the period of Demetrios Poliorketes, see Tomlinson 1970, pp. 311-312) and in the site of Kopanos 
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the case as sadly very few architectural elements of the original Ptolemaic structures 
have survived natural catastrophes and human encroachment.444 The palace complex 
itself was destroyed during the Alexandrine citizen uprisings in 272 CE, whereby the 
armies of Aurelianus obliterated a good one fourth of the city, including the 
Brouchion district where the so-called Royal Quarters stood.445 The Brouchion, 
which also accommodated the Mouseion was said to be as of old, the “abode of 
distinguished men.”446 Aboveground, traces of roads on the north-east side of Alexandria 
and colonnades are among the few remains of the Ptolemaic city.447 Underwater, 
excavations have been taking place in the harbour of Alexandria since the 1990s when 
the Egyptian government lifted a ban on maritime archaeology.448 The yield of these 
excavations is significant for Ptolemaic history as it involves the detection of remains 
from the Ptolemaic Royal Quarters, which lie at the bottom of the Eastern Harbour 
of Alexandria.449  
 Conversely, in the case of palaces in Makedonia there is very little by way of 
oral tradition upon which to base reconstructions. Even the discovery and 
identification of the two royal capital cities of the Makedonian Kings has proved an 
arduous process hindered by the vague and at times conflicting snippets of 
                                                 
(ancient Mieza), near modern day Naoussa (see Allamani & Koukouvou 2002) so far lack corroborating 
evidence to be identified as palatial structures and will not be dealt with here, [see Hammond (1997) 
pp. 178-179, contra Kosmetatou, (2000), p. 810, who calls them “palatial establishments”]. On the founding 
of the city of Alexandria and its architect, see Vitr. De Arch. II, pr. 1-4. Most important sources are 
Strabon’s description of the city of Alexandria including its palace, 17.1.6-10 and scattered descriptions 
of various parts of the palace preserved by Polybios (15.30), and Diodoros (17.52.3-7). See also the so-
called Letter of Aristeas §§ 109, 115, 181, 301. 
444 I.e. events such as the tsunami of the 21st July 365 CE (Amm. Marc. 26.10.15-19), recently verified 
by geophysical investigations, and the natural process of subsidence are amongst the factors leading to 
the gradual submergence of Alexandria underwater (see Stanley, Jorstad & Bernasconi 2004). In 
addition, the modern city of Alexandria has grown over the ancient ruins seriously limiting 
archaeological endeavours. 
445 See Epiphanios, Περὶ μέτρων καὶ σταθμῶν, ll. 258-261 and 324-326. 
446 “…amisit regionum maximam partem, quae Bruchion appellabatur, diuturnum praestantium hominum domicilium.” 
Amm. Marc. 22.16.15. 
447 Recently (2004) a Polish-Egyptian expedition unearthed remains of auditoria at the location of the 
Brouchion district. Initially, there was an upsurge of hopes that these belonged to the Royal Library of 
Alexandria, (as reported by Whitehouse, 12 May 2004) only to be watered down later on with the re-
identification of the remains as a 6th century CE Philosophy School, (cf. a conference was organised in 
order to discuss the findings by the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London. It was 
held in April 2005 and titled Discovery of the Alexandrian Philosophy School of the 6th Century by Polish 
Archaeologists, 2004, unpublished). For an Egyptian press release assessing the evidence, see Kamil 
(2005). 
448 First by the archaeologist J.-Y. Empereur in 1994 and soon after by Franck Goddio of the Institut 
Européen d'Archéologie Sous-Marine. 
449 For further information see the report of UNESCO concerning the management of the Alexandrian 
coastal heritage (available on the public domain at www.unesco.org/csi/pub/papers2/alex.htm ) as 
well as the website of the Head of Underwater archaeological data collection for the University of 
Oxford, Franck Goddio, http://www.franckgoddio.org/Default.aspx. 
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information that have survived. In the case of Aigai, historians and archaeologists had 
sought the original seat of power of the Makedonian Kingdom from modern day 
Edessa450 and its environs,451 to the little refugee settlement of Vergina.452 The 
modern history of the extensive foundations on the northern slopes of the Pierian 
Mountains near the latter is exemplary of the confusion that a thorough lack of 
context can create in determining the function of a structure. For Heuzey and 
Daumet, the French archaeologists who discovered the ruins in 1861 and conducted 
the first excavations, the site was identified as the ancient town of Valla and the 
structure as “a prytanée royale.”453 Associations with the royal family were maintained in 
all subsequent interpretations justified mainly by the scale of the structure and by the 
elegance of some of its architectural elements. Both were quite unprecedented for 
ancient Makedonian architectural standards known in the 1950s and 1960s. Romaios 
described it as a palace without, however, accounting for its existence in the area,454 
while his students and successors, G. Bakalakis and M. Andronikos, referred to it as a 
“royal summer resort.”455 It was not until the archaeological record of Vergina was 
enriched by discoveries such as the Royal Tombs (1976-1980) and the impressive 
theatre (1982),456 that the majority of scholars accepted the site as that of Aigai.457  
Once the identity of the city was more or less put to rest, definitions of the structure 
became less nuanced and it is currently described as the official royal residence used 
by the Makedonian Kings when they and their entourage would visit the old 
capital.458 State celebrations of the grandest scale, such as the marriage of Philippos 
II’s daughter Kleopatra to the king of Epeiros, Alexandros,459 as well as the 
preservation of the site as the royal resting ground, point to the continuing significance 
                                                 
450 This view was prevalent until the second half of the twentieth century and was based on a citation 
(Just. 7.1) that equated the ancient city of Edessa with that of Aigai. See Faklaris (1994), p. 609, for 
references. For versions of the foundation myth see Diod. 7.16, Just. 7.1.1. 
451 Edson (1970), p. 21 argued that Aigai was built next to Edessa, a view adopted by Kanatsoulis 
(1976), p. 31. 
452 The first to propose the location of Aigai at the site of Vergina was N.G.L. Hammond in 1968. See 
Hammond (1970). For a layout of the palace, see Appendix D. 
453 Heuzey & Daumet (1876), p. 212. 
454 Romaios (1953-1954). 
455 Andronikos et al. (1961). 
456 It features one of the largest known orchestras of the Greek world measuring a diameter of 28.44m, 
see Drougou (1997). Other important discoveries include the Sanctuary of Eukleia and excavations at 
the Agora, all of which are located north of the palace. For some epigraphic evidence supporting the 
relation of Vergina with Aigai, see Saatsoglou-Paliadeli (2001), p. 202. 
457 There are still dissenting voices, but they have not managed to be influential. For an identification 
attempt of Aigai with the site of Kopanos see Faklaris (1994), contra Hammond (1997). 
458 Saatsoglou-Paliadeli (2001), p. 202. 
459 Diod. 16.91.3-92. 
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of Aigai as the traditional centre for Makedonian cultic activity. After all, it was the 
place whence from the political power of the Argead dynasty first emanated. And it 
was there that it was destined to end. Whether a prophetic fable or a vaticinium ex eventu 
the tale of the fall of the Argead dynasty as triggered by the failure to bury the last of 
its kings at Aigai paints the portrait of a people firmly entrenched in their traditions.460 
 The discovery of the city and palace of Pella, presented the archaeologist with 
an equal share of difficulties as Aigai, only this time of a different sort. Contrary to 
Aigai where the ruins marked the existence of an unknown settlement, in the case of 
Pella there was nothing tangible to guide the archaeologists to the location of the 
capital apart from a short and rather vague reference in Livy.461 Until 1957 virtually 
no architectural elements of the city were visible.462  Hence, it was fortunate that from 
the early trial trenches of the first major organised archaeological dig in the area clay 
roof tiles turned up engraved with the words ΠΕΛΛΗΣ and ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΟΣ. Meaning 
rather unambiguously ‘of Pella’ and ‘of the king’ these verified the site as that of the 
capital of the Makedonian Kingdom.463 However, it would be almost three decades 
before the ruins of the palatial complex would be securely identified as such.464 
Today, an extensive palatial complex of circa 60.000m² has been unearthed but 
excavations are still very much in progress, with each successive excavating season 
yielding important evidence. 
 
DATING 
 Secure dating has not yet been resolved for either palace. The surviving palace 
at Aigai has been traditionally perceived as antedating the Argead dynasty. Proposed 
construction dates range from the reign of Kassandros (ca. 315-297 BCE) to the reign 
of Antigonos Gonatas (276-239 BCE).465 Nevertheless, support for this suggestion 
originates, rather inconclusively, from a stylistic analysis of its architectural 
elements.466 As archaeological evidence from the site accumulates though, this belief 
becomes increasingly challenged. An analysis of the tile stamps used in Aigai has 
                                                 
460 Just. 7.2.1-4: “praefatus, quoad ibi conditae posterorum reliquiae forent, regnum in familia mansurum.” 
461 Livy 44.46. For an overview of early attempts to identify the site of Pella made mostly by European 
travellers see Petsas (1960), pp. 116-117. 
462 See the descriptions of Petsas (1958, 1960). At the time he was Head of Excavations. 
463 Petsas (1978), pp. 20-21 with plates. 
464 Siganidou (1981). For a layout of the palace, see Appendix E. 
465 Borza (1992), p. 254 & n. 2. 




revealed that these predate the reign of Alexandros the Great.467 In addition, 
Drougou, current co-Director of Excavations at Vergina, whose team unearthed also 
the Theatre in 1982, supports a construction date roughly coinciding with the reign of 
Philippos II. Based on the unique shaping of the fairly well preserved eastern πάροδος 
of the Theatre the excavators support an architectural connection to the palace, now 
lost.468 The Theatre has been dated to the third quarter of the fourth c. BCE. The 
perceived conception of palace and theatre as a single unit linked by a causeway with 
monumental entrances, justifies a contemporaneous dating for both.469 Hence, the 
new evidence presents a more solid argument against the traditional Hellenistic dating 
of the palace at Aigai. In view of that, this thesis accepts an earlier rather than a later 
date.470 
 Similarly, secure dating has yet to be established for Pella. This is in part 
attributed to the multiple stages of construction, extension and modification that the 
original structure underwent over time. The main building phase of the south section 
of the core of the palace (Buildings I and II), which is estimated to be the oldest, has 
been attributed to the reign of Philippos II, around the third quarter of the fourth c. 
BCE.471 However, this does not preclude that the palace was built much earlier. A 
host of finds from amidst the ruins of this central area have been estimated by the 
excavators to predate the reign of Philippos II.472 More buildings were added around 
the nucleus of the palace under the reigns of Kassandros and subsequently the 
Antigonidai, when it was much enlarged.473 It is to be noted that in 171 BCE, during 
the reign of Perseus, the palace was already referred to as “old.”474 It is to the most 
ancient quarters of the palace that this chapter will place its emphasis.475 
                                                 
467 Pandermalis (1987). 
468 The eastern πάροδος forms a small square court designed to accommodate a monumental entrance 
connected to the palace, Drougou (1997), p. 289-290, Abb. 5.    
469 Drougou (1997), Saatsoglou-Paliadeli (2001), p. 206. Others to have argued for a dating of the 
palace from the reign of Philippos II are Nielsen (1994), p. 262 and Höpfner (1996), p. 17. 
470 The position of the pre-Philippic royal residence at Aigai has not been identified yet. Andronikos 
postulated that a fair assumption, that would only be verified by further research of course, would be 
that the earlier structure was built on the same area, quite possibly underneath, Andronikos (2004), p. 
39. 
471 Chrysostomou (1997), p. 128. See also Blackman (1996-1997), p. 77, Blackman (2000-2001), p. 97 
and Chrysostomou (2004b), p. 31. 
472 Of the earliest such finds is a large Doric column capital that Petsas (1978) argues belongs to the 
palace of Archelaos, pp. 48-49. 
473 Chrysostomou (2004b), p. 31. Also Blackman, Baker & Hardwick (1997-1998), p. 87.   
474 “Pellae, in uetere regia Macedonum,” Livy 42.51.1. 
475 See Appendix E. 
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 Overall, given the relative synchronicity of the construction of the royal 
residences at Aigai and Pella, the fact that they were both used simultaneously, as well 
as the practical advantages of one (Aigai) being fully excavated, as opposed to the 
work-in-progress that is Pella, it is believed that both can provide valuable evidence 
regarding the social and actual space occupied by the Argead rulers and their 
entourage.476  
 As for Alexandria, Diodoros and pseudo-Aristoteles report that the 
construction of the palace was ordered by the founder of the city himself in 331 
BCE.477 Supervision of the completion of building works in Alexandria, including the 
royal residence, was assigned to Kleomenes of Naukratis, one of the φίλοι of 
Alexandros.478 Although direct references are lacking, the royal residence must have 
been completed by the end of the fourth century, when Ptolemaios I, following a 
sojourn in Memphis, took up his residence there.479 It seems logical that the layout 
envisaged by Alexandros would be modified under Kleomenes of Naukratis and 
Ptolemaios I. Successive rulers, as we are informed, each made their own additions to 
the palace.480 Without architectural remains though, these alterations are impossible 
to appreciate. The preliminary conclusions of the underwater excavations of the 
Antirhodos Palace, however, are said to correspond with Strabon’s description “to the 
minutest detail.”481  
 
CHOOSING THE ΑΥΛΗ 
 Pella replaced Aigai as the seat of power of the Argead dynasty during the 
reign of Archelaos in the late fifth century BCE.482 The reasons behind the move are 
not clear but historical hindsight and the geo-strategic importance of the location of 
                                                 
476 Thanks to the labours of K.A. Romaios, F. Petsas, G. Mpakalakis and M. Andronikos, see Drougou 
& Saatsoglou-Paliadeli (2006), pp. 52-74.  
477 Diod. 17.52. See also [Aristot] Oikon. 2.1352a, Just. 13.4.11. Le Rider argues that [Aristot] Oikon. 
2.1352a suggests that the construction of Alexandria was finished under Kleomenes, (1997) pp. 88-89. 
478 Just. 13.4, Arr. Anab. 3.5, [Arist.] Oikon. 2.1352a. 
479 See Fraser (1972), I, p. 36. 
480 Diod. 17.52.4-5, Strab. 17.1.8, illustrates vividly the outcome of three centuries of building activity 
in the Ptolemaic capital: “…ἐξ ἑτέρων ἕτερ’ ἐστίν.” (Drawing on Hom. Od. 17.266, concerning the 
palace of Odysseus ...“there is building upon building.”) 
481 This sounds like a very optimistic assessment: Goddio cited in Schuster (1999), p. 46.  
482 The date usually given is c. 400 BCE, see Lilimpaki-Akamati (2004), p. 13, but could be placed 
earlier, since Euripides is said to have worked at the court of Archelaos in Pella before his death there 
in 406 BCE, Souda s.v. Εὐριπίδης. 
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Pella could provide some clues. Briefly, foreign relations successes in the south,483 a 
diplomatic entente in the west484 and regained control of the invaluable silver mines of 
Bisaltia in the east485 made plans for the reorganisation of the Kingdom feasible. The 
transfer of the royal residence to Pella must have conformed to a need for more 
effective management of newly acquired funds and territories, as well as keeping a 
better check on allies and enemies alike. The city, such as it stands, is located south of 
the mouth of the Axios gorge, which forms the main pass from the Central Balkans to 
the sea, and is in proximity of the eastern-western trade routes.486 At that time it could 
also profit from a nearby harbour, Phakos.487 In all these three respects Aigai would 
prove unsatisfactory. There was no easy access to the sea and in order to reach the 
northern and eastern territories, either to defend or control them, one and one’s army 
had to make the long detour around the Gulf of Thermaikos.488 Strategic 
considerations always come into play when it comes to the administration of power.  
 The importance of geography, as related to the distribution and 
administration of power, especially military and economic, is also clearly illustrated in 
the location of the Ptolemaic capital. Alexandria was founded by Alexandros III to the 
west of the Nile Delta, between the marshes of Lake Mareotis and the sea.489 At first 
glance, this scarcely inhabited spot on the Mediterranean coastline, most importantly 
lacking a reliable supply of fresh water, may have seemed like an odd choice for a 
city.490 The advantages that the location offered, however, outweighed the shortage in 
                                                 
483 These involve on the one hand strengthening of diplomatic ties with Athens as exemplified by the 
siege of Pydna brought to a successful completion with Athenian aid (Diod. 13.49.1-2) and by the 
Athenian grant of proxenia and euergesia to Archelaos, (IG I3 117). On the other, the acquisition of the 
territory of Perrhaibia just north of Thessalia added another buffer zone to the southern frontier of the 
Kingdom, (for a discussion with references see Hammond, 1979, p.139). 
484 See Arist. Pol. 5.1311b, for the marriage alliance between the eldest recorded daughter of Archelaos 
with the King of the Elimeians, Derdas.  
485 Archelaos was able to issue silver staters again after the mere tetrobols issued by the three kings that 
preceded him, Hammond (1989), p. 71-73. For an illustration see Hatzopoulos-Loukopoulos (1981), pl. 
13. 
486 For a visual representation see Hammond’s map at the back of the hardcover edition of his 1989 The 
Macedonian State, where he marks out the ancient routes, some still in use today. 
487 According to the ancient coastline Phakos, already inhabited in the Bronze Age, was 3km south of 
Pella. Today, the sea stretches 23km away. 
488 Aigai retained its symbolic significance as the first city of the Makedonian Kingdom. Its religious 
importance never waned. According to an ancient oracle ascribed to the reign of Perdikkas I, all rulers 
of the Argead dynasty were to be buried at Aigai lest their line should falter, (Just. 7.2). All of them 
were, with the exception of Alexandros III.  
489 Diod. 17.52. See also Plout. Alex. 26, Arr. Anab. 3.1.5-2.2, Curt. 4.7.27-28, Just. 11.11.13. 
490 Chauveau (1997) has demonstrated recently that the settlement of “Rhakotis”, attested by Pausanias 
(5.21.9-10) and Strabon (17.1.6) to have pre-existed Alexandria, denotes more a linguistic pun than an 
actual village. In the Egyptian tongue “Ra-qed” means ‘building site’ and this was the name used by the 
Egyptian population of the area to refer to the new city, even in later times, p. 77. Empereur (1998) 
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water supply, which was quickly remedied via the construction of an extensive 
network of cisterns and ducts.491 To the north, the city was catered by the spacious 
harbour of Pharos. Ancient authors comment on the strategic location of the city. By 
land, it was approachable only from east and west, both of which approaches were 
narrow enough to be easily defensible.492 Commercially, the revenues of the area were 
attested since the times of Herodotos to have been abundant,493 while ready access to 
the sea could only have strengthened the ties with the traditional commercial 
maritime powers of the Eastern Mediterranean.494 It will never be certain whether 
Alexandros intended for Alexandria to become the capital of his extended Kingdom, 
as some have suggested.495 It is important to note, however, that the Ptolemaioi seem 
to have understood the importance of the city’s location. Unlike their contemporary 
rivals the early Ptolemaioi did not maintain their seat of power in the capital cities and 
palaces of their predecessors.496 Instead, after a sojourn in Memphis as a satrap 
Ptolemaios I moved his capital to Alexandria where it remained to witness the end of 
the dynasty.497  There, he chose to take up his residence in the palace of his former 
commander.498  
 Both the new capitals of the Argeadai and the Ptolemaioi flourished. It was 
thus that the previously unimportant Pella grew to become the “greatest of the cities in 
Makedonia,”499 and Alexandria with its port came to eclipse those of Peiraias, Syracuse 
and Carthage, lacking “little of being the most renowned of the cities of the inhabited earth.”500 
 
                                                 
endorses the possibility that such misunderstandings could be attributed to the ancient authors’ 
ignorance of the Egyptian language, p. 37. 
491 A 20km long canal dug from the Canopic branch of the Nile transported fresh water to the city, 
which was then fed to countless cisterns built below households. See further Empereur (1998), pp. 124-
143. 
492 Diod. 17.52.3.  
493 Hdt. 3.91, where he attests to the profusion of Lake Mareotis. 
494 Vasunia (2001) comments on the possibility that the foundation of Alexandria at that specific 
location might have been promoted by the commercial circles of Naukratis, the Greek trading colony 
situated 45 miles south of Alexandria, p. 270. 
495 Ehrenberg, cited in Vasunia (2001), p. 272. 
496 The Seleukidai occupied at various points the Achaemenid palaces at Sardis, Ekbatana, Babylon 
and Susa. See Strab. 16.1.5 for Babylon. For the importance of Babylonian palaces during the Seleukid 
era, see Sherwin-White & Kuhrt, 1993, p. 38. More understandably, the Antipatridai and subsequently 
the Antigonidae settled in Pella and Aigai. 
497 We have no exact dating for the transfer of the capital to Alexandria. Our earliest reference is the 
Satrap Stele, which places a terminus ante quem in the year 311 BCE; a good dozen years after Ptolemaios 
took over the satrapy of Egypt. For a slightly earlier terminus see Turner (1984), p. 126, (313 BCE). In 
any case, the transfer was prior to the abandonment of the satrapy and the assumption of royal titulary. 
498 CGC 22182, (Satrap Stele). 
499 Xen. Hell. 5.2.13: …Πέλλαν, ἥπερ μεγίστη τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ πόλεων. 




 The royal residences themselves were in all cases reported to have been 
ostentatious designs. Claudius Aelianus mentions that Archelaos spared no expense 
for the embellishment of his palace and called upon the services of the painter Zeuxis, 
to no moderate fee, to provide its decorations.501 The result was such that people from 
all over were hard pressed to visit Pella just to view the palace. Similarly, Alexandros 
III’s instructions to his architects were to build a palace that would be renowned for its 
size and substance: βασίλεια κατασκευάσαι θαυμαστὰ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ βάρος 
τῶν ἔργων.502 The original plans were, in the course of time, supplemented, 
expanded, adorned, elaborated, as each successive king added his own diaitai.   
 The core of the new palace at Pella was built on the middle of three hills 
overlooking the shores of the Thermaikos Gulf, the so-called Lake of Loudias, and the 
surrounding mountains.503 At the time it was situated 1250m from the city of Pella 
and was surrounded by gardens and forested areas. Higher than the swamps that 
closed in on the Lake and away from the city clamour it must have presented its 
residents and guests with a serene and picturesque environment. The ruins excavated 
today stretch over 60.000m2 but during the reign of the Argeadai the grounds covered 
by the palace must have been less. In terms of defences, the palace enjoyed an 
excellent southern orientation with views to the Loudias plain, the lake and the 
surrounding mountains. The hill itself is steep to the east and west, but manageable to 
the north and south. The south face was protected by a thick crenellated fortification 
wall interspersed with towers.504 A road connected the monumental propylaia with 
the Agora, while a cart road climbed to the east side of the hill. To the north, a royal 
gate was added in the times of Kassandros, known as the Βασίλειος Κάραβος, which 
connected the palace with the Palaistra. The palace must have been very impressive 
to behold.505 As mentioned previously, however, the function of the βασίλεια as the 
                                                 
501 Cl. Ael. VH 14.17. Although Aelianus wrote the Varia Historia almost five centuries after Archelaos 
was building the Pellaion βασίλειον, the archaeological record does not contradict the sumptuousness 
with which he refers to the palace. Even if during the turn of the third century CE Pella presented an 
insignificant sight with few inhabitants (Luc. Alex. 6.15-7.1) its former “fortunate” status, as Lucianus 
calls it, was well known. What is more, the association of the painter Zeuxis with Archelaos and Pella is 
confirmed in Plin. NH 35.36, where the artist is alleged to have presented the King with a painting of 
the god Pan. 
502 Diod. 17.52.4. 
503 This was none other than the combined estuaries of the three rivers Aliakmon, Loudias and Axios 
that fell into the Gulf. Gradually alluvial deposits built up that transformed the area into a swamp. 
504 The wall was 3.30m in width. 
505 The palace is still under excavation and has only been partially revealed to date. With each 
successive excavation season, however, the picture becomes more complete. 
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awe-inspiring residence of the king and his family was only complementary to their 
administrative and social functions.  
 The palace at Pella consists (as per the excavations so far) of five clusters of 
buildings interconnected with stoai, gates, corridors, stairwells and peristyle 
courtyards. Much more elaborate in scope than the Aigai palace, the royal palace of 
the Makedonian capital incorporated alongside the residential quarters of the royal 
family all sorts of administrative buildings, reception rooms, public archives, a library, 
cult areas and a mint.506 The central, and most official, cluster of the palace includes 
four monumental buildings (I, II, IV and V), with residential, educational and official 
functions.507 Building IV is only conventionally called so as it consists of an intricate 
web of rooms, courts and baths.508 According to the excavators, this contained most 
probably the personal quarters of the King. Its layout has been frequently compared 
to the descriptions for the inner court of the Ptolemaioi in Alexandria (τὰ ἐνδοτέρω 
βασίλεια, πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας ἔχοντα διαίτας).509 The presence of dies and fragments 
of bronze rods suggest that in all probability the royal mint was incorporated to this 
building as well. 
 Building V has been identified as the Palaistra, or the Gymnasion. It measures 
63,50 x 70 meters and is one of the earliest gymnasia in Makedonia excavated so far. 
Its size is roughly equal to the Palaistra of Olympia. Its incorporation to the palace 
complex in the second half of the fourth century BCE might have been the result of 
Philippos II’s reorganisation of the royal youth.510 That this structure was a gymnasion 
is supported by literary sources such as Polyainos who refers to the existence of a 
palaistra in Pella, which also included a pool.511 At the north-eastern corner of the 
building there is a small swimming pool that communicated with both the bath in 
building IV and the Palaistra.512 Further, Ploutarchos preserves an anecdote, whereby 
Leonnatos from Pella sent many camels from Egypt to the gymnasia in Makedonia.513 
In addition, the presence of an ephebeion, (a teaching room) on the centre of the north 
                                                 
506 As regards cult areas, the court of building I includes apsidal recesses and stoai, which were used for 
worship. Evidence for this comes from pedestals discovered in situ, which supported bronze statues 
possibly of ancestors or heroes, Chrysostomou (2004b), p. 33.  
507 Refer to Appendix E. Building III (an unfinished stoic building) belongs to the reign of Kassandros. 
508 Chrysostomou (1997), p. 114. 
509 Strab. 17.1.9. Chrysostomou (2004), p. 453. 
510 Psoma (2006). 
511 Pol. Strat. 4.2.  
512 For the various components of a palaistra see Vitr. De Arch. 5.11: ἀποδυτήριον, ἀλειπτήριον, 
ἐλαιοθεσίον, κονιστήριον, κωρύκειον (=boxing room). 
513 Plout. Alex. 10. 
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side of the Palaistra, open on the south side, confirms the function of this building as a 
gymnasion for the physical training of the heirs to the Makedonian throne and their 
royal entourage. The ephebeia rooms usually consisted of an exedra with wooden seats 
where the youths and epheboi would take their instruction.514  
 A very interesting structure, if only for its sheer proportions, is the complex 
consisting of buildings I and II, both of which were designed to serve official and 
public functions. These share a façade, the length of which is 160 meters. The total 
surface area of both buildings amounts to a staggering 13.000m2. A monumental 
entranceway granted access to both buildings. Its roof was supported by four Doric 
columns of one meter in diameter. Measuring sixteen meters, it is six meters wider 
than the entranceway of the palace at Aigai. Both buildings had a rectangular court at 
their centre, from where large rooms fanned out on all sides. Building I boasts a very 
impressive room on the north side of the court, with a total surface of 400m2. The 
excavator argues that this large room was the οἶκος, or great ἀνδρών of the palace. 
Such a room would be used for the auditions of the king (χρηματισμός), councils and 
trials, but also for banquets (συμπόσια) and the reception of foreign ambassadors and 
diplomats.515 With a capacity for 26 klinai it is the largest of three other smaller 
andrones, situated on either side of Building I, each of which could accommodate up to 
15 klinai. Building II was the administrative and, at the same time, social hub of the 
palace.516 Finally, its courtyard is reminiscent of the μέγιστον περιστύλιον of 
Alexandria. Measuring 50x50m. this courtyard was probably used for larger 
gatherings. It also communicated with the palaistra. Chrysostomou argues that 
although the structures currently under excavation exhibit styles dating to the last 
quarter of the fourth century BCE and later, Buildings I and II basically kept their 
initial design, while having undergone certain adjustments and additions.517 
 The same emphasis on the social aspect of court life is exhibited in the palace 
at Aigai. The palace is a rectangular structure measuring 104.50X88.50m. With a 
central peristyle court (measuring 44.50m), surrounded by four doric stoai, its layout is 
very similar to a Hellenic oikos. The entrances to the various rooms which open 
beyond the peristyle court are marble and must have supported wooden frames and 
doors. The rooms on the south wing (F) appear to be the most formal. Klinai on all 
                                                 
514 Compare with the ephebeion in Mieza. 
515 Chrysostomou (1997), p. 126. 
516 Chrysostomou (1997), p. 125. 
517 Chrysostomou (1997), p. 128. 
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sides of the walls, as well as elaborate mosaics, indicate that these rooms were used for 
banqueting. The same arrangement is mirrored on the west side (M1, M2, M3), 
which probably housed the administrative quarters of the palace. These rooms are 
impressively big and are decorated with marble floors. They must have 
accommodated the bigger banquets of the royal family.518 Similarly, Room E houses 
an intricate mosaic floor, with female figures at each corner. A running step along the 
walls provided the basis upon which the klinai stood. 
 As in Pella, the palace dominates the plain beneath and the city of Aigai both 
through its position, as well as its size. It is defensively located on the slopes of a hill 
with a steep ravine on the west and a fortified acropolis to the south. It forms part of a 
complex that includes the Theare, the Agora and perhaps other buildings. A base 
survives which must have supported a balcony, out of which the ruler would have had 
a clear view upon the city of Aigai and the valley of the Haliakmon, way to the north. 
This opening to the outside world is a unique feature of the palace, as it is an 
extremely rare addition in the layout of the ancient oikos. The private quarters must 
have been located in the now entirely lost second floor. 
 As already argued above, the extant foundations of the Aigai palace date to 
the middle of the second half of the fourth century. In the Hellenistic period, an 
extension was added to the west, which must have comprised auxiliary rooms. The 
palace was finally abandoned in the second century with the fall of the Antigonidai.  
 As far as the Alexandrian palace is concerned, it is very unfortunate that 
despite recent archaeological work in the Eastern Harbour and its subsequent 
publication, there is still very little to go on in terms of the Royal Quarters. For the 
most part, these still lie submerged in the Great Harbour and concealed beneath the 
modern city of Alexandria.519 However, Strabon’s description, as well as sources such 
as the Letter of Aristeas, Theokritos’ Eidyllia, Poseidippos’ epigrams, Polybios and 
Diodoros provide us with small titbits of information enough to formulate a clear view 
of the layout of the Ptolemaic palace.520 As in Pella, the Ptolemaic Royal Quarters 
were surrounded by extensive grounds aimed for entertainment, which along with the 
palace complex, occupied more than one quarter of the city. The inner palaces 
themselves comprised a multitude of painted apartments and groves. Audience halls, 
                                                 
518 Drougou & Saatsoglou-Paliadeli (2006), pp. 101-123. 
519 Goddio et al. (1998) provide vital new information about the shape of the harbour, but despite the 
title of their book, very little on the Ptolemaic Royal Quarters. 
520 Strab. 17.1.8-9. See Nielsen (1994). 
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such as the one used by Ptolemaios II Philadelphos to receive the Jewish sages in a 
multi-day banquet, indicate that banqueting, with its blurred informal and official 
overtones, remained the cornerstone of social interrelations at the court. In addition, 
the palace contained large peristyle courts that could provide the venue for populous 
gatherings including the bodyguard, the household troops, as well as the officers of the 
infantry and the cavalry.521 Other sources reveal that the palace had areas of torture, 
while it must have been quite difficult to navigate on account of a multitude of 
intersecting galleries and gates.522 Finally, the Museum also formed part of the royal 
palaces. It included a public walk, an Exedra with seats, and a large house, in which 
the common mess-hall of the men who studied in the Museum was situated.523 Late in 
the dynasty, Lucanus still marvelled at the splendour of Kleopatra VII’s palace.524 
 
Most problematic of the two types of evidence is admittedly the interpretation of the 
material remains. It has been emphatically proposed that when dealing with the 
archaeological remains of ancient societies “form follows function [and] not the other way 
round”.525 Such a deduction is in line with the oft-repeated architectural dictum that 
form follows function.526 In the case of the palace at Aigai even though no epigraphy 
or other literary material is associated with the buidling, the archaeology can be quite 
telling for its function. Insofar as architecture can provide clues for the organisation of 
people, the multiplicity of lavish banquet rooms in all palaces signifies that dining was 
and continued to be a paramount aspect of élite interaction, domestic and foreign. 
The banquet provided the backdrop against which the ruler interacted with his 
courtiers and foreign ambassadors and could gain their support.527 As exemplified by 
the discussions that took place in the symposion between Ptolemaios II and the Jewish 
sages, the banquet also had a deliberative purpose to fulfill. In an Argead context, the 
                                                 
521 Polyb. 15.25. 
522 Polyb. 15.27, 15.31. 
523 Strab. 17.8. 
524 Lucan. De Bello Civile 10.107-127. 
525 Nielsen (1994), p. 13. 
526 Louis Henry Sullivan (1896), “The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered”, Lippincott's 
Magazine, “Whether it be the sweeping eagle in his flight, or […] over all the coursing sun, form ever follows function, 
and this is the law.” Even though expressed by a late nineteenth century modernist architect this notion is 
resonant of Vitruvius’ threefold principle of durability, utility and beauty as applied to the construction 
of defensive, religious and utilitarian buildings, Vitr. De Arch. 1.3.2.   
527 See Murray (1983). 
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sources make it explicit that Philippos II used dining as a setting in which to discuss 
state policy.528 
  In terms of who attended these banquets, the sources indicate, as mentioned 
previously, that these could be foreign dignitaries, such as the Persians invited in the 
court of Amyntas I, and most frequently, the king’s friends.529 The layout of the 
sympotic room, does not allow for differentiations in hierarchy. There is nothing to 
suggest architecturally that the kline of the king was placed at a more conspicuous 
level or place than the rest in Argead Makedonia. However, the Letter of Aristeas 
suggests that in Ptolemaic Egypt the king would sit at the centre and the various guests 
around him.530 This was probably the case in Makedonia as well, but the absence of a 
throne, or any other permanent conspicuous kline is indicative of the immediate nature 
of the relationships cultivated between the king and his court. Further, the banquet 
hall was called an andron, precisely because women were not allowed to dine with the 
men. In an incident recounted by Herodotos, Amyntas I explains to his Persian guests 
that the presence of women in banquets is not a custom of the Makedones.531 That 
this might have been the case is further strengthened by the apparent absence of 
banqueting vessels from Makedonian female burials.532 Conversely, σκύφοι, κύλικες, 
κρατῆρες, οἰνοχόοι and other such objects abound in male burials. This ‘rule’ of 
absence appears to have applied to women of the royal family and the families of the 
guests, as allowance was made for various female singers, flute-players and such like to 
entertain the banqueters with their presence.533 In architectural terms it has given rise 
to the designation ‘ἀνδρών,’ literally meaning the men’s quarters. Otherwise such 
rooms are known as συµπόσια.534 We know from literary sources that the women had 
                                                 
528 Ath. Deipn. 6.260a. 
529 Hdt. 5.21. See further Tomlinson (1970) and Borza (1983) for the symposia of Alexandros III. 
530 Aristeas §183. 
531 Hdt. 5.17-21, “Ὦ Πέρσαι, νόμος μὲν ἡμῖν γέ ἐστι οὐκ οὗτος, ἀλλὰ κεχωρίσθαι ἄνδρας γυναικῶν…” 
532 It has to be noted that most of the Makedonian chamber tombs excavated so far have been 
discovered robbed, with the remarkable exception of those in the “Great Tumulus” at Vergina. For a 
description of the finds of the female burial in the antechamber of Tomb II (‘Tomb of Philippos’) at 
Vergina see Andronikos (2004), pp. 175-197. Compare with the banqueting vessels from the main 
chamber, ibid. pp. 145-159. This view is to be tested further by the outcome of the ongoing excavations 
in the extensive burial ground of Archontiko, near Pella. Drs A. & P. Chrysostomou have excavated c. 
5% of the site which, according to the finds, flourished from the Archaic to the Early Hellenistic period. 
So far, female burials have not been associated with banqueting vessels. See the Archaeological Reports for 
the years 1996-2005, s.v. Archontiko. 
533 See Ath. Deipn. 10.435a-d (Theopompos FGrHist. 115 F 236), & the description of the banquet of 
Karanos in Makedonia, Ath. Deipn. 4.129a. 
534 Excavated symposia date as far back as the 6th century BCE and are not a Makedonian phenomenon. 
See Tomlinson (1970), p. 310. 
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their own quarters in the palace, the so-called γυναικωνίτης.535 Finally, the palace at 
Pella is the best testament of how much the political and fiscal life of the state was 
intertwined with the personal, recreational and educational life of its leader. Banquet 
rooms, the royal mint, the ruler’s private space, hunting parks and gymnasia were all 
situated in very close quarters. All these spaces, with the exception of the ruler’s 
private quarters, were frequented by members of the court and their offspring, making 
their interaction with the ruler constant, seamless and highly personal.  
 Having examined the connotations and the physical setting of courtly 
interaction, the following section draws attention to its social organisation.  
 
 
ΟΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΝ ΑΥΛΗΝ: THE COURT AS A SOCIAL SPACE 
 
“..‘Ruling’ is a complex activity, and […] the manipulation of people is one of the most important 
functions in this activity.”536 This maxim, expounded by Elias, draws on his theory of 
interdependence between the ruler of a so-called absolutist régime and the individuals 
that populate his immediate surroundings i.e. his courtiers. His idea runs contrary to 
the ‘Great Man’ theory of history that views individuals as the ultimate explanations 
of historical events.537 It is very common to think of Philippos II’s groundbreaking re-
organisation of the Makedonian Kingdom as if he put it in motion almost single-
handedly; or of Ptolemaios II Philadelphos as leading Egypt to bankruptcy, or to 
greatness, depending on the historian, as if he had embarked on a solitary mission.538 
Instead, Elias stresses that the actions of an individual must always be understood in 
reference to the network of interdependencies s/he forms with others. In light of this, 
rulers depended on the ruled as much as the ruled depended on the rulers. Drawing 
heavily on empirical material Elias demonstrated that “even the autonomy of the mightiest 
king ha[d] fixed limits.”539 Although the king alone from all other social groups in the 
                                                 
535 Hdt. 5.20, “…τὴν γυναικηίην”, Plout. Alex. 9.Separation between the sexes in the social activity of 
banqueting was in place during the reign of Philopator and his thalamegos, Ath. Deipn. 5.204d-206c. 
536 Elias (2006), p. 139. 
537 Elias (2006), p. 152. For the ‘Great Man’ theory of history see Carlyle (1963), also Sztompka (1993), 
pp. 261-264. 
538 For Philippos II, see Hammond (1989), p. 178: “These changes within the kingdom were assuredly powered by 
the personality of Philip; for he must have inspired the peoples of the enlarged kingdom to go to work with enthusiasm...” 
Ptolemaios Philadelphos: for the former characterisation, see Turner (1984), p. 159: “It was Philadelphus 
[…] who bankrupted Egypt.” For the latter, see Samuel (1993), p. 169.  
539 Elias (2006), p. 35. 
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realm can feel no pressure from above, he can nevertheless experience severe 
pressures from the sides (what can be described as peer group pressure, i.e. rival 
kings), but most importantly from below. In its most exaggerated form this implies 
that if all the actions of his subordinates were to be directed against him he would be 
cancelled out in a single moment. Such a scenario can scarcely materialize though. 
The reason is straightforward. In the narrower circle of the court, that concerns us 
here, it is usually the case that the actions of the court people, as individuals or as 
groups united by similar interests, are directed against one another in their 
competition towards ever-augmenting distinction. The ultimate source of this 
distinction, it has to be remembered, is the king. As much as it is, therefore, in the 
interest of the courtiers to maintain intact their source of satisfaction, so it is in the 
interest of the ruler to regulate the tension that keeps his courtiers divided. By extent, 
he would be more successful in channelling their energies away from him. This 
regulation, among other things, could take the form of dispensing titles,540 organising 
them hierarchically, and of developing a certain form of ceremonial.541  
 Court societies, however, and their inherent hierarchical order did not spring 
up spontaneously around the person of a charismatic leader turned ruler. They were 
“formed gradually on the basis of a specific transformation of social power-relationships.”542 This 
means that, as hinted above, individuals are driven into specific forms of relationships 
(in this case the court) by a particular dependence on others. Through their 
interdependence they hold fast to one another within it. The court then is generated 
through the interweaving of dependencies, but also reproduces itself again and again 
becoming an established institution, as long as this particular kind of mutual 
dependence persists within the structure of society at large.543 The successful 
regulation of those relationships/dependencies translated into augmented political 
power for the ruler, as the reach of his authority spread from the political centre to the 
periphery through the commissioning of his courtiers to carry tasks further afield. The 
following section will examine the organisation and hierarchical structure of royal 
courts in the Kingdom of Makedonia under the Argeadai and in the Kingdom of 
Egypt under the early Ptolemaioi. The examination will touch upon the manner in 
                                                 
540 Elias (2006), p. 78. 
541 Regulation could also involve the division of confidence to the effect that “La jalousie de l’un sert de frein 
à l’ambition des autres,” Louis XIV quoted in Elias (2006), p. 141-142. 
542 Elias (2000), p. 394. 
543 Elias (2000), p. 394. 
 
109 
which the individuals attached to the royal courts of Pella and Alexandria were 
organised, the functions they served and whether there was continuity between the 
two systems of court organisation. 
 
 
COURT ORGANISATION & HIERARCHIES  
 The designation hierarchy (ἱεραρχία) to describe the graded arrangement of 
interrelated individuals in the entourage of a ruler does not appear in the vocabulary 
of the Classical and Hellenistic sources that concern this thesis. The term is a later 
Christian construction with theological and cleric nuances,544 although etymologically 
it drew on the word ἱεράρχης, a religious office known to us from inscriptions from 
Oropos and elsewhere.545 
 In describing the powers and duties of the Argead rulers Hammond made 
reference to what he called their “assistants.” The position of these helpers, he 
mentions, “ranked immediately after [the King] and before any commoner.”546 Insofar as this 
holds truth it raises the question of the internal organisation of this body of aides. 
Hammond asserted that they conformed to some sort of “corporate hierarchy,” but he 
did not move beyond the supposition that this was shaped by the existence of 
favourites, who, nevertheless were chosen on the basis of merit.547 
 More specifically, during the Argead period we know of individuals with such 
designations as ἑταῖρος, φίλος, σωματοφύλακας, βασιλικός ὑπασπιστής, δορυφόρος, 
βασιλικός παῖς to have populated the immediate entourage of the ruler. The order 
they are presented here is not reflective of any sort of formalised hierarchy, as there 
appears to have been none. This, of course, does not imply that individuals occupied 
random spaces at court. Roughly speaking, ἑταῖροι, φίλοι and σωματοφύλακες appear 
to have occupied the higher echelons of the ruler’s entourage, while at the bottom of 
this informal hierarchy were the βασιλικοί παῖδες.548 Above everyone stood the ruler, 
                                                 
544 To the author’s knowledge, it is first used by Athanasios of Alexandria in the late fourth century CE 
to refer to the divisions of angels (Sermo in Annuntiationem Deiparae, 28.940) while Pseudo-Dionysios 
Areopagites in the fifth century extended its usage from the stratification of the heavens to include the 
order of clerics in the secular world, (De Caelesti Hierarchia, De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia). 
545 IG VII 303 (Oropos, end of third c. BCE), also IG IX, 1 32 (Phokis, c. 170 BCE). 
546 Hammond (1989), p. 23. 
547 Hammond (1989), p. 23 and pp. 55-56. 
548 The nature of their duties, which included among other things waiting at the royal table and tending 
to the king’s horse, coincided with tasks reserved in other societies for slaves, Curt. 5.1.42. Arr. Anab. 
4.13.1. They are also known to have prepared his bath, (Diod. 17.36.5), to have stood guard outside his 
chambers as he was sleeping, (Arr. Anab. 4.13.1 and Curt. 8.6) and to have waited upon him while 
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even though it is highly debatable whether any Argead made use of the title ‘King’ 
before Alexandros III. The appellation most frequently found in official documents 
was either just the proper name of the ruler, or sometimes followed by their 
patronymic.549 In cases where the ruler expected to be absent from the Kingdom, 
usually campaigning abroad, he would appoint a deputy ruler (or ἄρχων) to fulfil the 
royal duties in his stead. Interestingly, such agents were not always members of the 
Argead dynasty. In 432 BCE Perdikkas II left in his stead as ἄρχων a certain Iolaos, of 
whom very little is known, while Antipatros is most famous for sharing the delegation 
of affairs in Makedonia with Olympias during Alexandros’ absence in the Asian 
Campaign.550   
 This body of ‘assistants’ appears to have originated from the leading families of 
the Kingdom; first from Lower Makedonia and gradually, after its incorporation to 
the Kingdom by Philippos II, by Upper Makedonia as well. Distinguished lineage 
however, as has frequently been asserted in the past, was not a necessary prerequisite 
for admission in the entourage of the King.551 Since the times of Archelaos, whose 
reign offers the earliest evidence for the association of a Makedonian king with a 
group of ἑταῖροι,552 the title was given to non-Makedonian intellectuals that visited 
Pella as guests. Of those, the most famous is Euripides, who was chosen as a 
Companion by Archelaos.553 On his death he was honoured by the hetaireia of the 
King, which demonstrates that his inclusion in the body of Companions (ἑταῖροι) was 
not a mere honour. During the reign of Philippos II the ranks of the Companions 
were greatly expanded by the admission of individuals from all over Hellas. It seems 
as though ethnonyms were of no concern to the Argeadai. Anyone deemed by the 
ruler worthy of being named his Companion was eligible.554 This influx of ‘assistants’ 
                                                 
performing sacrifices, (Val. Max. Factorum et Dictorum Memorabilium 3.3. ext. 1). At war, they were 
expected to fight, Curt. 8.6.4, Arr. Anab. 4.16.6. Curtius 8.6.2 explicitly described the tasks performed 
by the Youths as “duties by no means very different from slavish labours,” (“..munia haud multum servilibus ministeriis 
abhorrentia.”) 
549 E.g. IG I3 61 (“π[ρέσβε]-[ς δ]ὲ τρεῖς πέμφσαι ὑπὲρ πεντέκοντα ἔτε γεγον[ότας] [ὁ]ς Περδίκκα[ν]”), IG 
II2 102 “[Ἀμύντα]ς Ἀρριδαίο”. See Hatzopoulos (1982) and the Oleveni inscription for the use of the 
title “Βασιλεύς” in conjunction with Philippos II. 
550 Thouk. 1.62.2. Hammond (1989) asserts that Iolaos was perhaps “a corollary member of the royal house,” 
p. 23. Diod. 18.118.1.  
551 Edson (1970), p. 22.  
552 Cl. Ael. VH 13.4. 
553 Cl. Ael. VH 13.4, A. Gellius, AN 15.20,  
554 Of the nearly 850 persons listed by Berve (1926), 275 are either certainly or probably ethnic 
Hellenes. Of this number, 126 persons are not associated with Alexandros’ train, and thus outside 
present concerns. Of the 149 that remain, 69-- nearly half-- are court figures not associated with 
administration. They include sophists, physicians, actors, athletes, musicians, jugglers, and other 
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in the mid-fourth century BCE reflects most vividly a Kingdom under expansion and 
on the verge of embarking on an international military campaign. Philippos II 
depended on the co-operation of both the élites of the cantons of Upper Makedonia 
and of the Hellenic city-states before he turned his back on them. He was also in need 
of manpower. Accordingly, these people came to the court of the Makedonian king in 
order to benefit from his generosity. The particular circumstances, under which each 
one of those individuals decided to migrate to the Makedonian court will inevitably 
remain unknown, but it seems that at the very least they recognized specific 
advantages to be accrued from such a move. Exiles and itinerant physicians and artists 
seem to have formed a recurring pool of candidates.555 By Philippos’ time, the 
exploitation of gold and silver mines in the area had turned Makedonia into an 
extremely wealthy state. Theopompos, with his usual hint of scorn reserved for most 
things Makedonian, informs us that the rewards of the Companions of Philippos II 
were equal to the income of the 10.000 richest Hellenes put together.556 Such an 
incredible amount was shared among just 800 individuals, which was the size of 
Philippos II’s hetaireia. Apart from a share in the booty and other monetary rewards, 
the Makedonian rulers were also in the custom of giving away plots of land or cities to 
their Companions. Our earliest reference of what is known as a dorea (gift of land) 
dates from the time of Amyntas I (c. 510 BCE) when he donated the city of 
Anthemous to Hippias, the tyrant of Athens.557 The more abundant evidence of the 
fourth century presents four instances where Philippos II did the same.558 Alexandros 
III continued the practice with territories he had won by the spear.559 After the defeat 
of Dareios, with the Treasury of the Persian Kings added to his possessions, 
Alexandros is said to have plunged into unfathomable depths of conspicuous 
consumption. What is interesting is that alongside him the Companions shared in the 
indulgence of extravagant luxury as well. Athenaios quotes from Agatharchides of 
Knidos that “whenever the Companions of Alexandros entertained him at dinner they encased 
                                                 
entertainers, and a variety of hangers-on. Of the 89 remaining names, three are of uncertain ethnic 
origin, 24 are Hellenes serving the king in a variety of administrative tasks: some are envoys, some are 
clerks, some financial officers and some act as royal agents in local places. 
555 This is a much kinder description of the composition of Philippos II’s courtiers, asTheopompos and 
Demosthenes would have liked: Theopompos FGrHist FF 162, 224, 225a-b, 236, Dem. Ὀλυνθιακὸς Β’ 
17-19. 
556 Theop. FGrHist 115 F 225b. Flower (1994) argues that despite Theopompos’ disdain several of the 
facts he presents are largely accurate, pp. 184-210. 
557 Hdt. 5.94.1. 
558 Theopompos FGrHist 155 F 224, 225. See also Herman (1987), pp. 110-111. 
559 See Appendix C. 
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everything that was to be served as dessert in gold; and when they desired to eat the dessert, they tore off 
the gold with the rest of the waste and threw it away, that their friends might be spectators of their 
extravagance, while their slaves enjoyed the profit.”560 But this is probably an exaggeration. 
However, as with all exaggerations there is probably a kernel of truth in it.  
 As admission to the court depended on the ruler, so did advancement. 
Arrianos demonstrates this point amply when reporting the first steps towards the 
organisation of Egypt after its conquest by Alexandros. The most important 
administrative and military posts were reserved for those closest to the King.561 The 
most trusted of friends could also represent the king in official state business or lead 
the army in his stead. Antipatros and Parmenion both commanded the army in 
Philippos’ place, and were also sent as ambassadors to Athens representing the 
ruler.562 Such a diverse set of responsibilities also raises the question of whether there 
was any specialisation in the function of the courtiers. This will be discussed further 
below. 
 
So far the discussion has traced the rudimentaries of membership in the Argead court. 
Admission was open to Hellenes as well as Makedones as long as they met with the 
requirements of the ruler and advancement was based on the degree of closeness of 
particular courtiers to the king.563 Similar to the court of Pella, the court of Alexandria 
was open to people from all over the Hellenic world. This time, the Makedonian 
element recedes to the background and the majority of the courtiers are attested to 
originate from Alexandria and the rest of the Eastern Mediterranean World.564 The 
Ptolemaioi shunned from including the native Egyptian nobility into their court 
ranks.565 The exceptions are few but one of them is worth mentioning. Of the six 
persons described before 300 BCE as particular friends of Ptolemaios I only one of 
them is a native Egyptian: Manetho, the Egyptian priest best known for his work 
Aigyptiaka, the history of Pharaonic Egypt.566 In spite of any prejudice from either side, 
there was still a wide range of different backgrounds of people attached to the 
Ptolemaic court. As Fraser suggested, this seems to point to the fact that the early 
                                                 
560 Ath. Deipn. 4.155c-d. 
561 Arr. Anab. 3.5.  
562 Theop. FGrhist. 115 F 217, Diod. 16.91.2; Dem. 19.69, Theop. FGrHist 115 F165. 
563 See also Xen. Cyr. 1.5.8, where the philoi are chosen from boyhood companions. This was also the 
purpose, as exemplified by the boyhood of Alexandros III, with the basilikoi paidai. 
564 Fraser (1972), p. 101 with references. 
565 See Lloyd (2002). 
566 Turner (1984), p. 125. 
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Ptolemaioi had the luxury to choose among the best talent available. Meritocracy, like 
in Argead Makedonia, persists. Merit, however, could mean different things for 
different men in power, depending on their goals. Polybios mentions that in his quest 
to secure his power in Alexandria the regent of the infant Ptolemaios V, Agathokles, 
found it advantageous to enrol conspirators in the court in order to eliminate his 
opposition. He thus, filled up the vacant places of the royal philoi by appointing 
servants and other attendants who were most remarkable for their effrontery and 
recklessness.567  
 An important change, which took place in the early Ptolemaic period as far as 
court ranks are concerned, is that the designation hetairoi disappears entirely.568 They 
still exist in the Antigonid and Seleukid Kingdoms, but their presence is restricted to 
the military ranks.569 The place of the hetairoi in the entourage of the Ptolemaic King is 
taken up by the philoi or Friends. The distinction between Companions and Friends is 
lost in Diodoros, Ploutarchos and the vulgate tradition but Arrianos seems careful to 
distinguish between the two different groups.570 Apart from the Friends we encounter 
royal pages and somatophylakes (Bodyguards) frequenting the inner circles of the court.  
      In terms of ensuring compliance, the practice of the dorea, the donation of land 
to philoi of the rulers, continued well into the Ptolemaic era. The extent of the practice 
was so widespread among the Hellenistic Kingdoms in general that being a philos of a 
King was almost synonymous with being the recipient of a grant of land.571 This was 
one way that the ties of interdependence between the ruler and his circle of courtiers 
were maintained. It deserves to be mentioned here that no extant source, however 
scarce they are, contains any reference as to any specific responsibilities the recipient 
might have in the face of the donor, other of course than the payment of the phoros.572 
It is interesting to note that in Ptolemaic Egypt the name dorea gradually came to 
denote the status of the land itself, becoming applicable to a whole category of 
domains on the king’s land, singled out for preferential treatment on account of the 
relationship between the donor and the grantee.573 It is no wonder then that men 
from all over the Hellenic world would flock to the courts of the Hellenistic rulers, 
                                                 
567 Polyb. 15.25.  
568 See Mooren (1977). 
569 Both retained the name for their Cavalries. Hatzopoulos (2001). 
570 In Arrianos, the term hetairoi refers depending on the context either to the king’s Companions in 
general, or to the Companion cavalry. 
571 Herman (1987), p. 106. 
572 Contra Herman (1987), p. 115. For the phoros see Chapter Four. 
573 Herman (1987), p. 108. 
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none the less so to the court of the Ptolemaioi, to find favour with the kings. Diodoros 
mentions that when Ptolemaios I took hold of the satrapy of Egypt a multitude of 
Friends gathered about him on account of his fairness.574 This reference to 
Ptolemaios’ fairness as a reason for joining his court hints at the subtle change, in 
some ways already in motion since Philippos II, of the term philos from a personal 
acquaintance of the ruler to a more technical designation, i.e. a title.575 This seems 
inevitable as the wider the circle of Companions or Friends grew, the lesser the private 
interaction with the King. By consequence, the more necessary the struggle between 
courtiers to win his attention and favour would become. 
 The distinction between the functions that the aforementioned designations 
had to carry appears at best vague when one delves into the sources. Both in the case 
of Argead Makedonia and early Ptolemaic Egypt, instances where one can infer the 
structure of the hierarchical organisation of the court are almost exclusively connected 
with the military, even when the latter is participating in social events. The most 
indicative example dates from the Successor period. In a banquet offered by 
Peukestas, the στρατηγός of Persepolis, to the army of Eumenes in 317 BCE the 
participants were seated in four concentric circles radiating from the sacrificial altars 
dedicated to the gods, two of which were reserved for Philippos and Alexandros.576 At 
the outermost circle, some ten stadia away from the centre,577 sat the mercenaries and 
the multitude of the allies.578 The penultimate outer circle was reserved for the 
ἀργυράσπιδες and the ἑταῖροι that had campaigned with Alexandros.579 Holleaux 
makes a convincing suggestion that the ἑταῖροι in question would probably have been 
the infantrymen known as πεζέταιροι.580 Second to the centre sat a variety of officials, 
including the so-called δεύτεροι ἡγεμόνες, and those of the ἔξω τάξεως, φίλοι, 
στρατηγοί and ἱππεῖς.581 Last, but certainly not least, the innermost circle was 
populated by στρατηγοί, those in charge of the ἱππαρχίαι, and those of the Persians 
that were honoured above the rest.582 If distance from the centre is an indicator of the 
level of importance of the particular groups then this banquet represents a clearly 
                                                 
574 Diod. 18.14.1. 
575 So McKechnie (1989), p. 212. 
576 Diod. 19.22.1-23.1. 
577 Ten stadia equals to approximately 1.8km. 
578 “..οἵ τε μισθοφόροι καὶ συμμάχων τὸ πλῆθος..” In both cases, these appear to have been non-
Makedones. 
579 “..οἵ τε ἀργυράσπιδες Μακεδόνες καὶ τῶν ἑταίρων οἱ μετ’ Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατεύσαντες..” 
580 Holleaux (1942), p. 10. 
581 “..τῶν τε δευτέρων ἡγεμόνων καὶ τῶν ἔξω τάξεως [καὶ] φίλων καὶ στρατηγῶν καὶ τῶν ἱππέων..” 
582 “..οἵ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰς ἱππαρχίας ἔχοντες, ἔτι δὲ τῶν Περσῶν οἱ μάλιστα τιμώμενοι..” 
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delineated hierarchy, military affects being transferred to a social context. Regular 
soldiers were placed at the farthest ends.583 In court, however, any gradations on the 
body of the Companions were imperceptible in terms of title. One can only assume 
that the highest ranks in the military belonged to those people at the peak of the king’s 
esteem and accordingly at the peak of the court hierarchy. We could infer in this case 
that the στρατηγοί were the most trusted of the king’s Companions, but it appears 
that court hierarchies were not fixed. 
 Another structure, which hints at a hierarchical organisation of the court was the 
matter of the accessibility of the king. The king could make himself scarce. How and 
when he chose to dispense with his physical presence was a source of political power 
in itself. It was a reasonable expectation in both the Argead and the early Hellenistic 
courts of people coming to the royal audiences from near and far to see the king in 
person. Ploutarchos preserves a telling anecdote from the reing of Philippos II, where 
an old woman rebuked him for referring the cases of most of those who had come to 
the audience. She told him that if he did not have the time to hear everyone out then 
he should not be king!584 However, by manipulating access to his person he could 
empower or rebuff, show favour or disfavour to whomever he pleased. In the Letter of 
Aristeas, Ptolemaios II, being anxious to meet the Jewish sages, dismissed all the other 
officials who had sought an audience with him. Aristeas mentions how this generated 
a general surprise, as there were prescribed waiting times before interested parties 
were admitted to the presence of the king. More specifically, urgent issues were 
addressed on the fifth day, while it was difficult for envoys from kings or very 
important cities to secure admission to the court before thirty days had passed. It was 
indicative of the height of Ptolemaios II’s personal opinion for these particular guests 
that he admitted them immediately, at the expense of others who had waited their due 
time, but whose presence he regarded as superfluous.585 Although audiences were part 
of the king’s duties, their hearing depended on the disposition of the ruler. Alexandros 
made a point of hearing out all the embassies waiting for him in Babylon in 323 BCE, 
                                                 
583 Another indication for hierarchy is the parade of the Xanthika: Hesychios s.v. Ξανθικά and Souda 
s.vv Ἐναγίζων, Διαδρομαί:  “ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπὶ παρατάξει κινημάτων. καὶ ἥ γε ἵππος παρήλασε πρώτη 
εὐτάκτως τε καὶ σὺν κόσμῳ, εἶτα διῃρέθησαν καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀντιπρόσωποι στάντες μαχομένων σχήματα 
ἐπεδείξαντο. κᾆτα ἐνόπλιοι διαδρομαί τινες ἐγίνοντο καὶ ἐξελίξεις καὶ περίοδοι.” See also the 
organisation of the marquee (σκηνήν) of Alexandros, Ath. Deipn. 12.539b-542b. 
584 Plout. Mor. 178f-179a, 179c Plout. Dem. 42.3-4. 
585 Aristeas §§174-175. 
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despite their large number, while Demetrios Poliorketes is alleged to have kept an 
Athenian embassy waiting for two whole years.586 
 Within the court ranks, access to the king was still not free.587 The common 
soldiers had to wait outside of Alexandros III’s tent in order to be escorted in by a 
hetairos or a somatophylax.588 The hetairoi enjoyed more immediate access, but that could 
be discontinued at the will of the king.589 The adoption of Persian court ceremonial 
and the imposition of Persian ushers in the royal quarters in 328 BCE upset the order 
of things to such an extent that Kleitos complained that the Makedones were now 
reduced to begging Persians in order to see their king.590 By 324 BCE all this 
ceremony deteriorated further the immediacy the hetairoi enjoyed in the presence of 
the king. It was now said that “the number of his friends and servants was so great, that no-one 
dared approach Alexandros.”591  
 The primary function of the hetairoi and philoi appears to have been roughly the 
same. As Tarn puts it both “formed a pool on which [the king] drew for satraps, generals, and 
men to command on some special occasion or [just] to fill some new office.592 It seems as though 
anyone could be assigned to anything. An example of this inexistence of specialisation 
is recounted by Theopompos and is imbued in his customary bitterness. Agathokles, a 
slave of the penestae of Thessaly came into the service of Philippos II. He was an 
uncouth man and a flatterer yet Philippos dispatched him to destroy the Perrhaibioi 
and, once his military assignment was fulfilled, to take charge of affairs there.593 This 
fluidity in the hierarchy was the result of non-existent specialisation. Successful 
completion of a mission could result in increased favour by the king and by extent 
increase in the influence of that person with the ruler. This is illustrated by the 
meteoric rise of some courtiers in the Ptolemaic period as well. A certain Skopas of 
Aetolia is said to have arrived in Alexandria destitute and within a span of three years 
he was commanding the entire Ptolemaic army.594 This example serves to highlight 
the personal nature of the organisation of the human element of the Ptolemaic court.  
                                                 
586 Diod. 17.113.1-4. Plout. Dem. 42.1-2. 
587 Spawforth (2007), p. 108. 
588 330 BCE: Curt. 6.7.17. 324 BCE: Arr. Anab. 4.13.7. 
589 Arr. Anab. 5.28.3.  
590 Plout. Alex. 51. 
591 Phylarchos, FGrHist 81 F 41.  
592 Tarn (1948), II, p.138. 
593 Ath. Deipn. 6.259f-260a. 
594 Porphyrios FGrHist 260 FF 45, 46.  
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 Apart from carrying the king’s commands at the price of some reciprocal 
compensation, the philoi also partook in the ruler’s political power. This is particularly 
evident in the relationship between the philoi of the king and the Hellenistic cities, 
where association with them could provide a point of contact between the citizens and 
the king himself. Philoi were frequently honoured by the cities on account of their 
benefactions.595 From the part of the ruler, according to Ma, the benefactions of the 
courtiers “represent[ed], or camouflage[ed], power as benefaction, as a means to foster local 
quiescence.”596 From the part of the cities though, the philoi could act as mediators 
between them and the king. Pelops, for instance, a garrison commander in Samos and 
philos of the Ptolemaic king, is also treated as the representative of royal political power 
on the island.597 It is not infrequent that the philoi would cultivate ties with their city of 
origin.598 An example is the exiled Spartan king Kleomenes who found refuge in the 
court of Ptolemaios III in Alexandria. The king accepted him into his circle of friends 
and even issued him with an annual stipend of 24 talanta, which Kleomenes used in 
order to maintain the compliance and loyalty of his own followers.599 Equally, in the 
Argead period, the institution of xenia or guest-friendship also provided links between 
courtiers, cities and the ruler. Philippos II is said to have had a lot of xenoi in the 
Hellenic world, some of whose loyalty to him was so great that he could persuade 
them to betray their cities to him.600 Overall, both the ruler and the cities looked to 
the courtiers for the middlemen who would represent the interests of the city to the 





This chapter has argued that the royal court was a source of political power for the 
Makedonian ruler both in Argead Makedonia and in early Ptolemaic Egypt. This 
power stemmed from the successful centralised, institutionalised and territorialised 
                                                 
595 See Ma (1996), pp. 179-242. 
596 Ma (1999), p. 238. See pp. 179-242 for a general discussion on the language of benefactions. 
597 IG XII 6.119. 
598 See Savalli-Lestrade (1996) and Mitchell (2009), pp. 15-24. Mitchell argues that the honours the 
philoi of the king received from the cities were given in order to reassert some control over their 
relationship with the king. 
599 Plout. Kleomenes 32.3. 
600 Diod. 16.54.2-4. 
 
118 
regulation of the social relations that formed between the ruler and his body of 
‘assistants.’601 These assistants were there to aid with the communication, negotiation 
and representation of royal political power. Their role as mediators operating to 
extend royal power from the centre to the periphery and abroad made them 
indispensable to the ruler. The royal hetaireia stood at the core of the ruler’s social 
network and, as such, “at the heart of the Argead king’s political power as long as he was able to 
keep their loyalty.”602 Even if this designation disappears in the early Ptolemaic period, 
groups of philoi maintained this immediate working relationship with the ruler and 
formed his principal pool of human resources out of which administrative and military 
positions were staffed according to need. 
 In terms of change and continuity between the court structures of Argead 
Makedonia and early Ptolemaic Egypt, Elias believed that the “individual’s thoughts and 
emotions are embedded in bonds of social interdependence, and change in accordance with long-term 
changes in the overall structure of these bonds.”603 In the case of the court societies in question 
their structure retained its fundamental characteristics. Its modus operandi based on 
personal interaction is evident first of all from the structure of the royal palaces, with 
their infinite emphasis on the quasi-official, quasi-informal role of banqueting as the 
cornerstone of social interaction on the court level. Secondly, the ad hoc criteria 
employed for the selection and advancement for members of the court, in both 
kingdoms depended on the disposition of the King, the personality of the candidate 
and the personal interaction between the two. Further, the ruler and courtiers were 
bound in ties of interdependence reinforced by their own self-interest. If the reciprocal 
obligations of loyalty and compliance procured in the face of some sort of irregular 
compensation (booty or land-grants) failed, then it was not a rare phenomenon that 
courtiers would switch their allegiances to other kings or that rulers would dispose of, 
in a manner not at all pleasurable, those in their entourage that were detrimental to 
their interests. The plunging of an insolent court poet into the sea in a cube of lead 
ordered by Ptolemaios II Philadelphos testifies to that.604  
 It was not until a structural change took place that the fluid hierarchy that 
characterised both Kingdoms became solidified into a stricter order around the close 
of the third century BCE. The change was effected by the gradual and imperceptible 
                                                 
601 Mann (1986), p. 27. 
602 Mitchell (2009), p. 15. 
603 Elias (2006), p. ix. 
604 Sotades of Maroneia, see Launey (1945).  
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settling of the Ptolemaic monarchy into an established government, triggered 
principally by the need for the economic organisation of the Egyptian resources (land 
and grain). The rise of a more sophisticated bureaucracy than that present in 
Makedonia with its need for specialisation created the need for titles to go with the 
tasks. Epistolographers and hypomnematographers appear side by side with chief 
stewards (archideatroi) and chief ‘door-keepers’ (archithyroros). It was then also that the 
once personal and informal designation of ‘friend’ switched to the genitive, (‘of the 
friends,’) and became another rank among ranks.605 The sheer need for more 
personnel to manage the bureaucratic structure eventually eroded the personal basis 
of social interaction between the ruler and his ever-expanding circle of courtiers and 























                                                 
605 See Mooren (1975). 
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  “δύο τε εἶναι λέγων τὰ τὰς δυναστείας παρασκευάζοντα καὶ φυλάσσοντα καὶ ἐπαύξοντα, 
στρατιώτας καὶ χρήματα, καὶ ταῦτα δι’ ἀλλήλων συνεστηκέναι” 
 









here is nothing antiquated about Caesar’s level-headed assessment that 
there are two vital things which created, preserved and reinforced 
sovereignties: soldiers and money, each of which depended heavily on the 
other. Cicero was of the same opinion when he declared in his Fifth Philippic that an 
infinite supply of money formed the sinews of war.606 The pragmatic realisation that 
money (or its historical equivalents) and soldiers were the two most coveted resources 
in the hands of aspiring rulers did not escape individuals in the ancient world any less 
that it does in the modern.607 Elias argued that armies and revenues were the two 
most decisive sources of power for a ruler. If monopoly control over either of the two 
ceased, then control over the other eventually and unavoidably disappeared as well.608 
Put simply, armies were raised in order to safeguard the already existing wealth of a 
political unit and to augment it by encroaching on the sovereignty and resources of 
neighbouring communities. In this light, military efficiency was the chief political 
concern of rulers. As the maintenance of armies is a costly affair, this vicious circle 
came to a halt only with the advent of the welfare state in the twentieth century, 
which displaced the conduct of war as the chief expense of a political unit.609   
Military capabilities have been invariably associated with power ever since the 
rise of the notion of ownership caused the early Neolithic pastoralists and 
agriculturalists to clash over stretches of land, the repeated use of which induced a 
                                                 
606 Cic. Philip. 5.5: “...nervos belli, pecuniam infinitam…” Admittedly, in the contemporary world lesser 
emphasis is placed on investing in manpower rather than on scientific research in the armaments 
industry. 
607 Cf. the writings of the eighteenth century American republican writer Joel Barlow against 
professional armies: “Thus money is required to levy armies, and armies to levy money; and foreign 
wars are introduced as the pretended occupation for both,” (repr. 1956), p. 95. Compare Ferguson 
(2001), who argues that human action in history is motivated by more than economic concerns.  
608 Elias (2006), p. 151, (2000), pp. 268-277. 




strong sense of entitlement and, hence, hostility for trespassers.610 Although theories of 
primary state formation (i.e. the transition from a non-state entity or society into a 
state) have veered away from purely militaristic explanations, it is generally accepted 
that once a political entity was formed, warfare constituted one of the central motors of 
its development.611 The history of the expansion of the Makedonian state is one such 
tale of displacement and military conquest.612 Originating from the mountainous 
areas west of Mount Vermion in Pieria, where they practiced transhumant 
pastoralism, the Makedonian tribes expanded some time during the seventh century 
BCE to the Eastern lowlands south of the Haliakmon River.613 By that time they must 
have united under the leadership of the tribe called Argeadai, whose king was 
Perdikkas I.614 The process was not peaceful and as the Kingdom extended towards 
the Axios by the end of the sixth century, several indigenous populations (Pierians, 
Bottiaians, Edonians, Almopians) had been driven out or exterminated.615 The 
overtaking of settled agricultural communities by a militarily superior warring tribe is 
implied in most versions of the Makedonian foundation myth. Perdikkas I, wishing to 
enlarge his kingdom, was instructed by the oracle of Apollon at Delphoi to seek out 
                                                 
610 See Keegan (1994), pp. 122-123. 
611 The conquest theories of Oppenheimer (1999, pp. 1-21, esp. p. 15) and others (see further Service 
1975, pp. 270-273, Mann 1986, pp. 54-57), which argue that the origins of the state lay solely in war, 
are not supported by the archaeological or anthropological record. For the transformation of simple 
political units to complex states through warfare, see Carneiro (1970). His “Circumscription Theory,” 
which is widely respected, describes how environmental constraints coupled with population pressures 
and warfare lead to complex state formation.  
612 Edson (1970), Hammond (1983). 
613 According to Hesiodos, our earliest reference on the region of Makedonia, it was around Pieria and 
the sacred mountain Olympos that the mythological eponymous ancestors of the Makedones, Magnes 
and Makedon, dwelled, Hes. Catalogue of Women (Ἠοῖαι) F 7. Thouk. 2.99 reports a succinct history of 
the territorial expansion of the Makedones up until the invasion of the Makedonian Kingdom by the 
Thrakian king Sitalkes in 429 BCE. Alongside the foundation myth provided by Herodotos 8.137-138, 
these two accounts constitute largely the only narrative we have of the early development of the 
Makedonian kingdom. The date for the earliest expansion can be inferred from Diod. 7.15. Other 
evidence is treated in Hammond (1989), p. 8. For archaeological and ethno-archaeological evidence 
regarding the practice of transhumant pastoralism in Upper Makedonia, see Chang & Tourtellotte 
(1993), Appendix C no 1. Further evidence for the pastoral economy of the Makedones comes from the 
observation made by Hammond (1989) that the major Makedonian festivals coincided with the autumn 
and spring migrations, p. 6. 
614 Str. 7a.1.11: “τούτων δὲ πάντων οἱ Ἀργεάδαι καλούμενοι κατέστησαν κύριοι.” App. Syr. 333 places 
the origin of the Argeadai tribe in Argos of Orestis. It is interesting to relate that this is where Karanos 
(the earliest recorded king of Makedonia originating from Argos in the Peloponnesos) established his 
rule, having received half of the Kingdom of Orestis, which lay west of Mount Vermion, as recompense 
for the military aid he offered to the Orestian King against his neighbours, the Eordaioi, Diod. 17.5. 
For conflicting views on the origin of the royal house of the Argeadai, see Hammond (1989), pp. 16-19 
with references and Borza (1992), pp. 80-84. Borza’s basic distrust of Herodotos and Thoukydides as 
uncritical transmitters of Makedonian propaganda does not consitute strong grounds for dismissing a 
recurring theme in contemporary sources (cf. Isok. Φίλιππος 5.32, 5.105-112). 
615 Thouk. 2.99, Diod. 7.15. 
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the land of Bottiaia, which was rich in sheep (πολύμηλον), and to establish his capital 
in the flatlands there (ἐν δαπέδοις).616 In Herodotos’ earlier account, the three 
brothers had set off from the Gardens of Midas (probably Mieza) to ‘trample on’ 
(κατεστρέφοντο) the rest of Makedonia.617 The expansion of Makedonian sovereignty 
reached its zenith with Alexandros III’s near-universal dominion of the known world. 
His achievement was a testament to the extent of Makedonian military power, in 
terms of both logistical organisation and its ideological hold on those participating in 
its hierarchy. The Egyptian satrapy of Ptolemaios I was itself a product of 
expansionary warfare, its territory having been won by the spear. In the ensuing 
havoc of the Successor Wars it was imperative that military power was sustained, 
increased and even flaunted, not only for defence and expansion, but also for prestige. 
And indeed it was, as the early Ptolemaioi never seemed to lag far behind in the 
Hellenistic arms race.618 
As a testament to the flexibility of citizen-status in Argead Makedonia and the 
economic prosperity that came with the successful management of natural resources, 
the size of the Makedonian army in the fourth and third centuries BCE grew from 
respectable to impressive in the span of less than a quarter of a century.  In 358 BCE 
Philippos II took ten thousand infantry and six hundred horsemen against Bardylis.619 
When Alexandros III embarked on the Asian campaign in 334 BCE, he was at the 
head of 32.000 infantry, of which 12.000 were Makedonian phalangites, and 5.100 
cavalry.620 He could also spare twelve thousand foot and fifteen hundred horsemen to 
leave behind, under the command of his regent, Antipatros.621 Narratives of the 
subsequent major battles raised the count to an average of 40.000 infantry and 6-
7.000 cavalry.622 In stark contrast, territorial and economic constraints, and the 
                                                 
616 Diod. 7.16, AG App. Oracula epigr. 88. See also Just. 7.1.1. For the complete rejection of the various 
versions of the oracles as Makedonian pro-Hellenic propaganda, see Borza (1982), pp. 11-13. His 
minimalist approach, however, undermines the value of Diodoros’ passage as an aitiological myth, a 
vaticinium ex eventu legitimising the simple facts of Makedonian expansion.   
617 Hdt. 8.138.3. See LSJ s.v. καταστρέφω. 
618 Casson (1971), esp. App. 2. 
619 Diod. 16.4.3. 
620 Diod. 17.17.3-4. 
621 Diod. 17.17.5. 
622 Figures according to estimates from the three major battles of the Expedition: Granikos, Issos and 
Gaugamela. The main sources are: for Granikos, Arr. Anab. 1.12-16; Diod. 17.19-21; Plout. Alex. 16; 
Just. 11.6.10-15. For Issos, Arr. Anab. 2.7-11; Curt. 3.8-11; Diod. 17.32-34; Plout. Alex. 20; Just. 11.9. 
For Gaugamela, Arr. Anab. 3.8-15, Curt. 4.9, 12-16; Diod. 17.56-61; Plout. Alex. 32-33. Plout. Alex. 
66.2 mentions that after the conquest of India Alexandros army numbered 120.000 infantry and 
15.000 horse. However, such a number probably includes the entire train of attendants, as the 
Makedonian army in the Battle of the Hydaspes river is estimated again between 30-40.000 foot, 
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exclusivity of citizen-status, prescribed that the classical and early Hellenistic city-state 
could only muster at best ten thousand men in the field.623 Not hindered by the 
logistics of long-distance campaigning, which forced Alexandros to keep his army 
numbers lower than he could afford, the Successors made full use of the Persian royal 
monies that came their way and raised the stakes considerably.624 From 18.000 
infantry and 4.000 cavalry at the Battle of Gaza in 312 BCE, the Ptolemaic army 
grew to deploy 70.000 foot soldiers and 6.000 mounted officers in the Battle of 
Raphia in 217 BCE.625 Additionally, technological innovations increased the 
efficiency of siege warfare, already popular with Philippos II, and advancements in 
naval engineering gave rise to fleets as large and elaborate as that of Ptolemaios 
Philadelphos, which comprised 4.000 vessels.626 Finally, the addition of elephants in 
the army ranks provided an indispensable heavyweight prerequisite for combat.627 
Alexandros started collecting enemy elephants at the Battle of Gaugamela and 
ultimately had so many beasts that a separate office was created for the men in charge 
of the elephant units (ἐλεφαντάρχης).628 The Successors made extensive use of these 
contingents and went to great lengths to maintain a steady supply. Ptolemaios II had 
elephants shipped up the Nile in specially designed boats, while some other of the 
animals even found their way to Epeiros.629 The size of armies, however, and their 
tactical effectiveness in battle are not the only determinants of the military power of a 
political unit.  
 
Inasmuch as warfare dominated the history of both Argead Makedonia and the 
Kingdoms created after the dissolution of Alexandros III’s empire, very few scholars 
                                                 
Delbrück (1990), p. 220. Anything larger than that would have been impossible to advance as rapidly as 
Alexandros’ army did, see Engels (1978), esp. table 7, pp. 153-156. Reinforcements that could raise the 
total of Alexandros’ army to a hundred thousand arrived after the decision to start the march home, 
Diod. 17.95.4, Curt. 9.3.21, see Engel (1978), table 6, p. 150. 
623 For superiority of Philippos II’s army in the Battle of Chaironeia, see Diod. 16.85.6-7. For city-state 
armies see indicatively the Battle of Marathon, where the Athenians sent between 7.000-9.000 men out 
of a total force of 10.000 (Just. 2.9, Corn. Nep. Milt. 5) and the Battle at Plataiai, where the Spartans 
put to the field the highest number of soldiers (10.000) of all the participants on the Hellenic side (Hdt. 
9.28.2). For the Lamian War of 323/322 BCE Athens managed to enrol even less than that, Diod. 
18.11.3.  
624 For the newly-acquired Persian wealth, see App. C nos 58, 61, 62, 65, 69. 
625 For Gaza, see Diod. 19.82-84, for Raphia, see Polyb. 5.79.2. 
626 For Makedonian siege warfare, see Kern (1999), pp. 197-428. Ath. Deipn. 5.230d. On Ptolemaic 
maritime development, see Lianou (2007). 
627 Paus. 1.12.3, Polyb. 5.79-86, see also Scullard (1974). 
628 Arr. Anab. 3.15.6, Plout. Demetr. 25.4. For the elephant force of Ptolemaios I, see Casson (1993), pp. 
247-248. 
629 ἐλεφαντηγός: Agatharch. Περί τῆςἘρυθρᾶς Θαλάσσης Ἐκλογαί 83. See Casson (1993), with further 
references. For the elephants of Pyrrhos, see Plout. Pyrr. 15, 17. 
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have attempted explicitly to integrate war and military power into the study of these 
societies, and in particular to the institution of kingship.630 The major proponent of 
this type of ‘integrationism’ is Austin.631 His starting point was a critique of the one-
sidedness of viewing warfare purely as a destructive, non-productive force. Without 
detracting from its negative aspects he stressed instead its social and economic 
dimensions. His study of the relationship between kingship, warfare, and the 
Hellenistic economy explored the inevitable link between military objectives and the 
pursuit of economic power. Following his example, recent scholarship has also 
devoted attention to the social dynamics between the king, his high command and the 
ordinary soldiers.632 The shift from a purely military history to one that integrates 
warfare in the economic, social and ideological fabric of the Hellenistic way of life is 
manifest in the work of Chaniotis, which is intended as an introduction to the subject 
of warfare in the Hellenistic period.633 Surprisingly, there is not a single chapter 
devoted to tactics or weapons, while the emphasis lies on the consequences of war in 
shaping Hellenistic social life and culture. In contrast, the bulk of Makedonian 
military history is still largely limited to the study of strategy and battle tactics, army 
numbers and logistics.634 Although there is substantial bibliography on the existence 
and political function of an Army Assembly dating back to the nineteenth century, 
discussions on the role of the army in shaping the military power of the king are 
rare.635 Scholarship on Ptolemaic Egypt seems to have been kept better abreast of the 
‘integrationist’ approach to military history. Although much of the scholarly output 
on Ptolemaic warfare, and in particular its army, still focuses mainly on its tactical 
organisation and the ethnic composition of its ranks, there have been attempts to 
                                                 
630 See Ducrey (2002) on the recent state of scholarship regarding the study of armies. His edited 
volume (2002), alongside Chaniotis, is the only book to date which deals explicitly with the relationship 
between army and power. However, neither Argead Makedonia nor Ptolemaic Egypt are treated. 
631 Austin (1986). 
632 Weber G. (1997, 2009). For the king and the army, see Billows (1995), pp. 11-32, Heckel (2009). 
633 Chaniotis (2005). 
634 Fuller (1958), Engels (1978), Ashley (1998). An exception is Hatzopoulos (1996), pp. 443-460, 
(2001b). Based on the latest epigraphic evidence, he examined the political relationship between the 
king and his recruits. Despite the fact that most of the relevant evidence dates from the Antigonid 
period, Hatzopoulos includes insightful discussions on the training and recruitment of young adults, 
which bear many similarities with the Ptolemaic Kingdom.  
635 The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare includes only a cursory treatment of 
Makedonian warfare in the times of Philippos II and Alexandros III, which serves as an introduction to 
the Hellenistic period, Serrati (2007). For the army assembly, see Adams (1986) with references. 
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integrate the army within the broader social context, especially at the lower strata.636 
From a top-down perspective, biographies of individual kings, abundant for Philippos 
II and his son but surprisingly scarce on the Ptolemaic side, accentuate the function of 
the king as a military leader by emphasizing his prowess in battle as a key element for 
successful kingship.637 In doing so, the military power of the king is taken to represent 
a de facto corollary of kingship. However, this is done without any further 
qualification than the realist assumption that ‘might is right’ and that in a 
monarchical environment, the personal characteristics of the king are those that 
determine the success or failure of the uses of military power. Personal charisma, in all 
its Weberian overtones, which furthers the conviction of followers, but also galvanises 
support from non-followers, is a key element in this approach.638 
 Souda’s definition of kingship is often quoted to illustrate the personal nature 
of Makedonian (Argead and Hellenistic) kingship.639 According to the tenth century 
CE compiler a Hellenistic king had to be wise, as it was only the wise that could 
maintain kingship without accountability, an intelligent administrator and able to lead 
an army. A weak king would not have been able to sustain his hold on his kingdom, 
even if he deserved it by virtue of descent.640 Without detracting from this definitional 
relationship between kingship and the exercise of military power, this chapter will seek 
to complement the work of ‘integrationists’ by exploring the relationship between 
military power and kingship in Argead Makedonia and early Ptolemaic Egypt. More 
specifically, it will examine those structures that sustained the military power of the 
monarchies in question and the power networks that stemmed from them. As military 
power does not manifest itself only in the conduct of war (offensive, defensive or civil), 
the military objectives of the ruler involved both foreign and domestic policy. The 
                                                 
636 For ethnic composition, see Lesquier (1911), Launey (1949-1950) and most recently, Marrinan 
(1998) and Blasius (2001). For a treatment of tactical organisation, see Sekunda (1995). For the place of 
the army in Ptolemaic society, see Fischer-Bovet (2007, 2008). 
637 For Hellenistic kingship in general, see Préaux (1978). For Philippos II, see more recently 
Worthington (2008), with bibliography. Similarly for Alexandros III, see Cartledge (2004), Heckel & 
Tritle (2009). For Ptolemaios I, see the very short and somewhat sketchy, yet only, biography of Ellis 
(1994). For Ptolemaios VIII, see Nadig (2007). 
638 See Eisenstadt (1968). A buoyant example of this approach is Cawkwell (1978), who asserted that 
the unification of Makedonia under Philippos II was successful due to the emotional attraction of the 
new subjects towards the king, p. 38.  
639 Walbank (1984), p. 63. 
640 “Βασιλεία ἐστὶν ἀνυπεύθυνος ἀρχή. οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι τοὺς σπουδαίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
βασιλέας. ἡ γὰρ βασιλεία ἀρχὴ ἀνυπεύθυνος, ἥτις περὶ μόνους ἂν τοὺς σοφοὺς συσταίη. Βασιλεία. οὔτε 
φύσις οὔτε τὸ δίκαιον ἀποδιδοῦσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰς βασιλείας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς δυναμένοις ἡγεῖσθαι 
στρατοπέδου καὶ χειρίζειν πράγματα νουνεχῶς: οἷος ἦν Φίλιππος καὶ οἱ διάδοχοι Ἀλεξάνδρου. τὸν γὰρ 
υἱὸν κατὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν ὠφέλησεν ἡ συγγένεια διὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀδυναμίαν. τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν 
προσήκοντας βασιλεῖς γενέσθαι σχεδὸν ἁπάσης τῆς οἰκουμένης,” Souda s.v. Βασιλεία b147. 
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organisation of each sustained networks of individuals and groups, the collaboration of 
which was necessary for the implementation of the ruler’s authority. The focus of this 
chapter will not rest on logistical considerations, army sizes or tactical efficiency. The 
capacity for physical force (manifested by the above, as well as the maintenance of an 
effective striking range) is the obvious quantifiable index of military power. However, 
there are additional, subtler conditions that contributed to the perceived extent of a 
King’s military power. It will be argued that this power did not emanate by virtue of 
the royal axioma alone in relation to the resources that kings could muster at any given 
time, nor did it depend on their personal charisma alone. Each on their own, these 
factors do not explain why groups of people tend to comply to the orders of a 
monarch, nor can they elucidate why military success is for those groups such an 
important determinant of successful kingship. It will be maintained that an approach 
towards the study of royal military power is more akin to the understanding of those 
mechanisms that enabled the ruler to command a high level of commitment from his 
subjects in regard to his military objectives and facilitated the continued 
monopolisation of physical force. It will be shown that in practice, the exercise of 
physical force by the monarch was sustained via the existence of supportive 
institutions and social structures that will be referred to as ‘enabling mechanisms.’ 
These can be found ingrained in the structures of the particular society that is under 
the rule of one. They include the ideology of the monarchy that was exercised and the 
role of military leadership within it, and the integration of facets of military 
organisation and military values within society (e.g. the institution of the klerouchia and 
the type of education that was advanced for the youth). In the process the discussion 
will attempt to determine whether the structures of military organisation remained 
discernibly similar between the two kingdoms or whether the experience of 
Alexandros’ conquest and the subsequent Ptolemaic rule over former 
Pharaonic/Persian Egypt contributed to the creation of a new version of this 
association.  
Before we embark on this discussion, however, it is essential to define military 







MILITARY POWER, ITS ORGANISATION, AND THE MONARCHICAL STATE 
 
Military power in a monarchy can be defined as the organised form of physical force, 
monopolised by an individual (the king) whose authority is considered legitimate by 
his subjects. It mobilises violence, whether actual or inferred, in order to regulate 
foreign policy and maintain internal stability.  Far from co-existing in an entirely 
lawless world system, where diplomacy was shunned, ancient political entities 
nonetheless lacked the sophistication of ‘soft’ tools of attraction or persuasion that 
appear so often in the rhetoric and practice of modern states.641 They also lacked the 
resoluteness to grant them priority over the ‘hard’ solution of armed conflict, even 
though it has been said that certain rulers, such as Philippos II, prided themselves 
more for their diplomatic tact than their military genius.642 Although informal 
customs and norms were in place aimed at regulating unwarranted aggression and the 
conduct of war, the mechanisms for enforcing compliance were weak.643 The 
monarchies were not exempt from observing these diplomatic niceties.644 However, 
the more powerful the state, the harder it was to subject it to interstate intervention 
through practices such as mediation and arbitration.645 In both the Classical and the 
Hellenistic period the system remained a multi-actor militarised anarchy, with various 
states vying for hegemony at any given time.646 By enlarging the size of territorial 
states, the dissolution of Alexandros’ empire simply upped the scale of war. In such a 
                                                 
641 The distinction between ‘hard’ (coercion) and ‘soft’ (persuasion) power was made by Nye (1990). 
Needless to note here that ‘soft’ power has its failings (suffices to observe the struggle of a soft-power 
oriented EU to mark its presence in the international arena, see Lianos 2008). The reasons behind the 
failure of soft power can be revealed through its realist and neo-realist criticism, whereby the only truly 
significant motivations behind any political action are economic incentives and the threat of force, 
Ferguson (2004). So Giddens (1985) p. 326, who has argued that there exists no plausible 'dialectical 
counterpart' to the progressive accumulation of military power.  
642 Diod. 16.95. 
643 For the existence in the ancient world of a common idea that interstate relations were based on the 
rule of law, see Bederman (2001). Low (2007) argues for a greater role of diplomatic tools in interstate 
relations, backed by a complex system of moral obligations and considerations. However, 
notwithstanding the partial regulation of interstate relations through shared normative behaviour, 
recourse to war as a first resort was a frequent phenomenon (as Low herself admits, pp. 108-109). It 
certainly seemed like that to Platon (Laws 1.626a) when he stated that all poleis are by nature at an 
undeclared war with each other, (τῷ δ᾽ ἔργῳ πάσαις πρὸς πάσας τὰς πόλεις ἀεὶ πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον 
κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι). See further Eckstein (2006), pp. 42-48. For examples of transgressions of interstate 
agreements, see Eckstein  (2006), p. 80.  
644 Ploutarchos recorded that by and large Alexandros observed the normal usages of war as would 
befit a king, Plout. Alex. 59.6-7. See also Dem. Ἐπιστολὴ [Φιλίππου] 12.3-4. 
645 Ager (1996), Eckstein (2006), pp. 79-80, n. 1. 
646 Eckstein (2006). Adcock & Mosley (1975) identified the most common causes of warfare in the 
ancient world as territorial ownership and rights of access, p. 128. The term ‘militarised’ refers to the 
widespread belief in the period that a state should maintain a strong military capability and be 
prepared to use it aggressively to defend or promote its interests, OED s.v. militarism.  
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system, when it came to defending or expanding sovereignties, or even maintaining 
an uneasy balance of power during peacetime, military power was the lifeline of the 
ancient state: aut vincam, aut periam. 
According to Mann, military power exhibits an authoritative organisation. 
This means that, unlike diffused power which occurs more or less spontaneously and 
informs the relations of social groups on the understanding that the power relations 
that emerge between them are natural, moral or based on common interests, 
authoritative power is a product of intent by individuals, groups and institutions and 
elicits conscious compliance from those affected.647 As such, it manifests itself both on 
an intensive and an extensive level. On the one hand, intensive organisation involves 
the concentrated power of a military commander vis-à-vis his inferiors. This results in 
the extraction of high levels of mobilisation from the army and is mainly responsible 
for the ability to flex effectively the military muscle of the state during campaigns. 
Obedience to the commander, who in the case of the kingdoms in question is the king 
himself, can be the result of material rewards, such as land or booty, as well as the 
realities of battle itself that bring out the charismatic qualities of a leader.648 However, 
in a monarchical environment, as we have already seen in the previous chapters, these 
incentives are only complementary to the loyalty engendered by the perceived 
legitimacy of the ruler to wield the customary powers that went part and parcel with 
his inherited axioma.  
On the other hand, extensive military organisation describes the ability to 
control groups of people spread over a wide geographical area in order to secure their 
minimal co-operation.649 As pacification tends to decentralise military power, this is 
especially relevant for the post-conquest organisation of the state. A militaristic 
empire, which is Mann’s example of extensive organisation, makes use of coercive 
methods for the purpose of maintaining compliance. This model of compulsory co-
operation, or concentrated coercion as Mann calls it, is a strategy based on the 
repression of subject populations with the aim of extracting compulsory labour. At the 
same time, it is argued that the army assumes a protective/controlling role under 
which trade and the economic development of the state could flourish.650 This 
organisation does not find its parallel in Argead Makedonia. There was no standing 
                                                 
647 Mann (1986), p. 8. 
648 So Walbank (1984), p. 74. 
649 Mann (1986), p. 7. 
650 Mann (1986), pp. 148-155. 
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army until the reign of Philippos II and even then there is no evidence to suggest that 
any designated military force was deployed to regulate internal affairs. As the product 
of conquest, the organisation of early Ptolemaic Egypt was more heavily militarised. 
Soldiers were forcefully settled in the land or billeted in private homes.651 Garrisons 
that evolved into towns were planted in the Egyptian chora and other locations that fell 
under the sphere of influence of the Ptolemaic empire. Finally, the appearance of a 
sophisticated police force evolved, which was responsible for establishing and 
maintaining order according to the precepts of the central authority. Even so, the 
predominant manner in which the decentralisation of military power manifested itself 
in both kingdoms involved the creation of economic interdependencies between the 
military personnel and the central authority, which took the form of land grants in 
exchange for military service.652 
Alongside the authoritative organisation of military power, one also finds 
elements of diffused organisation. Mann discusses the coerced spread of the 
conqueror’s culture (such as their language, script and one might add the system of 
education) as a strategy for providing further power supports to the state.653 But not 
all extensive organisation needs to be coercive. One need only consider in this context 
the cultivation of solidarities among the subject/citizen populations and between 
them and the central government. Originally intended to optimise efficiency in the 
battlefield by boosting local patriotism, they were carried over into the organisation of 
the pacified society. The Makedonian practice to group soldiers from the same place 
of origin together in ethnic regiments is one such example. This system survived in 
early Ptolemaic Egypt, even if the designations ultimately lost their ethnic significance 
and came to have specific military connotations.654 The gradual loss of pure ethnics in 
Ptolemaic Egypt meant that the indigenous population was progressively more 
integrated in the military organisation of the Kingdom. One of the effects of 
integration through shared identities, even if constructed, is that compliance to and 
support of the military agenda of the monarchy may be sustained without the need 
for coercion.  
                                                 
651 C. Ord. Ptol. 1, 5-10: a series of royal diagrammata dating from the reign of Ptolemaios II stipulating 
that one half of the billeted house belonged to the billeter and the other half to the billetee. 
652 Mann (1986), pp. 143-144. 
653 Mann (1986), p. 152. 
654 Fischer-Bovet (2008), pp. 84-105. 
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It becomes clear from the above discussion that the relationship between 
military power and the monarchy is far more complex than the simple inventory of 
the forces and technology at its disposal. What follows is an analysis of the three areas 
identified as key for the sustenance of royal military power: the role of the king as a 
military commander, the social integration of facets of military organisation and 
finally the promotion of military values through education.   
 
 
MECHANISM NO 1: MILITARY LEADERSHIP 
 
ROYAL MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN ITS INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT 
As already stated in the introduction to this chapter, military power has been 
associated with state-building and state-preservation.655 Although it is now generally 
accepted that the rise of the state was largely stimulated by environmentally 
circumscribed conditions that ‘caged’ populations of a particular area into greater co-
operation, the preservation of its assets against foreign conquest and raids required a 
military force that was organised centrally, as opposed to laterally.656 The sustained 
need for this type of military organisation contributed to the transformation of 
seasonal warlords into kings.657  
The centrality of military organisation within the scope of royal duties and the 
pivotal role of military power in the practice of government are unmistakeable in the 
writings of contemporary thinkers. In his discussion of the six types of constitution of 
his time Aristoteles divided kingship into five sub-categories. What is worth noting in 
terms of the relationship of the ruler and military power is that in three of them, 
namely the ‘Spartan’, the ‘heroic’ and the ‘absolute’ kingship, the ruler is explicitly set 
apart as the supreme commander of the military.658 In the case of the dual kingship at 
Sparta, which Aristoteles described as a lifelong generalship, the kings, although not 
sovereign in all areas of social life, were granted absolute authority in times of war. 
Similarly, the heroic king had supremacy over military affairs, even when in due 
course he was forced by historical circumstance to relinquish his religious and judicial 
                                                 
655 See the discussion in Mann (1986), pp. 53-58. 
656 Carneiro (1970), Mann (1986). 
657 Other factors contributed to the rise of kingship, such as the need for the central organisation of the 
political unit’s economic resources and surplus. For the routinisation of authority, see Weber M. (1978), 
pp. 245-256. 
658 Aristot. Pol. (Spartan) 3.1285a 4-6, (heroic) 3.1285b 3-5, (absolute) 3.1285b 29-33. 
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authority to the people. Lastly, it follows by definition that the king who ruled 
absolutely had sovereignty over all aspects of social life, including the military.  
 For the remaining two sub-categories of kingship, Aristoteles’ choice of 
analogies and examples demonstrates that the organisation of military affairs fell 
equally within the realm of responsibilities of the ‘barbarian’ and of the ‘elective’ king. 
For the first instance, Aristoteles equated barbarian kingship with tyrannical rule.659 
Elsewhere in his Politics he made the claim that early tyrants were typically generals, 
who seized control of a political unit because of their ability to wield military power 
against the status quo.660 The history of Archaic Hellas provides enough examples to 
support his argument.661 In the case of elective monarchy the aisymnetai (αἰσυμνήται) 
were leaders elected irregularly by the people in times of crisis. The power they were 
bestowed with at that time was unrestricted. It was a sort of elected tyranny as 
Aristoteles put it, albeit it was more often the case that the supremacy of such leaders 
lasted only until the diffusion of the crisis that brought about their appointment.662 
The example that Aristoteles presented places emphasis on the military prowess of the 
prospective aisymnetes as a prerequisite for the position: Pittakos was already a 
celebrated warrior when he was chosen by the people of Mytilene to oppose by force 
of arms the return of the exiled aristocratic party, which vied for the control of the 
island.663 We observe therefore that in all the variants of Aristoteles’ conception of 
kingship the organisation of military power is consistently present among the duties of 
the king. Irrespective of whether a monarchy is temporary or lifelong, hereditary or 
elective, extended over willing or unwilling subjects, and whether the king reigned 
with a carte blanche or constrained by the dictates of law, he was expected to lead the 
army in conquest and to have ultimate authority in matters of military organisation.  
Military power was also perceived to have a sinister side to it, as its abuse 
could effectively alter the government of a political unit. It was recognised that the 
                                                 
659 Aristot. Pol. 3.1285a 23, “τυραννικαὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτόν εἰσιν…” 
660 Aristot. Pol. 5.1305a 7-14, 5.1313b. 
661 E.g. Kypselos, the tyrant of Korinthos, expelled the ruling family of the Bacchiadai (Polyain. Strat. 
5.31) by making use of his position as polemarchos, and thus of his command over the military 
resources of Korinthos, (Nikolaos of Damaskos FGrHist 90 F 58). The importance of military power for 
prospective tyrants can be exemplified most strongly through numbers: Scheidel (2005) has estimated 
that roughly two thirds (70%) of those who established themselves as tyrants in archaic and classical 
Hellas did so through their capacity as military commanders or through their leadership in a violent 
coup, (p. 9, using Berve’s 1967 study of 41 tyrants in ancient Hellas).  
662 Although we encounter the aisymnetai as magistrates (e.g. IG VII.15 from Megara c. 192-159 BCE) or 
overseers (Theok. Eid. 25.48), Dionysios of Halikarnassos compared the nature of their duties with 
those of a Roman dictator (Ant. Rom. 5.73). 
663 See Diog. Laert. 1.74-75. 
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preponderance or monopoly in organising the military capabilities of a political unit 
widened the access of the ruler to other types of power, such as economic or political. 
Aristoteles acknowledged the fact that whoever held the power of arms held indeed 
the power to change the constitution.664 For Platon rule through a warrior class, 
which monopolised physical force, signified the failure of the ideal state, governed by 
the best of men (aristocracy). However, in its pure form, namely until the inevitable 
manipulation of military power in order to achieve economic objectives, this warriors’ 
government was characterised by the noble pursuit of honour (timocracy).665 
Aristoteles’ ethnographic research pointed to similar conclusions. He observed that in 
certain political units, especially ones that were strong enough to expand their control 
over neighbouring units, domination (κρατεῖν) was an end in itself and the system of 
education and laws were framed in such a way so as to regulate war. In those 
societies, military power was held in high esteem and was associated with honour.666 
Interestingly, the majority of the examples he quoted were monarchies and Argead 
Makedonia was one of them.667  
The Argead and Ptolemaic monarchies do not fit comfortably into one of the 
Aristotelian sub-categories. In the Argead case, divergence in opinion is caused 
mainly by the scarcity and multifarious nature of the extant evidence, which allows 
for a variety of different interpretations. Aristoteles, although intimately connected 
with the Makedonian monarchy, imparted very little, maintaining what can only be 
described as a paradoxical silence. He was after all a native of northern Hellas, having 
been born in Stageira, a city in Chalkidike neighbouring the Makedonian realm at 
the time.668 His father, Nikomachos, was a physician at Amyntas III’s’ court, and also, 
according to some sources, the King’s personal friend.669 Having spent his childhood 
and adolescence, possibly even within the Makedonian court itself by virtue of his 
father’s position, he left for Athens at the age of sixteen or seventeen only to return to 
                                                 
664 Aristot. Pol. 7.1329a: “οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων κύριοι καὶ <τοῦ> μένειν ἢ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν.” 
665 In the Nikomacheian Ethics (1160a 33-34) Aristoteles used the term in a different sense, denoting “the 
rule of those who possess a property qualification.” Pl. Rep. 8.545b-549b. 
666 Aristot. Pol. 7.1324b. 
667 So the Spartans, Skythians, Persians, Thrakians, Kelts, Carthagenians and Iberians, with the 
exception of the Kretans, Aristot. Pol. 7.1324b 7-26. 
668 Stageira was a member of the Chalkidian League around the time of Aristoteles’ birth, (384 BCE). It 
was razed to the ground by Philippos II in 348 BCE. It was later re-founded and incorporated into the 
Makedonian national territory either shortly after the dissolution of the League (348 BCE) or during 
Alexandros’ reign. See Hatzopoulos (1996), pp. 190-191, 196, 198 with references. 
669 Diog. Laert. 5.1. For relevant references from the dozen extant biographies of Aristoteles see 
Chroust, (1972), p. 367, nn. 5, 6. 
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Pella at the invitation of Philippos II to undertake the education of his thirteen-year 
old son, Alexandros.670 Such was his standing with the King that an anecdote 
preserved by Diogenes Laertios recounts how Philippos II re-built Stageira at the 
entreaty of the philosopher.671 Aristoteles tutored Alexandros for three years. After 
this tuition was over he did not leave for Athens but probably settled once again in his 
native Stageira until soon after the death of Philippos II.672 It is unfortunate that a 
man with such a deep first-hand knowledge and understanding of the workings of the 
Makedonian monarchy, and whose surviving work takes up the space of no less than 
two and a half thousand pages, has left us with so little on the subject of Makedonian 
political organisation.673    
Some of the most prominent scholars of ancient Makedonian history have 
argued that the kingdom of the Argeadai fell under Aristoteles’ fourth category of 
kingship, the heroic.674 This type of kingship was characterised by the hereditary legal 
rule over consenting subjects that was typical of Homeric society and in which the 
ruler was also the commander of the army.675 Others have suggested that 
Makedonian kingship resembled closely to the Indo-European type of military 
kingship, otherwise known as Heerkönigtum.676 Rule was based on the consent of a 
circle of nobles and the army to follow a charismatic leader into conquest. For both 
hypotheses, however, there is room for objections. Starting with the latter, it has 
already been shown in the first chapter that although no strict rule of primogeniture 
applied, the Makedonian ruler had to entertain familial connections to the Argead 
                                                 
670 343-335 BCE, Diog. Laert. 5.4.3-5, Cl. Ael. VH 3.17.43-44.  
671 Diog. Laert. 5.4.4-5. 
672 The tuition finished when Alexandros was appointed regent in 340 BCE. Aristoteles returned to 
Athens in 335/4 BCE, (for references see Chroust, 1972, n. 34). 
673 We do possess two of his Letters to Philippos and two to Alexandros. There are, judging by their 
titles, two more promising works regarding Makedonian political institutions which are, however, lost 
to us: Alexandros or Regarding Colonists (Ἀλέξανδρος ἢ ὑπὲρ ἀποίκων), and On Monarchy (Περὶ βασιλείας), 
probably written for Alexandros during his tutelage, (Diog. Laert. 5.22, the work was written for 
Alexandros according to [Ammonios] In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarius Ven. 1546, folio 5b, 9b IN: 
Ross (1952), p. 65]. The former was a treatise on how to plant colonies. Letters he wrote to other 
political figures such as Antipatros, but also to members of the King’s entourage such as Olympias and 
Hephaisteion, have equally been lost (Diog. Laert. 5.27). Another intriguing explanation for this lack of 
reference to the Makedonian monarchy has been put forward by Miller (1998). He argues that 
Aristoteles’ position in Athens after the death of Alexandros in 323 BCE was precarious enough to 
require his silence in most matters Makedonian. Anti-Makedonian feeling was soaring high and 
Aristoteles’ Makedonian connections could easily put him on the spot as a partisan of the 
monarchy/enemy. According to some of his biographies, Aristoteles complained to Antipatros in his 
Letter to the regent that Athens was not safe for an alien, (for the references see Chroust, 1972, n. 16). 
674 So Jouguet (1928), p. 63, Aymard (1950), Hammond (1972-1988), II, p. 158. 
675 Aristot. Pol. 3.1285b 3-5. 
676 See especially Granier (1931), pp. 1-3, 13-15. 
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dynasty. The lack of these connections impeded usurpation of royal authority from 
ambitious individuals, however charismatic they might have been. Additionally, the 
impression that the king was a primus inter pares, cultivated by the immediacy that the 
courtiers entertained with the king given the social structure of the court, does not 
stand close scrutiny any more than the view that the Makedonian monarchy was 
absolute. As regards the former, Carlier has demonstrated in his sober comparison 
between the Homeric and Makedonian kingship that this argument oversimplifies the 
evolution of Makedonian political development.677 Despite critique this position still 
holds currency in recent scholarship and is still often re-iterated by scholars as a case 
in fact.678 In a similar vein, Lane Fox made a series of statements in his biography of 
Alexandros III that have sprung from what can only be described as poetic license. 
He argued that (his version of) Alexandros III consciously strove to be a new 
Achilleus; that his Asian campaign was indeed “Greece’s last Homeric emulation” and that 
it was undertaken in search of personal prowess just like the expeditions of the Kings 
of the Homeric epics.679 Lane Fox’s comparison is exemplary of another common 
pitfall Makedonian scholarship often finds itself drawn into: the frequent 
romanticising of actors and their deeds.680 Understandably, this fallacy can be 
brought about by the at times frustrating dearth of evidence surrounding the early 
history of the Makedonian kingdom, which has vested its workings with an aura of 
inscrutability and where associations with a mythical past seem all the more appealing 
as complements to our fragmented knowledge.  
The debate on the historicity of the Homeric epics is still unresolved, yet even 
if one accepts that the epics do reflect eighth-century BCE constitutional practices, 
these cannot be transposed uncritically onto the Makedonian political organisation.681 
Doing so would be an attempt to fill in gaps in our knowledge of a political system by 
using as evidence constitutional elements of another system, whose roots are to be 
found in oral tradition dating almost three centuries before our earliest reference to 
Makedonia and which belong to a society that may or may not have been realistically 
                                                 
677 Carlier (2000) for a point-by-point comparison. 
678 See Fagan (1996), p. 260, Mossé (2004), pp. 47-54. 
679 Lane Fox (1973), p. 67. 
680 This trend is much more prominent in scholarship of the late nineteenth and the first half of the 
twentieth century, see for instance Droysen’s (1877-1878) and Tarn’s (1948) representations of 
Alexandros III. 
681 Finley in the World of Odysseus (2002), orig. publ. 1954, argues for the historicity of the Homeric 
epics. For the epics reflecting eighth century norms see Carlier (1984), pp. 136-240 and the 
introduction by Knox in Finley (2002), pp. 1-16. 
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portrayed, let alone ever been extant. Further, if Aristoteles indeed considered the 
Argead monarchy as an example of heroic kingship, he would have cited it as such, in 
the same manner that he used examples for the rest of his sub-categories. Instead, his 
refraining from doing so might point to the fact that he simply did not know of any 
historical counterpart to that type of kingship.682  
Let us turn finally to the ideological connection between military power and 
the Ptolemaic monarch. It has long been argued that since the foundation of the 
Ptolemaic kingdom its ideology bordered on the autocratic personal type, where the 
rulers’ warlike qualities, measured by their streak of victories, were an indicator of 
their political success.683 At least in the early period, before dynastic associations (e.g. 
Philopator, Philometor) became the norm, and informal cognomens (e.g. Physkon, 
Kokke, Lathyros, Auletes) overshadowed the official titles of the rulers, the king’s 
military power was revealed and flaunted through epithets such as Soter, Keraunos 
and Euergetes. Given the birth of the Ptolemaic Kingdom in conquest and its 
preservation in the face of its warring neighbours, these epithets seem to invoke and 
do justice to Aristoteles’ principle of benefaction to one’s ethnos as the prerequisite for 
the foundation of kingship.684  
The major philosophical currents of the Hellenistic period, Stoicism and 
Epikoureianism, did not engage in an intellectual defence of the monarchy. The 
ideology of kingship that was promoted after the death of Alexandros drew on 
Platon’s cardinal virtues of courage, justice, moderation, wisdom, piety and 
knowledge.685 Treatises on kingship, although very few have actually survived, seem to 
have reiterated the same stock themes that first appeared on King speeches (βασιλικοί 
λόγοι) in the early fourth century, such as those authored by Isokrates and 
Xenophon.686 These were intended more as elegies for the particular rulers rather 
                                                 
682 This acute observation was made by Hainsworth (1973), p. 189. 
683 Carlier (2000), p. 268, Walbank (1984), Samuel (1993). 
684 Aristot. Pol. 5.1310b 34-40: “ἅπαντες γὰρ εὐεργετήσαντες ἢ δυνάμενοι τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὰ ἔθνη 
εὐεργετεῖν ἐτύγχανον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης, οἱ μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον κωλύσαντες δουλεύειν, ὥσπερ Κόδρος, οἱ 
δ᾽ ἐλευθερώσαντες, ὥσπερ Κῦρος, ἢ κτίσαντες ἢ κτησάμενοι χώραν, ὥσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς 
καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ Μολοττῶν.” 
685 Pl. Rep. 4.427e: σοφία, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη. It is accepted that the number of cardinal 
virtues (four) was a literary exercise for Platon. Additional virtues are introduced already in Pl. Rep. 
4.430e: ἐγκράτεια, κρείττω αὑτοῦ (self-discipline), Pl. Rep. 6.487a: φίλος τε καὶ συγγενὴς ἀληθείας, as 
well as elsewhere, Pl. Prot. 330b: ἐπιστήμη, ὁσιότης, Pl. Laws 709e: where the tyrant should be νέος, 
μνήμων καὶ εὐμαθὴς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς φύσει. 
686 Isokrates: Εὐαγόρας, Πρὸς Νικόκλεα, Xenophon: Κύρου Παιδείας, Κυνηγετικός, Ἀγησίλαος, Ἱέρων 
ἢ Τυραννικός. For a summary and discussion of the lost works on Hellenistic kingship, see Walbank 
(1984), pp. 75-84 and Schofield (1999), pp. 742-744. 
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than philosophical discussions on the nature of the monarchy. Even so, nowhere is the 
significance of the army for the monarch so brusquely stressed as in Xenophon’s 
Hieron: a ruler must either maintain a military force, or perish.687 Both of the most 
important extant treatises on Hellenistic kingship emphasized the role of the king in 
war. Philodemos’ piece “On the Good King According to Homer” underlined the 
Homeric ideal of the benevolent and just, yet warlike king.688 Although referring to 
the era of the epics it is generally agreed that in this treatise Philodemos reflected 
much contemporary thinking on kingship.689 Similarly, the “Letter of Aristeas,” 
notwithstanding its Judaic theological emphasis, presented as one of the primary 
duties of the king the preservation of the lives of his subjects in warfare.690 In a way 
then, the Ptolemaic king was portrayed as another ‘Alexandros’; a defender of men. 
Overall, the Hellenistic ideological background to the institution of the 
monarchy served primarily as a justification for a (near) world-system that was borne 
out of conquest in the span of a generation. The content of the treatises was the 
product of their authors’ observations of the almost uninterrupted warfare of the 
period coupled with the understanding that within a court environment a king had to 
be praised.691 Although Hellenistic kingship lacked the philosophical theorising of the 
previous century, its treatment verified that military power, manifested in military 
leadership, was itself one of the cardinal assets of a ruler’s authority.  
 
 
MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE KING AS WARRIOR 
 In the morning of the Battle of Chaironeia Philippos II was standing at the 
head of the Companion Cavalry at the right wing of the Makedonian battle 
formation. He occupied the traditional position of the Makedonian king in battle.692 
His son commanded the Thessalian cavalry, as well as his father’s most seasoned 
                                                 
687 Xen. Hieron 4.11: “…στράτευμα τρέφειν ἢ ἀπολωλέναι.” 
688 P.Herc. 1507, see Murray (1965). 
689 Schofield (1999), pp. 742-743.  
690 Letter of Aristeas §§ 240, 281, 291. 
691 Most of the treatises on kingship were dedicated to different monarchs or individuals of authority: 
The Letter of Aristeas to Ptolemaios Philadelphos, Philodemos dedicated his work to his patron, the 
senator L. Calpurnius Piso sometime in the first half of the first century BCE, Theophrastos wrote 
another such treatise, which he dedicated to Kassandros, Ath. Deipn. 4.144e, Diog. Laert. 5.42.49. 
692 See also Diod. 16.4.5. This would be the position from where Alexandros would lead many 
successful charges against the Persian armies. The cavalry would attack first, acting as the hammer that 
would force the enemy troops to be crushed against the anvil of the Makedonian phalanx: Granikos: 
Plout. Alex. 16.2-6, Issos: Diod.17.33.5, 17.34.9, Gaugamela: Diod. 17.58.1, 17.59.2. 
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commanders (τῶν ἡγεμόνων τοὺς ἀξιολογωτάτους) at the left.693 It is believed that he 
was the first to lead the charge.694 The battle was ambivalent for quite some time, but 
eventually the eighteen-year-old Alexandros managed to crush the front lines of the 
Theban contingent, overcome the notoriously skilled Sacred Band and put the rest to 
flight. He was driven, according to Diodoros, by his will for victory and the desire to 
demonstrate his bravery to his father.695 Philippos also led the charge of the 
Companion Cavalry, advancing well in front of them. Thus, the remaining enemy 
lines were dispersed and victory was secured for the allied Makedonian force. This 
short and somewhat vague description of the most important battle involving the 
Makedonian army on Hellenic soil, preserved by Diodoros, might be poor in tactical 
details but is very rich on nuances of how the Makedonian king perceived his role as a 
warrior.    
Although Alexandros performed brilliantly by any standard, Philippos took full 
credit for the victory. This cannot be construed in any way as an intentional 
belittlement of Alexandros’ achievement, signalling perhaps another manifestation of 
father-son rivalry.696 Quite to the contrary, Philippos went on to entrust his son with 
the diplomatic mission to exact terms from a defeated Athens, in the company of 
Antipatros.697 Subsequently, he assigned Alexandros the leadership of a campaign 
against the Illyrians.698 Instead, Diodoros’ choice of wording -“not conceding the 
honour of victory even to Alexandros”- implies that victory was the king’s 
prerogative.699 It was not to be accorded to his commanders, his soldiers, or even to 
his own son. Apart from the prestige factor reserved for the victor, which in the case of 
Chaironeia was duly showcased in the construction of the Philippeion within the 
grounds of the Panhellenic Sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia, the exhibition of military 
prowess and success in battle was useful in inspiring loyalty in the army.700 More than 
that, however, the Makedonian king did not want this loyalty to be misattributed, i.e. 
diverted away from him. This is the thinking that Arrianos attributes to Alexandros in 
                                                 
693 Diod. 16.86.1. The four main sources of information for the battle are Diod. 16.86, Plout. Alex. 9.2, 
Front. Strat. 1.9, Polyain. Strat. 4.2.2. 
694 Plut. Alex. 9.2. 
695 Diod. 16.86.3. 
696 On Alexandros’ admiration of Philippos as a good warrior and king, but also as a rival, see 
Fredricksmeyer (1990). 
697 Just. 9.4.5. 
698 Curt. 8.1.25. 
699 Diod. 16.86.4: “…τῆς νίκης τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν οὐδ᾽ αὐτῷ παραχωρῶν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ…” 
700 The erection of victory memorials were common after significant battles, see also Diod. 16.4.7 
commemorating Philippos’ victory over Bardylis. 
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order to justify his decision to split the command of the Companion Cavalry between 
two hipparchoi.701 According to the author of the Anabasis, Alexandros particularly 
wanted to avoid the development of strong bonds of affection between his best and 
most heavily trained military unit and their commander; even if that would be his 
most esteemed personal friend, Hephaisteion. 
 The role of the Makedonian king as the head of the charge in battle reinforced 
the ideological cohesion of the army. Such was the anticipated impact of the ruler’s 
physical presence on the army ranks that an infant king was brought on the battlefield 
in its cradle, so that the aura of their king (regis sui auspicia) would lead the Makedones 
to victory.702 And according to Justinus it worked. When previously the Makedones 
were retreating before the Illyrians, this was not because they lacked courage, but 
because they lacked a king. Coupled with his fighting alongside the regular troops, the 
king’s direct engagement in battle went a long way in boosting their morale and 
performance. In the same way that individual army units tended to imitate the 
bravery or cowardice of their respective commanders leading them during the action, 
the king was the figurehead through which the entire force was motivated.703 Indeed, 
there is not one instance in Argead history when the presence of an adult Makedonian 
king is documented in battle that he does not take it upon himself to set an example of 
his valour (ἀνδραγαθία). Against the Illyrians of Bardylis Philippos II himself 
descended upon the enemy in a frontal assault, while military distinction was a pursuit 
that bordered on recklessness with Alexandros.704 On certain occasions, however, his 
taking of excessive risks turned out to be a necessary measure in order to galvanise the 
failing support of his troops.705  
 Of the Successor dynasties the Ptolemaioi were singled out as being the most 
indolent and the least warlike.706 It has been argued that their royal ideology explicitly 
rejected the virtues of moderation and self-control and had them replaced with tryphe 
                                                 
701 Arr. Anab. 3.27.4. 
702 Just. 7.2.8-12. The infant was Airopos I, who succeeded his father Philippos I when only a child 
(paruulum admodum). Hammond (1989, p. 22, n. 28) believed the child in question to be Airopos’ 
successor, Alketas, but although Justinus misses out on Alketas’ reign altogether, the flow of the 
narrative does not allow one to assume that the child was any other than Airopos I. 
703 See for instance in the Battle of Issos, Diod. 17.34.1. 
704 Diod. 16.4.5-7. For Alexandros, see for instance his rash crossing of the Granikos, Plout. Alex. 16 
and his storming of the Tyrian city-walls alone, a feat so daring that even witnesses found hard to 
believe actually happened, Diod. 17.46.2.  
705 Consider the recalcitrance of the Makedonian army against the prospect of renewed hostilities with 
the Indians, Curt. 9.4.16, Arr. Anab. 6.6-9, Plout. Alex. 63. 
706 Chaniotis (2005), p. 61.  
 
139 
(τρυφή). Scholars have associated tryphe with abundance, wealth and the prosperity 
that ensued from the fertility of the Nile.707 In its most negative aspect tryphe could be 
interpreted as a state of excessive wantonness, conscious display of luxury and a 
certain amount of softness of character.708 However, the adherence to a lifestyle of 
tryphe, which became more heavily integrated to the Ptolemaic royal ideology from the 
reign of Ptolemaios III Euergetes onwards, does not readily imply the foregoing of 
military virtues, like courage and bravery, as an essential corollary of Ptolemaic 
kingship.709 The controversial character of individual rulers even in ancient times 
demonstrates that what could have been perceived by observers as indolence was, in 
fact, not incompatible with a ruler’s direct engagement with the military 
responsibilities of kingship.710 What is more, it is interesting to note that although the 
profligacy and sluggishness associated with tryphe damaged the public image of the 
ruler, military engagement absolved and elevated them as good monarchs.711  
 Especially during the formative years of Ptolemaic rule over Egypt, the Souda 
definition of ‘kingship’ as handed to men neither by virtue of justice nor by familial 
bonds, but instead through their ability to lead armies applied to Ptolemaios I as it did 
to Antigonos Monophthalmos, Demetrios Poliorketes, Kassandros, Lysimachos, 
Seleukos and Ptolemaios Keraunos.712 The fragmentation of the once unified territory 
of Alexandros’ empire, itself the product of a ten-year war of conquest, initiated an era 
of armed conflict that ended in an uneasy balance of power only some half a century 
after his death with the establishment of the three major Successor kingdoms; the 
Antigonid, the Ptolemaic and the Seleukid. The establishment of the dynasties did 
not, however, and by any means, mark the end of war in the Hellenistic period. 
                                                 
707 Heinen (1978). For the Nile Mosaic of Palestrina as a visual representation of the fertility of the Nile, 
see Meyboom (1995), App. 13 and also figures 3 and 4 here. 
708 Tondriau (1948). Polybios explicitly associates this ‘softness’ to the influence of the Egyptian 
mentality, Polyb. 39.7.7: “…τις οἷον ἀσωτία καὶ ῥᾳθυμία περὶ αὐτὸν Αἰγυπτιακὴ συνέβαινεν.”   
709 Euergetes was the first to use the epithet Tryphon, as linked with the ideal of tryphe, Pomp. Trog. 
Prologue Book 30. Tryphe associated with extravagance and conspicuous display became a standard 
corollary of Ptolemaic kingship, see Rice (1983) for the Grand Procession of Ptolemaios Philadelphos as 
a celebration of tryphe. 
710 For Ptolemaios Philadephos, see Samuel (1993). See also Polyb. 28.21.5, 39.7 on Ptolemaios VI 
Philometor: “ Ptolemaios, king of Syria […] a man who, according to some, was worthy of great praise and 
remembrance, and according to others the reverse.” 
711 A potent example of this is Polybios’ assessment of the character of Ptolemaios VI Philometor, 
(28.21, 39.7). His bad judgement to flee to Samothrake during the Sixth Syrian War (170 BCE) against 
Antiochos IV Epiphanes was attributed to the corruptive influence of the king’s advisor Eulaios. His 
military achievements and courage in battle later on in life were enough evidence for Polybios to 
vindicate Ptolemaios’ true worth as a king. 
712 Despite dating from the Byzantine period the Souda entry closely described the circumstances under 
which the Successors of Alexandros III the Great rose into power in the turbulent period that followed 
the dissolution of his Empire, Souda, s.v. Βασιλεία b147. 
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Between the years 323 and 150 BCE Vernant has calculated that warfare ceased for 
only four short periods of one, two or ten years at the most.713 In those circumstances 
it was thus a pragmatically indispensable requirement of Hellenistic kingship that the 
ruler proved himself to be a capable military commander. Indeed, the majority of the 
successors of Ptolemaios I undertook campaigns and led their armies.	  Contrary to the 
scholarly tradition that supports a view of Ptolemaios II Philadelphos as the indifferent 
womanizer, while his sister-wife Arsinoe was the one pulling the strings, he has shown 
himself as one not to shun away from military challenge and his track record of 
victories is impressive indeed.714 He prevailed over Antiochos I in the First Syrian 
War and thus consolidated and enlarged the Ptolemaic foreign possessions in the 
Aegean all the way north to Samothrake. He was also proactive in organising 
expeditions in search of war material, mainly in the form of regular hunting missions 
he sent out to Ethiopia, the primary source location of war elephants for the 
Ptolemaic army.715 Ptolemaios III Euergetes began his reign with yet another conflict 
over Koile Syria, out of which he not only emerged triumphant, but having stretched 
the borders of the Ptolemaic Kingdom to their widest territorial extent. Finally, even 
Ptolemaios IV Philopator, whose reputation paints him as a man of lesser ambition, is 
credited with the top to bottom reorganisation of the Ptolemaic army and with the 
victory against Antiochos III at Raphia, which secured the northern borders of Egypt 
for the remainder of his reign.716 
As in Makedonia, the ruler was expected to lead by example. Diodoros 
preserves a colourful description of the Nile battle against Perdikkas, whereby both 
contenders led their army boldly against one another. Ptolemaios shouted words of 
encouragement to his friends and soldiers and, in a manner reminiscent of Alexandros 
in the siege of Tyros, mounted the bulwark, sarissa in hand and attacked the first 
elephant that came his way. His contempt for danger was imitated by his officers and 
friends and although Perdikkas’ soldiers put on a difficult fight Diodoros claims that 
Ptolemaios’ personal prowess and his exhortations drove his army on to many heroic 
deeds.717 
                                                 
713 Vernant (1968), pp. 279, 286. 
714 Burstein (1982), Samuel (1993). 
715 Casson (1993). 
716 Sekunda (1995). 
717 Diod. 18.34.1-5. 
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 Possibly the most immediate departure from the armies of Alexandros and 
Philippos, even more so than the deployment of war elephants, was the use of reserve 
units in battle.718 This development stationed the king not at the head of the charge 
but on the side of the formation, exercising the role of a modern general in co-
ordinating the battle during engagement, as well as planning it out before. Even if the 
king in this capacity might not always be leading the charge, the army’s morale just 
before the battle depended just as ever on the delivery of harangues and the 
motivation provided by the ruler’s physical presence.719 Polybios records that at the 
Battle of Raphia, the appearance of Ptolemaios IV amidst the ranks of the phalanx 
inspired the soldiers leading them to victory.720  
 Military success was a multiplier of royal military power. The effect that 
successful military leadership had on the growth of armies was amply demonstrated in 
the case of Ptolemaios I. Prevailing over Perdikkas in 320 BCE translated in 
Ptolemaios earning the unabated allegiance of the latter’s army after his assassination 
by his own troops. Aside from their services, the army of Perdikkas offered to 
Ptolemaios the office of the vanquished general as well; the prestigious stewardship of 
the Makedonian kingship, which Ptolemaios curiously declined.721 Similarly, the 
victory against Demetrios Poliorketes in the Battle of Gaza in 312 BCE meant that 
apart from the significance of the victory itself, eight thousand of Demetrios’ 
mercenaries deserted to Ptolemaios.722 Most of all, however, abstaining from military 
involvement was a sign of weakness. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the role 
Philippos III had to play in the battles of the Successors, who contended for the 
kingship he had better claim to than anyone else at the time. There is no record of his 
attempting to assume leadership of the army and in battle he was placed in charge of 
the weaker sections of the cavalry and of the elephants, while ordered to avoid 
engagement and observe the outcome on the other wing.723 On the contrary, even the 
most vocal enemies of his predecessor-namesake admired his hands-on approach 
when it came to military matters. Demosthenes scolded the Athenians for not being a 
bit more like Philippos II in battle: “No wonder that Philip, sharing himself in the toils of the 
campaign, present at every action, neglecting no chance and wasting no season, gets the better of us, 
                                                 
718 For the use of elephants, see Lloyd (2000), pp. 394-395. 
719 Diod. 16.4.3,17.33.1.2, 17.46.1. 
720 Polyb. 5.82.5-86.6. 
721 Diod. 18.33-37. 
722 Diod. 19.82-84, 90-93. 
723 Diod. 19.40.4. 
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while we procrastinate and pass resolutions and ask questions. I cannot wonder at this: the contrary 
would rather surprise me, that we, performing no single duty of a combatant, should overcome the man 
who fulfils them all.”724  
 
The pragmatic need for effective military leadership in turbulent times and the ruler’s 
performance while campaigning are important parameters in the appreciation of his 
military power. Despite negative press, the early Ptolemaic kings were as active as 
their Argead predecessors in the field, not only because military confrontation was 
inevitable in order to defend their territory and the wider balance of power, but also 
because military power remained a yardstick by which to measure the ruler’s success 
and accordingly, attract supporters. Going against the dictates of the Argead royal 
ideology, which viewed the king as a warrior, might have meant to risk isolation. 
Military power, however, as has been discussed in the introduction to this chapter, 
can exist outside of the campaigning season, which centralises it under the command 
of the ruler. During peacetime, military power tends to become decentralised. This 
tendency manifested itself in the military education of the younger generations and 
the creation of economic interdependencies between the soldiers and the central 
authority, which took the form of land grants in exchange for military service.725  
 
 
MECHANISM NO 2: A MILITARY EDUCATION 
 
In his Politics, Aristoteles brought to the foreground the importance of military 
education for a state whose outlook was in conquest.726 In this light, the education of 
the youth and the values it emphasised could be seen as corresponding to the political 
goals of the unit that subsidised it. Aristoteles used as examples Sparte and Krete, 
where the system of education, as well as the law, was framed with a view to war. 
Platon in the Republic stressed the importance of a military education from a different 
angle, that of creating good soldiers.727 He argued that not everyone could be a 
fighter, especially if they did not have the proper knowledge or the opportunity to put 
                                                 
724 Dem. 2.23. 
725 Mann (1986), pp. 143-144. 
726 Aristot. Pol. 7.1324b. 
727 Pl. Rep. 2.374b-e. 
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it into practice.728 To that end, the children of the guardians should be given the 
chance to fight alongside their parents in order to get valuable experience in warfare. 
What is more, military training was useful in that it promoted physical fitness, while it 
prepared a man for the military duties of a citizen. It was also conducive to bravery. 
Above all, though, it cultivated an interest in military science and all things military, 
which, from an ideological perspective, was beneficial in fostering compliance to the 
military objectives of the state, thus sustaining the power of its ruler.729  
 In early Ptolemaic Egypt, as has already been argued, the threat of 
encroachment by neighbouring kingdoms was never far removed and the realities of 
conquest implied that a vastly outnumbered conqueror community aspired to settle 
amongst the native Egyptian population. The desire to alleviate these pressures by 
stressing military training and values in education is evident in institutions such as the 
ephebeia and the neaniskoi.  
 Broadly speaking, in the Hellenistic period, and equally in Ptolemaic Egypt, 
there were two stages in the education of the young: the primary school and the 
secondary education of the gymnasion.730 Of purely civic origin, the gymnasion 
retained in Ptolemaic Egypt its role as the intellectual centre par excellence for the 
education of the youth. After the gymnasion, followed the institution of the ephebeia in 
the academic formation of the adolescents. This entailed the military training of 
young men between the ages of 18 to 20 under the supervision of the state.  
 Military education per se, however, probably started from the gymnasion in the 
guise of athletic contests, as the discipline of athletic training had always been 
regarded as good conditioning for young warriors.731 The earliest source for the 
existence of a gymnasion in Alexandria, dating to the early third century BCE, is a 
funerary epigram for a young boy who would no longer rejoice “in the shaded grounds of 
the gymnasion.”732 In Ptolemaic Egypt, the gymnasia were not always in the hands of the 
city, nor where they confined in civic environments. Instead, they appear to have been 
                                                 
728 Pl. Rep. 5.466e-467a. 
729 Similar ideas are expressed in the Laches, with only the homonymous interlocutor casting doubt on 
the bearing of certain forms of training, such as fighting in armour, in the performance of warriors in 
battle, Pl. Lach. 182d-184c. 
730 Boys and girls between the ages of 7 and 14 attended the primary schools. The gymnasia were 
reserved for boys of 14 to 18. According to Pomeroy (1984), p. 59 there is no direct evidence for 
elementary schools in Ptolemaic Alexandria. 
731 See Chaniotis (2005), p. 50. When during the fourth century BCE the ephebeia was instituted as a 
formal training ground of the polis' male youth for the military, it was to a great extent concentrated in 
the gymnasia and included the training in sports already habitually connected with the gymnasion. 
732 I. Métr. Ég. 62. 
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privately founded and maintained in cities, metropoleis, as well as villages.733 They 
were, however, more often than not dedicated to the king, as numerous petitions 
reveal. One of those suggests that they functioned under the royal auspices.734 
Further, the close connection of the gymnasion to the promotion of the dynastic cult 
of the sovereign implies that devotion to the life of the gymnasion was perceived as a 
means of expressing loyalty to the dynasty.735 Lastly, the wide distribution of the 
gymnasia must have contributed immensely to the diffusion of military values to the 
Hellenic-Makedonian populace.  
 In regard to the institution of the ephebeia, its existence has been confirmed in 
Alexandria since the first half of the third century BCE.736 Although its organisation 
remains largely elusive, it is a fact that Kyrene, under Ptolemaic rule, enjoyed the 
services of professional trainers in athletics, arms handling, equitation and archery, as 
well as of the military officials known as triakatiarchai, since the late fourth century 
BCE.737 The consistency of features that one encounters elsewhere in the Hellenistic 
world (i.e. the training in the javelin, the bow and, very importantly, the hunt, as well 
as the emphasis on the military education of the citizen, as opposed to philosophy and 
literature) allow for the suggestion that the same emphasis must have applied in 
Ptolemaic Egypt.738 
 Lastly, the institution of the neaniskoi is better documented. This group of 
young men, which is encountered all over the Hellenistic world, constituted the 
breeding ground of the future officers of the Ptolemaic army. Their age was between 
18 and 30 and they are often classed among the klerouchoi of the land.739 They are 
usually described as having graduated from the ephebeia and gone on to train in the 
army. A recent suggestion that the neaniskoi received administrative as well as military 
training in preparation for posts in the royal government strengthens the military 
dimension of the organisation of the Ptolemaic state.740 
 
                                                 
733 In the 3rd century BCE we are aware of four gymnasia in Egypt: that of Alexandria, Philadelpheia, 
Samareia and perhaps Luxor, Legras (1999), p. 209. 
734 P. Ent. 8. 
735 Austin (2006), p. 318. 
736 P.Oxy. 2465, c. 270s. Evidence for the existence of the Alexandrian ephebeia is scarce for the period in 
question. See Fraser (1972), p. 86. Also, it is worth noting the decree mentioning epheboi in a procession 
in honour of the Kanephoros preserved by Saturos: P.Oxy. 2465, F 2, col. 1. 
737 SEG IX:50. 
738 See Kennell (2006), p. xii, Chaniotis (2005), p. 51. 
739 P. Cair. Zen. II 59254. 
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Literary and recently published epigraphic material from Makedonia presents some 
very interesting links with the Ptolemaic system of education and its military emphasis. 
Until recently, most of the evidence regarding the aims of education in Argead 
Makedonia concerned the sons of the royal family. These received lessons on music, 
literature, geometry and rhetoric from distinguished philosophers of the period, such 
as Euphraios of Oreos, the student of Platon who taught in the court of Perdikkas III, 
and Aristoteles, who was the teacher of Alexandros III and the royal youths in the 
court of his father, Philippos II.741 Apart from a mathematical and literary formation, 
however, the heirs to the Makedonian throne and their young courtiers were the 
recipients of intense physical education. This can be inferred from the frequent 
participation of Makedonian kings in Panhellenic or local athletic contests, as well as 
in the royal hunts.742 Élite education in other parts of Hellas was composed of the 
same mixture of philosophical and military training. Diodoros preserves the type of 
education that Philippos II received during his stay in the Theban court: “Philip, who 
was reared along with [Epameinondas], acquired a wide acquaintance with the Pythagorean 
philosophy. Inasmuch as both students showed natural ability and diligence they proved to be superior 
in deeds of valour. Of the two, Epameinondas underwent the most rigorous tests and battles, and 
invested his fatherland almost miraculously with the leadership of Hellas, while Philippos, profiting 
from the same initial training, achieved no less fame than Epameinondas.”743  
The hunt was a very important part of military education, as well as a rite of 
passage. The Kyropaideia of Xenophon explicitly states that hunting is the means by 
which men (and women) become good in war, as there is hardly any quality 
demanded in war that is not necessary in the hunt.744 This is well attested in 
Makedonia where a Makedonas would not be allowed to recline on a banqueting 
couch until he had killed his first boar with a spear.745 The hunt it seems had retained 
its educational importance and status as a rite of passage in Ptolemaic Egypt. In his 
introductions of Ptolemaios V to the representatives of the Achaian League, 
Demetrios of Athens, an ambassador of the king, made special reference to the fact 
                                                 
741 See Dem. 9.62, Karystios of Pergamon apud Ath. Deipn. 1.508d, Plout. Alex. 7.14. See also IG VII 
2849 (Haliartos honouring a Makedonian philosopher), Psoma (2006), p. 285. 
742 See for instance, Hdt. 5.22, Just. 7.2.14, Plout. Alex. 4.9, Solinus 9.16, Diod. 17.16.3-4, Arr. Anab. 
1.11.1. For the royal hunt, see Palagia (2000), who sees the royal hunt as an Orientalising motif aimed 
at bringing legitimacy to the Successors.  
743 Diod. 16.2.2-3. 
744 Xen. Kyrop. 1.2.9-13. 
745 Hegesandros apud Ath. Deipn. 1.18a. Hegesandros comments on how Kassandros at the age of 
thirty was still not allowed to recline in symposia. 
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that the king had once killed a bull with a single throw of the javelin, while riding his 
horse.746 The passage is also telling of the importance of perceiving the king as a 
skilled hunter, rider, and warrior. Demetrios is singing his master’s praise and even if 
this could be attributed to diplomatic licence, it has served its purpose in catching the 
attention of the historian (Polybios), who committed the prowess of Ptolemaios V 
Epiphanes to posterity as “ἄξιον μνήμης.” It is also possible, however, that the interest 
of Polybios was triggered by the fact that, despite this feat, Ptolemaios V had not 
participated yet in battle at the age of 25.747  
Further evidence for the importance of hunting in Ptolemaic Egypt is provided 
by the prominence of a professional association with military undertones, the 
κυνηγοί.748 Although their existence is attested in Makedonia from the Antigonid 
period in relation to the cult of Herakles Kynagidas, their presence in Ptolemaic Egypt 
from the very outset of Ptolemaic rule suggests that analogous units might have existed 
in Argead Makedonia as well.749 Kynegoi, who answered to an ἀρχικυνηγός, appear in 
a dedication to Berenike, the wife of Ptolemaios I, alongside a phrourarchos and a 
certain Boiskos.750 Their task in the Ptolemaic context appeared to be the upkeep, 
breeding and training of hunting dogs. Two such kynegoi took part in the Grand 
Procession of Ptolemaios Philadelphos leading a pack of no less than two thousand 
four hundred dogs of selected exotic breeds.751 Dogs were used widely as guards in 
strongholds and were particularly useful in the all-important hunting of elephants.752 
Their function in Antigonid Makedonia was equally the guarding of frontier outposts 
and the conduct of royal hunts.753 The kynegoi, who were sometimes classified as 
soldiers (στρατιῶται), have left a considerable amount of inscribed dedications on the 
rocks of the shores of the Red Sea, in the countries of the Troglodytes and 
Aithiopians, as marks of gratitude for a good hunt.754  
 Although knowledge regarding the education of royal heirs and youths in the 
Successor Kingdoms is more limited than in Argead Makedonia there can be little 
                                                 
746 Polyb. 22.3. 
747 Polyb. 22.17. Hunting was also very important in the context of pre-Ptolemaic Egypt. One need 
only gaze at the low relief representations of Pharaohs hunting buffaloes on the pylons of the temples at 
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748 See Fraser (1972), Launey (1949-1950). 
749 SIG3 459 (Beroia, 248/247 BCE).  
750 OGIS 20 (Kition).  
751 Ath. Deipn. 5.201b. 
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754 OGIS 86 (reign of Ptolemaios IV): a group of kynegoi thanking the god Ares Nikephoros Euagros. 
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doubt, judging from the above, that military training in hunting, horsemanship and 
the use of weaponry was in any way lacking in the formation of young princes. The 
practice of formally associating the young heirs to the throne of their fathers in 
conjunction with the already established importance of personal military engagement 
makes this type of education all the more imperative.    
 As the evidence from the organisation of the Ptolemaic system of education 
suggests, it was not just the children and youths of the royal court that benefitted from 
it. Recently published inscriptions from Makedonia elucidate the possibility that a 
similar system of education existed in Makedonia and the Ptolemaic template was not 
just the result of the influence of the Hellenic city-states. First of all, an extract from 
Athenaios’ Deipnosophistai informs us that a gymnasion existed in the city of Pella since 
the fourth century BCE.755 Another operated in Dion long before its destruction by 
the Aitolians in 214 BCE.756 Finally, the oldest testimony to the existence of structures 
aimed at providing for the education of the Makedonian youths, dating also from the 
fourth century BCE, was found in the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore in Beroia.757 
Taken together, these inscriptions suggest that the formation of children within a 
gymnasion framework, i.e. through rigorous physical training, was not limited to the 
offspring of the dynasty, but rather was a state-wide institutionalized commodity. The 
gymnasiarchal law of Beroia and the ephebarchic law of Amphipolis, although later 
than the Argead period, provide clues for the curriculum and classes of youths that 
frequented the gymnasia. As in Ptolemaic Egypt, there were three classifications of 
youths: the paides (14 to 18 years), the epheboi (18 to 20 years) and the neoi (20 to 30 
years old), the latter two of which were expected not to interact with the paides.758 In 
terms of the curriculum, the paides trained in the palaistra alongside their paidagogoi, 
while the epheboi and the neoi adhered to a more precise programme of exercises: 
paidotribes and masters of arms taught them archery, how to throw the javelin, as well 
as aim with rocks and stones, and finally taught them how to ride and fight on 
horseback.759  The epheboi and neoi trained intensively from sunrise to sundown and 
were required to wear a uniform, which comprised of a chiton, a chlamyda, the petasos 
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and crepides. This type of military garb was retained until the very end of the Ptolemaic 
reign over Egypt and can be still seen in the so-called Nile Mosaic of Palestrina.760 
 What is very important in the context of the establishment and evolution of 
the Ptolemaic education system, other than its heavily physical-education oriented 
curriculum, is the already mentioned fact that in its earliest form it was a royal rather 
than a civic institution. Royal patronage was the norm in Makedonia as well. It is only 
in the late Antigonid period, under Philippos V, that the gymnasia become subsumed 
under the auspices of the Makedonian polis.761 Further, it has become clear from the 
above discussion that the Ptolemaic system of education, with its emphasis on military 
training, certainly had overtones from the Hellenic city-state system but a good deal of 
it was based on structures already in place in Argead Makedonia. One can discern in 
the intensive, daily, and strenuous physical training and discipline that took place in 
both the Argead, Antigonid and Ptolemaic gymnasia, states intent on developing a class 
of citizens that would be familiar with the hardships of war, keen on following their 
ruler in military exploits and not averse to the Homeric view that “even in times of 
relaxation, one should train for war.”762 
 
 
MECHANISM NO 3: A MILITARY SOCIETY 
 
Closely linked to the military training of the adolescents in Ptolemaic Egypt, the other 
most important manifestation of the permeation of the military power of the state into 
the everyday life of its inhabitants and one that, in the case of Ptolemaic Egypt, 
stretched from the centre of power in Alexandria to the chora, was the well-known 
institution of the klerouchia. This section will also discuss the evidence of the political 
role of the army in relation to the investiture of royal authority.  
 
 
LAND GRANTS & THE INSTITUTION OF KLEROUCHIA 
 The institution of the klerouchia is the most potent example of the 
decentralisation of military power. It has been argued that the settlement of the 
                                                 
760 See figures 3, 4 and 5 for a representation of Ptolemaic soldiers in what is thought to be typical 
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military in the land was one of the primary goals of the Ptolemaic state.763 The 
organisation of the klerouchic system is attributed to the first Ptolemaios and its 
expansion to the second.764 Its conceptual origins, however, have long been debated, 
with scholars suggesting that it was a mixture of the relevant Athenian and Pharaonic 
traditions of the practice of granting crown land to veterans and mercenaries in return 
for military service.765 However, it seems also possible that the institution could trace 
its origins in the widespread distribution of land grants from the Makedonian king to 
his courtiers and army officers, while making use of the Hellenic terminology of 
kleros.766  
 The Ptolemaioi did not build many cities, and therefore did not enjoy the 
support of citizen militias that characterised the defences of the Seleukid and 
Antigonid Kingdoms. They did, however, settle most of their possessions with 
klerouchoi. Ptolemaic klerouchic settlements can be found from the trans-Jordan to 
Kyrene and Philoteria on the Sea of Galilee.767 Apart from the geographic extent of 
the king’s military power ascertained through the distribution of the kleroi, the 
inalienability of the plot from the Crown to the klerouchos in the early period 
guaranteed the control through time of the ruler over his human resources.768 The 
fact that one of the prerequisites for extending the holding of the kleros to the progeny 
of the original klerouchos was their having undergone military training only serves to 
emphasize the extent of this control.769   
 Even if scattered throughout the Kingdom, settled in the midst of native 
groups, we observe an effort from the part of the ruler to keep the army as a distinct 
entity, united under various banners. On a fiscal level, the army, including those on 
active service alongside those settled on the land (kleroi), seems to have undergone a 
separate census than the rest of the population.770 In addition, at least in the third 
century BCE there was an administrative branch of government officials that were 
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178-181. 
769 Lesquier (1911), p. 61, referring to the contingent of tēs epigonēs. 
770 According to Clarysse & Thompson (2005), I, pp. 32-68 this is evident from the separate numbers 
for army units in figures from the Arsinoite nome and from the separate listings of household details for 
army families, II, p. 32. This separate census also counted the Hellenes in the chora. 
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entirely devoted to army census and army pay, the so-called army scribes.771 As 
Clarysse and Thompson argue, the imposition of taxes, their varying rates and to 
whom they apply are not solely economic, but also political measures. The King’s 
reliance on his army is revealed through the preferential treatment soldiers, as well as 
policemen and guards, the representatives of the Crown’s monopoly on physical force 
in the interior of Egypt, received in terms of tax relief.772  
 A further mark of distinction was that the regular Ptolemaic army (which 
included both cavalry and infantry) was known by the designation ‘Makedones,’ even 
at a time when the migration of Hellenic and other mercenaries and Hellenic-native 
intermarriage had rendered the term entirely devoid of ethnic significance. To be 
sure, there is no hard evidence that Ptolemaios I had any ethnic Makedones in his 
service at the time of his arrival in Egypt. Given the peaceful transition from Persian 
to Makedonian governorship and the imminent show-down of Alexandros with the 
King of Persia, it has been argued that these troops were more likely to have been 
mercenaries of various ethnic backgrounds, even if their commanders were 
Makedonian.773 Conversely, even if the first Ptolemaios did have Makedones in his 
army, the flow of Makedonian immigration must have drawn to a halt in the first few 
decades of his rule.774 The decision therefore to assign a name so close to the ruler’s 
home and its maintenance until well into the first century BC, where ethnic 
designations of army units were replaced by numeric and equipment designations, 
must have been a measure intended to provide cohesion to the army ranks.775 This 
was achieved through the establishment of a common, if constructed identity, based 
on shared origins with the ruler. The visual manifestation of this constructed identity 
can be found in the preservation of the Makedonian military uniform.776 
 It has been suggested that in the early period this preferential treatment was 
an attempt to keep the army (that is, the Hellenic component of the Ptolemaic state) 
                                                 
771 Clarysse & Thompson (2005), I, p. 48. Epistatai were concerned with the taxation of the land of 
cavalry klerouchoi, ibid., II, p. 31, n. 105. 
772 In Year 22 of the reign of Ptolemaios II Philadelphos a universal capitation charge was introduced; 
the salt tax. In the decade that followed, the tax was progressively lowered, until it was halved by 
Ptolemaios III in 243 BC. A capitation charge is a poll tax, i.e. a fixed amount of money payable per 
person. Clarysse & Thompson (2005), II, p. 87. 
773 Arr. 3.5.5. Griffith (1935), pp. 29-30. Cf. Billows (1995), p. 153, who suggests that there must have 
been c. 5,000 Makedones in Egypt. 
774 See Bagnall (1984), pp. 7-20 and Fischer-Bovet (2007). 
775 Marrinan (1998), pp. 545-546. 
776 See figures 3, 4 and 5. 
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distinct from the natives.777 Before this behaviour is assigned on segregationist grounds 
though, one should consider the findings of modern research in military psychology 
arguing that the higher the degree of cohesion between soldiers in army units the 
more effective their performance.778 Given the immense prestige the original 
Makedonian army enjoyed since the times of Alexandros, this measure alone might 
have been more effective in maintaining army cohesion, and consequently 
strengthening the military power of the ruler, than all the tax exemptions taken 
together.  
 The strategic importance of military settlements is revealed in the Syrian Wars 
of Ptolemaios III and Ptolemaios IV, when we are made aware that the majority of 
the cavalry engaged in the military confrontations was levied from the area of the 
Faiyum.779 It is also indicative of the political manipulation of military settlements that 
the klerouchic plots in Upper Egypt increased after the revolts of 207-186 BCE.780  
 
 
THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE ARMY 
 “Let the king elected by the Makedones preserve the area ruled by the Argeadai and let the 
Makedones with the king celebrate the customary rites for the Argeadai.”781 This is how the 
Alexandros Romance presents the resolution of the succession crisis in the section 
containing the so-called Will of Alexandros.   
 The close interrelationship between the ruler and the army is further 
supported by the role of the latter in the validation of kingship. Although the existence 
of a Makedonian Assembly, whether armed or unarmed, has long been debated this is 
not to deny the evidence that suggests that there were occasions where the army (or 
the closest circle of friends and advisors of the kings, who belonged to the army ranks) 
                                                 
777 Lesquier (1911). 
778 The territorial principle of recruitment prevalent in Argead Makedonia and extended into the early 
Ptolemaic period to an extent, which grouped soldiers according to their place of origin had a similar 
effect in the cohesion of the army: Arr. Anab. 3.27.4, Diod. 17.57.2, discussed by Hatzopoulos (1996), 
pp. 451-452, (2001). For the military psychology, see Cronin (1998). 
779 Clarysse & Thompson (2005). 
780 Manning (2006), p. 269. 
781 Ps.-Kallisth. Rec. α 3.33.11-12: “…ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ παρόντος Ἀρριδαῖον τὸν υἱὸν Φιλίππου. ἐἀν δὲ 
γένηται ἐκ Ῥωξάνης υἱὸς Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ἐκεῖνον εἶναι βασιλέα καὶ ὄνομα ἐπιτεθῆναι αὐτῷ, ὃ ἂν δόξῃ 
Μακεδόσιν. ἐὰν δέ θῆλυ γεννηθῇ ἐκ Ῥωξάνης, ἐλέσθωσαν Μακεδόνες ὃν ἄν βούλωνται βασιλέα, ἐἀν μὴ 
βούλωνται Ἀρριδαῖον τὸν Φιλίππου υἱὸν. ὁ δὲ αἰρεθεὶς διαφυλαττέτω τὴν τῶν Ἀργειαδῶν ἀρχήν, καὶ 
συντελείτωσαν Μακεδόνες  Ἀργειάδαις μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως τὰ νομιζόμενα.” On the historicity of the 
Alexander Romance, see Stoneman (1991). 
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was instrumental in consolidating a new King on the throne.782 The examples we 
possess confirm the intervention of the army on occasions of unrest or unclear 
succession. Philippos II, who at the time of his accession was serving as regent for his 
nephew, was “compelled by the people to accept the kingship.”783 Ptolemaios I was acclaimed 
King in 306 BCE by “those in Egypt,” and Appianus qualifies those as “his own household 
troops.”784 Further, it was not unheard of that the army deposed kings as well. A case in 
question is the one of Amyntas III, the grandfather of Alexandros III, who was 
“expelled by the Makedones” in 393 BCE.785 
 In Ptolemaic Egypt, the effective dynastic practice of co-regency instituted by 
Ptolemaios I for his son Philadelphos during the last two years of his reign, meant that 
the matter of succession was neatly taken care of before the death of the king. 
However, the army was still called upon to validate the right of new kings to rule 
when succession was not as straightforward or when the prospective king was still a 
minor. Since the acclamation of the first Ptolemaios the army was next called to 
decide on a succession more than a hundred years later, with Ptolemaios V, who at 
the time of his father’s death was only six years old. It is interesting to note how the 
acting regent, Agathokles, in an admittedly well-rehearsed gesture, raised the child 
high and called to the army that “his fate depend[ed] on [them] and [their] actions”.786 
Despite the apparent long-term lack of participation of the army in such decisions, the 
acclamation of the young Ptolemaios V, which Polybios calls anakleteria, demonstrates 
the perseverance of the role of the army as a source of legitimacy.787 
 In regard to whether this group of Makedones formed an Assembly of men in 
arms or not the evidence is eschewed. Granier was the first to suggest in 1931 that the 
so-called “Makedonian koinon” (τὸ κοινὸν Μακεδόνων), or the Makedonians (οἱ 
Μακεδόνες), both of which we encounter on numerous occasions in the Hellenistic 
period and less so in earlier periods, was essentially an Assembly composed of men 
eligible to bear arms.788 His views, though widely accepted in the period before 
WWII, have since been largely revised. Briant, whose critique on Granier is one of the 
most consistently formulated, has argued that the Makedonian Assembly was only 
                                                 
782 For an overview of the debate, see Adams (1986). 
783 Just. 7.5.9. 
784 App. Syr. 54. 
785 Porph. FGrHist 3 F 691. 
786 Polyb. 15.26.1-4. 
787 See Hammond (1989), pp. 281-282. 
788 Granier (1931). 
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extraordinarily composed of soldiers. On a regular basis it resembled a popular 
assembly, much like the ones in southern Greece.789 Other scholarly interpretations of 
the Makedonian Assembly have varied between two extremes. Some have rejected in 
toto the existence of any sort of regular assembly, whether consisting of soldiers or of 
the “foremost Makedonians” (οἱ πρῶτοι Μακεδόνων).790 Others have supported 
fervently the reality of a downright constitutional Makedonian Assembly.791 As with 
many areas of Argead history our knowledge of the functions and role in the common 
affairs of the Kingdom of the so-called Assembly of the Makedones is hindered by too 
little relevant evidence. In general, however, extreme views tend to be marginalised 
and there is a stronger consensus in favour of its existence.  
A minimalist view of the evidence reveals that an assembly is almost unheard 
of before the times of Philippos II. In the narratives of his early years as the head of 
the Makedonian kingdom we encounter references to some sort of gathering of the 
Makedones on two occasions. In the first instance, Diodoros and his sources present 
an assembly as a vehicle for communication between the King and the Makedones. 
Chronologically, the time was right after the succession of Philippos to the throne of 
Makedonia when the kingdom was in a precarious situation, threatened on all four 
sides by foreign invasions.792 The morale of the Makedonian army was at its nadir 
because of recent defeats. Philippos tried to harness the existing confusion by “bringing 
together the Makedones in a series of assemblies and exhorting them with eloquent speeches to be 
men”.793  These speeches proved to be successful in boosting the soldiers’ morale. 
There is no hint in Diodoros’ rendering of the story that Philippos was in any way 
being original in calling an Assembly of the Makedones as a means to address them 
directly. However, these assemblies could be occasional in character, called only on 
emergency situations. The second instance is cited by Hatzopoulos as another direct 
attestation to the existence of some sort of assembly at the time of Philippos II. 
Justinus and his source write that while Philippos II was acting as regent for his 
brother’s infant son the imminent wars of that period underlined (probably in the 
                                                 
789 Briant (1973), pp. 279-350. 
790 Errington (1978), pp. 99-105. For references to οἱ πρῶτοι Μακεδόνων see Arr. Anab. 1.15.3, Polyb. 
16.6..7, Plout. 8.3.2, G. Kedrenos, Comp. Hist. 1.256, where he states that Alexandros was given the 
kingship by this distinct group of Makedones. 
791 Hatzopoulos (1996), pp. 261-322. 
792 For a rendering of the difficult situation with which the Makedonians were faced in 360/359 BCE 
see Diod. 16.2.5 
793 “ἀλλὰ τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐν συνεχέσιν ἐκκλησίαις συνέχων καὶ τῇ τοῦ λόγου δεινότητι προτρεπόμενος 
ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν εὐθαρσεῖς ἐποίησε,”  Diod. 16.3.1. 
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minds of the Makedones) the need for an adult king to take over the leadership of the 
army.794 As a result, Philippos II was “forced by the people (a populo) to receive the 
kingship.”795 Unfortunately, in both cases, we have no way of establishing whether 
these assemblies were composed of armed or unarmed men and in any case most of 
the ammunition in the arsenal of the propagators for the existence or absence of an 
army assembly dates from the reign of Alexandros III.796 Even though, it seems 
unlikely that a regular Assembly of the Makedones ever met, the Makedonian 
evidence for when it did meet, in conjunction with the equivalent early Ptolemaic, 
suggest that the Makedonian army was a source for advice and legitimation of 





The essentiality of military power for the survival of the Makedonian and early 
Ptolemaic monarchy comes in stark contrast with Aristoteles’ depiction of the ideal 
state. The ideal state, which would, by definition, be governed by good laws, could 
exist in self-sufficient isolation without having to resort to conflict.797 Domination of 
neighbouring polities was deemed as unjust as it was unlawful and hence an army was 
redundant for the survival of the state.798 In the larger scheme of things, military 
pursuits should not be an end in themselves, but merely a means to an end.799  
 It has been argued that there are two solutions, in order to be left alone (and 
virtuous) in peace: either to withdraw from the world or, conversely, to absorb it.800 
The Classical city-state came very close to the first ideal in the fifth century BCE and 
managed to enjoy a dozen hard-earned warless years.801 Philippos II’s Makedonia to 
the contrary set out to absorb the world. Alexandros III may have come close to 
                                                 
794 Perdikkas was the King of Makedonia until his death on the battlefield against the Illyrians, Diod. 
16.2.4. Justinus preserves a more dramatic version of Perdikkas’ death at the hands of his scheming 
mother Eurydike, Just. 7.5. 
795 Just. 7.5.10. 
796 See Lock (1977), Carney (1981). 
797 Aristoteles advocated that civic isolation was possible and desirable, Pol. 7.1324b 40-1325a 1-4: 
“ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴη γ’ ἂν καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν μία πόλις εὐδαίμων, ἣ πολιτεύεται δηλονότι καλῶς, [...] ἧς τῆς 
πολιτείας ἡ σύνταξις οὐ πρὸς πόλεμον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἔσται τῶν πολεμίων”. 
798 Aristot. Pol. 7.1325a 6, “μηθὲν γὰρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιοῦτον.” 
799 Aristot. Pol. 7.1325a 7, “..οὐχ ὡς τέλος δὲ πάντων ἀκρότατον, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνου χάριν ταύτας.” 
800 Hassner (1997), p. 17. 
801 Lévêque (1968), p. 279, n. 108: There were overall four short periods of peace between 305 and 150 
BCE: 299-297, 249-248, 205-204, 159-149. 
 
155 
achieving it but his generals and successors definitely demonstrated none of the skills 
to finish the job. Withdrawn, each in their own corner of the eastern Mediterranean, 
the three Successor dynasties exhibited neither the proclivity to enjoy a splendid 
isolation nor the capability to absorb the world. Whatever the aspirations of the early 
Ptolemaic rulers in regard to world domination, or universal rule, as it is most 
commonly known in Hellenistic terminology, military power was paramount for the 
preservation of Ptolemaic rule.802 This is most evident in the emphasis placed on the 
concept that the land of Egypt was spear-won. At the Conference of Triparadeisos, 
Antipatros reconfirmed Ptolemaios’ hold of Egypt, Libya and “whatever towards the west 
he may acquire by the spear”.803 The preservation of conquest and the colonial situation 
soon found its way into official propaganda and military industriousness became one 
of the standard vestiges of the Ptolemaic King. In one of his Eidyllia, Theokritos 
praised Berenike, the mother of Philadelphos for having produced a “spear-bearing 
Ptolemaios to a spear-bearing Ptolemaios.”804 He added that “as a good king he cares deeply for 
the preservation of his fatherly inheritance and adds something to it himself”.805 Similarly, the 
Adulis inscription from the reign of Ptolemaios III underlines the same concerns for 
preservation and enlargement of territories, as well as preponderance over 
adversaries.806  
 The tradition of the Makedonian kingship, with its emphasis on the role of the 
king as a military leader, coupled with a system of education which fostered the 
formation of new generations of warriors and the closer relations between the ruler 
and his army through reciprocal obligations integrated in social organisation, acted as 
multipliers of the importance of the King’s real and perceived military power. In this 
respect, the rulers of early Ptolemaic Egypt remained faithful to the agenda of the 
Argead monarchy, which valued military kingship, values and involvement across the 
social frame, as pivotal. In addition, the status of Egypt as a spear-won territory 
created a set of expectations that had to be met, even if, as Samuel argues, in the case 
of Euergetes and Philopator this might have been done grudgingly.807 At any rate, 
Kallixenos’ description of the Grand Procession of Ptolemaios Philadelphos is 
testament to the fact that the early Ptolemaioi managed to put on parade, as well as 
                                                 
802 For the aspirations of the early Ptolemaioi, see Meeus (2008). 
803 Arr. Diad. F 1 34. 
804 Theok. Eid. 17.56-57. 
805 Theok. Eid. 17.105-106. 
806 OGIS 54. 
807 Samuel (1989), p. 73. 
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on the field, awe-inspiring military forces, which were reminiscent of the ones 
commanded by Philippos II and Alexandros III: “πρὸς δὲ τὴν κατάπληξιν τῶν 






























                                                 
808 Alexandros marching to Athens to exact terms after the Battle of Chaironeia: Diod. 17.4.4. For the 




Fig. 3: The Nile Mosaic from Palestrina – present state. The original parts (with 
section number) are shown in colour 
 
Sanctuary of Fortuna Primigenia – early first century BCE. Now relaid in the Palazzo 
Barberini-Colonna, Italy 
(image retrieved from the Wikimedia Commons, 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/29/Praeneste_-_Nile_Mosaic_-
_Section_Map.jpg, 




Fig. 4: Detail of the Nilotic landscape from the Nile Mosaic 
 
Sanctuary of Fortuna Primigenia in Palestrina – early first century BCE. Now relaid 
in the Palazzo Barberini-Colonna, Italy 
(image retrieved from the Wikimedia Commons 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:NileMosaicOfPalestrina.jpg  





Fig. 5: Detail of the Nile Mosaic depicting Ptolemaic soldiers in Makedonian garb  
 
Sanctuary of Fortuna Primigenia – early first century BCE. Now relaid in the Palazzo 
Barberini-Colonna, Italy 
(image retrieved from the Wikimedia Commons 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:NileMosaicOfPalestrina.jpg,  
last accessed 15 March 2010) 
 
157 
“Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather, they, or at least 
the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new 
rules.” 
 









s outlined in the introduction, the fourth and final layer of power structures 
that sustained the monarchy in the Argead and early Ptolemaic period 
involves the acquisition and organisation of economic power. Before 
moving any further, it is essential to define the concept of economic power and 
examine its sources. In the process, the discussion will touch upon the methodological 
debates surrounding the study of the ancient economy.810 
 Economic power is not merely a reflection of the amount of wealth the central 
authority of a state has accumulated, although it is widely understood that economic 
capabilities shape political and military intentions.811 Instead, theorists have variably 
traced the determinants of economic power in different sources, which accounts for 
the fact that there is no generally agreed upon definition for economic power. For 
Marxists, control over the means of production, principally labour, equalled with 
economic power.812 Weber and his followers objected to this monocausal explanation 
and emphasized that economic power is a consequence of historical (largely political) 
and structural circumstances, which determine the distribution of control over 
                                                 
809 Douglass North and Robert Fogel won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1993 for “having renewed 
research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to 
explain economic and institutional change,” (quote from the Nobel Foundation website, last accessed 1 
February 2010, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/index.html). 
810 On the so-called Methodenstreit (War on Method) see further Appendix A. 
811 See Zakaria (1998), who demonstrates that wealth does not equal economic power. His thesis, 
concentrating on the economic power of the United States of America since the late nineteenth 
century, is based on an examination of those circumstances that lead wealthy, yet politically and 
diplomatically inactive, states to become influential in the international arena. He concludes that in 
order for wealth to be instrumental in foreign policy it has to be harnessed by a central authority 
towards that particular purpose. It is only when this goal has been achieved that a state can be 
considered to yield economic power. 




economic goods across social groups.813 The same principle applied to both modern 
and pre-modern societies.814 Until the advent of the Finleyan paradigm in the 1970s, 
the study of the economic structures and organisation of ancient political units were 
largely neglected by both economists and ancient historians.815 The consensus viewed 
the ancient economy through the lens of the neo-classical model of economics, with its 
emphasis on profit-oriented human rationality.816 In this light the ancient world was 
perceived as a scaled-down version of modern Europe. However, the neoclassical 
paradigm does not incorporate power into its study of economic activity and is, 
therefore, not suited to explain the role of economic organisation in the exercise of 
power.817 Building on the economic sociology of Weber and the substantivism of Karl 
Polanyi, Finley argued that the economy was not a separate sphere of activity in the 
societies of the ancient Mediterranean. Rather, most economic action was driven by 
social rather than economic concerns (i.e. the pursuit of status, as opposed to profit).818 
The substantivist model, which remains the best-theorised framework for thinking 
about the ancient economy, identified the sources of economic power of ancient states 
as embedded in the organisation of economic exchange (reciprocity, redistribution 
and to a lesser extent, the market).819 Finley’s substantivism, however, has attracted 
serious criticism for laying too much emphasis on the social dimensions of economic 
activity at the expense of empirical evidence.820 Recent revisionist research, 
                                                 
813  “…the emergence of economic power may be the consequence of power existing on other grounds,” Weber M. (1978), 
pp. 67-68, 926-940.  
814 Max Weber did not believe that ancient societies belonged somewhere along a primitive-modern 
spectrum, see his analysis of the ancient city-state (1978), pp. 1212-1372 and his typology of ancient 
states (1976), pp. 69-79. For the primitivist-modernist and the substantivist-formalist debate see 
Appendix A. 
815 See the very useful introduction by Morris & Manning (2005). 
816 Rostovtzeff, the most prominent economic historian of the interwar period, was an ardent 
modernist. Such was the polarity that the neoclassical paradigm had instilled in the study of ancient 
economies that Max Weber’s neither/or approach to the primitivist/modernist debate was as if it had 
never been formulated. See Heuss’ quote IN Bruhns (2006), p. 45, n. 19: “The study of antiquity had 
proceeded for most of the twentieth century as though Max Weber had never existed.” 
817 Cooper (1993), pp. 87-88. 
818 See further Appendix A. The standard works are Polanyi (1944), The Great Transformation: The Political 
and Economic Origins of Our Time, Finley (orig. pub. 1973), The Ancient Economy. 
819 Mann (1986), p. 24. For Polanyi’s and Finley’s substantivism and for criticism see Appendix A, see 
also Morris & Manning (2005b), pp. 144-149. It is interesting that despite the apparent influences, 
Polanyi rarely acknowledged his intellectual debt to Weber. 
820 What Morris & Manning (2005b) call “oversocialisation.” The ‘empirical’ and ‘oversocialisation’ 
critiques argue that for the sake of non-falsifying the model, substantivism often fails to take into 
consideration an array of important data (e.g. the existence of banks), Morris & Manning (2005b), pp. 
145-147. Current adherents to the theory of substantivism (Davies 1998, 2001, 2005) have moved 
beyond Finley’s concentration on “dominant types” (Finley, 1999, p. 29). In order to accommodate the 
various ‘economies’ of the ancient Mediterranean basin (local, regional, long-distance, alternative), 
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originating mainly from the Stanford Social Science History Program, has sought to 
construct models and falsifiable theories for the structure of ancient Mediterranean 
economies by incorporating methodologies drawn from economic sociology 
(especially the so-called new economic sociology -NES) and New Institutional 
Economics (NIE).821 Despite its theoretical springboard, the Stanford School (if it may 
be dubbed thus) does not propose to detract from the primacy of data in historical 
enquiry.822 Both NES and NIE form mediations between the “methodological 
individualism” of neo-classical economics and the assumption that social structures 
and institutions matter in economic action.823 Equally important for this thesis is their 
primary concern for the role of the state (in our case the monarchy) as an important 
economic actor. Following from NIE, the economic power of individuals and groups 
stems from the efficiency of the property rights régime. In this process, the role of the 
state is paramount in that it specifies and enforces those property rights.824 
 To summarize, ancient economic history cannot be studied without a 
theoretical framework in mind. The atheoretical approach of the liberal humanist 
tradition, whose aim is to “preserve” the myriad details of human activity and 
emphasize the contribution of the individual “at their best” in history, has proven 
insufficient for an analysis of the structures, organisation and distribution of power in 
ancient economies.825 It is telling of the relevance of social and economic theory in 
ancient history that the position, which eventually came to dominate the ancient 
economy debate for decades, relied on the historical and economic sociology of Max 
Weber. The usefulness of deductive modelling has also been demonstrated in 
pioneering studies of ancient economic historians such as Hopkins and Cohen.826  
 Insofar as economic power is concerned, control over production and 
                                                 
Davies (2005) has produced a series of flow charts of resource movement with the aim of demonstrating 
the co-existence of different modes of economic behaviour, p. 134. 
821 New work in the field includes Davies (1998, 2001, 2005), Manning (2003), Manning & Morris 
(2005), Bresson (2007, 2008). The point of departure for the new economic sociology was Granovetter 
(1985), while for NIE the work of North (1981) is seminal. 
822 Morris & Manning (2005), pp. 34-35. 
823 In economics, as in sociology, the doctrine of “methodological individualism,” coined by 
Schumpeter (1908), but theoretically elaborated by Weber (1978), stipulates that economic (and social) 
phenomena must be explained by the actions of individual agents, Heath (2009) IN the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy s.v. methodological individualism. For the basic tenets of the New Economic 
Sociology, see Glossary. 
824 North (1981), pp. 7-8. For a diagrammatic representation of the connections between the 
government and property rights in NIE see Appendix B. 
825 Crane (1967), p. 12. 
826 Hopkins (1980, 1983, 2002) worked on models of Roman revenue flows, while Cohen (1992) studied 
the Athenian banking system.   
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exchange, as well as an efficient property rights régime, are all crucial parameters for 
defining its nature and extent. However, neither can take precedence over the other 
purely on theoretical grounds. Primacy, if applicable, can only be determined by the 
available empirical evidence.827 The definition of economic power used in this thesis is 
borrowed from Michael Mann, whose historical sociology summarizes the most recent 
developments in the field. Following Mann, economic power “derives from the satisfaction 
of subsistence needs through the social organisation of the extraction, transformation, distribution, and 
consumption of the objects of nature.”828 Meeting the economic objectives of these tasks, i.e. 
the successful allocation and management of scarce resources vis-à-vis the infinite 
possible alternative uses that they could be put to, presupposes the formation and 
mobilisation of social networks that sometimes comprise vast numbers of people 
scattered across extensive territories.829 This is because, according to Mann, economic 
power is by nature diffuse and thus, not easily controlled from the centre.830 No 
economic organisation would be possible if those social networks were not able to 
engage in some sort of stable co-operation. Equally, such co-operation would not be 
viable for extended periods of time, were it not for the existence of a supervisory body 
with organisational superiority that would institutionalise control through customs, 
laws and norms, thus gaining the compliance of the supervisees.831 Under this light, 
the ability of a dominant individual(s) or group(s) to monopolise successfully control 
over the extant production, distribution, exchange, and consumption networks allows 
him/them to yield economic power.   
 A better understanding of the structures of an economy and the social 
networks that are formed around them can put into perspective the manner in which 




                                                 
827 Mann (1986), pp. 24-25. 
828 Mann (1986), p. 24.  
829 Mann (1986), p. 24. The ‘perennial’ problem of economics has been best articulated by Robbins 
(1932): “Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which 
have alternative uses,” p. 16. 
830 Mann (1986), p. 24. This goes against views for the unitary and strictly hierarchical organisation of 
states, i.e. advocated by Wittfogel (1957) and Eisenstadt (1963). 
831 Mann (1986), p. 7.  
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Very little has been written on the economy of the Makedonian state. No 
single book-length treatment exists, while articles dedicated to the subject are few and 
far between. Hardly any of the scholarship concerns the period prior to the reign of 
Philippos II.832 This scarcity of studies stands in striking contrast to the bulk of recent 
scholarship on the Ptolemaic economy.833 The defining factor behind this discrepancy 
lies in the nature and, more specifically, the volume of evidence available for each 
Kingdom.  
The perceived scarcity of Makedonian evidence is the cause for the consistent 
absence of the Argead Kingdom from almost any economic history debate. Although, 
admittedly, the quantity of Makedonian evidence pales before the plethora of the 
Ptolemaic papyri, a fair assessment of the Makedonian economy under the Argead 
kings is by no means elusive. The collection of the relevant material, which is 
presented here in a catalogue format under Appendix C, showcases how undeservedly 
understudied the economic structures of the Makedonian Kingdom have been so far. 
The body of evidence is indeed quite impressive. Argead economic activity is 
found recorded on inscriptions in the form of royal decrees (letters and diagrammata) 
and official trade agreements with third parties.834 The literary sources provide 
extremely valuable references, dating mainly from the reigns of Philippos II and 
Alexandros III, but also from earlier periods.835 Inferences can also be drawn from 
coins and material culture.836 The type of metal, the denominations and geographical 
                                                 
832 Hammond (1972-1988, vol. II) does examine the economic development of Makedonia under 
Philippos II but this is done in a fourteen-page section, where he also examines military security and 
national unity, pp. 657-671. His later treatment of the same subject under Philippos and Alexandros in 
his Macedonian State (1989) is more focused but still mainly descriptive, pp. 177-187. For Borza (1992) see 
index s.v. Macedonians and Philip II. Other valuable treatments are by Montgomery (1985, 1997), Borza 
(1982, 1987), Hammond (1988, 1995b), although (with the exception of Borza 1982, 1987) they also 
tend to focus on the reign of Philippos II and the economic innovations he wrought. 
833 The seminal work is still Préaux [1979 (1939)]. More recently see Manning (2003, 2005, 2006), 
Archibald et al. (2005), von Reden (2006, 2007). 
834 E.g. the royal diagrammata involving the re-organisation of national and newly conquered (royal 
and civic) land (SEG 34.664, SEG 36.626) and the trade clauses included in international treaties (IG I3 
89, SIG3 135). See further Appendix C. 
835 E.g. Thoukydides (1.58.2) records the prerogative of the Makedonian king (Perdikkas II) to move 
populations at will, also the Opis Speech in Arr. Anab. 7.9-10. See further Appendix C. 
836 On the coins of the Kingdom of Makedonia, see Price (1974), Le Rider (1977, 1996). On the 
relevance of archaeological evidence to economic history see Greene (2006). 
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spread of coins by a particular state attest to the level of monetization of that 
economy, as well as its trading partners. Levels of prosperity and trading patterns can 
be deduced from grave goods, architectural remains and chance finds, such as 
shipwrecks.837 Added to that is the steady flow of new epigraphic discoveries and 
publications that have appeared in the last decade and a half. All of the above no 
longer justify the scholarly neglect of the Argead economy on the grounds of 
ignorance.838 Goukowksy’s complaint in the 1970s that “[o]n connaît à peine les 
institutions de la Macédoine avant Alexandre,” can be eased.839  
 Earlier scholarship recognised the importance of agricultural land, the 
exploitation of silver and gold mines, timber, as well as coinage as economic resources, 
but most Makedonian scholars did not attempt to take the analysis beyond the 
description of the obvious, namely that the king exercised some form of control over 
them. The prevailing approaches on the nature of this control have generally followed 
suit from where their advocate stood on the constitutionalist-absolutist debate and 
what their take was on the nature of the Makedonian monarchy. Errington, the 
foremost proponent of the absolutist thesis, would have the economic organisation of 
the Kingdom subsumed under the “supremacy of the king in all recorded aspects of public 
life”.840 For Hammond, who stands at the other end of the spectrum, although the 
King retained an “almost complete concentration of the State’s wealth in [his] hands,” 
allowance is made for the apparent separation between the property of the King and 
the property of the Makedones.841 In addition, there is a tendency in scholarship to 
credit developments in the economy solely to the personality of a particular ruler, and 
this is usually Philippos II.842 Hammond was convinced that “changes within the kingdom 
                                                 
837 One example of the intensity of trade between Northern Hellas and the Aegean is the late fifth 
century BCE shipwreck near Alonessos. Excavated in 1992, it appears to be the largest surviving 
Classical Age trade vessel, with a maximum capacity of 4.000 amphorai. What was in all probability an 
Athenian merchant ship transported a cargo of wine amphorai from Mende in Chalkidike, an, at the 
time, independent Eretrian colony famous for the quality of its wine (Μενδαῖος οἶνος). See Hatzidake 
(1996), Papadopoulos & Paspalas (1999). The desirability of Mendean wine is reaffirmed by the fact 
that we find it growing on the Estate of Apollonios in the Faiyum. P. Zen. 59033. Athenaios (Deipn. 
11.784c) attests that is was still exported in large quantities during the reign of Kassandros. For the 
economic significance of grave goods, see the preliminary results of the ongoing excavations at the West 
cemetery of Archontiko in Pella, Press Release of the Hellenic Ministry of Culture, 10 September 2008, 
Eleutherotypia 1 April 2009. 
838 Hatzopoulos (1996). Errington (2002). 
839 Goukowsky (1975), p. 273. For a record of Argead economic activities, see Appendix C. 
840 Errington (1974), p. 37.  
841 Sources, such as Diod. 16.71.2, Arr. Anab. 1.27.4 and FD 5.19.74, attest that the Makedones 
received and dispensed of sums of money as a group and in their own name, independent of the king, 
Hammond (1988). 
842 Cawkwell (1978), pp. 17-18, Hammond (1989, 1995). 
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were assuredly powered by the personality of Philip; for he must have inspired the peoples of the 
enlarged kingdom to go to work with enthusiasm…”843 Hammond’s own enthusiasm can be 
explained for having given too much credit to the historicity of the Opis Speech.844 
However, the idea of Philippos’ perceived economic innovativeness has attracted 
scholars with ampler access to the recent epigraphic evidence. Still, for those who 
want to dramatize Philippos’ importance in Makedonian history, prior to him there 
was no economy to speak of.845 
 The economic organisation of the Makedonian kingdom, and the role of the 
king in ordering it, has generally been described as akin to a tribal economy, 
structured along the lines of Rodbertus’ notion of Oikenwirtschaft.846 The economy of 
the oikos, as the primary stage in the economic development of the world, stood 
behind the city- and the state-economy. Both Rodbertus and later Bücher agreed that 
this was where the ancient economy in its entirety belonged.847 Even though their 
thesis has been effectively discredited, the economy of the kingdom of Makedonia is 
still largely regarded as a typical household economy.848 However, the definition, as 
well as the structures of this type of economy in the context of a monarchic state, is 
nuanced. Usually, it is implied that the entire state was administered as an extension 
of the household of the ruler, i.e. organised along the same lines that a master would 
his personal household. According to Rodbertus and Bücher, a household economy 
was a closed economic system, whose main aim was autarchy.849 Production was 
tailored for subsistence, while specialisation and trade were minimal. Exchange was 
embedded in a series of social obligations that were satisfied through reciprocity and 
gift-giving. Already in the fourth century BCE, however, the Aristotelian school had 
recognized that “the authority of a master (of a household) and the authority of a statesman are 
                                                 
843 Hammond (1989), p. 178. 
844 Arr. Anab. 7.9.2-3. Hammond (1989), pp. 177-187. Contra Montgomery (1985, 1997), Bosworth 
(1988), pp. 101-113, maintains that the economic evolution sketched in Alexandros’ speech is “wildly 
inaccurate,” p. 109. 
845 Worthington (24 April 2009). 
846 Rodbertus (1865) coined the term, which was then developed and incorporated into an evolutionary 
schema by Karl Bücher (1893), Davies (1998), pp. 233-234. For the Makedonian state as a tribal state 
see Thomas (1966), p. 396, n. 37, Samuel (1988), Hammond (1989), p. 164, Archibald (2000), p. 227. 
847 Rodbertus (1865), Bücher (1893). For the ensuing controversy see Appendix A and also the 
provocative article by Derks (2002). 
848 Davies (2005), “[in] monarchies […] the ideological and administrative model was that of the household,” p. 129. 
For the Bücher/Meyer controversy, see Appendix A. 
849 “Die Autarkie die Oikos,” see Moss (1937), p. 214. 
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not the same, nor are all forms of authority identical between themselves, as some claim.”850 The 
difference between them was one of scale and character. In Book II of pseudo-
Aristoteles’ Oikonomika where the author distinguishes between the various types of 
economic administration, that of the monarchy, described as “μεγίστη μὲν καὶ 
ἁπλουστάτη,” is diametrically opposed to the “ἐλαχίστη δὲ καὶ ποικιλωτάτη” 
economy of the private household.851 In view also of the ongoing archaeological work 
in Makedonia, it becomes increasingly more problematic to treat the economic 
organisation of the monarchy as a centralised household economy with the ruler as its 
master. This unitary model ignores the presence of economic actors other than the 
king, overlooks any social and economic networks formed between the central 
government and local authorities, undermines the existence of trading activities and 
markets and misrepresents the constraints of ensuring compliance. In short, it is quite 
unrealistic. 
 Finally, as a by-product of Aristoteles’ typology of monarchies, Makedonian 
kingship has often been cited in parallel with the Homeric as examples of ‘heroic 
kingship.’852 The comparison, although rarely analysed, is carried over on all aspects 
of social life, including the economy.853 Finley’s model of a Homeric subsistence, gift-
giving economy seems all too reminiscent of the household economy model described 
above.854 The Homeric comparison, however, is fraught with problems of evidence 
and method.855 Although the current consensus on Homeric studies argues for the 
historical basis of the social background of the Homeric epics (as reflecting Hellenic 
chieftain societies of the ninth century BCE), and despite what has come down to us 
through Alexandros III’s own fondness of the Homeric epics, as a “traditionally cultivated 
closeness of the Macedonian elite to the epic world” this does not mean that the Makedonian 
                                                 
850 “φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτική, οὐδὲ πᾶσαι ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαί, 
ὥσπερ τινές φασιν.” Arist. Pol. 1.1255b.  
851 Ps-Arist. Oikon. 2.1345b. Mεγίστη (of the greatest extent) vs. ἐλαχίστη (of the least extent), 
ἁπλουστάτη (the most straightforward) vs. ποικιλωτάτη (the most diversified). On the nature of the 
‘royal economy’ in pseudo-Aristoteles, see Descat (2003). 
852 Arist. Pol. 3.1285b. Brunt (1997), App. B: “Aristotle and the Macedonian people and monarchy,” 
pp. 334-335. 
853 Edson (1970), pp. 22-23. The article of Carlier (2000) is, to my knowledge, the only piece of 
scholarship that engages with an analytic comparison between the Homeric and Makedonian kingship, 
stressing the differences. Unfortunately, he does not discuss the economy. On the Homeric economy 
see Donlan (1997, 1998). 
854 Finley (2002, orig. pub. 1954). 
855 Borza (1992) expresses the same concerns, p. 236. 
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reality was any similar.856 One must accept that “die Ilias ist kein Geschichtsbuch” and 




 Writing on the nature of the evidence for the Hellenistic economies Davies 
conceded that scholarship is at least a generation away from any significant corpus 
that would provide the relevant refined data for a more secure modelling of the 
economies of the Hellenistic period.858 Even so, significant advances have been made 
since Finley dismissed the Hellenistic economies as non-existent, in his influential 
substantive approach to the ancient economy.859 At the forefront of this progress stand 
the Hellenistic Near-Eastern economies. This is because, in stark contrast to the 
classical economies that are revealed to us mostly through indirect narratives, they 
benefit from a wealth of contemporary primary sources, usually categorised as 
‘archives,’ which lend themselves for various levels of qualitative and quantitative 
analysis.860 In the case of Egypt, the arid climate of the desert has proven very 
generous with the preservation of the main writing medium, the papyrus.861 Literary 
accounts by historians, such as Diodoros Sikeliotes and Polybios, provide the scholar 
only with the occasional anecdote; a situation similar to that in Argead Makedonia. 
                                                 
856 Donlan (1997, 1998). For contemporary perceptions of the Makedonians as a less advanced people 
representing an ‘earlier’ stage of social evolution, see Hall (2001), citing among other primary sources, 
Thouk. 1.5.3-1.6.2. Hunter (2004), p. 249. On the appreciation of Alexandros for the Homeric epics, 
see also Vasunia (2001), pp. 253-255. 
857 Hampl (1962).  
858 Davies (2001), p. 46. 
859 “There was […] no “Hellenistic economy”: from the outset there were two, an ancient sector and an Oriental sector,” 
Finley (1999), p. 183. Quantitative studies have become common in the field of numismatics, see 
Duyrat & Picard (2007). The modelling of Hellenistic economies has been partially attempted by 
Aperghis (2004) for the Seleukid economy, Manning (2003) for the Ptolemaic. On the relationship of 
the available evidence and the construction of general models for Ptolemaic Egypt, see Manning 
(2005b). 
860 In the Seleukid Kingdom primary evidence consists principally of temple archives (e.g. the 
Persepolis Texts, the Babylonian Chronicles), inscriptions and coins, Aperghis (2004), pp. 7-18. 
861 For a valuable discussion concerning the advantages and limitations of working with papyri, see 
Bagnall (1995). The most important papyrological sources dealing with the workings of the state 
economy in the early Ptolemaic period are the Zenon Archive from the area of the Faiyum, the Revenue 
Laws (P. Rev.), P. Tebt. III 703, P. Lille and P. Sorbonne from the area of the Ghoran, the Petrie Papyri, 
collated from mummy cartonnage found in cemeteries around the area of Gurob, a site at the entrance 
of the Faiyum, and to a lesser numerical extent the Hibeh Papyri from the Oxyrhynchos. All collections 
are in Greek and date from the third century BCE. Equally important sources written in demotic are 
the P. Mattha, a legal code from the third century BCE discovered in Hermopolis and the similar in 
scope P. Berlin 13621 and P. Cairo 50108 recto, also known as the Zivilprozeßordnung, dating from the 
same period, Manning (2003), pp. 18-19. For a detailed map of the Arsinoite nome and its villages, see 
the Fayum Project Map at http://www.trismegistos.org/fayum/fayum2/map.php, last accessed 20 
March 2010.  
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This dearth of literary sources in Ptolemaic Egypt is, however, more than 
compensated by the Greek papyrological record, which has preserved an abundance 
of royal diagrammata, legal agreements, administrative correspondence and tax 
receipts; all remnants of the economic organisation of Egypt. Tax receipts and other 
bureaucratic documents can also be found inscribed on ostraka, as well as recycled in 
mummy cartonnage. What is equally remarkable about the nature of the 
documentary evidence in Ptolemaic Egypt is the fact that alongside the top-level 
management, we possess accounts for the organisation of the lower levels of 
administration. A variety of material in the local, non-official, language, (i.e. Egyptian 
demotic and hieroglyphic), which records mainly private legal contracts and yet more 
tax receipts, are only beginning to be exploited in a systematic way. They are also 
increasingly studied in conjunction with the Greek official documents, especially 
through the work of that rare breed of scholars who combine the knowledge of 
classical languages with Egyptian. Taken together, the Greek and Egyptian material 
contributes to a rounder understanding of the organisation of the Ptolemaic economy, 
as it documents the social networks that developed on both the decision-making core 
and the local administration level. 
 The sheer volume of the available evidence, however, does not mean that its 
interpretation is devoid of problems; quite the contrary. The level of recorded detail 
renders Ptolemaic sources difficult to streamline. In addition, geographical and 
chronological inconsistencies in their distribution inhibit the drawing of generalised 
models. On the one hand, we have a lot of data from the Faiyum area (5-7% of the 
total arable land in Egypt) but not so much from elsewhere.862 This discrepancy has 
led scholars to unduly generalise one set of circumstances over the entire chora. 
Rostovtzeff for instance, in his study of the Zenon archive, treated the documents as 
representing “Egypt in miniature.”863 On the other hand, urban centres, most notably 
Alexandria and Ptolemais, are hardly represented at all. Equally, in terms of 
chronological distribution, there is relatively little evidence dating from the reign of 
Ptolemaios I, while the amount of sources increases drastically for the reign of 
Ptolemaios II, reaching a peak during the reign of Ptolemaios III.864 Precisely because 
we lack information for the formative first reign of the Ptolemaic dynasty in Egypt, 
                                                 
862 Manning (2003), pp. 13-21. 
863 Rostovtzeff (1922), p. 129. 
864 See graph (fig. 1) in Manning (2003), p. 17. 
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Ptolemaios II is usually credited with the major economic reforms that we see in place 
in the Zenon archive or the Revenue Laws.865 It is very probable, however, that our 
present understanding is just an accident of preservation. 
 Current interpretations of the Ptolemaic economy are still largely based on the 
work of two scholars: Claire Préaux and Mikhail Rostovtzeff.866 Although their 
syntheses are more than sixty years old now, they still form the starting point of any 
enquiry on the Ptolemaic economy. This comes as a consequence of their 
unparalleled mastery of the vast documentary evidence. However, Préaux’s 
conclusions on the nature of the ‘royal economy’ are more descriptive than model 
driven. Her verdict that the entire economic organisation of the Ptolemaic kingdom 
was set up for the maximization of the king’s revenues was based on the meticulous 
presentation, but not analysis, of the most important economic activities in the 
Ptolemaic Kingdom, as revealed in the papyri. Conversely, Rostovtzeff constructed a 
model, which ultimately set the tone for the scholarly outlook on the Ptolemaic 
economy for almost half a century. He viewed the Ptolemaic state as the household 
(oikos) of the ruler, in which the Ptolemaioi erected an elaborate, centrally planned 
state economy directed towards the accumulation of royal capital.867 This economy 
was characterised by sustained economic growth driven by long-distance interregional 
trade, which was conducted by a rising bourgeois class.868 Agricultural productivity 
was increased through the introduction of new technology and methods.869 In short, 
he viewed the economic administration of the Ptolemaioi as akin to a “Keynesian 
economic stewardship.”870 
 The view of Ptolemaic Egypt as a strongly centralised, dirigiste, economically 
rational and despotic state ruled by a militarised minority of Hellenes has also been 
influenced by Wittfogel’s thesis of “hydraulic agriculture and despotism,” which 
constitutes the first consistent attempt to explain the economic structures of ancient 
civilizations. According to this model, commonly known as ‘oriental despotism’, 
despotic empires developed because large-scale waterworks required centralised, 
“agro-managerial” supervision.871 A ruler with monopoly control over water resources 
                                                 
865 Rostovtzeff (1922), Tarn & Griffith (1952), Turner (1984), Manning (2008), p. 85. 
866 Préaux (1979), Rostovtzeff (1922, 1941). 
867 Préaux (1979), pp. 569-570. 
868 Rostovtzeff (1941), pp. 269-272. See also Manning (2003), pp. 130-131, (2006), pp. 259-260. 
869 Rostovtzeff (1941), esp. pp. 271-274, 411-414. 
870 As put aptly by Green (1991), p. 362. 
871 Wittfogel (1957). Similarly, see Eisenstadt (1963). Mann (1986), pp. 93-98. 
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and irrigation management concentrated all political and economic power in his 
person. This power was then exercised in an absolutist manner on all levels of state 
administration. Archaeological work in Pharaonic Egypt, however, has revealed that 
Wittfogel’s thesis does not stand up to close scrutiny. The irrigation of the Nile floods 
was not controlled centrally, but regionally. In fact, the only major public work co-
ordinated by the state was the drainage works in the Faiyum depression during the 
reign of Amenemhat III of the 12th Dynasty.872 By the time this project was under 
way, however, the centrally planned organisation of the Pharaonic state was already 
established and could not have been influenced by a de facto decentralised 
management of hydraulic agriculture. Such a view of the state disregards the existence 
and importance of social networks in the organisation of production and exchange, 
thereby restricting the economic power of the ruler. It is against this background that 
Wittfogel’s concept of a unitary, highly centralised state has been effectively dismissed 
as “mythical.”873  
 The reconsideration of the ‘strong state’ paradigm has been one of the most 
important developments in Ptolemaic history in the past twenty years. The main 
postulates of Rostovtzeff’s model of the Ptolemaic state have been all challenged. 
Préaux argued that technological innovation was not as pioneering or as widespread 
as Rostovtzeff would posit and Samuel maintained that the primary economic 
objective of the ruler was social and economic stability rather than infinite economic 
growth and wealth accumulation.874 Additionally, Samuel expressed his reservation 
regarding the validity of Rostovtzeff’s centrally planned and administered economy 
hypothesis, while Manning set out to demonstrate that the Ptolemaic economic 
administration was in fact far more decentralised than previously thought.875 At the 
same time, there was a shift in the consensus regarding the influences on the 
organisation of the Ptolemaic economy. Although Rostovtzeff believed that the 
economic structures of the Ptolemaic Kingdom were inherited from their Pharaonic 
predecessors, only to be tweaked for the better accommodation of the conquerors’ 
interests, recent scholarship has investigated other underlying traditions that might 
have influenced the Ptolemaic administration: Bingen stressed the connection of the 
                                                 
872 Butzer (1976), pp. 39-57. 
873 Mann (1986), p. 10. 
874 Préaux (1966), Samuel (1983). This view is debatable on the grounds that ultimately social and 
economic stability is not a goal in itself. Rather, it is to be used as a springboard for minimised friction 
and lower compliance costs. 
875 Samuel (1989, 1993), Manning (2003, 2005, 2005b, 2006). 
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tax regulations present in the Revenue Laws with traditional Hellenic tax-farming 
techniques, while Manning argued that the Ptolemaic economic structures were built 
on Persian fiscal policy.876 Equally, Hammond observed that property rights in the 
Argead Kingdom were quite similar to the Ptolemaic.877 Despite all the revisionist 
work, however, the old model of the centrally planned, directed economy with 
structures carried over from the Pharaonic period, and adapted where possible, still 
persists in mainstream scholarship.878 It will probably be years until the paradigm is 
shifted entirely. What is more, while the Pharaonic and Persian influences on the 
Ptolemaic economy have received a fair share of attention, so far there has been no 
serious attempt to investigate the influence of Argead prototypes in the economic 
organisation of early Ptolemaic Egypt. A comparison between the two will explore the 
likelihood of Makedonian economic structures migrating into early Ptolemaic Egypt. 
This is a fundamental connection, which, owing to the relative obscurity of the 
Argead economic organisation, has been the least recognised in the field of the 
economy, and certainly much less than in any of the monarchical power structures 
discussed in the previous chapters.   
 
 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING THE STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIES 
 
Since the unitary, centralised and bureaucratic model of the Ptolemaic state has 
undergone serious scrutiny and is no longer considered watertight, scholars have 
explored alternative frameworks for explaining the economic organisation of 
Ptolemaic Egypt. This thesis adopts the model advanced by the Stanford School, 
which is informed by the economic sociology put forward by Douglass North. His 
Neo-Institutional Economics approach has been fruitfully applied to ancient 
economies.879 North argues that in order to analyse the framework of the organisation 
of a historical economy one needs to consider three things: a theory of the state, a 
                                                 
876 Rostovtzeff (1941) believed that the organisation of the Ptolemaic economy did not involve a “radical 
break” with the Pharaonic past so much as a “partial improvement,” p. 1197. Bingen (1978), Manning 
(2006). 
877 Hammond (1989), pp. 284-285. 
878 Mostly through the still quite influential work of Finley (1999), p. 154. See also Samuel (1989), p. 53, 
Manning (2005b), p. 176. 
879 See further North (1981), esp. chapters 1-9. For the application of his theory of the state and 
economic organisation, see Manning (2003). 
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theory of property rights and a theory of ideology. Together, these three dimensions 
form the institutions of an economy. The study of institutions, or what North calls 
“the rules of the game,” compensates for the unrealistic, frictionless and institutionless 
economic world of perfectly operating markets presented by neo-classical economic 
theory.880 Such a model cannot effectively account for change in society, especially 
when individuals make decisions not based on a rational calculation of their individual 
profit. Equally, it cannot explain stability, i.e. the reasons why a group of people 
remain loyal to the status quo, or obey social rules when they could evade them at 
their benefit. The examination of the “rules of the game” presupposes a theory of 
ideology, which can accommodate the 'irrational' element in human economic 
behaviour ignored by neo-classical theory.881 Ideology can extend the lifespan of 
particular economic structures and institutions, even when they are inefficient, on the 
basis of a collective belief in their legitimacy. In the context of this thesis, a belief in 
the legitimacy of particular ruling houses and their right to extract taxes or organise 
production, as well as an embedded appreciation of monarchy as a valid mode of 
governance, minimized friction and the cost of enforcing compliance.  
 The second essential building block for understanding the organisation of an 
economy is property rights. The structure of property rights reflects which individuals 
or social groups in a political unit retain the exclusive authority to determine how a 
resource is used.882 Contrary to the unitary model applied to ancient monarchies, 
property rights were seldom concentrated in the hands of the ruler. There were 
always rivalling political units or individuals from within the existing hierarchy that 
challenged the monopoly of the ruler’s authority. The closer these substitutes were, 
the less freedom the ruler enjoyed to act in defiance of the needs and wants of his 
constituents. Put differently, property rights were borne out of the constant bargaining 
between the desires of the rulers for wealth maximization and the efforts of subjects to 
reduce transaction costs.883 Based on the evidence it is interesting to examine which 
                                                 
880 More specifically, the “rules of the game” according to NIE terminology are the basic formal legal 
rules and informal social norms, which govern individual behaviour and structure interaction, North 
(1993), pp. 5-6.  
881 In economic terminology, the term "irrational" refers to a purposefully non-efficient cost-benefit 
analysis. 
882 Alchian (2008). As North (1981) points out, “the essence of property rights is the right to exclude,” p. 21. 
883 North (1981), p. 18. Put simply, transaction costs are the costs incurred in making an economic 
exchange. For instance, when purchasing a loaf of bread the transaction costs are the costs above and 
beyond the monetary cost of the loaf, e.g. tracking the most beneficial seller of bread, travelling to and 
from the place of sale, negotiating the sale price and ensuring the other party honours the agreement 
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individuals or groups actually shared in the ownership of the land and resources in 
Argead Makedonia and Ptolemaic Egypt.  
 Finally, as it is the state that determines the structure of property rights and 
ensures their enforcement, one needs to adopt a theory of the state. It is necessary, 
however, to clarify from the outset that in the context of the kingdoms in question the 
notion of the ‘state’ as an institution that guarantees political order does not apply. 
According to the distinction proposed by Münkler, the historical definition of the 
state, as defined by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1628, is juxtaposed by a trans-
historical/universal definition, the application of which concept is not restricted by 
period or place. Argead Makedonia and Ptolemaic Egypt can best be described 
according to this second classification. As such, they were by no means an 
institutionalized power figuration set to guarantee the political order of a finite 
territory. Rather, these ‘states’ formed in themselves a political order centered on the 
monarch, whose main interests were power preservation and the collection of surplus 
and revenues.884 In turn, the subjects acknowledged the legitimacy of that political 
order and paid taxes in exchange for services, such as justice, the preservation of order 
and protection.885 Although this arrangement may sound like there was some form of 
contract in place between ruler and people, it is best to remember that, as Hume 
stated already in the 1740s, usurpation and conquest usually precede the formation of 
any type of contract.886 Given the origins of both Argead Makedonia and Ptolemaic 
Egypt in military expansion and the preponderance of the threat of violence factor in 
decision-making, both on a domestic and interstate level, this thesis adopts North’s 
neoclassical theory of the state, whereby “a state is an organization with a comparative 
advantage in violence, extending over a geographic area whose boundaries are determined by its power 
                                                 
through enforcement or compliance. All of these activities have an opportunity cost in terms of energy, 
money and time. 
884 These goals were pursued with the aid of a distinct group of people that frequented the court of the 
ruler and were known as the “φίλοι” or “συγγενεῖς:” the friends or relatives of the king, Münkler 
(1998). 
885 North (1981), pp. 23-24.  
886 Hume (1994), pp. 189-190. It is worth presenting here the debate between the contractual and 
predatory models of the state. The ‘contractual’ has been by far the most influential and argues that the 
reciprocal relation between the government and the populace is consensual. On the contrary, the 
‘predatory’ or ‘exploitation’ model emphasizes as the sole objective of the rulers the maximization of 
their own wealth. Services are only provided to the populace insofar as they serve the same purpose. 
Whether these services have a positive impact on the welfare of the subjects is an unintended 
consequence of them being offered. See Moselle & Polak (2001). 
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to tax constituents.”887 Assuming an unequal distribution of violence potential, the 
structure of property rights in such an organization is oriented towards the wealth-
maximization of the political centre, sidelining the wealth and welfare of its subjects. 
However, although predatory in origin, North’s model still allows for contractual 
relationships to develop as military organization gives way to the peaceful day-to-day 
workings of the economy of the state. 
 
It is against this background that this chapter examines those structures around which 
the Argead and early Ptolemaic economies were organised. It will be argued that 
complementary to firmly embedded Pharaonic traditions, revolving around the 
organisation of agriculture and irrigation, and the Persian fiscal practices in place at 
the time of Alexandros’ conquest, the structures of the early Ptolemaic economy relied 
to a considerable extent on ideological and practical templates carried over from 
Argead Makedonia. It will be shown that these templates are especially related, albeit 
not limited, to the Makedonian administration of newly conquered lands, notably in 
their guise as spear-won territories. An examination of the structure of property rights 
in both Kingdoms will serve to support this connection. 
 The argument runs contrary to the postulates of the Oikenwirtschaft theory, 
whereby the ruler managed the economy of the state as an extension of his personal 
household. The economic power of the Argead and Ptolemaic ruler was not as 
centralised as previously thought and, significantly, it was not a correlate of personal 
shrewdness, although weaker kings had more trouble to sustain compliance across the 
extensive socio-economic networks of groups and agents, which were contractually 
bound to his authority.888  






                                                 
887 North (1981), p. 21. On the origins of the state in military organisation, see Spencer (1969, pp. 117, 
125), Ritter (1969, pp. 7-8), Oppenheimer (1999). 
888 The contractual nature of the relationship involved the already mentioned supply of social goods 
such as justice, security and stability in exchange for economic goods (i.e. revenues). Weak leadership 




PROPERTY RIGHTS & ECONOMIC ACTORS  
 
 
The property rights structure in Argead Makedonia and Ptolemaic Egypt was likewise 
a reflection of the prevailing notions of the state and its supporting ideology. In the 
preceding chapter on the structures of military power it has been argued that the role 
of the state in both kingdoms centred on the monopoly of physical force inherent in 
the nature of the Makedonian monarchy and used in order to maintain political 
order. The chapters on dynastic and court power structures highlighted the fact that 
the ability of the king to perpetuate his authority, and in this case to enforce property 
rights, rested to a large degree on the ideological cohesion provided by his perceived 
legitimacy of himself and that of the dynasty to do so. In these conditions, it is to be 
expected that, other than the prerogative to enforce them, the lion’s share of property 
rights would lie with the king. His ownership, however, and by extent his economic 
power, was not universal. Rather, allowance was made for the participation of other 
individuals or groups in the property rights regime. It will be noted, however, that the 
groups that enjoyed such access were not the same in both Kingdoms. 
 
 
THE KING  
Land was a Kingdom’s most important economic asset, yielding crops, 
minerals, timber and, importantly, taxes. Aristoteles conceded that it was also the 
origin of a king’s power. As the quid pro quo for the loyalty of his subjects, the king 
assumed to all intents and purposes the role of an ardent gatherer and distributor of 
land.889 The nature of royal ownership over the aforementioned resources, however, is 
not as straightforward as Hammond would have liked when he wrote that “[the kings] 
owned all deposits of gold, silver, copper, iron, and other minerals; all stands of fine timber; and 
extensive areas of farm land and hunting parkland.”890 In a letter to the Athenians Philippos II 
grieved the kidnapping of his messenger Nikias right from within his territory, “ἐκ τῆς 
χώρας τῆς ἐμῆς.”891 In the same letter, he complained of the disingenuous behaviour 
of the Athenians, who, although not openly at war with the king, encouraged the 
disruption of sea-trade with Makedonia and ravaged his land, “τὴν χώραν μου κακῶς 
                                                 
889 Aristot. Pol. 3.1285b: “…πορίσαι χώραν, ἐγίγνοντο βασιλεῖς ἑκόντων καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι 
πάτριοι.” 
890 Hammond (1989), p. 179. 
891 [Dem.] Ἐπιστολὴ[Φιλίππου 12.2. 
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ἐποιεῖτε.”892  Indeed, when referring to “my land” Philippos II could, just as well, be 
describing his relationship with it in a literal sense (as his own private property) or in a 
wider political sense (as the land of the Makedonian Kingdom, of which he was the 
Head). These nuances were picked up by scholars prior to Hammond, who argued 
against the personal ownership of the territory by the king.893  Whether a king could 
claim ownership of the land and resources in the same absolute, legal manner that a 
private individual would over his private property, or as the hereditary designated 
trustee of a political unit acting on behalf of its members is pivotal for an 
understanding of his property rights. Although it is difficult to gauge with any degree 
of certainty the extent and nature of his hold over the Makedonian resources there 
are, however, few yet strong indications that point towards the latter, at least for parts 
of the lands under Makedonian rule.  
At the head of this body of evidence stands Alexandros’ explicit statement in 
the Opis Speech that he was no more than the guardian of the wealth of the 
Makedones that had been entrusted to him.894 Despite the obvious problems posed by 
the historicity of this passage, comparative evidence from the neighbouring federal 
state of Thessalia, where the tax revenues were re-invested in the running of public 
affairs, reinforces the likelihood of a similar management of proceeds being in place in 
Makedonia.895 Interestingly, Souda also defines public revenues (or affairs) as not the 
property of the sovereign power.896 Additional evidence for the non-pervasive 
ownership of the king is to be found in epigraphy. 
 
LAND AND TAXES IN ARGEAD MAKEDONIA 
 Hatzopoulos’ exhaustive study of Makedonian inscriptions (up until 1996) has 
crystallised the view that the possessions under the sovereignty (ἀρχήν) of the 
Makedonian king since the beginning of the fifth century consisted of territories that 
were always more extensive than those inhabited or colonised by Makedones.897 His 
                                                 
892 [Dem.] Ἐπιστολὴ[Φιλίππου 12.5. 
893 Hampl (1934), pp. 10-56, Rosen (1970), pp. 65-79, Borza (1987), p. 39 n. 29. 
894 Arr. Anab. 7.9.9: “κέκτημαι δὲ ἰδίᾳ οὐδέν, οὐδὲ ἔχει τις ἀποδεῖξαι θησαυροὺς ἐμοὺς ὂτι μὴ ταῦτα, 
ὑμέτερα κτήματα ἢ ὂσα ἒνεκα ὑμῶν φυλάττεται.” See below, the section on the Makedones. 
895 Dem. Ὀλυνθιακὸς Α 1.22: “ὡς οὐδὲ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς ἔτι δώσοιεν αὐτῷ καρποῦσθαι: τὰ 
γὰρ κοινὰ τὰ Θετταλῶν ἀπὸ τούτων δέοι διοικεῖν.” For the similarities between Thessalia and 
Makedonia in the political sphere, see Hatzopoulos (1996), pp. 478-479, Archibald (2000). 
896 Suda s.v. Βασιλεία (148): “…οὐ τὰ δημόσια τῆς βασιλείας κτήματα.”  
897 Hatzopoulos (1996), pp. 167-216. Thoukydides speaks of Philippos’s former “ἀρχήν” in the sense 
that he was sovereign over the lands now taken by the Thrakai, Thouk. 2.100.3-4. Philippos was the 
insubordinate brother of Perdikkas II, see Thouk. 1.57.3. 
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tripartite division of those lands into national, civic, and royal gave a sharper 
definition to the chameleonic perception of the extent of the Kingdom that puzzled 
earlier scholarship.898 Most importantly, however, it revealed that the Makedonian 
king had different rights and obligations with respect to each one. 
What Hatzopoulos called the ‘national territory,’ was the result of conquest 
and subsequent settlement by Makedones. Originally, it consisted of the Old 
Kingdom, to which was added Upper Makedonia.899 Under Philippos II, Makedonian 
communities could be found from as far northwest as Alkomene in Derriopos, all the 
way to the basin of the river Strymon to the east.900 Quite importantly for evaluating 
the extent of the king’s property rights, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
individual Makedones and other private landholders within these boundaries were 
required to pay tax on their property to the royal treasury.901 According to Curtius, 
the Makedones were ‘free men’ and as such they were exempt from paying tribute to 
the ruling authorities. Significantly, even in times of crisis the Makedones were not 
expected to contribute extraordinary funds (εἰσφοραί), as was the case in the city-state 
world.902 It is telling that when Alexandros embarked on the Asian Expedition and 
found himself in need of cash he borrowed money from his courtiers, which in turn he 
repaid through the award of several grants.903 But that is not to mean that landowners 
in the Kingdom were free-riding the system. To the contrary, according to extant 
accounts private individuals had to pay dues on goods imported and exported from 
their lands, as well as provide the state with a per capita public service and other regular 
financial contributions. The dead of the major battles of the Asian Expedition, 
according to Arrianos, were honoured by having their surviving immediate family 
                                                 
898 It is a fact that the borders of the Makedonian Kingdom were never rigidly set. They fluctuated over 
time reflecting the military success or failures of its rulers. To guard themselves from “chasing a chameleon 
through the centuries” ancient Makedonian historians made the distinction between a geographic and a 
political Makedonia, Hammond (1972-1988), I: pp. 3-5, followed by Borza (1992), pp. 28-30. 
According to Borza’s conception, this corresponds to the use of the terms Macedonia (geographic 
designation) and Macedon (political designation), although he does not clarify how these two concepts 
work and how they are reflected in the sources.  
899 See further Edson  (1970), Dell (1970). 
900 Peithon, son of Krateuas, from Alkomene is included among the Makedonian officers to man 
Alexandros III’s triereis, Arr. Ind. 18.6. For the incorporation of Amphipolis in the Lower Strymon into 
the Makedonian Kingdom, see Hatzopoulos (1991). That the Strymon formed the physical eastern 
boundary of the Kingdom of Makedonia can also be deduced from the fact that Kynnane was not 
allowed to cross it with her army by Antipatros, Polyain. Strateg. 8.60.  
901 Curt. 6.6.11: “Sed, opinor, liberis pretium servitutis ingratum est.” Cf. Tertullianus (Apologeticum 13.6) who 
considered direct taxes on land as “notae captivitatis.” 
902 E.g. Antiph. Κατηγορία φόνου ἀπαράσημος 2.2.12. See Isager & Skydsgaard (1992), pp. 141-143. 
An εἰσφορά was an extraordinary tax on property that was required by the state mostly for military 
purposes. 
903 Plout. Alex. 15.1-3, Arr. Anab. 7.9.6, see also Appendix C no 55. 
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become exempt from taxes pertaining to their land (κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἀτέλειαν ἔδωκε) 
and other public services (λειτουργίαι) and levies (κατὰ τὰς κτήσεις ἑκάστων 
εἰσφοραί).904 Given the free status of Makedonian citizens, the land-tax mentioned 
here would probably apply to those amongst the soldiers that were grantees of tracts 
of royal land. As regards the levies, although not much is known about them, it is 
possible that Alexandros was referring to the oft-recorded import and export taxes on 
goods that passed through Makedonian lands. One cannot be certain whether these 
dues were valid only on granted royal land, which is where most of our evidence 
comes from.905  However, if one translates ‘τὰς κτήσεις ἑκάστων’ as the ‘properties of 
each’ then quite probably this trade tax applied to private landowners within the 
national territory as well. Finally, the λειτουργίαι are the most obscure component of 
a Makedonas’ contribution to the state. It seems doubtful whether in this case these 
included military service, especially since military obligations were specifically 
excluded from similar absolutions in the past.906 In order to gain the favour of his 
father’s soldiers the young king Alexandros granted to everyone ‘immunity from all 
things,’ except military service. Securing a constant supply of loyal military force was 
just as important during the Asian Expedition as at its eve, if not greater. Therefore, 
given also the absence of widespread slavery in the Kingdom, public services could 
have included the extraordinary participation of the Makedones in public works, 
either through their own manual labour, or through the provision of draught animals 
and other supplies.907 
Civic land involved territories that came under the jurisdiction of individual 
cities, whether situated in the Makedonian kingdom or conquered by it but not 
annexed. The tax status of cities incorporated in the national territory is not entirely 
clear, but there is no evidence to suggest that they were subject to a property tax. It 
would also appear that formerly autonomous cities, such as Amphipolis for which we 
are better informed, maintained the right to dispose of the lands that belonged to 
                                                 
904 Arr. Anab. 1.16.5, 7.10.4 
905 SIG3 135, Syll.3 332, SEG 47:940. See Hatzopoulos (1996) for other interpretations of those levies, 
pp. 439-440. 
906 Just. 11.1.10: Macedonibus inmunitatem cunctarum rerum praeter militiae uacationem dedit. 
907 Cf. the “φόρος λητουργικός” from the Mnesimachos inscription, Sardis 7.1 1.  
 
177 
them at will.908 Still, in times of uncertainty the king would be called in to settle any 
territorial disputes with neighbouring communities or to set the civic boundaries.909  
If conquered territories were not incorporated and colonised then, as a general 
rule, it appears that the land remained in the possession of the communities (poleis or 
ethne), which were now subject and allied (“ξύμμαχα […] καὶ ὑπήκοα”) in a fashion 
similar to the incorporated territories. They were, however, under the obligation to 
pay some form of tribute and probably to supply contingents for the Makedonian 
army.910 The composition of the army Perdikkas II mustered against Arravaios of 
Lynkos in the late fifth century BCE supports this argument. The king led a cavalry of 
Makedones and an infantry made up of Hellenes who lived in Makedonia (“τῶν 
ἐνοικούντων Ἑλλήνων ὁπλίτας”), followed by a host of barbarian light infantry.911 
Evidence for the payment of tribute of subject cities, especially from the reigns of 
Philippos II and Alexandros III, abounds.912 A case in point is the city of Priene, 
which had to be explicitly relieved of this fiscal duty by decree of the Makedonian king 
himself.913 The citizens of Priene, even if not residing in the city proper, were declared 
free and autonomous and owners of their lands in the countryside, as well as their 
houses in the city. By contrast, the non-Prienians, living in the surrounding villages, 
were subject to taxation.914 
The last, but most important category of land in the Makedonian Kingdom in 
terms of revenue, was the so-called royal land (χώρα βασιλική). On certain occasions, 
rather than remaining in the hands of its pre-conquest owners, newly acquired land 
passed to the possession of the king himself. Most often, the king would recognize 
some strategic advantage to the territory in question (richness in natural resources, like 
timber, minerals or soil fertility) and would claim it as his own. The phrase normally 
associated with these lands in the literary sources is “ἡ ἑαυτοῦ γῆ.”915 That this simple 
possessive designation amounted to almost a terminus technicus is highlighted by its 
                                                 
908 See Hatzopoulos (1991). 
909 SEG 40:542: Philippos II was summoned to settle a boundary dispute in the area of Mygdonia. The 
extant inscription is probably a royal diagramma. For a similar case, see Appendix C no 25. 
910 Thouk. 2.99.2.  
911 For the supply of soldiers, see Thouk. 4.124.1. Cf. the discussion on recruitment and the ‘territorial 
principle’ in chapter 3. 
912 See Appendix C nos 14, 41, 59. 
913 OGIS 1 (= I. Priene 132) ll. 13-15: “τῆς δὲ συντάξεως ἀφίημι τὴμ Πριηνέωμ πόλιν.” For other instances 
see Appendix C, especially the treatment of Persian cities after their conquest by Alexandros III, where 
a tax collector is normally appointed. 
914 OGIS 1 (= I. Priene 132) ll. 3-7: “ὄσοι μέν εἰσι [Πριηνεῖ]ς, αὐτο[νό]μους εἶναι κα[ὶ ἐλευθ]έρους, 
ἔχ[οντ]α̣ς τήν τ[ε γῆγ κ]αὶ τὰς οἰκίας τὰς ἐν τ[ῆι π]όλει πά[σα]ς καὶ τὴγ χώραν·” 
915 Thouk. 1.58.2, [Dem.] 7.39-41. 
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existence in inscriptions, such as the royal letter of Alexandros to the city of Priene: 
“χώραγ̣[γ]ι̣νώσκω ἐμὴν εἶναι.”916 As such, the rights of the king on this land 
paralleled the rights of any private individual over their property. It is on rare 
occasions that the king is described as exploiting the land directly. According to 
Aischines, Philippos II owned some vineyards, which he worked with war prisoners 
from Olynthos.917 The norm, however, was that agriculturally fertile land would be 
either leased out or granted to ἑταῖροι, φίλοι or other beneficiaries to exploit in return 
for φόρος (rent or tax).918 Forests and land rich in minerals could be leased out or 
granted as well, but the resources themselves (timber and metals) appear to have 
remained in the jurisdiction of the king.  
There is no conclusive evidence that forested areas and mines were 
automatically and exclusively owned by the king.919 The common occurrence of the 
king granting gifts of timber can suggest that at least some of the forests were royal 
land.920 Be that as it may, the bulk of the evidence is consistent in that the king 
directly controlled the trade of timber and enjoyed the relevant tax revenues from the 
leases.921 First in support of this argument is that all the extant commercial treaties 
involving the sale of timber between Makedonia and third parties were conducted 
with the king as the sole representative of the Makedonian side.922 Secondly, 
inscriptions such as the one recording the ban on timber sales imposed by Alexandros 
III in the land of Philippoi make it abundantly clear that the regulation of timber 
production was a royal prerogative.923 This document also provides evidence for the 
engagement of individual entrepreneurs or groups of people in timber trade.924 Their 
                                                 
916 OGIS 1 (= I. Priene 132).  
917 See Appendix C no 38. 
918 See Appendic C nos 22, 40, 55. 
919 Borza p. 39, n. 29. (Aristoteles (Pol. 6.1321b) preserves a mention of the magistracy of ὑλωρός 
(forester, responsible for timber), which he considered indispensable in safeguarding a state’s resources. 
Given the wealth of Makedonia in timber and Aristoteles’ background this magistracy could well have 
existed as a royal appointment in Makedonia. As such, it could be used as an argument in favour of the 
state possession of forests, but without any other corroborating evidence it has to remain a conjecture. 
920 See Appendix C nos 11, 17, 35. 
921 For the lease of γῆ ἔνδενδρος, see the royal grant of Lysimachos to Limnaios, SEG 38:619, Hatz. 
Epig. App. 21, see Appendix C no 22. 
922 See Appendix C nos 11, 14. 
923 See Appendix C no 48. 
924 In the late Antigonid period forests and mines were leased to individuals for exploitation, Liv. 
45.29.10-11. In the case of forests at least the lease went to the highest bidder indiscriminately of ethnic 
background, Liv. 45.29.14. 
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involvement was most likely subject to the same produce tax due to the Crown, which 
Theophrastos’ boastful man was happy to evade thanks to his royal connections.925  
As far as mines are concerned, the literary sources mention that the Argead 
kings were able to extract large revenues from their exploitation.926 Unfortunately, we 
do not know whether they were leased out, or worked by wagers who reported 
directly to the king’s contractors.  Since Philippos II is said to have invested in mining 
technology the latter method appears probable.927 However, in the Roman Settlement 
of 167 BCE it is specifically mentioned that the mines were leased out to individual 
entrepreneurs who paid tax to the king.928 The practice could have been similar to the 
administration of the Athenian silver mines at Laurion and elsewhere. In the case of 
Laurion, the state claimed ownership of the mines (but not of the lands above it), while 
farming out their leases to private individuals (the poletai, ten in number) for a fixed 
sum and a percentage of the workings.929 Since all mining activities had to be 
registered with the state, the Athenian government retained control over the 
exploitation of precious metals.930  
Tax farming as a method of reassigning the burden of tax collection to the 
highest bidder in public auctions was not unknown in Argead Makedonia. Aristoteles 
preserves the financial re-organisation effected by Kallistratos for Perdikkas III, which 
doubled the royal revenues from harbour dues.931 The ellimenion tax reflected the right 
of ownership over the actual water of the harbour and presumably of the use of the 
port facilities. It is the final resource located within the bounds of the national territory 
(alongside timber and metals) that the king could claim direct and unlimited control 
of.932 
Royal land, the most profitable of all the types of land discussed above, has to 
be distinguished from the national territory. Other than mines, forests and ports the 
                                                 
925 See Appendix C no 51, and also no 9. 
926 Alexandros I: Appendix C no 3, Philippos II: Appendix C nos 28, 33. 
927 Diod. 16.8.6-7: “ταῖς κατασκευαῖς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ηὔξησεν…” 
928 Liv. 45.29.10-11. 
929 A series of leases to individuals dating down to the early third century BCE has been preserved on 
inscriptions, see Austin (1994), pp. 545-546 with ancient and modern references. See also Shipton 
(1998) . 
930 Hyper. Ὑπὲρ Εὐξενίππου ἐισαγγελίας ἀπολογία πρὸς Πολύευκτον 4.34. 
931 See Appendix C no 19. 
932 See also Appendix C no 31, for the appropriation of the Thessalian harbour dues by Philippos II 
following his victory at the Krokos Field. 
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king possessed explicitly nothing else within the Kingdom of Makedonia proper.933 
Whenever land was designated as ἡ ἑαυτοῦ it always involved territories lying outside 
national and civic borders. For example, when Perdikkas II made a gift of Mygdonia 
to the Chalkidians this was not incorporated in the Kingdom.934 The same applied to 
the district of Anthemous that Amyntas I offered to Hippias at the close of the sixth 
century and to Potidaia that Philippos II gave to the Olynthians.935 This is where the 
concept of spear-won territory (Γῆ δορίκτητος) becomes relevant. Land won in 
conquest never belonged straightaway to the Kingdom of Makedonia proper and did 
not do so unless it was distributed to the Makedones.936 Instead, spear-won territory 
was equivalent to Crown territory, which the king could exploit directly, lease out or 
grant to third parties.937 What the Athenians failed to grasp in the debacle concerning 
the island of Halonnesos was that since Philippos II delivered the island from pirates, 
then according to the prescripts of royal property rights it belonged to him by right of 
conquest. He was hitherto at liberty to grant it to whomsoever he pleased, even if it 
was back to its former owners; the operative word being ‘former.’938 
 
LAND AND TAXES IN PTOLEMAIC EGYPT 
 Experts on Ptolemaic economic history have argued that the structure of the 
Ptolemaic economy owed much to the Persian imperial administration that preceded 
it, while it formed a continuation of Pharaonic developments in irrigation and 
agriculture.939 From the point of view of the native Egyptians, they speak of the 
Ptolemaic takeover as a seamless process, whereby a Makedonian Pharaoh and his 
dynasty merely replaced an equally foreign dynast, the Persian, without much 
fanfare.940 In the field of economic structures, accommodation to the old institutional 
practices, as opposed to radical change, is stressed.941 The process of developing what 
became known as the ‘royal economy’ was slow and it is argued that it only took off 
                                                 
933 Hatzopoulos (1996) has tried with a considerable degree of conviction to demonstrate that the 
‘national’ territory was “exhaustively divided between poleis and ethne,” the latter being rural 
communities, p. 220. 
934 Appendix C no 4. Hatzopoulos (1996), p. 174. 
935 Appendix C nos 3, 26. Hatzopoulos (1996), pp. 174-175.  
936 Both Mygdonia and Anthemous were incorporated in the Makedonian Kingdom after 348 BCE 
under Philippos II, Hatzopoulos (1996), pp. 189-199. 
937 See Appendix no 40. 
938 Dem. Περὶ Ἁλοννήσου 7.2. 
939 Manning (2003), pp. 8-9, (2006), esp. pp. 266-267. For the development of plantation districts in 
Pharaonic Egypt as a model of land development in later periods, see Eyre (1994). 
940 Manning (2003), p. 158. 
941 Rostovtzeff (1941), pp. 1197, Shipley (2000), p. 196. 
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under Ptolemaios II Philadelphos.942 As far as innovations in the economic 
organisation of the kingdom are concerned these are recognized to be the 
introduction of public auction and royal banks, both described as Hellenic 
institutions.943 In short, the role of Makedonian economic structures in the 
organisation of Ptolemaic Egypt is conspicuously absent from the literature. The 
underlying reason for that is without a doubt the state of the evidence. In many ways, 
it is a situation similar to the obscure role of Ptolemaios I in the economic 
consolidation of Ptolemaic sovereignty, whereby scarce evidence is taken to indicate 
limited influence and state activity.944 His marginalisation in favour of his son is 
largely driven by the dearth of contemporary material and the abundance of third 
century BCE evidence, such as the Revenue Laws Papyrus (P. Rev.) and the archives 
of Zenon of Kaunos (P. Cair. Zen.), secretary to the King’s financial right hand, the 
dioiketes Apollonios. However, discounting entirely the level of migration of the 
Makedonian ‘rules of the game’ to early Ptolemaic Egypt provides a distorted 
understanding of the structure of its economy on a state level. Argead Makedonia was 
a monarchical state, whose structures allowed what Giddens called a high-level of 
time-space distanciation. This is nothing else than a jargonic expression to denote that 
as a state Argead Makedonia possessed the necessary tools (writing, recording, 
monetisation, symbolic tokens of standardised value recognised beyond the local level) 
that enhanced the ability of its structures and practices to be reproduced across time 
and space.945 What is more, the epigraphic evidence that has accumulated in 
Makedonia over the past thirty years renders the consideration of that migration 
imperative in discussions concerning institutions in the Hellenistic kingdoms. The fact 
that there is marked institutional continuity with Persian economic administration and 
Pharaonic practice does not necessarily clash with the possibility that a Makedonian 
organisational template might have been influential.  
Going back to the property rights of the king in Ptolemaic Egypt, as Pharaoh 
in the eyes of his Egyptian audience, he was in principle the ultimate owner of the 
                                                 
942  Rostovtzeff (1922), Tarn & Griffith (1927), Turner (1984), Manning (2008), p. 85. For an analysis of 
the royal economy, see Rostovtzeff (1941), pp. 267-316, Préaux (1979). 
943 On public auctions, see Manning (2003), pp. 160-161. On Ptolemaic banks, see Bogaert (1994). 
944 See Manning (2005), p. 8.  
945 See further Giddens (1981), ch. 4. 
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land and all its inhabitants.946 According to Makedonian practice, the acquisition of 
Egypt in conquest (‘by the spear’) put the king in a similar position. As far as the 
realities of the state are concerned though, there were two types of land: land that 
yielded rent and land for which rent was foregone. The latter category, which is 
described in Hellenic administrative documents as γῆ ἐν ἀφέσει, included the land 
granted to klerouchoi and temple estates.947 As in Makedonia, the major rent yielding 
land was royal land. This was granted as a gift to private individuals (δωρεά) or rented 
to royal farmers. From the former the king collected an annual tax.948 Apart from 
designated royal land, the most impressive and lucrative portion of which was the 
Faiyum depression, the Ptolemaic king did not interfere much with the existing land 
tenure régime.949 Principally, he appears to have appropriated unclaimed and 
underused land (as in the Faiyum) and the right to assign parts of it to his soldiers or 
friends. Temple ownership was largely undisturbed and small-scale holdings that 
could be classed as ‘private’ land continued to exist, especially in Upper Egypt. That 
being said, however, evidence shows that these holdings, usually orchards or house 
plots, were taxed at the same rate as royal land.950 
 The right of the Ptolemaic king to tax all classes of land, apart from klerouchic 
and temple estates, and most types of produce is in practice the equivalent of actually 
owning the land. From the outset, the Persian practice of paying a fixed annual tribute 
to the king was abandoned in favour of a system designed to yield the maximum 
amount of income to the ruler through taxation.951 The regional variation in the type 
of taxes, the medium in which they were paid and the amount collected demonstrates 
the willingness of the early Ptolemaioi to secure a stable revenue by accommodating 
their practices to the established order.952 This can be explained both in neoclassical 
economic terms, as an effort by the new rulers to avoid the excessive transaction costs 
that a full restructuring of the already existing economic system would entail, as well 
as by their adherence to an already existing model of economic administration 
imported from Makedonia.  
                                                 
946 This was not the case in Persia, Aperghis (2004), pp. 88-89. See also Diod. 1.73.2-7, who claims that 
in Egypt one third of the land belonged to the king, one third to the priestly class and one third to the 
Egyptian klerouchoi.  
947 Keenan and Shelton (1976), pp. 2-10. 
948 Billows (1995), p. 125. 
949 Royal land was mostly concentrated in the Faiyum and the neighbouring Oxyrhynchite and 
Heracleopolite nomes, Rowlandson (1985). 
950 Manning (2003), pp. 71-72 with references. 
951 Hdt. 3.91.2-4 records that this amounted to 700 talanta. 
952 See for example the regional variations of the harvest tax, Manning (2003), pp. 59-61. 
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The New Lands Paradigm 
Recent scholarship has tried to dispel the view that Ptolemaic Egypt was 
governed as spear-won territory. At the same time concessions are made for the role 
of Ptolemaios I, however badly recorded, in setting the foundations for the 
organisation of the state.953 It will be argued that these two views are in fact hardly 
reconcilable. On the one hand, the literary sources are quite explicit that Ptolemaic 
Egypt was territory spear-won for Ptolemaios.954 On the other, the evidence from 
Argead Makedonia regarding the administration of newly-acquired territories points 
to the fact that spear-won land, and its concomitant equation with crown land, did not 
necessarily involve the wholesale displacement and appropriation of all people and all 
property. The example of Philippos II’s gradual integration of Amphipolis within the 
national state will serve to support the view that the partial accommodation of the 
Egyptian property rights structure by the Ptolemaic dynasty did not constitute a 
deviation from the norms of administering spear-won land that the king did not wish 
to reserve for private exploitation.955 
 Amphipolis, strategically placed by the river Strymon, was not incorporated in 
the Makedonian national territory immediately after it was conquered by Philippos II 
in 357 BCE. Hatzopoulos concluded that the city remained a theoretically 
independent ally of the Makedonian king for no more than a year, while Griffith 
placed a terminus ante quem in 343 BCE.956 Whatever the date of incorporation a series 
of Amphipolitan sale deeds studied by Hatzopoulos reveals that the process involved 
the preservation of both civic institutions and the original population in place. It 
seems that the only individuals who were evicted from the city were the political 
adversaries of Philippos.957 A vital ingredient of the incorporation of the city to the 
Makedonian state, as we have seen, was its settlement by Makedones. A study of 
ethnics demonstrates that the population of Amphipolis was replenished by 
Makedones originating not only from the Old Kingdom, but also from Upper 
Makedonia.958 As far as civic institutions are concerned, Philippos retained the same 
                                                 
953 Manning (2003), pp. 140, 158. 
954 Arr. Diad. F 1 34. 
955 The following discussion owes much to Hatzopoulos (1991), (1996), pp. 181-189. For an 
enumeration of the phases of incorporation (4), see also Errington (2002), pp. 16-17. 
956 Hatzopoulos (1991), (1996), p. 184. Walbank based his chronology on the existence inter alia of a 
Makedonian cavalry unit from Amphipolis, Hammond, Griffith & Walbank (1972-1989) II, pp. 351-
356. 
957 Diod. 16.8.2.  
958 Hatzopoulos (1996), p. 182. 
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epistates, Sparges, for a number of years.959 Other civic magistracies also remained in 
place, such as the board of the polemarchoi. However, what is most interesting to 
observe in the case of Amphipolis is the harmonious political and civic co-existence of 
Makedonian immigrants with the local Amphipolitans and especially the élite, which 
continued to provide the human resources to man important administrative positions. 
It is telling that in the deeds of sale none of the magistrates, not even the newly 
introduced eponymous priest of Asklepios, bears a typically Makedonian name.960 On 
a wider social level, the onomastic corpus by Tataki offers evidence that the city 
became fully Makedonian, but at the same time remained distinctly Amphipolitan. 
The co-existence of the ethnics Makedon ex Amphipoleos, but also the far more widely 
attested plain Amphipolites bear testimony to what Hatzopoulos has aptly described as 
the “open society” of the kingdom of Makedonia and Hammond has praised as the 
inclusiveness of the Makedonian polis. Both appraisals stand in stark contrast to the 
racially exclusive city-state of the south.961  
 Overall, spear-won territory was put to use at the discretion of the king. Some 
times population pressures and security concerns would dictate the re-settlement of 
Makedones in frontier locations, where better agricultural land was on offer and 
where enemies could be kept easier at check. Strategic advantages were recognised by 
the king and such transfers took place possibly even before the reign of Perdikkas II, 
while they intensified under Philippos II.962 Other times, cities could be completely 
razed to the ground (such as Methone) and re-settled purely with Makedones for 
reasons that the sources do not clarify.963 However, beyond the national borders cities 
with mixed populations seem to have been the norm.964 When it was deemed 
advantageous the Makedonian state had devised an administrative system that was 
characterised by racial and institutional flexibility. Hammond may be right when he 
asserts that this was one of the greatest contributions of the Makedonian state to 
                                                 
959 For the debate on the role of the epistates, which some interpret as a royal appointed overseer, see 
Tarn (1913), pp. 194-196, Bengtson (1952), pp. 317-330. Follow epigraphic references in Hatzopoulos 
(1996), p. 371. Hatzopoulos (1996) argues that the epistates was a regular civic magistrate, pp. 372-396. 
For Holleaux (1897) the epistates was a “gouverneur, un homme de confiance du souverain,” p. 452. Even on 
etymological grounds alone, the author would opt for an interpretation viewing the epistates as a royal 
overseer, see also Hammond (1999). 
960 Hatzopoulos (1991). 
961 Tataki (1998), pp. 45-63, Hatzopoulos (1996), p. 182. See the comments in Hammond (1993). 
962 Theag. BNJ 774 F 3, Thouk. 1.58.2, Diod. 13.49.1-2, Steph. Byz. s.v. Pella for the earliest instances 
of population transfers. See further Appendix C nos 10, 12. 
963 Appendix C no 30, Hatzopoulos (1996), pp. 179-181. 
964 Appendix C nos 41, 43. 
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posterity.965 Rather than emphasising solely Pharaonic or Persian influence in the 
organisation of the Ptolemaic economy, which of course has enormous merit when 
one studies the intricacies of that system, it is the contention of the author that the 
institutional flexibility exhibited by the economic organisation of the early Ptolemaioi 





There existed individuals and groups within the Argead and Ptolemaic 
Kingdoms that enjoyed quite significant property rights over portions of land and its 
revenues. To the extent that their property rights intersected with that of the king, this 
section will discuss the entrepreneurs of the monarchical state.  
 The most important economic link between the king and individual 
entrepreneurs were the land grants (δωρεαί). These were given as gifts usually to 
hetairoi and philoi at the ruler’s discretion. As already discussed in Chapter Two, land 
grants were utilised by both the Argead and the early Ptolemaic kings as a tool for 
attracting talented individuals. Nearchos, the admiral of Alexandros III’s fleet, a 
Kretan by birth, received a grant and settled in Amphipolis during the reign of 
Philippos II.966 The same applied for the Mytilenian brothers Erigyios and 
Laomedon, both hetairoi to Alexandros III.967 Similarly, during the early years of 
Ptolemaic expansion individual Makedones, the closest associates of the Ptolemaic 
kings, received substantial land grants. Apollonios the dioiketes received ten thousand 
arouras in the new town of Philadelphia in the Faiyum and some land in the 
Memphite nome.968 Between Makedonia and Ptolemaic Egypt the land grant lost its 
hereditary (ἐμ πατρικοῖς καὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκγόνοις) and alienable (κυρίοις οὖσι 
κεκτῆσθαι καὶ ἀλλάσσεσθαι καὶ ἀποδόσθαι) qualities.969 In the latter they became 
strictly personal holdings, identified by the name of the holder (Ἀπολλωνίου).970 In 
both kingdoms, however, the king retained his right to revoke the grant. Thus, we find 
Perdikkas, son of Koinos, confirming in the reign of Kassandros, the land grant that 
                                                 
965 Hammond (1993). 
966 Arr. Ind. 18.4, 10. 
967 Thomas (2007), p. 61. 
968 See Rostovtzeff (1922), p. 42. 
969 See Appendix C nos 22, 40. 
970 See Rostovtzeff (1922), pp. 48-49. 
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was given to his grandfather by Philippos II.971 Apollonios it seems had his confiscated 
when Ptolemaios Euergetes succeeded his patron Philadelphos.972 It is not entirely 
clear whether this was because his commission as dioiketes ended (i.e. land grants were 
entirely dependent on the status of the grantee) or because of some personal fallout.  
 In terms of financial obligations, the gift did not come free. The grantees were 
still expected to pay the phoros of crown land to the king. By giving away the land, the 
king on his part had possibly foregone the produce taxes (εἰσάγοντι καὶ ἐξάγοντι καὶ 
πωλοῦντι καὶ ὠνουμένωι), while his beneficiaries received the rents from the actual 
cultivators.973 As temporary landowners they had significant power over their 
contracted employees, as well as over production. In Ptolemaic Egypt, however, the 
king was not a sort of absentee landlord. Documents, such as P. Cair. Zen. 2 59155 
(256 BCE), present him directly interfering in the cultivation of the land.974 Land 
grants, therefore, were used both as a means to gratify and reward loyal courtiers by 
diverting revenue to them, but at the same time, remained under the jurisdiction of 
the king, who could manipulate production in favour of intensification. 
 Other than the fact that the king’s friends were largely associated with 
extensive land ownership, either granted by the king or by virtue of their own 
aristocratic status, not much is known about the economic activities of grantees in 
Argead Makedonia.975 Recent excavations at Argilos, a city just to the west of the 
Strymon mouth, have revealed a large and solidly built farmhouse crowning the 
acropolis of the city. It has been suggested by the excavators that it may have been the 
headquarters of a large estate given to one of Philippos’ hetairoi in the second half of 
the fourth century BCE.976 The farmhouse complex contained a well-preserved rotary 
                                                 
971 Appendic C no 22. It may be that the reconfirmation of land grants was not standard practice, but 
rather in this case reflected the incorporation of the grant into the civic land of Kassandreia, thus 
blurring its status. 
972 He was also stripped of his commission as dioiketes, Rostovtzeff (1922), pp. 18-20. 
973 For the phoros see Hatzopoulos (1996), pp. 435-436. Cf the Mnesimachos inscription in Billows 
(1995), Aperghis (2004). The Zenon archive preserves a variety of agreements between Apollonios and 
groups of farmers, who rented plots belonging to the estate. Some parcels were given over to klerouchoi, 
see Manning (2003), p. 113, n. 86 with references. 
974 See also Rostovzeff (1922), pp. 48-49. 
975 Theopompos FGrHist 156 F 225b. See, however, the third century BCE evidence of a certain 
Zopyros (it is unknown whether he was in the entourage of a king), who according to recently studied 
deeds of sale from Mieza had bought extensive tracts of land in the area aiming to form a ‘super-estate,’ 
Hatzopoulos, M.B. (2007). An Old and New Inscription from Mieza: the Constitution of Extensive Landed Properties 
in the Central Macedonian Plain and the Question of λαοί in Hellenistic Macedonia, unpublished conference 
paper. Abstract available at http://www.currentepigraphy.org/2007/09/06/ciegl-xiii-thematic-panel-
23-‘the-epigraphy-of-macedonia’/, last accessed 19 March 2010. 
976 Summary of findings in the site of the excavators: http://www.argilos.org, last accessed 23 March 
2010, see also Foxhall (2007), pp. 159-161. 
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olive crusher, which could indicate one of the main crops of the estate. There is no 
evidence to suggest that the king would interfere in production, either in terms of what 
was cultivated or how much. Rather, it seems that the nature of the land grants in 
Argead Makedonia satisfied the need to preserve and enhance the loyalties of the 
courtiers, but also fostered strong expectations of reciprocity, which are most amply 
manifested in the king’s ability to turn to his courtiers when he was in need of 
financial assistance.977  
 It has been suggested that the granting of land had precedents in Achaimenid 
practice and in the grand estates of the Pharaonic period.978 However, in agreement 
with Billows, this thesis believes that the contractual relationships formed between the 
king and the entrepreneur/grantees in Ptolemaic Egypt are highly reminiscent of 
Argead practice.979 Even if the evidence so far seems to suggest that the royal grip on 
the Ptolemaic gift estates was more concentrated, the basic idea of ensuring 
compliance, remunerating collaborators and binding them in reciprocal financial 
obligations through land grants was already there in Argead Makedonia. What is 
more, the granting of gift estates was another way of asserting royal control over new 
or reclaimed lands. Philippos II had set a precedent when he allocated the reclaimed 
marshlands in Philippoi, a practice that the first Ptolemaioi repeated in the Faiyum 
depression.980 In that, there is no obvious reason why they (and indeed the gift estates 
in Ptolemaic Egypt are mostly attested in the early period down to the reign of 
Ptolemaios Euergetes) should be following any other template.981 
 
Other than the king and individual entrepreneurs there is evidence of two other 
important economic actors partaking in the property rights régime under the 
umbrella of the monarchy: the Makedones and Temples. Both cases, however, are a 
testament to the structural discontinuities arising from the necessary adaptation to 
different local conditions. While the former economic group disappears in the 
                                                 
977 Appendix C nos 54, 55.  
978 Achaimenid: Rostovtzeff (1922), pp. 143-144, Briant (1982), pp. 310-316, Aperghis (2004), pp. 103-
104. Pharaonic: Eyre (1994). 
979 Billows (1995). 
980 Appendix C, nos 29, 48. Archaeological excavations in the town of Tebtynis in the area of the 
Faiyum have revealed that a wave of around 6.500 klerouchoi were settled there during the reign of 
Ptolemaios I, see Gallazzi (1989), Manning (2003), pp. 108-110. Further evidence in support of an early 
date for the reclamation of the Faiyum comes from the choice of village toponyms, which seem to 
correspond to the names of the Alexandrian demes. It is thus quite plausible that the Faiyum was 
developed simultaneously with Alexandria under Ptolemaios I, Clarysse (2007), Mueller (2006), p. 151. 
981 Rostovtzeff (1922), p. 145. 
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transition from Argead to Ptolemaic, the latter makes a dynamic entry in the property 
rights structure of the Makedonian state in Ptolemaic Egypt, controlling extensive 
tracts of land and enjoying lavish tax privileges.982 
 
 
THE MAKEDONES  
The Makedones as an ethnic group present an interesting component of the 
property rights structure in the Argead Kingdom.983 Although their organisation and 
role in the political administration is admittedly obscure, there is enough epigraphic 
and literary evidence to identify them as a nominal (at the very least), yet quite 
distinct, economic actor.984 Perhaps the most telling anecdote of the nature of the 
relationship between the Makedones and their King can be found in Arrianos’ 
rendition of Alexandros’ speech at Opis. There, the king is presented as the guardian 
of the wealth that belongs to the Makedones, which is also his only property: “I own 
nothing myself, nor has anyone treasures of mine to show, save these possessions of yours, or what is 
being safeguarded for you.”985 Although frequently dismissed as a rhetorical exercise, 
which in its details it probably was (as we have seen above, the Makedonian king was 
in fact the owner of royal land and did control the accruing revenues directly) the 
                                                 
982 The most important texts for the third century BCE are the Edfu Donation Text, inscribed on the 
outer wall of the Temple of Horus at Edfu, the Hauswaldt Papyri (P. Hausw.) and the Milon Archive (P. 
Eleph.). For the hieroglyphic text and a translation of the Edfu Donation Text, see Meeks (1972) and 
Manning (2003), App. 1. For P. Hausw., see Manning (1997). For P. Eleph., see Clarysse (2003). 
983 For a summary of the different meanings (geographical, political, military) of Makedones, see 
Hammond (1995). Following Hdt. 8.137-139, Thouk. 2.99, Ps. Skylax 66, Hammond (1995a) and 
Hatzopoulos (1996, pp. 160-161, 167-171, 204-209, 219) this thesis accepts that not all the populations 
under Makedonian rule were considered Makedones, e.g. Illyrians, Chalkidians etc. were still known as 
such under the expanded kingdom of Philippos II. Makedones (or else, the Makedonian ethnos) were 
the inhabitants of Lower (Hdt. 7.173.1: Μακεδονίης τῆς κάτω) and Upper Makedonia (Hdt. 7.173.4, 
8.137.1: ἄνω Μακεδονίην), as well those that were transplanted to the cities of Makedones (Diod. 
31.8.4: πόλεις Μακεδόνων) in the conquered lands, beyond the Axios and the Strymon. Through this 
process of re-settlement and colonisation the new possessions gradually would become part of “τὴν 
λοιπὴν χώραν τὴν Μακεδόνων,” [e.g.. SEG 12.374, ll. 5-6, 243 BCE: asylia decree addressed to King 
Antigonos, the citizens of Pella and the rest of the land of the Makedones – Meletemata 22, Epig. App. 
58, Rigsby (1996), no 23]. It has to be underlined that the designation Makedones was not dependent 
on any strict notions of blood or ethnicity. A prosopographical study of Amphipolitans, undertaken by 
Hatzopoulos (1991), has demonstrated that the pre-annexation local élite was quite quickly fused with 
the new Makedonian element to form the new citizen body of what was now a Makedonian city. 
984 Depending on where they stand on the constitutionalist-absolutist continuum, scholars have assigned 
the Makedones full or nil participation in the economic activities of the Kingdom. On the one hand, 
Hatzopoulos (1996) suggested that, at least for the Antigonid period, there might have even existed two 
separate treasuries: a royal and a Commonwealth one, p. 432. Given the lack of evidence, however, 
that would constitute a leap of faith. On the other hand, scholars like Tréheux (1988), have denied the 
Makedones any degree of financial autonomy, pp. 45-46; an opinion that is rendered forfeit by 
evidence dating long before the Antigonidai came to power. 
985 Arr. Anab. 7.9.9, “κέκτημαι δὲ ἰδίᾳ οὐδέν, οὐδὲ ἔχει τις ἀποδεῖξαι θησαυροὺς ἐμοὺς ὅτι μὴ ταῦτα, 
ὑμέτερα κτήματα ἢ ὅσα ἕνεκα ὑμῶν φυλάττεται.”  
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essence of this passage cannot be easily dismissed: i.e. that the King had to recognize 
property rights to his Makedonian subjects.986 Curtius reiterated the notion that the 
Makedones partook in the property rights structure of the Kingdom, viva voce Meleagris. 
Routing against the succession of Roxanne’s unborn child during the negotiations in 
Babylon, Meleagros hurried the soldiers to plunder Alexandros’ amassed wealth by 
stating that the people (the Makedones) were in fact the rightful recipients of the 
treasures of the king.987  
Epigraphic evidence from the turn of the fourth century onwards, written with 
the hardly contested vocabulary of official administrative documents, adds support to 
this argument. In the earliest relevant reference we possess, which dates from the reign 
of Amyntas III (c. 393/392 BCE), the Koinon of the Chalkidians was allowed to 
export pitch and other ship-building materials from Makedonia as long as the 
appropriate customs dues were paid, not to king Amyntas, with whom a defensive 
alliance was concluded on the obverse of the same inscription (Ἀμύνται τῶι 
Ἐρριδαίου καὶ Χαλκιδεῦσι), but to the Makedones (Μακεδόσιν).988 Further support to 
the seemingly tangible economic role of the Makedones is recorded in the literary 
sources. There, they are presented in several instances as the recipients of state 
revenues. Diodoros states that after the conquest of Thrake by Philippos II the 
Thrakians were required to pay tithes from their agricultural produce and trade to the 
Makedones (“…προσέταξε δεκάτας τελεῖν τοῖς Μακεδόσιν”).989 Equally, as 
punishment for their defection, the people of the city of Aspendos in Asia Minor were 
obliged to pay an annual tribute to the Makedones (“φόρους ἀποφέρειν ὅσα ἔτη 
Μακεδόσι”).990  
Other evidence presents the Makedones as the collective recipients of land 
tracts. Following the destruction of Methone in 354 BCE and the expulsion of its 
citizens Philippos II distributed its land to the Makedones (“…τὴν δὲ χώραν διένειμε 
                                                 
986 For an interpretation of the Opis speech (esp. the part referring to Philippos II – Arr. Anab. 7.9.2-5) 
as reflecting a Platonic (cf. Nomoi 3.676a-682e) rhetorical topos, see Montgomery (1997), p.103, 
Bosworth (1988), pp. 103-107, contra Nagle (1996), pp. 156-157. According to this view, literary 
references to the evolution of lifestyle from transhumant pastoralism and mountain living to settled 
agriculture in the plains are used as a standard medium for describing economic change. For a recent 
overview of the debate regarding the historicity of the Opis Speech, see Nagle (1996), who stresses the 
authenticity of the essence of the speech, pp. 152-155. 
987 Curt. 10.6.23, “Quin igitur ad diripiendos thesauros discurritis? harum enim opum regiarum utique populus est 
heres.” 
988 SIG3 135, Hatzopoulos (1996), Epig. App. 1. 
989 Diod. 16.71.2.  
990 Arr. Anab. 1.27.4. 
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τοῖς Μακεδόσιν”).991 Similarly, pseudo-Skymnos records that Oisyme, formerly a 
colony of Thasos, was refounded as Emathia during the reign of Philippos II and 
thereafter belonged to the Makedones (“…πρότερον Οἰσύμη πόλις Θασίων γενομένη, 
μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Μακεδόνων..”).992 Likewise, an important recently discovered 
inscription records the re-organisation of the site of Kalindoia, where Alexandros III 
simply gave its land and that of the surrounding territories to the Makedones: 
“βασιλεὺς̣ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔδωκε Μακεδόσι Καλίνδοια καὶ τὰ χωρία τὰ περὶ 
Καλίνδοια·.”993 It has been argued by the editor of the inscription that the Makedones 
in question were specific individuals who received separate land grants.994 However, it 
is unlikely that if that were the case the details of the separate grants would be spared 
from the inscription.995 What is more, the colonisation of cities, new and old, by 
Makedones appears to have evolved into a standard way of consolidating Makedonian 
rule (arche) over newly conquered territories at least since the reign of Amyntas III.996 
Even within the ancestral kingdom populations were moved en masse when political, 
military and economic exigencies pointed to greater advantages. Such expectations 
must have prompted Archelaos to relocate the city of Pydna some four kilometres 
inland from its original site.997 Equally, a study of onomastics, as well as the 
archaeology of Pella, reveals that the transfer of the capital from Aigai at the turn of 
the fourth century BCE must have involved significant population movements.998 In 
agreement with Hammond, the re-organisation of Kalindoia and the cession of its 
land to the Makedones signalled the creation of a new Makedonian city in the 
Chalkidian Peninsula, complete with a priesthood to mark the beginning of the new 
                                                 
991 Diod. 16.34.5. 
992 Ps.-Skymnos 656-658, Steph. Byz. s.v. Οἰσύμη.  
993 SEG 36:626, ll. 5-10. For the dating of the re-organisation in 335/334 BCE, see Hammond (1988). 
The stele was set up in 323 BCE, Vokotopoulou (1986), p. 97.  
994 Vokotopoulou (1986), who draws a parallel with Plout. Alex. 15.3, where the king is presented as 
having distributed his possessions to those of his friends who would accept them. Contra Griffith (1965), 
p. 136. 
995 Individual beneficiaries were usually named (e.g. Apollophanes of Kardia, Dem. 7.39-41, Perdikkas 
of Koinos, Syll.3 332). Compare with SEG 34:664, where the recipients of land are collectively Thrakes 
(col. B, ll. 3-6), and the citizens of Philippoi, (col. A, l. 9, col. B, ll. 9-10).   
996 For a summary see Hammond (1972-1988), II, p. 174. 
997 The move followed the successful re-incorporation of Pydna to Archelaos’ domains after its sedition 
in 410 BCE, Diod. 13.49.1-2.  
998 Hammond (1972-1988), II, p. 56, Hatzopoulos (1996) I, pp. 171-173 with references. Both 
Archelaos and Amyntas III are credited with the transfer of the capital (Archelaos: Ellis-1994, p. 726, 
Greenwalt-1999, Amyntas III: Hatzopoulos-1996, p. 172, n. 3, Hansen-2004, no 543). No primary 
source documents the instigator and all interpretation rests on archaeological evidence. In the fifth 
century, however, Thoukydides still regarded the region of Pella and its environs as Paionian, Thouk. 




Apart from recipients, the Makedones are also presented as dispensers of state 
monies. The extant evidence points to a concentration of financial activity in the 
religious sphere, where the Makedones are represented managing amounts of very 
significant size. A Delphic inscription of 325 BCE records the payment of 10.500 
staters donated directly by the Makedones to the Delphic Amphiktyony 
(“[Μ]ακεδόνες Ἀρχέπολις, Ἄγιπ[πος], [σ]τατῆρας μυρίους πεντακοσ[ίους]”).1000 Their 
contribution precedes and follows that of the Delphian and the Pagasitan ethne 
accordingly.1001 The role of the king in this case appears limited to the appointment of 
the representatives of the Makedones.1002 Equally remarkable, however, is the actual 
sum of money donated. Whether paid in silver or gold staters, the contribution of the 
Makedones was by several thousands the most generous in the list.1003 
Unfortunately, we are very badly informed as to how the purported finances of 
the Makedones were planned and administered; how were the taxes, tribute and 
profits from the use of the land gathered, where were they stored and how decisions 
were reached regarding their investment. The extant evidence does not allow us to 
establish whether the Makedones disposed of a treasury that was separate from the 
royal, as some scholars have suggested.1004 The reference of Titus Livius to the royal 
treasury on the island citadel of Phakos situated in the marshlands surrounding Pella is 
the only one we possess.1005 The evidence, however, does lend support to the 
suggestion that the Makedones disposed of their own finances in the same way 
perhaps that the individual Makedonian poleis did. That being said, we are not aware 
of any designated officials or body in charge of their administration, other than the 
king, whose self-ascribed role as the keeper of Makedonian wealth is expounded in the 
Opis Speech.1006  
                                                 
999 Hammond (1988), p. 386. 
1000 CID 2.100, ll. 10-11. This inscription adds support to Hammond’s (1993b) argument that following 
Philippos II’s intervention to end the Sacred War of 356-346 BCE, the Makedones, as opposed to 
Philippos II and his descendants alone (Diod. 16.59.4-60.1), were admitted to membership in the 
Delphic Amphiktyony, (Dem. 19.327, Paus. 10.3.3, 10.8.2). For contrasting arguments and the relevant 
source analysis, see the discussion in Hammond (1993b).  
1001 CID 2.100, ll. 8-9, 12-13.  
1002 CID 2.100, ll. 2-3: “παρ’ Ἀλεξάν]δρο[υ Ἀρχεπόλιος, Ἀγίππου·]” 
1003 The second highest amount, given by an unidentified group, was actually five times lower (2.100 
<?> staters), CID 2.100, ll. 21-22.   
1004 Hatzopoulos (1996), p. 432. 
1005 Liv. 44.46.6-8, “gaza regia in eo loco erat.” 
1006 See the lists of theorodokoi for the late fourth century BCE that include Makedonian cities: IG 




Whereas in Argead Makedonia the Makedones appear to function as a separate 
economic actor, their importance wanes in Ptolemaic Egypt. First and foremost, they 
cease to appear as a group alongside the king in official documents. The Ptolemaic 
king is styled, neither as the ‘King of the Makedones,’ nor as the half of the 
partnership that appears to be the Makedonian state in the standardised formula 
employed in Antigonid Makedonia: “Βασιλεὺς δεῖνα καὶ Μακεδόνες.”1007 Although 
these formulae provide little conclusive evidence regarding the constitutional status of 
the Makedones in the homeland, their frequent reference alongside the king plays 
upon the sense of their importance as a group, with the king perceived as acting 
alongside, as well as in their best interest. This ‘partnership’ quality, however 
idealised, disappeared in the Ptolemaic Kingdom, where the king was 
characteristically known simply by his first name and patronymic, following the 
designation ‘Βασιλεὺς.’1008 
 As a group the Makedones become increasingly scarcer in the sources. The 
scholarly consensus up until the last quarter of the twentieth century was that the 
Makedones enjoyed a special status in Egypt, superior even to the Alexandrian 
citizens.1009 This view is based on a few passages by Josephus, who presents their 
elevated status as a wish of Alexandros that was merely respected by the 
Ptolemaioi.1010 However, the evidence, as Fraser argues, points to the contrary. A list 
of the known people that were employed for political and diplomatic posts abroad 
demonstrates that the Ptolemaioi recruited according to merit and not according to 
ethnicity. Although neither the Alexandrians nor the Hellenes form the absolute 
majority, the Makedones are certainly a minority.1011  
                                                 
intriguing observation that during the fourth century the king is replaced as the sole Makedonian 
theorodokos by an increasing number of individual Makedonian cities. For the internal organisation of 
Makedonian cities, see Hatzopoulos (1996), pp. 127-165.  
1007 There are five extant inscriptions from the reign of Amyntas, son of Perdikkas III, down to 
Philippos V naming the King of the Makedones, e.g. IG VII 3055, Walbank (1984), p. 65. For the 
formula of King, Makedones and Allies, see SVA 501 [treaty between King Antigonos (III) and the 
Makedones and the city of Eleutherna], SEG 16.450 (this is in very fragmentary state but the 
Makedones in addition to someone else seem to be making an offering in their own name in the 
Sanctuary at Delos in 222 BCE) and IG XI.4.1097. Both these formulae are not available for either the 
Ptolemaic or the Seleukid kingdoms. 
1008 For their native subjects they employed other titles, see OGIS 90. 
1009 Tarn & Griffith (1952), pp. 217-218. 
1010 Fraser (1972), I, p. 52, Joseph. FGrHist 616 F 4, BJ 2.487-488, AJ 12.8. 
1011 For a list of Makedones and Alexandrians employed in overseas posts, see Fraser (1972), II, p. 149, 
n. 210. A notable Makedonas is Patroklos, son of Patron, the admiral of Philadelphos.  
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In Alexandria proper the most conspicuous presence of the Makedones is 
attested in the army, where an elite corps, whether ethnically Makedonian or not, 
continued to carry the name, as some form of honourific title, well into the first 
century BCE.1012 They formed the so-called therapeia, the royal guard of the palace in 
Alexandria and the personal bodyguard of the king. They had undoubted military, as 
well as some political significance, but hardly any economic. It is only quite late in the 
Ptolemaic period that they appear to be making communal dedications in the form of 
statues to their fellow soldiers. This denotes, at the very least, the existence of a 
budget, but there is very little evidence for any other concerted activity by the 
Makedones in Ptolemaic Egypt.1013  
 
There are a number of pragmatic considerations accounting for the waning 
importance of the Makedones as a group in Ptolemaic Egypt. First of all, their 
numbers became increasingly negligible. Recent studies have demonstrated amply 
that contrary to previous thought the term ‘Makedonas’ became a pseudo-ethnic 
already since the second century BCE.1014 Secondly, the importance of Alexandria as 
the centre of the Ptolemaic Kingdom, subsumed in significance all other ethnics under 
its own demotic and civic appellations, i.e. it had become more important to be an 
Alexandrian in Ptolemaic Egypt than to be a Makedonas in the civilian sense, (it has 
already been noted above that in the military sphere the term Makedonas still carried 
symbolic capital).1015 With the numbers of ethnic Makedones dwindling, the 
Ptolemaioi gradually created a new privileged group that appealed more to the 
cosmopolitanism of the age: the Alexandrians. Their privileged status was reflected in 
their preferential place, alongside other individuals classed as ‘Hellenes,’ within the 
Ptolemaic taxation system. In a manner reminiscent of the Argead kings who did not 
tax the Makedones at all, the Ptolemaioi sought to reinforce the loyalties of their 
indispensable Hellenic-speaking administrative class by granting them lower tax 
rates.1016 
                                                 
1012 Marrinan (1998), pp. 545-546. The presence of genuine Makedones is well attested in the army of 
Seleukos, see Musti (1984), p. 189. 
1013 SEG 8.532 = SB 5.7787 = Faiyum 1.13 (42 BCE): “τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείαι ἱππέων τῆς 
θεραπείας...” Fischer-Bovet (2007) explores the contributions made by army officials for the building of 
temples in Upper Egypt. The evidence, however, consists of private, rather than group, donations. See 
also SB 1:1106. 
1014 Fischer-Bovet (2008). Cf. Launey (1949-1950). 
1015 Fraser (1972), p. 53. 
1016 See Clarysse and Thompson (2005), Manning (2003), p. 131. 
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TEMPLES & SANCTUARIES 
What establishes temples, sanctuaries and their representatives (i.e. priests) as 
economic actors is their ability to attract, redistribute and, in the case of the latter, 
manage wealth. What reinforces their role as such is the fact that they are supported 
by a constant supply of large numbers of people eager to transform their religious 
sentiment into material offerings, as well as the fact that any business is more or less 
guaranteed to be transacted under conditions of peace. 
Historically, Hellenic sanctuaries acted as nodes of cultural and political 
interaction, drawing together various political units from across the Mediterranean 
wishing to participate in common ritual activities.1017 Competition, which ordinarily 
existed between rivalling states, was channelled into athletic and artistic contests, 
whose unobstructed conduct was ensured by the imposition of a sacred truce 
(ἐκεχειρία).1018 Even though transgressions against the inviolability of pilgrims and the 
asylia of sacred sites did occur, the political authorities were ready to make the 
necessary compensations.1019 Sources confirm that the Kingdom of Makedonia firmly 
abided by this tradition. When Phrynon of Rhamnous was attacked and imprisoned 
by Makedonian bandits during the Olympic truce of 348 BCE, Philippos II 
apparently returned the ransom exacted for his release, because at the time of his 
capture the individual in question was on his way to visit Olympia.1020 The cessation 
of hostilities for the duration of pan-Hellenic festivals (at least in and around the 
sanctuaries and the patron city-state) created a privileged, safe setting for inter-state 
gatherings. The sanctuary was thus gradually transformed into the focal point for the 
cultivation of formal inter-state relations.  
The evidence for the existence and organisation of temple estates and the 
economic role of priests in Argead Makedonia is restricted. A number of royal 
diagrammata record the ruler’s attempts to resolve among other things disputes over the 
appropriate handling of grants of land to temples, the correct dispensation of temple 
monies and the regulation of temple dedications, but they date from the Antigonid 
                                                 
1017 See most recently Marinatos & Hägg (1993), Miller (2006), Pedley (2005). 
1018 Paus. 5.4.5-6, 5.20.1. The quoit (δίσκος) of King Iphitos upon which the text of the Olympian truce 
was inscribed was still on display during Pausanias’ time. For the Isthmian truce, see Paus. 5.2.1. 
1019 Wars were never effectively stopped during Pan-Hellenic Festivals. However, it was very rare that 
the sacred site itself, with its polis and surrounding territory should it be in or near an urban area, was 
embroiled in hostilities. Travellers on pilgrimage were generally granted safe passage to and from the 
festival. See Dillon (1997), esp. ch. 2. For the evolution of asylia from a practical necessity to a religious 
honour in the Hellenistic period, see Rigsby (1996). 
1020 Aisch. 2.12-13, Dillon (1995). 
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period.1021 Although these might provide some indication of the economic activities of 
temples that could be traced back to the Argead period, the only solid evidence we 
possess comes from the literary sources, where it appears that the king was the head of 
cult. As such, one of his main responsibilities was to perform the necessary sacrifices to 
the gods on a regular basis. The instances where the Makedonian king is recorded to 
be performing his religious duties abound.1022 Apart from extraordinary circumstances 
such as celebrating victories and invoking the benevolence of the gods prior to battle 
there were customary sacrifices that needed to be performed.1023 The role of the king 
in their performance can be inferred from the fact that they were not overlooked even 
at a time when Alexandros’ health was seriously failing.1024 Equally, when the king 
was absent from home, he would appoint others to conduct the daily sacrifices in his 
stead.1025 This was a position of honour and was given to members of the inner circle 
of the king. Philippos entrusted them to Alexandros when he was away and, 
accordingly, Alexandros granted the privilege to his mother Olympias and 
Krateros.1026 The performance of the sacrifices, which took place in plain view of a 
large crowd each time, strengthened the ideological power of the ruler. 
Although the king acted as the high priest, other priests did exist in almost 
every Makedonian city.1027 However, as eponymous priests their role appears to have 
been primarily civic, rather than religious. The majority of them were priests of 
Asklepios, while a few others officiated in honour of the founder of a Makedonian city. 
Recent archaeological evidence suggests, though far from concludes, that Philippos II 
was involved in a cult in his honour in the city of Philippoi.1028 The economic role of 
the priests, however, in the religious life of the cities and the sanctuaries they were in 
charge of is quite obscure. 
 The most renowned Makedonian sanctuary and the centre of Makedonian 
religious activity was Dion.1029 Since the times of Archelaos it was the home of the 
only Makedonian Games and festivals were frequently organised on important 
                                                 
1021 For Briant (1973), the Antigonid kings were “Priest-Kings,” p. 326, n. 2. 
1022 For a list of Alexandros’ III sacrifices, see Samuel (1983), p. 77, n. 36. See also Bell (2006), p. 66, n. 
70.  
1023 Diod. 15.86.6. 
1024 Arr. Anab. 7.24.4, 7.25.6. 
1025 Plout. Alex. 23.3. 
1026 Plout. Alex. 9, Hammond (1985), pp. 156-160. 
1027 See Hatzopoulos (1996), pp. 153-155. 
1028 See Hatzopoulos (1996), Epig. App. 83, mentioning Philippos and his temene amongst other 
divinities. 
1029 Just. 24.3.2, Liv. 44.5. 
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occasions (such as the nine-day festival held by Alexandros before his departure on the 
Persian campaign).1030 However, we know little of its organisation, assets and their 
administration.1031 Unfortunately, there are no extant publicized inventories of the 
temple treasures in the manner of the Athenians.1032 Most of our knowledge comes in 
connection to a mid-fourth century fragmentary civic law decree from the Agora of 
Dion.1033 From this it appears that the city of Dion was responsible for the 
organisation of the festivals and games in honour of the gods worshipped in the 
sanctuary, which was undertaken by a committee of elected men. Although treasurers 
are mentioned we are not informed further of the assets they disposed of. As the 
sanctuary was under the supervision of the city of Dion it would be permissible to 
draw some insights from the manner in which city-state sanctuaries were organised.  
Hellenic sanctuaries were financially independent and new research has 
demonstrated that the temple economy in the world of the polis was buoyant.1034 
However, sanctuaries were generally not big landowners in ancient Hellas. Their 
wealth consisted of movable goods and buildings rather than land.1035 The 
philosophical explanation for this can be found in the assertion that the Olympians 
had not created the earth and hence did not hold exclusive rights to it. Egyptian 
cosmology, however, dictated otherwise; land was considered the divine property of 
the gods, and by extent of the king.  
In Ptolemaic Egypt, the priests (i.e. the Egyptian élite) held significant parcels 
of land in the name of the gods (sacred land), as well as land leased out to private 
individuals in exchange for rent (private land). According to the Edfu Donation Text, 
which records sacred land holdings in Upper Egypt, 18% of the land within the Edfu 
nome was owned by the temples.1036 In the village of Kerkeosiris, temple land 
amounted to 16% of the total.1037 Apart from rents, some temples were also the 
recipients of the so-called apomoira, which amounted to one sixth of the tax from the 
produce on fruit and wine from all the land, excluding sacred land.1038 The Ptolemaic 
state recognised and enforced the property rights of priests or priestly corporations in 
                                                 
1030 Diod. 17.16.3-4. 
1031 Diod. 17.16.3-4. 
1032 E.g. IG II2 1388. 
1033 Hatzopoulos (1996), Epig. App. 56. 
1034 Dignas (2002). 
1035 Toutain (1968), p. 110. 
1036 Manning (2003), pp. 74-79. 
1037 Verhoogt (1998). 
1038 Préaux (1979), pp. 171-186. This practice was carried on from the Pharaonic period, von Reden 
(2006), p. 169. 
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Egypt, and the ancient property rights structure of the temples, especially in the 
Thebaid, remained more or less intact.1039 The temples were allowed to continue to 
manage their endowments and receive their income. 
At the same time, the early Ptolemaic rulers, recognising the influential role of 
the priests within the Egyptian society, proved very keen to uphold the necessary 
niceties expected on behalf of a new dynasty. Thus, the traditional act of donation, a 
royal ritual performed at the beginning of each reign, which is commemorated in the 
Satrap Stele, presents Ptolemaios I ‘repeating’ the donation of his predecessor to the 
temple.1040 This was not a fortuitous act. Royal donations and temple-building, as well 
as any other concession that the Ptolemaioi were prepared to and did grant to the 
powerful Egyptian clergy, were not gestures of largesse per se, but rather necessary 
trade-offs in order to maintain and minimise the costs of compliance in Upper 
Egypt.1041 Certainly, the maintenance of the old property rights structure and land 
tenure regime had a constraining impact on the extent of the economic power of the 
Ptolemaic ruler in the area. However, the political implications were by far more 
important. 
Having said that, the Ptolemaioi did transfer considerable aspects of the 
traditional economic organisation of the temples to the monarchy. These new 
measures related mostly to revenues from taxation, which were diverted from the 
temple coffers to the royal. Money taxes would be collected in the royal banking 
system and taxes in kind would be sent to the royal granaries.1042 In addition, with the 
economic administration of the dynastic cult in the hands of the King a large degree 
of the economic power directly related to the traditional cultic activity of the temples 
was reduced.1043 This was especially the case in Lower Egypt. Another change which 
ascertained the supremacy of the economic role of the state vis-à-vis the temples was 
the fact that the silver standard was no longer guaranteed by the treasury of Ptah in 
Memphis, as it was the case from the Pharaonic down to Persian times. The old 
Persian mint was transferred, quite fittingly, in the capital of the Ptolemaic dynasty in 
                                                 
1039 It is interesting to note that the only city built by the Ptolemaioi in the Thebaid, Ptolemais, was 
significantly far away from the spheres of influence of the traditional religious centres of Pharaonic 
Egypt: Memphis and Thebes.  
1040 CGC 22182. 
1041 See the table of Ptolemaic temple-building activity in Huss (1994), pp. 26-39. See also Meeks IN 
Manning (2003), p. 76. 
1042 Manning (2003), p. 57. 
1043 Préaux (1979), p. 180. For the dynastic cults, see also Koenen (1993). 
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Alexandria, and the royal mint there assumed the role of the chief guarantor of the 





Running contrary to the limited attention received in the secondary literature it has 
been shown that the Argead economy was in fact much more sophisticated than 
hitherto recognised. Based on the new epigraphic material that has surfaced in the last 
thirty years, there is now a case to be made for the continuity of Argead templates of 
economic organisation into early Ptolemaic Egypt. 
 This chapter has studied the structure of property rights in both kingdoms. 
From the discussion it has emerged that although several organisational aspects of the 
Ptolemaic economy had their roots in the Pharaonic and Persian fiscal organisation, 
especially as one moved farther away from the centre of Ptolemaic authority in Lower 
Egypt, the accommodating attitude of the early Ptolemaic dynasty to pre-existing 
property rights structures derived from a pragmatic need to exchange privileges for 
compliance. Most importantly, for the purposes of this thesis, this was done in 
accordance to the template set by the Argead dynasty when it came to the 
organisation of their newly acquired lands. Early Ptolemaic Egypt was governed as the 











                                                 
1044 Manning (2003), p. 176. For the date of the transfer of the mint from Memphis to Alexandria, see 
Stewart (1993), p. 239, von Reden (2007), p. 33. In favour of the mint being established in Alexandria 
in 326 BCE, see Newell (1923), p. 64, Mørkholm (1991), p. 52. For a slightly later date, see le Rider 





In a little-discussed enkomion by the lyric poet Bakchylides, a vision of ships carrying 
grain and vast riches from Egypt was incorporated in the drunken musings of a young 
prince early in the fifth century BCE.  
 
 
Β’ ... 5 
 εὖτε νέων ἁ[παλὸν] ⌊γλυκεῖ’ ἀ⌋νάγκα  
 σευομενᾶν κ⌊υλίκων θάλπη⌋σι θυμ⌊όν,⌋  
 Κύπριδός τ’ ἐλπ⌊ὶς δ<ι>αιθύσσῃ φρέ⌋νας,  
Γ’      ἀμμειγνυμέν⌊α Διονυσίοισι⌋ δώροις·  
 ἀνδράσι δ’ ὑψο⌊τάτω πέμπει⌋ μερίμν⌊ας·⌋  10 
 αὐτίκ⌊α⌋ μὲν π⌊ολίων κράδ⌋εμνα ⌊λύει,⌋   
 πᾶσ⌊ι δ’ ἀνθρώποις μοναρ⌋χήσ⌊ειν δοκεῖ·⌋   
Δ’ χρυ⌊σ⌋ῷ ⌊δ’ ἐλέφαντί τε μαρμ⌋αίρ⌊ουσιν οἶκοι,⌋   
 πυροφ⌊όροι δὲ κατ’ αἰγλάεντ⌋α πό[ντον]   
 νᾶες ἄγο⌊υσιν ἀπ’ Αἰγύπτου μέγιστον⌋  15 
 πλοῦτον· ὣς ⌊πίνοντος ὁρμαίνει κέαρ.⌋  
 …  
 
 
“…when the sweet compulsion as the cups race round warms the hearts of 
youths to tenderness, and expectations of Kypris rushes through the mind, 
mixed with the gifts of Dionysos. They send men’s thoughts to soar sky-
high: for instance, a man is undoing the veils of cities, and fancies he will 
be monarch over all men. Halls gleam with gold and ivory, and, bearing 
their wheat over a glittering sea, ships carry from Egypt vast wealth. So the 
heart of the drinking man is stirred.” 1045 
 
 
The prince was Alexandros I and the poem was probably commissioned by his father 
Amyntas, king of the Makedones, in anticipation of his son’s succession.1046 The 
setting for Bakchylides’ enkomiastic poem could be placed at the late stages of any 
given symposion held in the Makedonian royal court. The association between the 
consumption of wine and the unleashing of one’s imagination towards the attainment 
of nobler and higher goals is a topos in sympotic literature.1047 Against this background, 
                                                 
1045 Bakchyl. F 20B.6-16. Translation by Fearn (2007), pp. 35-36. 
1046 Fearn (2007), pp. 55-56. 
1047 Cf. Aristoph. Knights  92-92: “You see? Whenever men drink, then they are rich, they are successful, they win their 
cases…,” Plout. Quaest. Conv. 7.715a: “…wine has many voices, filling everyone with pointless chatter and aspirations 
of leadership,” Pl. Laws. 2.671a-b: “Such a gathering inevitably tends, as the drinking proceeds, always to grow more 
and more uproarious; […] Everyone is lifted above their normal self: […] regarding himself as competent to be ruler over 
both himself and everyone else.” See also Fearn (2007), pp. 37-38, 53, 57. 
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Bakchylides’ poem presents the innermost desires of a future king: military prowess, 
strong monarchic rule and economic power.  
 
E’ …  
 …  
 τί γὰρ ἀνθρώ[ποισι μεῖζον]  
 [κέρδο]ς ἢ θυμῷ χαρίζε[σθα]ι κ[αλὰ;] 20 
 
For what (greater profit) for men is there than indulgence of one’s own 
heart with respect to fine deeds?1048 
 
 
Aside from the fascination that Egypt’s wealth commanded over the Makedones at 
this early stage in their history (and this is indeed the earliest reference to Egypt in a 
Makedonian context), this poem holds a historical significance that goes beyond the 
literary portrayal of a prince’s drunken illusions of grandeur.1049 As a royal 
commission, it reflects the earliest ingredients of a developing Makedonian royal 
ideology of power.1050 Based on military preponderance, the power of the state can be 
extended indefinitely. Alongside wealth, these were goals worthy of a king’s pursuit. 
These were the sources of his power.  
 
ὣς ⌊πίνοντος ὁρμαίνει κέαρ.⌋ 
 
[And] .. So the heart of the drinking man is stirred.1051 
 
 
The aim of this thesis has been twofold. On the one hand, it involved going beyond 
what kings and generals of the ancient world empirically understood as the sources of 
their power: soldiers and money. Utilising concepts and models from social and 
economic theory this thesis has identified four sources of royal power: dynastic, 
                                                 
1048 Bakchyl. F 20B.19-20. Translation by Fearn (2007), p. 36. For a similar motif see the only other 
extant enkomion of Alexandros, son of Amyntas, by Pindaros F 120-121.3-6: | …πρέπει δ’ ἐσλοῖσιν 
ὑμνεῖσθαι... | ...καλλίσταις ἀοιδαῖς. | τοῦτο γὰρ ἀθανάτοις τιμαῖς ποτιψαύει μόνον {ῥηθέν}, | θνᾴσκει δὲ 
σιγαθὲν καλὸν ἔργον, “…it is fitting for the good to be praised… …with the fairest songs. For (it is said) 
that this is the only tribute that touches upon the honours due to the immortals; as, once silenced every 
good deed will perish.” Pindaros’ enkomion is probably roughly contemporary to Bakchylides’ praise to 
Alexandros. 
1049 There is little doubt that, like Alexandros III, his Successors were aware of the immense economic 
advantages of controlling the most prolific grain-producing territory in the known world, Hölbl (2001), 
p. 9. Egypt was recognised as the best and richest of all the satrapies: “σατραπεία πασῶν ἀρίστη καὶ 
προσόδους ἔχουσα μεγάλας Αἴγυπτος,” Diod. 18.6.3-4.  
1050 It is unfortunate that only two fragments of Pindaros’ enkomion to Alexandros survive, none of 
them shedding any light to the nature of the ‘good deeds’ that Pindaros praises Alexandros for.  
1051 Bakchyl. F 20B.16. Translation by Fearn (2007), p. 36. 
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courtly, military and economic. Each of these was deconstructed in order to reveal the 
most important structures and networks that characterised their organisation and 
which contributed to the sustenance of the power of the ruler. The second aim of this 
thesis was to examine the migration of those structures and networks from Argead 
Makedonia to the organisation of early Ptolemaic Egypt. 
 
The contribution of Argead Makedonian organisational templates in the structuring 
of the Ptolemaic monarchy has long escaped analytical consideration, partly due to 
the state of the evidence on the Makedonian side, but primarily because of the 
persistence of scholarship to conceive of the Hellenistic world as a separate entity, 
radically different from the city-state world that preceded it, heavily influenced by 
Alexandros’ orientalising experiment and much too decadent and enfeebled to 
compare with the Roman Res Publica that dissolved it.  This almost watertight 
fragmentation of time and space rendered the emphasis on change over continuity 
virtually inescapable. 
 
This thesis is based on the premise that the above presents a distorted version of 
historical reality. Viewing structures as principles of organisation, which make it 
possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and 
space, and power as the outcome of the real and observable interrelations between 
networks of individuals and groups, this thesis has distanced itself from that segment of 
socio-historical tradition, which views human actors as the principal agents of change. 
Through the comparative analysis of the structures and networks that sustained royal 
power in both kingdoms, it has been argued that, in their majority, Argead structures 
were remembered and instantiated in the organisational practices of the early 
Ptolemaic rulers. Such a comparison has been sanctioned by the amount of 
Makedonian evidence that has accumulated in the last thirty years, which allows for a 
more balanced understanding of the workings of the Argead monarchy.  
 
The underlying reason for the reproduction of Argead structures of government in 
early Ptolemaic Egypt was not the fact that they were highly conservative, resisting 
change even in the most volatile of circumstances. Rather, it was because the 
structures around which the monarchy was organised were formed in such a way that 
they could absorb the impact of imperial success in a manner that other political 
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formations could not. The all-inclusiveness of the citizen base of the Makedonian 
cities, as opposed to the racial exclusivity of the city-state, the differentiation between 
the management of national territory and territory won by the spear, all added to the 
creation of a template for colonial government that was tried and tested for 
generations before the Successors found themselves in charge of their satrapies. The 
concept of spear-won territory allowed the monarchy to disengage itself from the need 
to devise new methods to function within a foreign environment. Faced with a very 
mixed subject base Ptolemaios I knew that accommodation to local practices was key, 
precisely because he had experienced how new acquisitions under Philippos II were 
governed according to their ancestral customs. The king’s rule merely added an extra 
layer of control over existing frameworks. 
 
The equation of spear-won land with crown land, which in Makedonia was owned 
and managed by the king as his personal property, along with the waning numbers of 
the Makedonian population in Egypt contributed to the strengthening of the personal 
nature of Ptolemaic kingship. The fact that the Makedones as a nominal constitutive 
element of the state were dropped from the standard diplomatic formulae of 
Ptolemaic Egypt, however, cannot be taken to mean that the rule of the Ptolemaic 
king was unconstrained. Instead, this thesis has argued that the king’s authority was 
bound to a variety of networks of individuals, which populated his household and his 
court and had to satisfy the expectations of at least three audiences (Makedonian, 
Hellenic and Egyptian) each of which anticipated the fulfilment of a different 
‘contract’ in return for their compliance.1052  
 
Added to the above, a contributing factor to the imperial success of both the Argead 
and Ptolemaic states was the overwhelming adherence to a monarchic ideology, 
which established the ‘dynasty’ as the preponderant ideological umbrella under which 
élite and populace alike united. The conscious manipulation of Argead dynastic 
frames of reference in the Ptolemaic Kingdom points towards an understanding 
among decision-makers that the preservation of the traditional political status quo was 
advantageous. Despite the volatility of a hereditary dynastic monarchy the régime was 
maintained and strengthened by stricter succession rules, in an (in hindsight 
unsuccessful) effort to eradicate dynastic instability.  
                                                 
1052 According to the neo-classical model of the state. 
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The list of structures and networks that sustained royal power treated in this thesis 
does not claim to be exhaustive, neither in its content nor in the level of analysis. If 
one had the luxury of time and a generous word limit most could be further 
elaborated in article-length studies. In addition, there are still areas where comparison 
between the organisation of the two kingdoms would yield very interesting results, 
such as the monopoly of physical force exercised in a domestic context or the 
frameworks of economic exchange and the uses of monetisation.1053 Both would 
benefit from the newest epigraphic and numismatic material whose discovery and 
study is steadily increasing our knowledge of that northern kingdom, so frequently 
condemned as the backwater of Hellas. This thesis hopes to have provided a stepping-
stone towards the instatement of Argead Makedonia as an added frame of reference 
for the more balanced understanding of the workings of the Successor Kingdoms. 
 
In all, referring back to von Martin’s question quoted at the opening of the 
introduction, this thesis has shown that in the case of the migration of Argead 

















                                                 
1053 Especially since so much work has been done lately on the Ptolemaic police, see Bauschatz (2005), 
(2007), (2007b). 
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A network of social relations or ‘interdependencies’ formed 
by individual actors. Undermining the autonomy of the 
agent emphasised by much of Western philosophy and 
political theory, Elias (2000) argued that individual actors 
can only be understood through their interdependencies 
with each other. As such, historical change was still 
activated solely by the actions of individuals (as opposed to 
an externally structured system) but only as these were 
formed within their ‘figurations.’ Intentional independent 
agency is constraint by the constant interweaving of the 
countless actions of agents within the figuration, the 
outcome of which is unintentional and unplanned. Simply 
put, individuals can make decisions, but these are never 
personal either in their content or their consequences. Elias’ 
figurational sociology was an attempt to bridge the agency-
structure or individual-society gap. 
 
 
New Economic Sociology 
 (NES) 
 
Replaced the so-called Old Economic Sociology in the 
1980s, which was still respectful of mainstream neo-classical 
economics. It introduced social structure as a determinant of 
economic action. 
It functions on three basic assumptions: 
a. all economic action is a category of social action 
b. social action is embedded in ongoing inter-personal 
networks of relationships, and cannot be explained 
in reference to the actions of individually motivated 
actors 
c. economic institutions are socially constructed.1 
 
 
New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) 
 
Theoretical framework consisting of a set of analytical inter-
disciplinary concepts, such as property rights, transaction 
costs, credible commitment, agenda control. The main 






The ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of 
one’s environment (Mann, 1986). It has to be noted that 
power is a dispositional concept: it refers to the possibility of 
an action occurring, rather than its actual occurrence. One 
does not necessarily have to own power resources, but only 





Proposed by Giddens (1984) this is a theory, which like 
Elias’ figuration theory, attempts to transcend the 
action/structure, individual/society dichotomy. Instead, 
                                                 
1 Swedberg & Granovetter (1992). Founding article Granovetter (1985). 
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Giddens focuses on how “social practices [are] ordered across time 
and space,” p. 2. According to the theory, social structures are 
produced and reproduced by the actions of the individuals.  
Put simply, social structure is both the medium and the 
outcome of social action. This is what Giddens calls the 
“duality of structure,” and places it in direct opposition to 





Any recurring pattern of social behaviour. It refers to the 
binding properties (rules and resources) which make it 
possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across 
varying spans of time and space and which lend them 
systemic form (Giddens, 1984). In this process, structures 
are only existent when remembered and/or instantiated 






Term introduced by Giddens (1981, 1984) to describe the 
‘stretching’ of social relations, systems and practices across 
time and space. He distinguished between low and high 
levels of time-space distanciation. Time-space distanciation 
is accentuated (exhibiting a wider spatial and temporal 
reach) in a state environment, whereby the limits of personal 
(one-on-one) interaction or what Giddens calls social 
integration, can be transcended, resulting in what he calls 
system integration. This implies that integration can take 
place even when actors are physically absent, i.e. across 
historical time and geographical space. Low-level time-space 
distanciation is characteristic of tribal societies, where all 





























THE PRIMITIVIST-MODERNIST AND SUBSTANTIVIST-FORMALIST DEBATES 
 
The study of ancient economic history is rife with dichotomies. It has been called the 
“academic Hundred Years’ War” and not without good reason.2 Valuable in its depiction of 
two extreme positions, the Bücher-Meyer controversy of the 1890s exposed the 
precarious equilibrium between history and economics.3 The ancient historian (Meyer) 
vehemently denied the identification of ancient economies with household economies 
(Oikenwirtschaft) based on exchange rather than a market, as a primitivist oversimplification 
in the quest for a linear evolution of society and economy from primitive to modern 
capitalist. The economist (Bücher), on the other hand, dismissed the application of 
modern capitalist structures to the study of the ancient economy as a modernist, 
anachronistic caricature. Although significantly toned down, the primitivist-modernist 
debate that dominated the first half of the twentieth century has formed the undercurrent 
of other prevalent dichotomies in the field such as the substantivist (Polanyi) versus the 
formalist (e.g. Firth).4 Like the primitivists but with an added socio-political dimension, 
the substantive approach negates the existence of modern economic structures in what 
they perceive is an ancient economy fundamentally embedded in the social structures of 
the society in question and determined by political developments and the preservation of 
the status-quo. Conversely, the formalists argue that the economic sphere of activity in 
ancient societies is ipso facto separate from the social and has its own logic dominated by 
profit- and pleasure- maximising rationality. Much like the modernists, the formalists 
argue that, although not of the same sophistication, the ancient economy is constituted by 
elements readily recognisable in modern economies.5  
 However, as categories of thought these approaches are not particularly useful in 
describing social reality for a number of reasons. Fist of all, they appear to be static, while 
quite clearly the divide between them is not impermeable. As Cartledge has noted, even 
the most ardent primitivist would not ignore the fact that economic activities extended to 
some degree beyond the household, nor the most passionate modernizer would deny that 
some of the economic structures s/he recognised as modern were really rather primitive 
or dependent on social conditions.6 A similar permeability applies to the substantivist and 
formalist approaches. Polanyi never precluded the existence of profit-driven economic 
                                                 
2 Rathbone (2002), p. 156.  
3 For an anthology of the original texts, see Finley (1979).  
4 This dichotomy originated in the field of anthropology. Polanyi’s substantivism was articulated in The Great 
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (1944). Conversely, Raymond Firth was the first 
anthropologist to take up Lionel Robbins’ classic definition of economics as the study of choices made 
under conditions of scarcity and apply it to his study of the economic life of a group of islanders in Polynesia 
(1939). He firmly believed that formal concepts and tools of neo-classical economics had a universal validity 
based on human rationality.  
5 On the substantive and formal meaning of the economy, see Polanyi (1992). 
6 Cartledge (2002), p. 15.  
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activities in pre-capitalist societies, while Sahlins’ structural substantivist endeavour in his 
Stone Age Economics was, in spite of his best efforts, dotted by a formalist concern for the 
individual and the satisfaction of their needs.7 It may be that Sahlins’ work had 
inadvertently pointed to the possibility of a third way (i.e. the marriage of elements from 
both action-driven, utilitarian neoclassical micro-economics and structure-based cultural 
explanations).  
 Secondly, it follows that adherence to one or the other imposes limitations on our 
understanding of the nature and workings of ancient economies. These limitations hinge 
upon the assumptions that each approach employs to base their analysis, which can result 
in a partial selection and/or appreciation of the evidence. A potent example of the 
inadequacies of such closed views is the rise and fall of the so-called ‘Finley’s model’. 
Heavily influenced by Max Weber’s historical sociology, which associated pre-industrial 
economic activity with the preservation of status, and building on Polanyi’s tripartite 
evolutionary typology of reciprocity, redistribution and market exchange, Finley 
produced an influential model of a single ancient Mediterranean economy, which 
included ancient Greece and Rome from 1000 BCE to 500 CE, but excluded the 
Hellenistic period and the Near East.8 The status-based structures of this single economy 
were fundamentally embedded in social practice.9 Finley denied the rationality of 
individuals as economic agents in ancient societies and framed economic activity within 
the confines of ‘subsistence’ and the pursuit of cellular self-sufficiency and status.10 
Finley’s main observations on the ancient economy have withstood academic scrutiny, 
and for a long while substantivism appeared to have won the battle against modernism 
and formalism. Hardly anyone today would argue against the importance of social status 
as an incentive in transactions, the close link between economic activity and political 
power, the limitations of economic organisation in ancient political units, or the 
predominance of agriculture as a source of capital in pre-industrial societies. What had 
been hailed as the ‘new orthodoxy’ with Finley and his disciples though has undergone a 
serious shift in emphasis.11 Finley’s model is no longer thought to provide a sufficient 
framework by which to contextualize the new types of evidence that are considered 
relevant for the study of ancient economies. Of these new types of evidence, the most 
                                                 
7 Polanyi (1944, pp. 41-50) viewed profit as a means to an end and not as the end in itself. As Cook (1974, 
pp. 356-357) has observed, Sahlins (1972) is a rigorous substantivist in ideological terms only. When it 
comes to methods he does not provide an explanation of the failings of formalist methodology, while at the 
same time he is caught striving to explain economic structure on the basis of the satisfaction of individual 
needs, examples in O’Laughlin (1974), p. 1362.  
8 Finley (1999), pp. 27-29. See also the very good introduction to Finley’s work by Morris, in ibid.  
9 See in particular Finley (1999), ch. 2. For Weber’s views on the role of status and its effect on the non-
creation of markets and the restriction of effective property rights in the ancient economy see Economy and 
Society (1968), esp. ch. 9 on Political Communities. According to Weber, a free and competitive market will 
only come into existence when societies are stratified according to classes, which are created by economic 
interest. Finley collaborated with Polanyi and A.H.M. Jones. His views were broadcasted in a series of 
lectures delivered as the Sather Classical Lectures at Berkeley and later published as The Ancient Economy 
(orig. pub.1973).  
10 See Finley (1999), pp. 117-118.  
11 Hopkins (1983), pp. xi-xiii. The previous ‘orthodoxy’ he was referring to was Weber’s seven-tiered 
evolutionary typology of ancient political units. For a summary of the critiques of the substantivist model 
see Morris & Manning (2005), pp. 144-148. 
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important is material culture, which Finley considered untrustworthy and misleading.12 
What is more, in Finley’s model the aforementioned assumptions shape a fortiori the 
interpretation of the evidence for the sake of the creation of a general model. Hence, for 
instance the differences between the Spartan and Athenian economic systems are muted. 
Economists and historians alike are increasingly less convinced by the usefulness of such 
total views and direct attention towards the regionalism and isolation of certain ancient 
economies.13 In spite of the perceived clarity and practical appeal of a general model to 
explain economic organisation in the longue-durée, it is far more likely for it to generate 
bias that would sacrifice accuracy and detail of evidence for the overarching thesis.14  
 The most important shift in the Finleyan thesis is the re-introduction in the debate 
of the market principle, the role of the individual as a rational economic agent and the 
element of growth (as opposed to economic and technological stagnation) long advocated 
by modernists, like Rostovtzeff.15 Finley’s modernist refutation was grounded on a much 
closed definition of the purpose of economics (namely Erich Roll’s description of “the 
economic system as an enormous conglomeration of independent markets, [where] the central problem of 
economic enquiry [was] the explanation […] of the formation of price).16 Unable to distinguish 
networks of independent markets in the ancient Mediterranean he decided on the 
insignificant existence of markets at the expense of reciprocal relations between status 
groups.17 From an economist’s perspective Finley’s premise was inconsistent not only with 
Roll’s own work, but with the wider advancements in economics at the time.18 By extent, 
he had precariously denied in ancient societies the development of those particular 
mechanisms that enabled the pursuit of profit and economic growth for their own sake, 
such as interest rates, investment, competition and impersonal markets where 
consumers/buyers want to maximize utility and producers/sellers profit. According to 
Finley, this was due not to any intellectual failing but to institutionally-bound economic 
behaviour, which placed such activities at the margins of economic life.19 As a result, 
Finley’s ‘new orthodoxy’ severely underestimated the innate drive of human beings 
towards the satisfaction of their self-interest and the making of profit, occasionally even at 
the expense of status incentives.20 Added to the restrictions placed by a narrowed 
appreciation of the economic theory Finley was trying to refute, such an approach was 
not substantiated by the sources of the period. Research has shown that, contrary to 
                                                 
12 He believed that “…archaeology cannot show, of course, […] the legal and economic relationship between landowners 
and the manufacturers of pottery, tiles and bricks,” (1999), p. 190.  
13 Cartledge (2002), pp. 12-14, Witcher (1985). See also Reger (1994) and Woolf (1992).  
14 For the practical value of accepting a model of a single ancient economy, see von Reden (2006).  
15 Contrary to Finley’s view on economic stagnation, see Hopkins (1980, 1983, 1983b). Hopkins, a follower 
of Finley, revised the latter’s model of a single ancient economy to accommodate the potential for 
significant economic growth and trade. For the existence of technological progress and innovation in the 
ancient world, see Greene (2000).  
16 Roll (1945), p. 373, cited in Finley (1999), p. 22.  
17 Finley (1999), p. 60.  
18 See the critique of Gunther (1974), where he cites Lancaster’s ‘demand theory’ as more pertinent to the 
ancient world. Lancaster argued that different economic activities yield different kinds and levels of reward. 
Status and wages, according to the demand theory are just different kinds of rewards in an economic 
system. Thus, unlike Finley’s postulations, constant wage rates do not denote lack of a labour force in the 
ancient world.  
19 Finley (1999), pp. 22-23.  
20 It was the same mistake that cultural relativism committed when it disregarded the constancy of human 
nature through time. See the work of Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead.  
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Finley’s model, production of certain goods exceeded by far local needs and was intended 
specifically for export to foreign markets. This was the case, to name but a couple of 
Hellenistic examples, with part of the total production of wheat in Ptolemaic Egypt and 
wine from the Hellenic colony of Chersonesos in Krimaia.21 Gradually, the 
disproportionate growth of a handful of cities, certainly by the time of the preponderance 
of Rome, intensified the cultivation of cash-crops, which generally included the trio of 
staple foods; grain, olive oil and wine. Survey and marine archaeology have been 
instrumental in demonstrating how rural areas became increasingly devoted to 
monoculture.22 Stamped amphora handles recovered from wrecks and ancient refuse 
dumps combined with material remains of olive and wine presses in rural landscapes have 
proven much more valuable than Finley would ever allow, considering his vocal disdain 




THE WAR ON METHOD 
 
The above discussion brings to the foreground, arguably, the most important 
consequence of the ongoing debates on ancient economic history: the problem of method, 
or the ‘war on method’ (Methodenstreit) as the disagreeing German and Austrian economic 
historians called it at the turn of the nineteenth century.24 Where does one look for 
evidence of economic activity? What is the best way to analyse it? And indeed, what can 
be classified as economic activity? These are all essential categories that need to be 
clarified if one wishes to examine further economic power and its use by decision-making 
authorities. Torn by the mutual suspicion of one discipline for the methods of the other, 
economists and historians with an interest in the ancient world have failed to establish a 
methodological framework by which to identify and describe, as well as explain and 
compare, the various economic systems of antiquity and the structures that constitute 
them. The bone of contention between primitivists and modernists, and formalists and 
substantivists alike lay in the angle from which they approached modern economic 
theory. Effectively, it was an argument over three things: the universal validity of 
economic categories versus cultural relativism, the supremacy of a priori theoretical 
models over empirical data or vice-versa, and finally, the perennial problem of the agency 
                                                 
21 Alexandria consistently sold her surplus of grain for profit abroad; see Préaux (1979), pp. 147-152, 
Casson (1954). According to Segré (1934, p. 281) on an average year that quantity amounted to around 
10.000.000 artabas (= c. 400.000 tons of grain). The figure is accepted by Rostovtzeff (1941), p. 366, n. 162. 
Chersonesos is estimated to have produced around 20.000.000 litres of wine per annum for the 
Mediterranean market in the third century BCE (Randsborg, 1994, pp. 186-187).  
22 For wine stamped amphoreis recovered from various refuse heaps see Grace (1947), esp. pp. 449-451. 
More recently, Hopkins (1980, 1983b) has argued that inter-regional trade between countryside and towns 
in the Roman period has been on a far larger scale than previously thought. His research on amphorai 
handles from shipwrecks and on the cost of ships used in trade had shown that the latter was conducive to 
large-scale trading of staples. His conclusions overturn the view that small-scale trade of luxuries for the 
consumption of a wealthy minority was the norm in long distance trading. For further archaeological 
support on the frequency and scale of long-distance trade see the work of Mattingly (1995) on oil-presses in 
Roman North Afrika.  
23 Finley (1965), p. 41.  
24 For a concise overview of the Methodenstreit, see Fusfeld IN Durlauf & Blume (2008), s.v. Methodenstreit.  
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of the individual over its subordination to social structure. Never fully resolved, the debate 
on method in economic history broke afresh in the 1960s between the substantivists and 
the formalists. Like in the 1890s, it was often merciless: as the German empiricist 
Schmoller grudgingly refused to even read the Austrian purist Menger’s arguments, so 
the substantivist economist Knight scolded the formalist economic anthropologist Linton 





































                                                 
25 For a collection of the documents on the 1880s Methodenstreit between Schmoller and Wenger, see Ritzel 
(1951). The following quote is graphic of Knight’s defensiveness of economics against economic historians, 
which he considered as outsiders: “[When] Professor Linton says: “…the economic problems of ‘primitive’ man are 
essentially the same as our own and many of them can be studied even better in ‘primitive’ societies, because they manifest 
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ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN ARGEAD MAKEDONIA 
 
 
# REIGN REFERENCE DESCRIPTION 




Grevena Archaeological Project, Southwest 
Makedonia: Interdisciplinary archaeological 
survey of the province of Grevena, which 
identified approximately 325 archaeological 
sites ranging from the Early Neolithic to the 
modern era. 
The aim of the project was to study modern 
pastoralist and agriculturalist communities in 
order to shed light on the archaeological 
remains of the area. The project highlights 
occupation patterns and provides evidence of 
economic activity in an area completely devoid 
of literary references.   
Early Neolithic sites are concentrated on low 
hills above major river valleys. Evidence for 
transhumant pastoralism appears on the 
archaeological record in the Late Bronze Age, 
with herders occupying both lowland and 
highland sites. Hellenistic sites are characterised 
by occupation on step-sided slopes that were 
often surrounded by fortification walls 
2 Amyntas I (c. 505 BCE) Hdt. 5.94.1 
Amyntas I offered the district of Anthemous to 
Hippias, son of the Athenian tyrant Peisistratos, 
who refused it. As he was probably not in 
possession of that territory, his offer could 
suggest a joint occupation 
3 
Alexandros I  
(second quarter of 
5th c. BCE) 
Hdt. 5.17.2 
Alexandros was earning one silver talent per 
day from the mines at Mt Dysoron, north of 
Thessalonike 
4 Perdikkas II (432 BCE) Thouk. 1.58.2 
Perdikkas induced the Chalkidians to abandon 
and demolish their towns on the seaboard, and 
settle inland at Olynthos. He rewarded those 
who abided by his will by giving them a part of 
his own land (τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γῆς) in Mygdonia 
around lake Bolbe. They could reside there as 
long as the war against Athens lasted. The offer 
was accepted  
5 






Hellenic trade vessel found underwater near the 
island Alonessos. It was carrying a cargo of c. 
3000 amphorai of wine, most from the 
Makedonian town of Mende (at the time an 
independent city). Mendaian wine continued to 
be popular in the Hellenistic period (P. Cair. 
Zen. 59033, Ath. Deipn. IV.129d) and was 
exported in large quantities (Ath. Deipn.  
XI.784c) 
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# REIGN REFERENCE DESCRIPTION 
6 Perdikkas II (424/423 BCE) IG I3 61 
Economic blockade to Methone: Athenian 
decree asking for the permission of Perdikkas II 
to allow the Methonians to sail Makedonian 
waters and trade in Makedonian land without 
hindrance. This decree reveals how economic 
measures were taken in order to achieve 
political objectives (in this case the 
abandonment by Methone of its Athenian ties 
and its recognition of Makedonian suzerainty in 
the area, (for the dating of the decree see 
Mattingly 1961) 
7 Perdikkas II  (423-413 -?- BCE) IG I3 89 (IG I2 71) 
Treaty of Alliance between Athens and 
Perdikkas II, including a trade agreement that 
the Athenians alone were to receive oars from 
Makedonia. In turn the Athenians offer few 
concessions to the Makedones. Cf. Theoph. HP 
5.1.7 explains how the lightness and durability 
of pine, fir and cedar wood rendered them 
useful in shipbuilding  
8 Archelaos (413-399 BCE) Thouk. 2.100.1-2 
Archelaos revolutionised the infrastructure of 
the Kingdom by building straight roads, walled 
cities and strongholds 
9 Archelaos  (411 BCE) 
Andok. Περὶ τῆς 
ἑαυτοῦ καθόδου 
2.11 
Archelaos granting special privileges to 
Andokides, by virtue of shared hereditary family 
connections, for the cutting and exporting of an 
unlimited number of oars. If Andokides charged 
the Athenians above cost, he could have 
obtained five drachmai per oar, which indicates 
how profitable the business of exporting refined 
wood was for the Makedonian Kingdom  
10 Archelaos (410 BCE) Diod. 13.49.1-2 
Archelaos transferred the city of Pydna and its 
inhabitants twenty stadia away from the sea. 
The move came as a reaction to Pydna’s 
secession from the Makedonian arche and 
followed Archelaos’ successful siege of the city, 
whereby he gained rights of conquest 
Cf. For another example of the exercise of the 
royal prerogative of transplanting populations 
see Theagenes BNJ 774 F 3. An unknown king 
moved (μεταγαγὼν) the inhabitants of the city 
of Balla in Pieria to Pythion in Peraibia. Pythion 
was annexed into the Makedonian Kingdom 
during the reign of either Amyntas III or 
Philippos II 
11 Archelaos  (407/406 BCE) IG I3 117 (IG I2 105) 
Decree honouring Archelaos as proxenos and 
euergetes for providing timber and oars to 
Athenian shipwrights. It has been suggested that 
he had granted them permission to construct a 
fleet in situ in Makedonia in the shortest 




(first quarter of the 
Hammond (1972-
1988) II: 56, 
The Makedonian capital was transferred from 
Aigai to Pella. This was accompanied by 
significant population migrations. 
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AEMTH 2 (1988), 
Steph. Byz. s.v. Pella 
Archaeological evidence suggests that orchards 
and vineyards were once cultivated in the 
vicinity of Pella. Βούνομος or Βουνόμεια, the 
original name of Pella suggests a connection 
with pasturage 
13 Amyntas III (393 BCE) 
Diod. 14.92.3, Diod. 
15.19.2-3 
Having been defeated by the Illyrians Amyntas 
III temporarily relinquished his political 
authority and with it he ceded large portions of 
the Makedonian-Chalkidian borderland to the 
Olynthians as a gift, “τὴν σύνεγγυς χώραν 
ἐδωρήσατο..” The Olynthians enjoyed the 
revenues (προσόδους) from the land and 
because of these profits they refused to return 
the land to Amyntas when he was strong 
enough to reclaim it 
14 Amyntas III (393/392 BCE) 
SIG3 135 (Hatz. Epig. 
App. 1) 
Treaty of Alliance between Amyntas III and the 
Chalkidians, including specific instructions for 
the export of pitch, timber and other ship-
building materials, as well as the payment of 
dues (τέλεα) to the Makedones for the 
ἐξαγωγὴν δὲ εἶν καὶ διαγωγήν of the 
aforementioned materials. Needing their 
support against the Illyrians, the treaty seems to 
favour the Chalkidians 
15 Amyntas III (382 BCE) Xen. Hell. 5.2.38 
During the Spartan expedition against the 
Ckalkidian League, Amyntas III was urged by 
Teleutias, the Lakedaimonian commander, to 
contribute to the campaign by hiring 
mercenaries and enticing the –at the time- 
autonomous kings of Upper Makedonia into an 




(375/374 BCE or 
373/372 BCE) 
IG II2 102 
Decree of alliance between Athens and 
Amyntas III. The oaths taken by both parties 
are not revealed, but the treaty has been 
interpreted as part of the rapprochement 
between the city of Athens and the Kingdom of 
Makedonia involving mutual financial and 
defensive benefits (Cargill 1981: 85-87, Borza 
1992: 186-187) 
Cf. Xen. Hell. 6.1.11: Jason of Pherae stated c. 
374 BCE that Macedonia was the source of 
Athenian timber: “ἔχοντες μέν γε Μακεδονίαν, 
ἔνθεν καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ ξύλα ἄγονται.” The 
Kingdom was coveted by the Thessaloi for the 
same reason 




Amyntas granted timber specifically to 
Timotheos, son of Konon, Athenian strategos. 
The consignment of timber incurred freight 
costs of 1750 drachmai, which (as it has been 
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suggested by Meiggs 1982: 145) could have 
been enough to build ten triereis 
18 Perdikkas III (365 BCE) 
SEG 34:355 (1), 
Roesch (1984) 
Decree of the Theban League honouring 
Athenaios, son of Demonikos, as proxenos and 
euergetes. Roesch has proposed that the Kingdom 
of Makedonia supplied the Thebans with timber 
to serve the naval program of Epameinondas. 
Athenaios must have been the Makedonian 
representative who facilitated this trade. For the 
relations between Makedonia and the Boiotian 
League, see Hatzopoulos 1985  
19 Perdikkas III (361-360 BCE) 
[Arist.] Oikon. 
2.1350a 
Kallistratos re-organised the finances of the 
King and raised the annual revenue from the 
harbour dues from twenty talanta to forty. 
Comparative evidence shows that even at 
double the value harbour dues in the Kingdom 
of Makedonia were still relatively a lower source 
of income than in other places (Rhodos: 166 
talanta – Polyb. 30.31.12, Kersobleptes of 
Thrake: 200 talanta – Dem. 23.110).  
The method of collecting the harbour dues was 
based on tax-farming. Kallistratos improved the 
economic incentives for individual 
entrepreneurs (not just the wealthiest) to 
undertake the collection of taxes by lowering the 
sureties to one third per talanton, (as opposed to 
the previous arrangement of providing sureties 
for the whole amount of the twenty talanta) 
[Aristoteles] does not provide any information 
regarding the date of this reform. However, it is 
possible that it is the same Kallistratos as the 
Athenian orator self-exiled to Methone in 361 
BCE (Lyk. Κατὰ Λεωκράτους 93) and the 
founder of the city of Daton close to the mines 
of Pangaion (ps.-Skylax 67). Daton has been 
associated with Krenides (later refounded as 
Philippoi by Philippos II) to which it constituted 
the harbour (App. B. Civ. 4.13.105, see also 
Hansen 2004: no 637). According to Strab. 
7a.1.33, 7a.1.36 Daton had excellent 
agricultural land, dock-yards and goldmines 
20 Philippos II (359 BCE) Diod. 16.3.3-5 
Bribery: Philippos II gained the loyalty of the 
army of the Makedones through gifts. Similarly, 
in his struggle against the pretender Argaios, he 
maintained peace with the Paionians by bribing 
them (δωρεαῖς διαφθείρας). In the same way he 
managed to divert the Thrakian support 
enjoyed by his other rival, Pausanias, (δωρεαῖς 
πείσας) 
21 Philippos II (359-336 BCE) Strab. 7.1.20 
Pella contained the mint of Makedonia: “τὸ τῆς 
Μακεδονίας χρηματιστήριον” 
22 Philippos II, Alexandros III and Syll.3 332, Hatz. 
Grant (δωρεά) of royal land and tax privileges to 
individuals (hetairoi or philoi) of the King: This 
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Kassandros 
(?350s-297 BCE) 
Epig. App. 20 
 
inscription records the confirmation of an older 
grant of royal land by King Kassandros to 
Perdikkas, son of Koinos. The original grant 
was made by King Philippos II to Perdikkas’ 
grandfather Polemokrates and involved the 
same lands in the region of Bottike (fields in the 
village of Sinos and the hill of Trapezous near 
Olynthos). The grant was hereditary (ἐμ 
πατρικοῖς καὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκγόνοις) and the lands 
could be freely alienated (κυρίοις οὖσι 
κεκτῆσθαι καὶ ἀλλάσσεσθαι καὶ ἀποδόσθαι). As 
a matter of fact, Polemokrates had bought (ἐν 
ἀργυρίωι) land in nearby Spartolos from a 
Ptolemaios, son of Ptolemaios (probably a 
hetairos of the king), who had also received it as a 
grant from Alexandros III (ἔδωκεν). These lands 
were also exempt from taxes (ἀτέλειαν αὐτῶι 
καὶ ἐκγόνοις καὶ εἰσάγοντι καὶ ἐξάγοντι τῶν ἐπὶ 
κτήσει). Χώρα βασιλικὴ was χώρα 
φορολογουμένη, φόρος being the generic term 
in Makedonian usage for all revenues from the 
royal lands (Arr. Anab. 1.27.4: φόρους 
ἀποφέρειν ὅσα ἔτη Μακεδόσι, 3.17.5: ὁ φόρος 
δὲ ὁ συνταχθεὶς..)  
- Cf. the granting of hereditary tax-exemption 
(ἀτέλειαν ἔδωκεν) by Kassandros to 
Chairephanes on all goods that were imported, 
exported, sold and bought in his land, except 
those for trading purposes- εἰσάγοντι καὶ 
ἐξάγοντι καὶ πωλοῦντι καὶ ὠνουμένωι πλὴν ὅσα 
ἐπ’ ἐμπορίαι (306-298 BCE - SEG 47:940, Hatz. 
Epig. App. 21). His estates were attached 
administratively to the new city territory of 
Kassandreia, which at the time was 
independent of the Kingdom of Makedonia. 
However, according to Hatzopoulos this 
paradoxical tax-exemption can be explained by 
the fact that Kassandros wanted to maintain the 
tax privileges of local Makedones despite the 
foundation of a new city  (Hatzopoulos, 1996: p. 
440, n. 5). This is possibly the same 
Chairephanes that assumed the costs of 
draining work in Eretria in exchange for 
exploiting the reclaimed agricultural land for 
ten years and for the annual rate of three 
talanta (IG XII, 9.191) 
- Cf. the grant of royal land by Lysimachos to 
Limnaios, son of Harpalos (285/284 BCE, SEG 
38:619, Hatz. Epig. App. 21). The land grant 
involves three separate areas that amount to 
2.460 plethra of forested land and 20 plethra of 
vineyards. All could be freely alienated 
Cf. the fictional account in ps.-Aisch. Epist. 
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12.7-8: [Aischines] wonders whether joining the 
court of Alexandros III was not the best thing to 
have done upon leaving for his exile, as he 
would receive from the king hefty compensation 
for his services. The author adds that he could 
not ignore that Demades possessed inns in 
Boiotia, cultivated fields of twenty plethra and 
that he dined in golden vessels. Equally, 
Hegemon and Kallimedon, one in Pella and the 
other in Beroia, had received gifts and were 
very well married indeed (all were Makedonian 
sympathisers, Dem. 18.285, Din. 1.94) 
23 Philippos II (358 BCE) 
Strab. 7.7.8, Diod. 
16.4.3-7 
Philippos II acquired the silver mines of 
Damastion, near Lake Ochrid, Illyria 





Following the conquest of Amphipolis, which 
contributed a great deal to the growth of 
Philippos’ power as it was favourably situated 
towards Thrake and the neighbouring regions 
(Diod. 16.8.3), he conquered the former 
Thasian colony of Oisyme, which, thereafter, is 
recorded to have belonged to the Makedones 
25 Philippos II (357-350 BCE) 
SEG 40:542, Hatz. 
Epig. App. 4 
Settlement of boundaries (ὁροθεσία) of the area 
of Mygdonia in the South-Eastern part of 
Chalkidike by Philippos II. The document is 
probably a royal diagramma. Cf. an ὁροθεσία of 
Amyntas, father of Philippos between Doliche 
and Elimeia and a further by Philippos the king 
for the Bragylioi, Tiberioi and Kossynioi 
(Hatzopoulos-Loukopoulos, Morrylos 58, n. 1, 
Wace & Thompson 1910/1911: 195) 
26 Philippos II  (356 BCE) Diod. 16.8.5 
Having conquered Potidaia, Philippos sold its 
inhabitants into slavery and handed over its 
territories to the Olynthians “τὴν δὲ πόλιν 
ἐξανδραποδισάμενος παρέδωκε τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις, 
δωρησάμενος ἅμα καὶ τὰς κατὰ τὴν χώραν 
κτήσεις” 
27 Philippos II  (356 BCE) Diod. 16.8.6 
Philippos enlarged the city of Krenides with a 
considerable number of new inhabitants and 
renamed it to Philippoi (Diod. 16.3.7).  
For the foundation of Poneroupolis (a city of 
villains and false witnesses settled with two 
thousand people by Philippos), see Theopompos 
FGrHist 115 F 110. Str. 7.6.2 identifies 
Poneroupolis with Kabyle, another of Philippos’ 
settlements close to Byzantion. Plin. NH 4.41 
identifies it with Philippoupolis (cf. Cl. Ptol. 
3.11) 
28 Philippos II  (356 BCE) 
Diod. 16.8.6-7, 
Strab. 7a.1.33-34 
Philippos took over the gold mines in the 
Pangaion Mt near Philippoi (former Krenides) 
that were scarcely exploited at the time. He 
developed them to the point of yielding a 
revenue of more than one thousand talents a 
year (roughly triple the amount that Alexandros 
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I collected a century earlier from the mines at 
Mt Dysoron). According to Diodoros, it was this 
money that helped Philippos II expand and 
strengthen the Makedonian state (cf. Diod. 
11.70: Athens and Thasos had quarrelled over 
control of these mines over a century earlier - in 
464 BCE) 
Cf. Strab. 7.7.4 for the economic importance of 
the territories between the Strymon and the 
Nestos rivers for the Makedonian Kingdom. 
Philippos appropriated them to himself because 
he could extract large revenues from the mines 
and the fertility of the land  
29 Philippos II (356 BCE) 
Theoph. CP 5.14.5-
6 
Philippos reclaimed (deforested and drained) the 
plain of Philippoi in order to open up the area 
for agriculture 
30 Philippos II (354 BCE) Diod. 16.34.5 
Following the successful siege of Methone, 
Philippos razed the city and distributed its lands 
to the Makedones, (τὴν δὲ χώραν διένειμε τοῖς 
Μακεδόσιν) 
31 Philippos II (352 BCE) 
Dem. Ὀλυνθιακὸς 
Α´ 1.22 
Following his victory at the Krokos Field against 
Onomarchos of Phokis, Philippos proceeded to 
secure control of the public revenues of the 
Thessalian League (i.e. the profits from its 
harbours and markets)  
32 Philippos II (351-350 BCE) 
Dem. Κατὰ 
Φιλίππου Α´ 4.34 
Piracy: Demoshenes accuses Philippos in 
making profit out of piratical activity, harassing 
the Athenian allies by raiding their commercial 
vessels. Philippos is also said to have carried off 
the citizens of Imbros and Lemnos captive and 
to have seized the shipping at Gairestos levying 
untold sums of money 
33 Philippos II (348 BCE) 
Diod. 16.53.2-3, 
Dem. Περὶ τῆς 
Παραπρεσβείας 
19.114, 19.167 
Bribery: Diodoros preserves the famous phrase 
that “διὰ χρυσίου πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ διὰ τῶν ὅπλων 
ηὐξηκέναι τὴν ἰδίαν βασιλείαν.” Philippos 
distributed money to the most influential men in 
various cities and thus was able to corrupt their 
judgment. 
After the capture of Olynthos, Philippos 
acquired the Chalkidian mines, rich in gold, 
silver, copper and iron. The Chalkidian coinage 
was suspended and Philippos coined his first 
‘Philippeioi’ with which he bribed several cities 
into surrender (διδοὺς χρυσίον). See Hammond 
(1995b). That Philippos’ gold was coined can be 
inferred from Demosthenes’ accusations that 
Philokrates paraded the unmistakable 
Makedonian-sourced coinage in his commercial 
dealings and even changed it at the bank. 
34 Philippos II (348 BCE) Diod. 16.53.3 
Rewards for gallantry in action 
(ἀνδραγαθήσαντας): Philippos rewarded with 
appropriate gifts those amongst his soldiers who 
showed bravery in battle. Cf. Diod. 16.75.3-4, 
 219 
# REIGN REFERENCE DESCRIPTION 
where in the siege of Perinthous the Makedones 
were driven by the rewards of victory; a wealthy 
city to sack and Philippos’ gifts. Cf. also Diod. 
16.86.6, where the valiant in the Battle of 
Chaironeia were similarly rewarded 
35 Philippos II (347-343 -?- BCE) 
Dem. Περὶ τῆς 
παραπρεσβείας 
19.265 
Lasthenes of Olynthos (Dem. Περὶ τοῦ 
Στεφάνου 18.48) is accused of bribery for 
having built his roof in Olynthos with timber 
given to him as a gift from Makedonia. Cf. 
Diod. 16.53.2 
36 Philippos II (c. 346) BCE Isok. Φίλιππος 5.5 
Amphipolis, by that time incorporated fully 
within the Kingdom of Makedonia, contributed 
revenues (προσόδους) to Philippos. As part of 
the national territory, Amphipolis should have 
been free of tax. The revenues that Isokrates is 
referring to could involve tolls and other taxes 
on the import and export of goods. The volume 
of trade in Amphipolis, given its strategic 
location at the mouth of the Strymon, must 
have been considerable. For the Athenians also 
exacting significant “χρημάτων προσόδῳ” 
(Thouk. 4.108.1) from Amphipolis, at a time 
when it was an independent ally, see Isaac 
(1986), pp. 39-40 
37 Philippos II (344/343 BCE) Diod. 16.69.7 
Booty: In a campaign against the Illyrians, 
Philippos ravaged the countryside, captured 
many towns and return to Makedonia laden 
with booty (μετὰ πολλῶν λαφύρων). 
Cf. Diod. 16.53.3: Similarly, a few years back 
Olynthos (348 BCE) was plundered and its male 
population and property sold to slavery 
(διαρπάσας δ᾽ αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας 
ἐξανδραποδισάμενος ἐλαφυροπώλησε). By 
doing so Philippos came up with the funds to 
pursue the war against the Athenians 
Cf.  
- Arr. Anab. 1.1.13-2.1, where 
Alexandros captured all the women, 
children and property of the Thrakes 
that he could lay his hands on and sent 
it to the cities on the Makedonian coast 
(335 BCE)  
- Arr. Anab. 1.4.5, where Alexandros 
collects all the booty left behind by the 
Getai (335 BCE). 
- Arr. Anab. 7.10.4, where Alexandros 
retorts his Makedones at Opis for 
having received such high pay, and for 
having carried off so much booty 
wherever this could be got  
38 Philippos II (348 BCE) 
Aisch. Περὶ τῆς 
Παραπρεσβείας 
Royal exploitation of Crown property: 
Aischines describes prisoners from Olynthos, 
friends of Satyros the comic actor, who were 
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2.156 working the vineyards of Philippos bound by 
chains (αἰχμαλώτους σκάπτοντας ἐν τῷ Φιλίππου 
ἀμπελουργείῳ καὶ δεδεμένους παρὰ πότον). Cf. 
Arr. Anab. 1.16.6, where the prisoners of the 
Granikos (334 BCE) were bound in fetters and 
sent back to Makedonia to work (ἐργάζεσθαι) 
39 Philippos II (343 BCE) 
[Dem.] Περὶ 
Ἁλοννήσου 7.9-13 
Philippos sent ambassadors to negotiate an 
inter-state legal agreement (σύμβολον) with 
Athens. The main objective of this contract 
would be to regulate commercial suits between 
Makedones and Athenians. However, the 
author of the speech (possibly Hegessipos) is 
critical of the initiative as none of Philippos’ 
predecessors ever pursued such arrangements 
with the Athenians. These were especially 
redundant at the time of the speech on the 
grounds that commercial relations between the 
two political units were more infrequent than 
before, as well as because currently such suits 
were regulated through ἔμμηνοι δίκαι strictly 
within thirty days of their occurring. The 
complaints were settled during the winter 
months when the seas were closed off to trade 
40 Philippos II (343 BCE) 
[Dem.] Περὶ 
Ἁλοννήσου 7.39-41 
Crown ownership in the Thrakian Chersonesos: 
Philippos treats the whole of the North of the 
Agora as his own property (τὸν μὲν γὰρ τόπον 
ἅπαντα […] ὡς ἑαυτοῦ ὄντα) and has granted 
as a private estate  (δέδωκε καρποῦσθαι) to 
Apollonides of Kardia. The South of the Agora 
he also treats as his own (ὡς ἑαυτοῦ οὖσαν τὴν 
μὲν αὐτὸς καρποῦται) and while he has kept 
part of it for himself he has bestowed pieces of it 
to others (δωρειὰν δέδωκε) 
41 Philippos II (343 BCE) Diod. 16.71.2 
After defeating the Thrakes in battle Philippos 
imposed the payment of a tithe (δεκάτη) to the 
Makedones as tribute.  
He also planted new cities in strategic places to 
keep a check on their power. Cf. Just. 8.5.7, 
8.6.1-2: Philippos transplanted peoples and 
cities here and there, according to his whim and 
according to whether he thought places needed 
to be populated for strategic purposes (i.e. on 
the frontiers to oppose his enemies). On 
occasion, he would settle prisoners of war in 
order to strengthen the population of certain 
towns. In this way, he addressed the 
demographic organisation of the Kingdom 
42 Philippos II (340 BCE) 
Theopompos 
FGrHist 115 F 292, 
Philochoros FGrHist 
328 F 162  
(Didymos On 
Instance of economic warfare: Philippos 
detained through military force an Athenian 
grain fleet of about 200 ships in Hieron, at the 
entrance of the Bosporos. The interception of 
their cargo gave him seven hundred talents in 
profit. The criticality of an uninterrupted grain 
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Demosthenes 10.34) trade for Athens is illustrated by the fact that 
following the incident the Athenians declared 
war on the Kingdom of Makedonia (Harding 
2006: 210-211) 
Cf. Dem. 18.241, where in 330 BCE Philippos 
is presented as the master of Hellenic grain 
trade: “τοῦ μὲν Ἑλλησπόντου διὰ Βυζαντίων 
ἐγκρατὴς καθέστηκε, καὶ τῆς σιτοπομπίας τῆς 
τῶν Ἑλλήνων κύριος” 
43 
Alexandros III 
(during the reign of 
Philippos II - 
340 BCE) 
Plout. Alex. 9.1 
When Alexandros was left regent of Makedonia 
for the duration of Philippos’ expedition against 
Byzantion, he took over the city of the Thrakian 
tribe called Maidoi and re-founded it as 
Alexandroupolis. The population settled there 
was mixed. Cf. Diod. 17.83.2 for the foundation 
of cities of non-Makedonian population by 
Alexandros, the names of which are not 
preserved 
44 Philippos II (340/339 BCE) 
Theopompos 
FGrHist 115 F 225b 
Philippos’ Companions, who in that year were 
not more than 800, derived more income from 
their lands that the ten thousand richest 
landowners in Hellas put together  
45 Philippos II (338 BCE) 
Paus. 1.34.1 
 
After his victory in Chaironeia, Philippos 
presented the Athenians with the city-state of 
Oropos, which he regained from the Thebans. 
For his promises in the 340s to restore Oropos 
and Euboia to the Athenians in exchange for 
Amphipolis see Dem. 6.30, Dem. 5.10. Cf. 
[Dem.] 7.2-3, where Philippos suggested to 
grant the island of Alonnesos, which he had 
freed from pirates and considered his own 
property, as a gift to the Athenians 
46 Alexandros III (336-334 BCE) 
Dem. Περὶ τῶν πρὸς 
Ἀλέξανδρον 
Συνθηκῶν 17.10 
Alexandros overthrew the democratic 
institutions in Pellene, had the majority of its 
citizens expelled and their property given (τοῖς 
οἰκέταις δέδωκε) to slaves 
47 Alexandros III (335 BCE) Just. 11.3.6 
At the beginning of his reign Alexandros made 
peace with the Thessaloi. Like they had done 
with his father (Dem. 1.22), they resigned to 
him all their public revenues and customs dues 
(uectigalia omnia reditusque suos) 
48 Alexandros III  (335 BCE) SEG 34:664 
Alexandros’ settlement regarding the frontier 
dispute between the town of Philippoi and the 
Thrakes. Through his ambassadors, Philotas 
and Leonnatos, he maintained the 
allocations/gifts of land made earlier by 
Philippos II. Alexandros granted permission to 
the Philippians to cultivate royal land in return 
for rent (or tribute) <προστελοῦσ[ι․․․]> The land 
in question, formerly known as Krenides, might 
have involved reclaimed marshland from the 
reign of Philippos II c. 350-340 BCE (cf. 
Theoph. CP 5.14.5-6, who speaks of which it 
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the only evidence) 
Alexandros also publicised a temporary ban on 
the sale of timber from Mt Dysoron. While the 
king controlled the timber resources of the 
kingdom, it appears as if in this case the 
Philippians were granted certain rights to sell 
timber, which were now suspended: “τὴν δὲ γῆν 
τὴν ἐν Δυ[σώρ]ωι̣μηθένα πωλεῖν τέως ἡ 
πρεσβεία πα[ρά τοῦ Ἀλε]ξάνδρου ἐπανέλθηι” 
(cf. [Dem.] 17.28, where he states at the 
beginning of Alexandros’ reign that timber is 
difficult to come by in Athens 
49 Alexandros III (335 BCE) Arr. Anab. 1.3.1-4.8 
Alexandros ordered the fitting of a small 
Makedonian fleet in Byzantion and sailed it up 
the Danube. Having subdued the tribes settled 
near the Danube, he was in the position to 
control the traffic of merchandise that came 
down the river  
50 Alexandros III 335/334 BCE SEG 36:626 
The re-organisation of the Chalkidian town of 
Kalindoia and its neighbouring villages of 
Thamiskia, Kamakaia and Tripoatis. 
Alexandros granted these lands to the 
Makedones (ἔδωκε) 
51 Alexandros III (334-323 BCE) Theoph. Char. 23.4 
During his regency for Alexandros Antipatros is 
presented as exercising his royal prerogative of 
granting tax privileges for the export of timber 
to individual entrepreneurs, Makedonian or 
foreign. In this case, Theophrastos’ boastful 
man is allowed to export timber free of duty 
(ἀτελοῦς) 
52 Alexandros III (334-320) 
OGIS 1 (= I. Priene 
132) 
Letter of Alexandros regulating land ownership 
at Naulochos (the port-town of Priene): The 
citizens of Naulochos, who were Prienians 
remained free, autonomous and owners of the 
buildings and land in the city and the 
countryside. To the contrary, the land of non-
Prienians in the area was declared royal land –
belonging to Alexandros (χώραγ̣[γ]ι̣νώσκω 
ἐμὴν εἶναι)- and the inhabitants were subject to 
taxes (φόρους). The city of Priene itself was 






The reclamation of Lake Kopais in Boiotia. 
Strabon reports that Alexandros III had 
employed Krates of Chalkis, a mining engineer, 
to clear or maintain the channels that drained 
the lake free from obstructions. According to 
Krates’ letter to Alexandros, although work was 
being stalled due to political unrest in Boiotia, a 
good part of the lake had already been drained. 
Cf. Hammond (1972-1988, III: 31) suggested 
that Alexandros was also interested in land 
reclamation in the area of Amphipolis, but 
evidence is scarce 
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54 Alexandros III (334 BCE) 
Plout. Alex. 15.1 
(see also 
Anaximenes FGrHist 
72 F 29, Phylarchos 
FGrHist 81 F 77), 
Arr. Anab. 7.9.6 
 
Ploutarchos comments on the financial situation 
of the King right before the Asian Expedition, 
which was tenuous. According to his sources, 
Alexandros had 70 talents to provision for his 
thirty thousand foot soldiers and four thousand 
cavalrymen (Aristoboulos), cf. Arr. Anab. 1.11.3. 
Duris spoke of a sum sufficient for only thirty 
days of maintenance, while Onesikritos 
mentioned that the King was two hundred 
talanta in debt at the time. Arrianos records 
that Alexandros inherited only a few precious 
metal goblets from Philippos, less than 60 
talanta in cash and another 500 in debt. In 
order to embark into the expedition he was 
obliged to borrow another 800 
55 Alexandros III (334 BCE) 
Plout. Alex. 15.2-3, 
Just. 11.5.5 
Royal grants to hetairoi and philoi on the eve of 
the Asian Expedition: Perhaps because he 
borrowed heavily from his courtiers (Arr. Anab. 
7.9.6) in order to finance the campaign, 
Alexandros gave them in return grants from the 
crown property (τῶν βασιλικῶν): “ἀπονεῖμαι τῷ 
μὲν ἀγρόν, τῷ δὲ κώμην, τῷ δὲ συνοικίας 
πρόσοδον ἢ λιμένος.” This way he distributed 
most of his possessions in the Kingdom to those 
who would accept his favours 
56 Alexandros III (334 BCE) 
Diod. 17.17.2 
Just. 11.5.10-11 
Γῆ δορίκτητος: Alexandros claimed Asia as his 
personal prize from the gods (παρὰ τῶν θεῶν 
ἀπεφαίνετο τὴν Ἀσίαν δέχεσθαι δορίκτητον) by 
hurling his spear on the ground  as soon as his 
ship landed on the shore. Spear-won territory 
generally meant that it was crown territory 
(βασιλικὴ χώρα). 
Cf. Arr. Anab. 7.4.2: all the lands that 
Alexandros had conquered in Asia were dubbed 
“δορίκτητοι.” 
Cf. Diod. 19.105.4: Following the murder of 
Roxanne and Alexandros IV ordered by 
Kassandros, the Diadochoi could pretend that 
their realms were won by their spear (βασιλείαν 
δορίκτητον) 
57 Alexandros III (334 BCE) 
Arr. Anab. 1.16.5, 
Arr. Anab. 7.10.4 
Most comprehensive statement of taxation in 
the Kingdom: In the context of the favours 
granted to the men killed in action at the Battle 
of Granikos Alexandros remitted their parents 
and children from taxes (ἀτέλειαν, εἰσφοραί) 
and services (λειτουργίαι). The taxes pertained 
to the use of royal land (τὴν χώραν), to which 
the dead were probably grantees, and property 
(κτήσεις). As far as the services are concerned 
these were most probably public services (and 
hardly military, cf. Just. 11.1.10) involving 
possibly other regular per capita financial 
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contributions (possibly import and export taxes 
on goods passing through the land), provision of 
draught animals, personal labour in public 
works and the like. 
Arr. Anab. 7.10.4 (οἱ γονεῖς δ’ ἔντιμοί εἰσι 
λειτουργίας τε ξυμπάσης καὶ εἰσφορᾶς 
ἀπηλλαγμένοι) implies that similar remissions 
were granted to the families of the dead in 
subsequent battles 
58 Alexandros III (334 BCE) Arr. Anab. 1.17.3-8 
Sardeis (Sparda) is surrendered to Alexandros 
along with its treasury. The king proceeds to 
appoint officials for the collection of the tribute 
and taxes pertaining to the administration of the 
city (τῶν δὲ φόρων τῆς συντάξεώς τε καὶ 
ἀποφορᾶς) 
59 Alexandros III (334/3 BCE) Arr. Anab. 1.27.4 
Alexandros demanded from the Aspendians to 
surrender their most influential men as 
hostages, horses, a hundred talents as 
retribution and an annual tribute (φόρους) 
payable to the Makedones 
60 Alexandros III (333 BCE) Curt. 3.11.23 
Spoils of war: After the battle of Issos, the 
soldiers of Alexandros captured the tent of 
Dareios and presented it to the king intact. 
Alongside the symbolism of the victor taking 
hold of the seat of power of the vanquished, 
Dareios’ opulent tent was part of the booty. Cf. 
Arr. Anab. 7.9.7-8 where it becomes evident 
that soldiers were allowed access to booty at the 
discretion of the king: “τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα 
ἑκόντα προσχωρήσαντα λαβὼν ὑμῖν καρποῦσθαι 
ἔδωκα” 
61 Alexandros III (331 BCE) Arr. Anab. 3.16.3-5 
Babylon is surrendered to Alexandros along 
with its treasury and he appointed 
Asklepiodoros, son of Philon, as a tax collector 
(τοὺς φόρους ἐκλέγειν) 
62 Alexandros III (331 BCE) Arr. Anab. 3.16.6-7 
The inhabitants of Susa surrendered the city to 
Alexandros along with the entirety of their 
treasury and the rest of the royal property. The 
treasury contained the equivalent of 50.000 
silver talanta  
63 
Alexandros III or 
his Successors 
(331-313 BCE) 
Ep. Cat. N. 1, ll. 10-
17 (Perlman 2000), 
SEG 36:331 
The Nemean list of Theorodokoi records the 
financial contributions of Makedonian cities 
such as Amphipolis, Lete and Allante (or 
Atalante) for the Nemean Games. Note the 
evolution of theodorokia in Makedonia from 
being solely the duty of the King  (Ep. Cat. E. 1, 
Frg b, l. 9, Perlman 2000: Perdikkas III serving 
as theorodokos for the whole of Makedonia, 
360/359 BCE) to being served by different 
communities. Of this evolution this is our 
earliest evidence. Cf. Plassart (1921), col. III, ll. 
51-97, where the contributions of a host of 
Makedonian cities to the Sanctuary at Delphi 
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are recorded c. 230-210 BCE 
64 Alexandros III (330 BCE) Diod. 17.70 
Alexandros gave the city of Persepolis over to 
his soldiers to plunder (τοῖς στρατιώταις ἔδωκεν 
εἰς διαρπαγὴν). Only the palace was off limits. 
Persepolis is described as the richest city under 
the sun, with many wealthy private households 
65 Alexandros III (330 BCE) 
Diod. 17.71.1, Curt. 
5.6.9 
Alexandros took hold of the accumulated 
revenues of the Persian Kings from the treasury 
at Persepolis. The total in the treasury 
amounted to 120.000 silver talanta when all 
metals were converted to the silver standard. 
This was done according to a ratio that 
Diodoros does not specify. Alexandros is said to 
have used a part to finance the expedition and 
the rest he ordered to be safely deposited in 
other palaces. It was finally transported to 
Ecbatana under the supervision of Parmenion 
(Arr. Anab. 3.19.7) and handed over to 
Harpalos. 
Curt. 5.6.11 alone records that a certain 
Tiridates surrendered the treasury to 
Alexandros and for that he was rewarded by the 
King 
Regarding the burning of the palace of 
Persepolis, Parmenion advised Alexandros that 
it was not wise to destroy what was already his 
own property: αὑτοῦ κτήματα ἤδη (Arr. Anab. 
3.18.11) 
66 Alexandros III (326/325 BCE) 
Syll.3 302 (IMT 
Kaikos 923) 
Individual entrepreneurs: A certain Krateuas 
ceded (ἔδωκεν) a field, building plots and an 
orchard to a certain Aristomenes. The latter 
was to exploit the land directly, as well as pay 
an annual rent of a chrysous (a gold stater or 
two gold drachmai) for the orchard  
67 Alexandros III (325 BCE) CID 2.100 
The Makedones donated directly in their name 
the sum of 10.500 staters to the Delphic 
Amphiktyony 
68 Alexandros III (324 BCE) Arr. Anab. 7.9 
The Opis Speech: 
- 7.9.2-5: An evolution from 
transhumant pastoralism to settled 
agriculture and city-living is described, 
effected during the reign of Philippos 
II. Mention is also made to the 
commercial expansion of the Kingdom 
and the proliferation of mining as a 
business 
- 7.9.9: Alexandros refers to the “wealth 
of the Makedones” (ὑμέτερα κτήματα) 
and to the fact the King is simply the 
guardian thereof, cf. Curt. 10.6.23 (323 
BCE) 
69 Alexandros III (323 BCE) Just. 13.1.9 
Upon the death of Alexandros there were 
50.000 talanta in the royal treasury and 30.000 
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more were coming in from the annual tax 





(after 323 BCE) 
IG IV 617 
Makedonian poleis had their own finances. IG 
IV 617 records the financial contributions of 
poleis such as Aigai, Edessa, Atalante, Europos, 
Kasandreia and Philippoi to the Sanctuary of 
Hera at Argos, or to the Sanctuary of Asklepios 
at Epidauros (Perlman 2000: 127-128)  
71 Perseus (168 BCE) Liv. 44.46.6-8 
The man-made citadel of Phakos in the 
marshland surrounding Pella housed the Royal 
Treasury of the Makedones (gaza regia). At the 
time after the Battle of Pydna it was empty, save 
three hundred talanta that Gentius (the Illyrian 






Plout. Aem. 32-34 
The wealth of the Makedonian (and Epirote) 
states made a terrific impression on the 
Romans. The gold and silver in the procession 
of Lucius Aemilius Paulus (granted the 
cognomen Macedonicus by the Senate) 
amounted to more than 120.000.000 sestertii. 
Livius also mentions that Perseus had spent an 
equal amount of money on preparing the war 
against the Romans and on financing his flight 
to Samothrake. He adds that all this money was 
accumulated over thirty years from the profits 
of the mines and from other sources. Unlike his 
predecessor Philippos V, who was short on cash 
when he undertook his wars against the 
Romans, Perseus was quite well off. (Cf. Polyb. 
18.44, Liv. 33.30, for the war indemnity that 
Philippos V was forced to pay the Romans after 
his defeat in the Second Makedonian War: one 
thousand talanta, half as a lump sum and the 
rest in ten annual instalments. Perseus made 
attempts to resolve his own defeat in 168 BCE 
on similar financial terms, but was unsuccessful: 
Polyb. 27.8.2, Liv. 42.62.) 
Ploutarchos records among the Makedonian 
treasures paraded in Aemilius’ triumph 2.250 


















Late sixth century 





* The weight of the local 
Makedonian standard 
varied from time to time. 
From quite early on, 
there was a discrepancy 
in weight between issues 
intended for export and 
those for local 
consumption, the latter 
being somewhat lighter. 
The Thrako-
Makedonian standard 
was used by the 
Chalkidians in Olynthos, 
the Amphipolitans and 
the Akanthians 
Beginnings of Makedonian minting: The Thrako-
Makedonian ethne and a few poleis, including 
Verge, Aineia, Mende, Potidaia, Skione and 
Akanthos, mint and release into circulation the first 
silver coins in the region. The mineral wealth of 
Makedonia allowed those ethne and poleis to mint 
high-value denominations, such as octodrachms, 
dekadrachms and dodekadrachms. Interestingly, the 
first Makedonian coin bearing the legend ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥ 
appears in the kingdom of the Edonai and dates to 
475-465 BCE (MN 1). The independent minting of 
the Thrako-Makedonian ethne came to an end 





(c. 14,45g and 
lighter) 
Launched the first royal coinage. He minted the first 
high-value royal silver coins (octodrachms and 






(c. 14,45g and 
lighter) 
The military and political instability of Perdikkas’ 
reign is reflected on his minting activity. He 
produced only small silver octobols and smaller 
denominations. This lack can be explained by the 
fact that during his turbulent reign he must have lost 




Abandonment of the 
local Makedonian 
standard. Silver 
staters of c. 10.90g 
(akin to the weight of 
the Persian daric) 
Introduced high denominational coins (silver staters) 
of a reduced standard (c. 10.90g), as well as the first 
bronze coinage in the history of the Makedonian 
Kingdom. The Makedonian bronze coinage is also 
one of the earliest in the Hellenic world. Athens 
introduced bronze coins with a silver coating in 407 
BCE. As a result of the first, he created a closed 
currency zone in which only his coinage circulated. 
The bronze coinage indicates a larger emphasis on 
cash exchange, as opposed to barter. This innovation 
maximized revenues from minting by saving up on 
the precious metals reserves, but also from taxation, 
which was easier to control. The recognisability of 
                                                 
26 Essential reading includes: West (1923), Price (1974, 1991), Franke (1972), le Rider (1977, 1996), 
Thompson (1982), Arnold-Biucchi (2006), Makedonias Nomisma (MN) Catalogue (2009)  
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the reduced standard facilitated trade with favoured 
partners (i.e. Athens) 
Period of Dynastic 
Instability 
(399-359 BCE) 
Silver staters akin to 
the Persian standard 
of Archelaos, but of 
even lighter weights  
The kings of this period minted limited amounts of 
silver staters and their denominations. It appears that 
the bullion originated from the state reserves, which 
soon became depleted, as is suggested by the 
reduction in the weight of the silver staters of 
Pausanias (395/4-393 BCE) and Amyntas III (393-
370/369 BCE) - MN  19-23. 
Alexandros II  (370/369BCE) minted only in bronze. 
Perdikkas III (365-359 BCE) re-introduced high 




of the Thrako- 
Makedonian 
standard (c. 14,45g). 
Gold Philippeioi on 
the Attic standard (c. 
8.60g) 
Introduced bimetallism (gold and silver) in the royal 
coinage of Makedonia. Bronze circulated widely to 
address the domestic needs of the state. 
Mints operated in Pella and Amphipolis. 
In 356 BCE Philippos minted silver tetradrachms, 
didrachms and other denominations on the local 
Makedonian standard. Post-348 BCE the so-called 
gold “Philippeioi” emerged, which substituted the 
golden daric in international exchange. 
Philippos’ reign sees the end of the independent 
minting of Makedonian poleis, which resumes only 
during the reign of the last two Antigonid Kings, 
Philippos V and Perseus  
Alexandros III 
(336-323 BCE) 
336-333 BCE: Silver 
tetradrachms on the 
Thrako-Makedonian 
standard (c. 14,45g) 
333-323 BCE: Silver 
tetradrachms on the 
Attic standard (c. 
17.20g) 
After three years of maintaining the numismatic 
program of his father, Alexandros reverts to the 
internationally recognized Attic standard. 
There were 26 working mints during his reign to 




Attic standard (c. 
17.20g) 
Philippos continued the minting of Alexandros’ types 
and standard. The local Makedonian standard was 
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